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Foreword

For over 40 years Oscar K. Buros was Director of the Buros Institute of
Mental Measurements and Editor of the Mental Measurements Yearbooks.
He was a crusader, and he devoted his entire career to his crusade. He
was a crusader for better tests and the more effective selection and use of
tests, and he used the Mental Measurements Yearbooks as the principal
instrument in this crusade. Buros passed away in 1978, and his widow,
Luella Buros, worked tirelessly to find a new home for the Institute. As a
result of her efforts the Institute was relocated at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
The new Buros Institute has sponsored an annual symposium called
the Buros-Nebraska Symposium on Measurement and Testing. The
prominence of the name of Buros in the symposium title attests to our
interest in using the symposium as still another vehicle for contributing
to the Buros crusade. There is always the hope the events of the symposium will have some influence on the development of better tests or
the more effective selection and use of tests. At our second symposium,
for example, Dr. Gene Glass, the keynote speaker, emphasized the field
of measurement had become too isolated from its roots in psychology
and had suffered grievously from lack of theoretical relevance to other
fields and from the contributions that other fields could make to its
development. His plea was reminiscent of that made earlier by Anne
Anastasi. The theme for the third Buros-Nebraska symposium might be
said to have taken this lament in the most serious manner possible. As
we planned the third symposium, there were several people in the
planning committee who felt the field of cognitive psychology had done
ix

x

Foreword

much in recent years that had important implications for how and what
we should measure and for the improvement of measurement instruments . And thus was born the theme of our third symposium and the
basis for this third symposium book: The Influence of Cognitive Psychology on Testing.
The development of the theme and plans for this third symposium
and book is an interesting history of the stage-setting influence of the
Buros "crusade" for better tests combined with the search in all of our
symposia for the best ways to improve those tests. It is obviously our
hope that the reader will find the results of this theme development to
be both interesting and illuminating.
James V. Mitchell, Jr.
Director of the Buros Institute of Mental Measurements and
Editor of the Mental Measurements Yearbook

Introduction: The Implications
of Cogn itive Psychology for
Testing

Royce R. Ronning
Jane C. Cono ley
John G. Glover
University of Nebraska

The 1985 Buros-Nebraska Symposium was developed to address the broad issue
of the influence of cognitive psychology on testing and measurement. In the
planning process, four topics were formulated that we asked contributors to
address. The fo llowing four issues provided the focus for the Symposium and
hence for the present volume. We explore:
I. Cognitive psychology as a basis for questioning some of our assumptions
about the nature of mental abilities;
2. The influence of cognitive psychology on test development;
3. Cognitive psychology influences on test validity;
4. Cognitive psychology as a means to provide a linkage between testing and
measurement.

Each contributor, of course, responds to the four issues in a variety of ways
and with differing emphases. Although examination of the chapters reveals all
four issues are at least implicitly touched on, it is clear that issues one, two, and
three were addressed most directly.
Why such a set of symposium themes? The explosive growth of cognitive
psychology since 1950 has been widely noted. Cognitive psychologists claim a
purview far beyond psychometric issues and take as their domain a rather
breathtaking range of topics dealing with human behavior. For example, Donald
Norman (1980) suggests the following range of topics as the domain for cognitive science: belief systems, consciousness, development, emotion, interaction, language, learning, memory, perception, performance, skill and thought.
Psychometric theory and practice are now addressing the need to find methods
for measuring increasingly varied and complex levels of behavior. The breadth

2

RONNING, CONOlEY, GLOVER, AND WITT

of topics cognitive science sets out to address suggests its appropriateness as a
source of information and data for examining such complex behaviors.
In 1984, Robert Sternberg (see Volume I of this series) briefly mentioned his
sense that the boundaries between cognitive psychology and psychometrics are
arbitrary and capricious. However, his description of the basic research strategy
of the cognitive psychologist- intensive examination of performance on the
particular task-suggests an important difference in perspective. It is this difference upon which the present volume capitalizes. Existing psychometric test
development techniques are largely empirical, arising out of a history of test
development dominated by correlational methods. These methods have led to
heavy emphasis on description of tests by factor analytic techniques or examination of predictive validity . Factor analytic studies have resulted in clearer descriptions of the nature of test content and relationships among items within tests.
Predictive validity studies provide an estimate of test value in predicting some
external criterion. Neither perspective, however, provides information leading to
clearer descriptions of the specific human behaviors upon which successful test
performance is based .
In the same chapter Sternberg described the range of cognitive tasks studied
by cognitive psychologists. He recognized that most of these tasks have not been
used to predict conventional psychometric criteria such as grades. Nonetheless,
substantial progress has been made in use of relatively novel tasks to predict
general, as well as crystalized and fluid intelligence. This effort was only briefly
addressed by Sternberg (1984). If a comprehensive picture of the contributions of
cognitive psychology to the testing movement is to be understood and appreciated, a more substantial development of the four themes mentioned earlier must
be provided.
At the same time that cognitive psychology has been expanding its contributions to issues close to those traditionally deemed psychometric, increasing demands have been placed upon the test movement to develop instruments that
assess more complex levels of knowledge and performance . Glass (1986), in the
second Buros Symposium volume , roundly criticized the current state of psychometric theory and practice. He asserted that beginning in about 1940 psychometrics began to move away from psychology and that by the 1960s, " ... testing in psychology and education was severed from its roots in the study of human
behavior" (p. 13). Others, (e.g., Glaser, 1981 , and Hawkins, 1977) criticize
extant tests for their lack of value in helping educators decide how children
should be educated. Such criticisms, coupled with the press for increased sensitivity to assessment issues in testing groups such as ethnic minorities, women,
and the varieties of disabled persons, lead to the realization that current psychometric theory and practice is inadequate to meet such varied demands. While
Glass pressed the field of psychometrics to meet the challenge of psychoanalytic
psychology, others, (Anastasi, 1967) have raised the issue more generally. Can
testing methods be developed that appraise performance in such a way that test
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givers may not only make selection decisions, but also acquire information basic
to developing methods to help educators facilitate change in individuals and
groups? Can cognitive psychologists provide descriptions of the structure of
human information processing in ways that permit improved test construction as
well as, ultimately, improved methods of education?
What is the current status of attempts to use "cognitive" tasks and cognitive
research methods to assess performance in so-called "achievement" areas such
as reading and writing? Are there upper limits to the information that these
"new" methods can give us? Following the logic of Gene Glass, it seems clear
that new conceptions of assessment are required, assessments that not only lead
to improved selection decisions, but that also directly inform practice. Cognitive
psychology may provide one source of ideas for these new assessment methods.
However, differences in goals between psychometricians and cognitive psychologists may mask the significance of the information cognitive psychology can
supply to performance appraisal. For example, concerns for selection and classification on the part of psychometrists may conflict with cognitive psychologist's
desire to examine the processes humans use in responding to both simple and
complex stimuli.
The present volume, then, represents an approach to measurement from a
cognitive perspective. The rather varied chapters provide perspectives on the role
cognitive psychology may play in developing means for both understanding and
assessing human behavior. Taken together , they suggest the potential for fruitful
collaborative work between psychometricians and cognitive psychologists .

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Part I: The Cognitive-Psychometric Connection
The boundaries between cognitive psychology and psychometrics are not clear.
The three approaches taken by the chapter writers in this section demonstrate the
fuzziness of the distinction . Hunt, as well as G laser. Lesgold. and Lajoie address
the distinction by directly examining potcntial situations where the measure ment
issues and cognitive issues impingc upon each other. .Jensen . on the other hand .
addresses a larger issue, thc cxtent to which human performance may. or shou ld
be, explained at a physiological rather than a psychological level.
In the second chapter, thc initial conference presentation. Professor Earl Hunt
re-examines the issue Cronbach raised in his 1957 American Psychological Association presidential address: thc nccd to unite expcrimenta l and correlational
approaches to understand human behavior. Hunt's chapter, "Science , Technology , and Intelligence, " demonstrates that at some levels such unification has
already taken place, (i .e., some cognitive experimental approaches now are
studying individual differences in process behaviors , while some individual dif-
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ference approaches are concerned with process issues). At the same time , Hunt
describes situations where the "costs," financial and otherwise, of measuring
specific cognitive behav iors in situation specific settings may be hi gher than
psychometric consumers are willing to pay . He also points out that current
pschometric devices meet criteria of financial cost and prediction to certain
settings , such as educational success, remarkably well.
Finally, Hunt rephrases the issue in a more complex way by questioning the
appropriateness of a union of the two camps at a level where one might wish to
" . . derive the dimensions of psychometric Euclidean representation of abilities
from an underlying process theory. " Hunt' s question does not suggest that either
approach is correct or incorrect, but rather that each was devised to answer
different questions. Thus, the one approach deals with legitimate and important
issues of prediction and classification while the other deals with the significant
task of understanding cognitive performance in a wide variety of domain s. In
effect, Hunt seems to suggest a symbioti c relationship rather than a synthes is of
approaches . This somewhat less positive view of the relationship between the
two approaches is not shared by the writers of chapter three.
In chapter 3, "Toward a Cognitive Theory for the Measurement of Achievement, ,, Professors Glaser, Lesgold, and Lajoie consider the division between
psychometric and cognitive approaches from the perspective of the psychologically oriented practitioner-educator. They describe the strengths of the psychometric approach in areas of aptitude testing and selection, while stressing its
weakness in providing an understanding of instructional and learning processes .
Because typical achievement measures fail to provide an understanding of process, Glaser et aI., report on progress in developing means for appraising knowledge structures and cognitive processes underlying differenti al performance in
specific fields or domains of study .
Although admitting that knowledge of such structures and processes is limited, the authors assert that new perspectives in achievement testing will grow
from the study of cognitive processes in learning and development examined in
the context of instructional method. The use of the computer as a tool to provide
intelligent , responsive tutoring systems illustrates, they believe, one technique
that will not only gather psychometric data on learner behavior, but will also
permit compari son of novice learner behavior to that of experts, thus permitting
examination of process data . Knowledge obtained through use of computers to
retain task processes permits assessment of present level attainme nt , and in
addition , reveals forms of error, gaps in know ledge, etc., that require instructional attention.
The chapter concludes with identification of a set of dimensions that present
components of achievement competency developed over time. The eight dimensions, knowledge organization and structure, depth of problem representation ,
quality of mental models, efficiency of procedures, automatic ity, procedurali zed
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know ledge, and procedures fo r theory change and metacognitive sk ills, provide a
fres h perspective from which to examine traditional achievement assessment. In
contrast to Hunt , Glaser et al. express considerable optimism for the value of
cognitive approaches in broadening the instrumentation through which achievement behaviors are assessed.
In chapter 4 , " The g Beyond Factor Analysis," Professor Jensen describes a
process that may help us to understand cognitive and psychometric issues by
considering them as subprocesses of a more fund amental process. He examines
the problem of the basis of intelligent performance from examination of the g
factor derived from factor analyses of a wide variety of psychometric and cogniti ve tasks. In contrast to the preceding chapters, Jensen presents an argument
for expl anation of behavior at the level of biological rather than psychological
constructs.
In a carefull y developed argument , Jensen deals with three increas ingly complex issues: (1) He attempts to demonstrate that g is a stable entity and not a
statistical artifac t; (2) He builds a case that g carries the bulk of the reliable
variance in intelligence (and by extension in many other "cognitive" tasks) in a
way suggesting a biological basis fo r g leading him to conclude that the most
vi able expl anation for g will be fo und not in psychological but " . . . in genuinely physiological terms." Thi s argument , whether in the fin al analysis correct
or incorrect, fo rmulates the issue of understanding intelligence in such a way that
in the words of a reviewer, it " . .. will occupy researchers in intelligence for
the next decade or longer. " Clearl y an argument leading to such a strongly
biological conclusion will spark substanti al interest to both psychometricians and
cognitive theorists.

Part II. Cogn itive Approaches to Psychometric Issues :
Applications
Part II gives the reader a perspective on the success of current attempts to use
cognitive approaches in understanding "standard " achievement areas such as
reading and writing. The reader is invited to consider the adequacy of present
explanations based on cognitive analyses for describing both process and outcome of such complex tasks as reading and writing. At the same time, one may
reasonably question the applicability of existing cognitive research techniques to
issues of understanding domains typically measured by conventional psychometric devices. The degree of care necessary to adapt cognitive techniques to the
understanding of complex tasks is also delineated.
In chapter 5, " The Assess ment of Cognitive Factors in Acade mic Abilities,"
Professors Benton and Kiewra li st a series of interrelated cogniti ve fac tors that
appear to contribute to successful scholastic achievement. These factors, declarative and procedural knowledge, control processes, and cognitive and meta-
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cognitive strategies are assumed to underlie successful performance in subject
domain areas such as reading, writing, mathematics, and science. Cognitive
research in several domain areas is outlined in considerable detail. Research
support for the usefulness of the cognitive perspective is described and an assessment of its present status is attempted.
Benton and Kiewra examine research and theory in the subject matter domains based in cognitive psychology . To the psychometrician, the extent and
size of this literature may be surprising. Their review suggests a significant new
direction in cognition is the study of complex processes necessary for success in
domain specific areas. Such an examination seems fruitful not only in confirming
cognitive principles derived from simpler and perhaps more artificial laboratory
tasks, but in discovering additional principles growing out of the interactions
observed when domain specific knowledge , such as skill in geometry, is acquired using more general cognitive skills.
Professor Ericsson's chapter, "Theoretical Implications from Protocol Analysis on Testing and Measurement," takes a technique associated with the study of
complex problem solving, protocol analysis, and builds a carefu l, logical argument for the value of the technique in illuminating the nature of the problemsolving process. He documents the value of protocol analysis as a particu larly
useful technique to provide psychometricians with descriptions of the nature of
the cognitive processes required for successful performance on a psychometric
test. This information differs widely from that gained through examination of the
psychometric structure of a test using statistical procedures such as factor
analysis.
Ericsson's descriptions of existing research and theory in protocol analysis
provide convincing support for the value of verbal reports to the psychometrist.
Analysis of the verbal reports made while carrying out such diverse activities as
algebra, spatial ability, and digit-span memory tasks reveal the flexibility and
usefulness of protocol analysis techniques in adding to our understanding of how
subjects solve problems. Of equal importance, are the implications this approach
has on test construction .
Part III. Methodological Issues

The last section of the volume reminds the reader of the gap between theory and
practice . In both chapters, the writers raise, directly or indirectly, issues of
methodology and definition. The optimism Glaser et al. express about the potential of studies of cognitive process to inform practice must be tempered by
recognition of the need to find means to choose among the many competing
models in cognitive psychology . Similarly, those cognitive or psychometric
theorists who desire to understand cognitive behaviors that may underlie expression of some ability must have a very clear sense of how the ability is to be
defined. Thus, if we wish to examine verbal abi lity, we need to determine
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precisely what we mean by the term before we can hope to successfuly discover
underlying processes that lead to performance reflecting degrees of that ability .
The extensive research and theoretical activity occurring in cognitive psychology has resulted in the generation of a large number of competing models of
cognitive structure and process. In chapter 7, "Structure and Process in Cognitive Psychology Using Multidimensional Scaling and Related Techniques,"
Professors Shoben and Ross present a rationale and a number of research examples suggesting the use of multidimensional scaling (MDS) as a method to
provide a basis for choice among competing models. When a structure or model
is assumed to vary across individuals, such methods of providing constraint in
choice are valuable to psychometricians as well as to cognitive psychologists . As
is the case when dealing with many methodological approaches, the method by
no means provides final answers to the choices among structures cognitive psychologists face. Yet, Shoben and Ross nicely demonstrate the value of MDS
techniques in providing as clear a set of constraints as is consistent with the level
of development of cognitive psychology.
The final chapter in the volume, "New Perspectives in the Analysis of Abilities," returns to a somewhat more psychometric approach. Professor Carroll
attacks the problem of definition of specific abilities by providing empirical data
on a seemingly simple aptitude, human pitch discrimination. Carroll examined
data on a large number of college students, looking particularly at differences
between successful and less successful performance . His psychometric approach, examination of high and low scores, contrasts to the protocol approach
described by Ericcson . Thus Carroll wishes to examine performance by analysis
of scores of persons performing well or poorly on the pitch discrimination task.
From Ericsson's perspective one might attempt to find a way to permit subjects
carrying out pitch discrimination tasks to describe the process they use to make
difficult pitch discriminations. His examination of high and low scores revealed
the seemingly obvious finding that difficulty on the task was dependent upon the
size of the pitch difference between two tones . High abi lity individuals have
smaller pitch difference thresholds than less able persons .
Generalizing this finding to all aptitudes, Carroll argues that one definition of
ability is the difference in individual thresholds of that abi lity. Carroll supports
his case with several other examples. While he does not make the argument, a
clear implication for the cognitive psychologist is the need to study the basis for
the empirical finding. To what process(es) do we attribute the differential difficulty ? Carroll provides an example of a Block Counting test used to study
development of spatial ability. He identifies the chief source of difficulty as that
of "visualization." A study (through protocol analysis) of the procedures subjects use to attempt that visualization might provide an interesting addition to
Carroll 's approach. Yet his argument is clear: In order to describe the process
used in carrying out an act representative of some ability , the description is only
useful if the ability is very clear and tightly described.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Demands by consumers for increasingly valid assessments of performance in a
wide set of arenas pose a continuing challenge to test constructors. Some psychometricians argue that sophisticated measurement techniques have extracted as
much useful information as exists from existing psychometric instruments. If
these experts are correct, the demand for increased test validity cannot be met
with existing instruments or measurement techniques.
Cognitive psychology appears to offer an attractive alternative to meet consumer demands. Cognitive theory has spawned a variety of theories of complex
human intellective functioning moving beyond the study of purely laboratory
tasks to the study of real world performance in activities that are significant to
consumers. This volume demonstrates , we believe , the presence of a considerable body of theory and data about human cognitive processes valuable in meeting consumer concerns. Combined efforts of cognitive psychologists and psychometricians may well result not only in new tests and testing formats but
substantially different conceptions of scoring and test use.
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THE COGNITIVEPSYCHOMETRIC
CONNECTION

Science, Technology, and
Intelligence'

Earl Hunt
The University of Washington

The intelligence test has been cited as psychology's most important technological
contribution to society. Whether this is good or ill can be debated (Eysenck,
1979; Gould, 1981; Herrnstein, 1971; Kamin, 1974). Certain facts are not really
subject to debate . Psychologists can and have developed "standardized interviews" that, on a population basis, provide a cost effective technique for personnel classification in industrial, military, and some government settings. However, the tests are very far from perfect indicators. Validity coefficients between
tests and performance ratings typically range in the .3 to .5 range (i.e. , from 10
to 25% of the variance in performance is predictable from test scores). While
such correlations may be high enough to justify testing in many situations, there
is a nagging feeling that better tests can be found .
The popular view is that a technology must be rooted in a science; in this case
psychological tests must be rooted in a science of mental competence. In fact, the
situation is not quite that simple. Psychology has two distinct sciences of mental
power. One, the psychometric study of intelligence (hencefOith psychometrics),
(2) is closely interwined with the development of testing itself. The other tradition , Cognitive Psychology, has historically stood apart from the study of individual differences. Yet, both study the human mind, in the human brain.
A number of years ago Cronbach (1957) urged psychologists to unite these
two disciplines. At one level the uniting took place. Cognitive psychologists do

IThe term " psychometrics" will be used throughout this paper to refer to the psychological
theories of mental competence that have been deve loped by applying correlational analysis methods
to test scores . The alternative meaning of psychometrics , as a branch of applied mathematics, will not
be used.
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look at individual vari ations, and the techniques of Cognitive Psychology are
used to study indi vidual di ffe rences. The resulting research , however, has had
rather little influence on the technology of testing . Is this because there is always
too long a lag between science and technology? Or is there a deeper reason? And
if there is a deeper reason , is there cause fo r al arm ? Should something be done to
accelerate the application of new scientific findings to psychologica l technology?
These questions are particul arly apt today because Cognitive Psychology and
a group of related disciplines, collectively called the "Cognitive Sciences," are
perceived as being extreme ly active intellectually. This is in marked contrast to
psychometrics, where the questions currentl y being debated are not terribl y
different from those that were debated over 50 years ago (Hunt , 1986a). Interest
in the technological potential of the Cognitive Sciences has been expressed at as
high a level as the Offi ce of the Pres ident of the United States (Holden , 1984) .
The interest in Cognitive Science has a strong technological bias. It is hoped that
advances in the study o f laws of cognition will lead to the deve lopment of a
technology of intelligent devices. These devices may expand the power of human
intelligence . They may also expand the effi ciency of our society 's very large
program of form al education , which is perceived as having substantial defects. It
is log ical to believe that the development of better methods to improve mental
competence will be closely linked to better methods of evaluating competence.
This view may be too optimi stic. The current fervor in the Cognitive Sciences
is based on real changes in our views of the mind . However, these changes are
derived fro m theories about cognition that are almost intellectuall y orthogonal to
psychometric theories of intelligence on which modern intelli gence testing is
founded . Previous writers have urged that psychometricians and experimental
psychologists unite in their study of the mind (Cronbach , 1957; R . J. Sternberg,
1977a, b; Underwood , 1975). They have proposed that the personal ability measurements of the psychometricians be added to the des ign vari ables manipulated
by the experimentali sts, so that the interactions between the two could be studied . This logic is epitomized by the phrase "aptitude x treatment interaction. "
The same logic is found , slightl y muted , in studies of cognitive correlates between psychometric and Cogniti ve Sc ience measures (Pe llegrino & G laser,
1979) . In both cases there is an implicit ass umption that di scovering the correlations between measures that have been developed in different inte llectual traditions will fu rther our understanding in both fi elds. In thi s paper some questions
are raised about the approach. T wo traditio ns can seldom be rammed together by
statistics. What is required is a theoretical synthes is that fu ses the m . If the
synthes is cannot be made the theories will probably co-ex ist, each covering
slightly different do mains.
Is the synthes is on the separate theory approach appropriate fo r the study of
individual di ffe rences in cognition? Thi s question can be only answered by
considering the present status of the psychometric and Cognitive Science views
of the mind , and asking whether they are compatible. Thi s question is explored
below. The sort of answer to be expected should be made clear. It is not a
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question of one approach being right and one being wrong . Neither is it a
question of technology versus science. The question is whether psychometrics
and cognitive science can be synthesized into a single view. If they can, then the
technology can be developed from a uniform scientific basis. If Cronbach's two
"camps of scientific psychology" are inevitably separate camps each may develop its own technology, which may be useful for different purposes.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY
Since its inception psychometrics has been beholden to technology. Where
would test theory be without the number 2 lead pencil, the mark sense form, and
the calculating machine? The digital computer, which came somewhat later,
really did little more than cement intellectual trends that had already developed in
response to what, collectively, will be called the' 'paper and pencil technology."
The paper and pencil technology made it easy to record the products of
cognition. Note the stress on product. The paper and pencil technology is at its
best when large numbers of fairly short questions are presented and when the
respondent must choose from a fixed set of alternatives. The paper and pencil
technology is not well suited to recording how a person chooses the answers, and
is worse suited for situations in which free form responding is required. Perhaps
most important, the paper and pencil technology emphasizes counting the total
number of correct items or, in more recent applications, determining the most
difficult item that a person can consistently answer correctly. Thus, the conditions of the measurement procedure rule out observation of some psychologically
interesting behavior, and no amount of theorizing can put them back in.
The paper and pencil testing process has also been influenced by the economic
constraints imposed on personnel evaluation, largely in military and educational
settings. Because the test has been thought of as a one-time only measure on
which to base a long term prediction of a vaguely specified criterion, great stress
has been laid on measuring traits that are stable over repeated test administrations . Indeed, in many discussions of testing the correlations between test scores
taken at different times are regarded as measures of test reliability rather than as
measures of the stability of the examinee's ability to do whatever the test
requires.
These are reasonable strategies if the goal of prediction is accepted. The
decision to concentrate on stable mental traits does , however, rule out of consideration broad classes of behavior that could be considered part of intelligence. In
particular, measures of learning and of individual variability of performance will
not be measured . However, learning and personal stability could easily be regarded as part of a person's mental competence.
While any testing technology will be appropriate for some behavior and not
for others , the very success of paper and pencil testing has made its shortcomings
unusually serious. The behaviors measured on the tests have become the accept-
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ed definition of intelligence. The extent of this belief has been shown by reactions to some of the attempts that experimental psychologists have made to
establish theories of individual differences in cognition. Although these attempts
proceed from a very different tradition, and although atempts to reproduce correlations with traditional tests were specifically disavowed in one of the earliest
papers on these attempts (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973) people still evaluate
both their own (Keating, 1984) and other's (R. J . Sternberg, 1984, but for a more
balanced view see R. J . Sternberg, 1985) work in terms of correlations with
existing tests.
The paper and pencil technology has led to a particular type of theorizing. The
volume of data produced by giving batteries of tests to large numbers of people
has forced psychometricians to develop sophisticated statistical procedures for
data summarization and analysis. The natural way to represent a person' s test
scores is by a vector, and the natural way to summarize a vector is by a smaller
vector. Hence factor analysis, the art of extracting the small factor score vector
from the bewilderingly large vectors of test scores. The summary is well defined
mathematically . A person's abilities are represented by a point in a Euclidean
space of " mental abilities." The point is then mapped on a line representing the
(usually vaguely defined) ultimate criteria. As shown in Fig. 2.1, this is a
perfectly respectable way of making classification decisions .
The Euclidean representation has been used as a psychological theory of
intelligence, by interpreting the dimensions of the Euclidean space as basic
mental traits. The method is well known , so no further description is needed
here. (See Nunnaly, 1978, for a good introduction .) This is where the problem
lies. Factor analytic based theories do not provide an adequate conceptual basis
for thinking about individual differences in mental competence, except for the
restricted purpose of classification . Why is this?

ACCEPT
SPATJ AL
ABILITY

PRED I ClEO
JOB
PERFORMANCE

*- - - - --7

VERBAL

REJECT

AB I LI n

FIG. 2.1. The Euclidean mode l of me ntal ab ility . A person is conceptualized as
a point in a space of spatial and verbal menta l traits. Each point on the space can be
mapped into an acceptance or rejection interva l on a one-d imensional criteri on
variable .
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The usual objection to factor analytic theories is that the factor analysis as a
mathematical procedure does not lead to a unique Euclidean representation of the
data. Therefore subsidiary mathematical assumptions are made that, in effect,
dictate the psychological theory to be accepted (Gould, 1981). The biggest
argument is over whether one should insist that the dimensions, when interpreted
as traits, be mathematically orthogonal. The argument is not trivial, because the
orthogonality requirement mathematically precludes the discovery of separate
but correlated psychological traits. This and similar indeterminancies in the
mathematical solutions to the data analysis problem set the stage for a confusing
play of empirical observations. Different investigators applied different mathematical techniques to different data sets; producing a variety of claims for models
that vary from Spearman's (1927) classic "general" theory of intelligence
through hierarchial model of "general intelligence" of varying degrees, and
finally to the orthogonal specific abilities models exposed by Thurstone (1938)
and Guilford (1967) .
The trees may have obscured the forest. Carroll (1984) has done the field a
considerable service by applying consistent factor analytic procedures to some of
the major data sets reported in the literature. In it's simplest form, what Carroll
found is that most of these data sets can be fit by a " hierarchial general factor "
model of human abilities. Examples of such models are those espoused by Cattell
and Horn (Cattell, 1971; Horn & Donaldson, 1980) or by Vernon (1961). The
Cattell-Horn model seems to be the most accurate. It assumes that there are three
major classes of abilities. These are the "crystallized," and usually highly
verbal, ability to apply previously learned solutions to current problems (Gc), the
"fluid intelligence" ability to apply general problem solving methods to new
situations (Gf), and a "visualization" ability to deal with problems involving
visual-spatial relations (Gv). (There is some evidence for an analagous ability to
deal with auditory relations [Stankov & Horn , 1980]) . There is ample evidence
that these abilities are distinct, although Gc and Gf are correlated in most
populations.
One of the most encouraging things about the Cattell-Horn model is that it fits
reasonably well with neuropsychological analyses of brain function. These analyses are based on quite different sorts of observations about cognition; extensive
examinations of pathological cases . The match is particularly strong for Gv and
for Gc, interpreted as verbal ability, for there is massive evidence that spatialvisual and verbal information processing take place in different physical locations in the brain (Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). There is also some evidence for
selective forebrain involvement in the sorts of planning functions that appear to
be involved in the ability to plan and coordinate activities . At least superficially
this sounds like Gf, although it should be realized that the sorts of failures of
planning described for frontal lobe patients are much more extreme than those
associated with low Gf.
In summary, hierarchial models provide good summaries of the abilities
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tapped by paper and pencil testing. To a limited extent, we can make a guess
about where some of the information processing that underlies the tr~its identified in the models takes place in the brain. Clearly there is some reality to the
model, as a Euclidean description of human abilities . The problem is that it is
difficult to go further with any Euclidean model of cognition, because such
models provide relative descriptions of the products of thought without any
commitment to a model of the process of thinking.
Since this point is crucial, a hypothetical illustration will be given. Consider
the task of predicting how a person might perform on a test paragraph comprehension. A psychometrician could predict the total test score, by using a
formu la something like:
Predicted test score = a x (Examinee's Gf trait score)
+ b x (Examinee's Gc trait score),

where a and b are appropriately valued coefficients . But this predicts how well
the person will perform, not how.
To describe performance on the test one has to have a model of how a person
merges his or her general knowledge with the information in the text, in order to
construct a representation of the information in the paragraph , and then one has
to have a model of how the examinee interprets questions and interrogates the
internal representation of the text. These models deal with processes , not relative
outcomes .
Psychometricians are certainly aware of this problem . Their approach has
been to examine tests that appear, by mathematical criteria, to be relatively pure
tests of a trait. The hope is that an examination of such tests will lead to a better
understanding of what the trait means. This has worked relatively well for
spatial-visual reasoning (Gv), which seems to be composed of several definable
actions; holding bits of visual images in one's head, and moving images about
"in the mind's eye" (Lohman, 1979; McGee, 1979) . The approach has worked
much less well in the case of the more general "crystallized" and "fl uid "
intelligence traits. The relevant findings are very well summarized by recent
work by Snow and his colleagues (Marshalak, Snow, & Lohman, 1984; Snow,
1986). They used multidimensional scaling methods to construct a space of
various tests in which distances between tests approximated correlations between
them. Hence tests that define a factor will be grouped in tight clusters . A graphic
summary of some of their results is shown in Fig. 2.2. As the figure shows, there
are clusters that define the Gf and Gc factors. However the tests in these clusters
tend to be complex ones. Therefore people differ in their interpretation of the
behavioral capabilities needed to attack them. The well known Raven Progressive Matrix test (Raven, 1965), which is widely regarded as a good Gf
measure, is a good example. The test contains problems that yield to several
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FIG. 2.2. An abstracti on of the two dimensional space of mental tests developed
by Marshalek, S now, and Lohman (1 983) . Tests were located by a multidimensional scaling in which the distance between tests in the space is roughly proportional to the correlation between them; the higher the corre lation the less the
distance between test points. Some of the tests shown in thi s figure are I-Raven
Matrices, 2-Letter Series, 3-Hidden Figures, 4- Paper Form Board , S-Object Assembly , 6-Yocabulary , 7-lnformation, 8-Comprehension of verbal statements, 9Arithmetic problem solving, IO-Digit span, and I I-Locating A 's in a line of tex t.
Three groups of tests are shown , corresponding to fluid inte lligence (GF),
crystalli zed intelligence (GC), and visualization (G Y).

alternative strategies, each of which utilizes distinct elementary processing steps
(Hunt , 1974' . Therefore one cannot eas ily summarize the processes that the
Raven Matrix test tests. A summary that one person finds adequate will displease
another , and there is no way to resolve the issue .
R. J. Sternberg (J977a, b) has developed an alternative approach to the problem of definition of what a trait means. The technique is called "component
analysis. " One assumes that an examinee's overall test performance can be
broken down into components, where a component is defined as a process that
begins with a defined input from previous components and ends with a defin ed
output to be delivered to the next component in line . Consider analogy tests.
Each item is of the form
" A is to Bas C is to DI , D2, D3, D4"
e.g.,
" Cat is to Dog as Wolf is to (Lion, Giraffe, Elephant , Penguin)"

Such a problem can be solved in the following steps.
I . Code the meaning of the terms.
2. Establish the relati on between the A and B terms.
3. Appl y that relati on to map from the C term into an ideal answer.
4 . Locate that answer amongst the D terms th at most closely approximates the
ideal answer.
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The time required to answer a test item is assumed to be a linear function of the
time required to execute each component process, plus a "junk" term representing "all other processes involved." A similar model can be constructed for
estimating the probability of producing the correct answer as a function of the
probability of correctly executing each component process. A person's ability to
execute individual components can be estimated in two ways; by designing
modified test items that isolate one of the components (as was done in Sternberg's original work) or by constructing a factorial experiment in which the
experimental variables are chosen to modify the difficulty of one and only one of
the component processes (e.g., Pellegrino & Kail, 1982).
Componential analyses can produce very accurate partitions of variation in
performance on different problems within a particular type of test, averaged
across individuals . On the other hand, no one of the component process measures
seems to account for very much of the variance in inter-individual test performance. The "junk" parameter, which represents "encoding plus everything
else" is consistently the most accurate estimate of general performance in other
areas. This is disconcerting, for the processes contributing to the junk parameter
are not defined by the experimental variations . As a result , componential analysis does provide a better idea of what behaviors are required to take a conventional test, but componential analysis has not related these behaviors to a theory
of cognition, nor has it explained why some tests work as predictors in some
situations.
The criticisms that have been directed at the hierarchial model are not specific
to it. They can be directed at any trait theory of cognition. This does not mean
that trait theories are false, just that they have inherent deficiencies. Can these
deficiencies be remedied by combining psychometrics with cognitive psychology? To answer this question, let us take a look at the Cognitive Psychology
view.

THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH

Cognitive psychology is based on an approach to the mind that is markedly
different from the Euclidean representation approach taken by psychometrics.
The modern (post 1970) approach has been strongly influenced by a variety of
other disciplines , notably by linguistics, neuropsychology , artificial intelligence,
psychology, and to a lesser extent cultural anthropology. These branches of each
of these disciplines that are concerned with thinking have come to be referred to,
collectively, as the ' 'Cognitive Sciences." This is an umbrella term for a collective movement toward the development of a unified theory of mind rather than to
multiple, discipline-specific models . Since modern cognitive psychology is best
underscored as part of this movement a few words about it are in order. The basic
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ass umption of the cognitive sciences is that there are laws that govern physical
symbol manipulating systems, somewhat akin to laws that govern physical phenomena. At a very general level, Shannon & Weaver's (1 949) theory of info rmation transmission would be an example of such a law . The term " physical
symbol manipulating system" is important. The cognitive science approach
ass umes cognition is achieved by the manipulation of symbols that represent
some external world . However the act of symbol manipulation requires some sort
of physical system. What cognitive science studies is the restraints placed on
symbol manipulation by the nature of the external world being represented , by
the nature of symbol manipulation itself, and by the physical character of the
system doing the manipulation.
Pylyshyn (1 983) has identified three levels of cognitive science studies. The
first is the study of the influence of physical mechanisms upon cognitive processing. This can be done by analyzing the one device that we know is capable of
thought; the mammalian brain . The cognitive and neurosciences merge here. A
complementary approach is to analyze the performance of hypothetical phys ical
devices, to see if they could perform the computations that are required to
achieve certain cognitive actions. Examples of such work are the study of the
learni ng and memory capacities of networks of idealized, neuron-like devices
(Hinton & Anderson , 198 1; Minsky & Papert, 1969) and analyses of the networks that can realize computations required in vision (Marr, 1982).
Pylyshyns's second level of cognitive science research deals with pure symbolic process ing capabilities defined without concern for the external referents of
the symbols being processed . An example would be the well known studies of
the scanning of info rmation in short-term memory (S. Sternberg, 1969, 1975) or
studies of the process of moving visual images " in the mind 's eye" (S hepard &
Cooper, 1982).
At the highest level are studies of thought processes that are controlled by
people's understanding of the referents of symbolic process ing . Examples of
work at thi s level are studies of problem solving and text comprehension. Johnson-Laird (1 983) has described this leve l of research as research on the mental
models that people construct and manipulate in the course of proble m solving.
For brevity let us refer to these levels as the phys ical, information processing,
and referential levels of cognition. C learl y the phys ical level is the most concrete, fo r an action of the mind must ultimately be an action of the brain . The
referential level is what we normall y think of as consc ious thought. T he most
abstract of the three levels is the in formation process ing level. Py lyshyn presented the levels as analogically simil ar to the stud y of computer circuitry, system
design, and programs within computer sc ience . A related , and perhaps somewhat
clearer, analogy is to think of studies at the phys ical (brain) level in humans as
being analogous to the study of computer hardware, studies at the representationa I level as being analagous to the stud y of the actions of particul ar programs,
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and studies at the information process ing level as being analagous to studies of
the operations permitted in a computer language in whi ch the representational
" programs" are written.
To provide a more specific illustration, consider the study of human verbal
comprehension. At the physical level there have been numerous studies showing
that language process ing in the brain takes place largely in the left hemisphere
(Kolb & Whishaw , 1980) . At the representational level we find studies of how
the info rmation people extract from a text is influenced by their level of knowledge of the topic, the text, and their beliefs about the use they will have to make
of the text-based information (Johnson & Kieras, 1983; Chiesi, Spillich, & Voss,
1979) .
The information processing level is the hardest level to define , because it
refers to processes rather than to phys ical structures, but the processes are not
open to conscious inspection. Continuing the analogy to computation , unraveling
the information processing elements of cognition is a bit like attempting to infer
the basic operations of a computer programming language by observing the
performance of programs written in that language. The problem can be illustrated
by considering the logic of the sentence veriftcation paradigm developed by
Clark and Chase ( 1972) . This procedure will be considered in some detail because it has been the vehicle for a reasonable amount of research on individual
differences. The procedure is shown in Fig . 2.3.
First a simple sentence is shown. The sentence is followed by a picture. The
participant must indicate whether or not the sentence correctly describes the
picture. Since errors are infrequent , the dependent vari ables are the time a person
requires to comprehend the sentence ("comprehension time" ) and the time
required to determine whether or not the sentence correctly describes the picture
( " verification time ") . These can be altered by varying the truth value and
syntactic-semantic form of the sentence. For instance , it takes longer to verify
negations than affirmations ( "Plus above star" versus " Plus not above star ")
and longer to veri fy sentences containing marked terms (" below") than unmarked ones ("above" ). The time required to carry out bas ic steps in linguistic

PL US NO T ABOV E STAR
(RE SPON SE)

*

+

(RESPO NSE )

FIG. 2.3. T he Se ntencc Ve rification paradi gm. A phrase is disp layed.
When the parti cipant indicatcs that
the phrase is undcrstood thc pi cture is
di splayed. The participant thcn determines whcther or not the phrase correc tl y desc ri bed the pi cture . The dependent variables are the times
between phrase display and co mprehension (comprehension time)
and pi cture di splay and ve rifi cati on
(verificati on time).
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information steps can be measured by observing how verification times change
when sentence forms are altered systematically. The logic can be extended to
individual difference research by determining how (or whether) the time required
to execute a specific lingui stic process varies across people .
Harking back to my earlier di scussion of Psychometrics, two major differences between the cognitive psychology and the psychometric approaches are
apparent. Both are particularly striking in studies at the information processing
and representational level. Cognitive psychology is 'interested in the process of
cognition , rather than the product. Thi s can be seen in the studies of verbal
comprehension just described , where the emphas is is on building a model of how
a linguistic statement is understood , rather than on specifying how likely a
person is to understand an arbitrary statement. The second diffe rence, which
follow s from the first, is that a cognitive psychology theory of individual differences must fit into a process model of the cognitive action being studied . The
cognitive psychologist is not particularl y interested in determining the dimensions of the Euclidean space adequate to describe individual's ability , relative to
each other. The cognitive psychologist is interested in knowing how variables
related to the individual impinge upon the process of that individual' s cognition.
This can be illustrated by looking at a series of studies on the role of shortterm memory in reading. There is a positive correlation between measures of
memory span and scores on omnibus written tests of verbal ability (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980; Palmer, MacLeod , Hunt , & Davidson, 1985 ). Daneman and
her colleagues (reviewed in Daneman, 1984) asked why this is so. First it was
shown that higher correlations can be achieved if the measure of memory span is
one that directly refl ects the ability to hold information in memory while processing intervening linguistic statements, rather than one that reflects the " pass ive"
capacity to hold words in memory without doing some intervening activity . (The
memory span subjects of most intelligence batteries are of the latter sort.) Next,
it was shown that the ability to hold information in memory exerts its effect on
certain steps in linguisti c process ing, such as the ability to resolve anaphoric
references or to recall previously presented information when some reference to
it is required. Instead of stopping with the observation that reading comprehension and short-term memory tests load on the same fac tor , Daneman and her
colleagues examined the process of reading in order to determine what produced
the loading.
Because the emphasis of cognitive psychology is on process , experimenters
try to construct laboratory situations that isolate process . A cognitive psychologist may find performance in an isolated situation extremely interesting, on
theoretical grounds, even though that isolated situation does not draw upon
behaviors th at are called upon a great deal in the everyday world . Prediction is
not the point.
Measures of individual di fferences that relate to a theory of process are always
of interest, in the framework of that theory, even though variations in the mea-
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sures may not be highly related to variations in performance in any important
socioeconomic activity. Indeed, from a theoretical view some of the most important measures on an individual may be those measures that reflect constancies.
Years ago, Miller (1956) observed that there is very little absolute variation in
the human abilities to make perceptual judgments and to hold information in
short-term memory. The importance of these constancies for perception and
language comprehension is immense. Yet measures with low variability are not
good predictors.
Given the difference in philosophy, it is not clear that cognitive psychology
and psychometrics can be united. On the other hand, it is not clear that they
cannot. The problems are somewhat different at each of Pylyshyn's three levels
of the study of the mind.
The functioning of the mind depends on the functioning of the brain, so
questions about the relation between brain processes and mental processes are of
interest. The famous issue of hemispheric localization of function is an example.
So are studies of the influence of specific chemicals upon mental functioning;
e.g., the role of alcoholic intoxication upon memory. A great deal of technological development has gone into the construction of measures of functioning
of the physical brain, ranging from neuropsychological observations of behavior
to such exotica as tomographic scans (Mazziotta, Phelps, Carson, & Kuhl ,
1982). The technology provides an excellent way to study two things; the general
physical substrate of the normal mind and aberrations in mind that are produced
by specific, usually physical alterations in the brain.
The fact that the dimensions of individual variation uncovered by psychometrics do map reasonably well upon the brain functions discovered by neuropsychology is an important observation. The neuropsychological observations
are almost all based on the study of extreme cases, while the psychometric data
rests very largely upon the study of normal variation in mental competence
within a normal population . This suggests that there are sufficient differences in
brain functioning in the normal population to make a difference in at least some
of our behaviors, specifically those actions required by a conventional aptitude
test. In terms of the Euclidean representation of the psychometrician, the question is whether or not measures of brain functioning are sufficiently close to
psychometric measures to fit into the psychometric dimensional representation of
the mind. In more pragmatic terms whether or not brain function measures can be
related to everyday functioning in normal individuals depends on whether the
measures are related to behaviors shared by test taking and everyday cognitive
actions , or whether the brain function measures are mainly associated with
cognitive epiphenomena of the test itself.
From time to time there are reports that there are "substantial correlations"
between measurements of brain functioning and some extremely complex behavior, such as a general intelligence test. (S.ee Hendrickson, 1982, for a recent
example.) The vast majority of these reports have simply failed the crucial test of
independent replication . This is not to deny that the proposition that individual
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differences in brain functioning have something to do with individual cognitive
behavior. I am sure that they do, especially in extreme cases. As a matter of
scientific interest, studies of the relation between brain functioning and cognitive
behavior should and will be repeated. However it is not at all clear what will be
learned by studies that are confined to reporting correlations between gross
measures of brain function and gross measures of mental function; e.g., a correlation between a measure of the variability of the brain's overall response to a
repeated stimulus and performance on a general intelligence test. Unless the
correlations were extremely high (and again I repeat my caution about independent replication) all this tells us is that the general functioning of the brain is
related to general cognitive functioning. Did anyone doubt this?
Brain-cognition questions have a seductive physical concreteness. If tomographic scans reveal metabolic activity in a particular brain region during
certain sets of cognition (e.g., activity in the right hemisphere during spatialvisual reasoning) then surely this must tell us how we think . Unfortunately, it
does not. It tells us where we think. Brain function measures do not answer the
questions posed by the cognitive psychologist unless measures on the brain can
be associated with specific processes. To some extent this has been done, especially in the analysis of language comprehension, where the processes of word
and sentence comprehension have been disassociated at an anatomical level. It is
even possible that physical disassociations between different techniques for word
analysis will be discovered (Coltheart, 1985). Such work is certainly exciting,
but it is probably not going to have much influence on the relation between
psychometrics and cognitive psychology, since neuropsychology rests upon evidence from pathological cases. One must also remember that a process may be
distributed over several anatomical loci. So a failure to identify an anatomical
location for a process tells us little. There would be a need for information
processing studies even if we knew all there was to know about neuropsychology.
Early theories of information processing emphasized the isolation of stages of
symbol manipulation. In Fig. 2.4 is an example, taken from an early paper by
Smith (1968) , in which the act of selecting a response to a stimulus was broken
up into two stages of stimulus analysis and two stages of response execution. In
fact, this approach is the historic progenitor of R. J. Sternberg'S (1977a,b)
component analyses of intelligence tests . The strongest interpretation of Smith's
model is that there are distinct stages of information processing, that activity in
one stage is independent of activity in the other stages, and that the stages pass
information to each other in a serial manner. Thus a model like that shown in
Fig. 2.4 is really quite a strong statement about information processing . A more
general view is to regard thought as depending upon isolable subsystems, or
modules , of information processing actions that operate independently of each
other (Fodor , 1983; Posner, 1978). Each of the modules contains its own view of
some aspect of the external world. These views are eventually integrated into an
overall representation of what is going on . As an example of modular processing ,
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FIG. 2.4. S mith 's (1 968) stage
model of stimu lus class ification and
response production. Each box is assumed to represent a d istinct psychological process . The processes take
pl ace in series, progressing from the
top downward .

consider what must happen when an automobile driver is told , verbally, by a
passenger, that the passenger would like to stop for dinner at the next restaurant.
Figure 2.5 shows the exchange of information between modules that must go on
inside the driver's head if the car is to be maneuvered into the nearest restaurant
parking lot .
The current " wi sdom " is that the integration of modular process ing that
occurs in cognition can be modeled by the use of a conceptual device known as a
production execution system. The basis of production execution systems is the
production , that is, a pattern and an action to be taken if that pattern is executed.
In Fig. 2. 6 is a slightly whimsical set of productions for driving a car. Each
module of thought can be conceptualized as the set of patterns and primitive
actions that are effected within by that module. Intermodule communication is
achieved by allowing modules to place their output either into the pattern area of
other modules or (more usually) by assuming a common " bl ackboard" area that
can contain patterns appropriate to any of the separate modules. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. 7 , which shows the organization of an hypothetical modular

FIG . 2. 5 . A modul ar approach to
cogniti on. Each box represents a
class of menta l processing, anal agous
to a spec iali zed work shop. In integrated thin king in fo rmati on is passed
back and forth between the di ffere nt
modules, and fi nally represented as a
coherent internal picture o f the ex ternal world . Process ing is not necessaril y serial.
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FIG. 2.6. Fragments of a set of production rules for driving an
automobile.
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system of productions that might be required to execute the logical production
system stated in Fig . 2.6.
Thinking of thinking as organized modularity leads to an emphasis upon
certain classes of information processing functions. The first is the definition of
the modules themselves. Modules should not be thought of as stages in component processes (as described previously in discussing R. J. Sternberg's work) ,
but rather as specialized workshops containing resources to be assembled into
component processes. The distinction is roughly analagous to the distinction
between a hardware manufacturer, such as the Boeing Aircraft Company, that is
capab le of doing certain things , provided its shops are not overloaded, and the
stages in the process of constructing a specific aircraft, missile, or space vehicle.
lnformation processing research attempts to identify the modules and the
actions of which the modules are capable. This is done by inferring the existence
of a module , or of a process within a module, and by observing the selective
action of variables on certai n types of performance . An example is a widely cited
study by Biederman and Kaplan ( 1970) which demonstrated selective effects of
stimulus discriminability and response compatibility upon visual encoding and
motor response production systems . An alternative technique for inferring the
existence of separate modules is to show that action within one module does not
interfere with action in another module. This sort of reasoning is exemplified by
FIG. 2.7. The organization of an
information processing system for
executing productions. The productions res ide in long term memory . Informat ion is presented to the system
on auditory and visua l channe ls that
are connected to the external world.
The system can "keep notes for it- ·
se lf" by placing temporary information in work ing me mory, and using
this information to guide production
selecti on.
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dual task studies, in which people are asked to do ostensibly independent tasks.
If the tasks are done by separate modules it should be possible to time share the
tasks without interference . A good illustration is a study by Kerr et al. (1985) in
which main'taining one's posture was found to interfere with visual but not with
verbal memory tasks .
Once modules have been identified one can investigate the extent to which
each module displays variation across individuals . Similar studies can be made
of processes within a module. Logically, individuals are treated as factors in an
experiment, and one observes when differences associated with individuals
(e.g., age, sex, or sometimes simply individual identity) make a difference in the
performance of a task that is already known to involve a particular module. The
fact that the modules have been defined independently is what distinguishes the
experimental psychology of individual differences from psychometric investigations. In psychometric theory a "good" measure is defined by the pattern of
correlations involving it and other tests. In cognitive psychology the meaning of
the testing procedure will already have been defined, with respect to a pal1icular
theory of cognition, and will have been justified by the nomothetic experiments
done to validate that theory. The pattern of indi vidual differences is something to
discover, but the pattern does not validate the measure .
The approach can be illustrated by a further consideration of linguistic information processing. The modular character of linguistic processing has been
established by psychometric, neuropsychological , and experimental psychological criteria. In order to process language one has to know words . This is reflected
in the well known fact that (at least in young adults) vocabulary size is an
excellent indicator of one's general ability to deal with language. This is the
reason that vocabulary tests are often used as "markers" for verbal ability. Tests
of the speed of retrieval of the meaning of common words identify a reliable
dimension of individual differences. Furthermore, this dimension of ability is
distinct from the ability to manipulate strings of words, as tested in the sentence
verification paradigm (Hunt, Davidson, & Lansman, 1981; Palmer et aI., 1985).
These findings indicate that the language processing module contains two somewhat separate mechanisms, one for retrieving word information from long-term
memory and one for manipulating information after it has been retrieved. The
conclusion is buttressed by neuropsychological findings indicating that different
brain structures are involved in retrieval of word meaning and sentence analysis
(Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). Because sentence and word processing are not perfectly correlated they evidently make a distinct contribution to the psychometrician's verbal comprehension trait. Note the implied causality. Sentence and word
processing measures are not regarded as loading on an underlying trait of verbal
comprehension ability, they are thought of as producing that ability. On the other
hand , from the point of view of someone interested in prediction, a test that
mixed sentence and word processing into a general test of the ability to com-
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prehend language might be far more useful than isolated tests of the separate
processes .
Verbal comprehension depends on the integration of word information into
sentence structure, and sentence structure into discourse structure. Detailed models for both processes have been proposed (Kintsch & van Dijk , 1978; Schank,
1975). Both assume that what a comprehender does is to construct a structure
representing the meaning of the message being received. This is not a trivial task,
since the meaning of words and sentences will often be determined largely by
context. Substantial individual differences in the ability to define words in context have been observed , indicating that variation in fitting semantic meaning to
pragmatic context is a major source of variation in verbal comprehension (Hunt,
1985) .
Positive findings such as these fit well into hierarchial psychometric models
because they suggest that broad dimensions, such as "verbal ability," can be
broken down into more tightly defined traits. But what about negative findings?
One of the processes that facilitates the integration of words into sentences is a
nonselective "printing" process , in which topics that have already been identified increase a person's sensitivity to the recognition of related words (Foss,
1982). The usual example is that people shown the word "Doctor" are quick to
recognize the following word "Nurse." There is no doubt about the existence of
this mechanism or about its role in the processing of normal discourse . However
the priming mechanism appears to show little variation across individuals , and
therefore measures of it are poor predictors of relative verbal comprehension
ability (Hunt, 1985) .
From a cognitive science view, findings showing that there is a linguistic
information processing module, that it has subprocesses, and that the subprocesses sometimes show individual variation represent a start towards an information processing theory of verbal ability. Mapping the distribution of individual
differences, per se, (i .e., constructing the appropriate Euclidean representation)
is not a high priority next step. Studies that relate theoretically defined measures
to specific individual characteristics are far more interesting. For instance, it
appears that adult aging harms linguistic information processing at the level of
sentence and text integration (Cohen, 1979; Light, Zelinski, & Moore, 1982).
This is somewhat contrary to the psychometric observation that' ' verbal ability,"
as defined by certain psychometric tests, is relatively impervious to aging (Botwinick, 1977). How is this discrepancy to be resolved? Questions such as this are
central to a scientific understanding of individual differences, but may be much
less central to prediction of performance in wide-range situations.
The discussion of verbal comprehension illustrates how cognitive psychologists think about individual differences within an area of information processing
module. Cognitive psychology also stresses the process of integration of information across different modules, or across different sources of input. The dis-
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tinction is important. Studies of the exchange of information between processes
deal with the passage of information from one representation to another. Studies
of the way in which people deal with multiple sources of information focus more
upon people's ability to control the way in which attention highlights first one,
and then another, aspect of the current situation . Both of these concerns present
challenges for the psychometric approach, but for somewhat different reasons.
Virtually everyone who has examined problem solv ing has stressed the importance of forming a good problem representation . Perhaps the clearest example is
in high school geometry. Strictly speaking, geometric problem solving is an
exercise in syntactical analysis; well formed strings of symbols are to be written
into other well formed strings using a finite set of rules. Problem diagrams are
not logically necessary, but they certainly help . It is quite easy to show that
people differ in the representations that they use. Consider the sentence verification task. Most people solve this problem by comparing the meaning of linguistic
descriptions of the picture to the meaning of the sentence. These are people who
will use the sentence to construct an image of the picture they expect to see and
then compare it to the picture that they are actually shown (MacLeod , Hunt, &
Mathews, 1978) . Regularities in representation use can also be shown across
cultures. Ch ildren raised in a western European culture will attack an object
memorization task similar to the game "concentration " by developing a verbal
strategy of where the objects are . Desert dwelling Australian aboriginal chi ldren
treat the same task as one of memorizing a visual image (Kearins, 1981).
The fact that different people use different representations poses a major
problem for any trait model of cognition . Changes of representation may change
the type of information processing that is required to take a particular test. This
challenges a basic assumption of all psychometric methods; that the same linear
combination of abilities can be used to predict the test score of every examinee.
More colloquially, if representations change then there will be "representation
optional" tests that are verbal tests to some and visual-spatial tests to others.
When representation optional tests are included in psychometric batteries they
will give erratic results, because their loadings will depend on the freq uency of
use of different representations in the population being tested. (Sentence verification tests provide mixed results when used with college students, but seem to be
purely verbal tests in populations of older people [Hunt & Davidson, 198 1] .) By
a sort of Darwinian logic, representation optional tests drop out of intelligence
testing, because they do not fit well into the Euclidean model of ability description. But, from a cogn itive sc ience view, knowing the sort of representations a
person likes to use is one of the most important pieces of information that you
can have about problem solving ability.
Colloquially , we sometimes say that a person failed to solve a problem because their attention wandered. The ability to control attention during problem
solving appears to be an important source of individual difference. This ability is
usually tested by giving people several tasks to do in a short time period, and
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seeing how well they are able to cope with streams of information from different
tasks. The tasks involved are almost always very simple ones, such as detecting
whether or not a particular word has occurred in a string of words presented to
the right or left ear (dichotic listening), or determining whether a signal has been
presented at a particular location in the visual field. These simple tasks are
studied because they are believed to be key components in a variety of very
complex machinery operating tasks, such as flying an airplane.
Early research suggested that there are no reliable individual differences in the
ability to do several things at once, apart from the ability to do each of the tasks
singly . This early work has been criticized, however, on methodological
grounds , and a reanalysis of key studies indicates that the abi lity to share one's
attention across several tasks ("time sharing ability ") is a reliable dimension of
individual differences (Ackerman, Schneider, & Wickens , 1984; Stankov ,
1983). Research identifying just what time sharing ab ility is , is in its infancy .
However, we do have some indications of its nature.
Time sharing must involve some capacity for controlling attention. People
who are good either at focusing attention on one auditory channel (e.g., li stening
to a speech against a background of conversation) or splitting attention across
two auditory channels (listening to a conversation while talking on the telephone)
are not necessaril y the people who can focus or split attention across the visual
field, but there is a substantial (.60) correlation between measures of control of
attention within each modality. This suggests that there are both inter and intra
modality mechanisms involved (Lansman, Poltrock , & Hunt, 1983). There also
seems to be a reliable dimension of individual differences in the abi lity to shift
attention from one stream of input to another. Examples are the task of shifting
from listening to one ear in a dichotic presentation to listening in another, or
shifting from following one sequence of visual symbols to following another
(Hunt, 1986b; Hunt & Farr, 1984). We do not know the relation between "attention shifting" ability and the "attentional control" ability identified by Lansman
et al. (1983).
The abi lity to control attention is not tested by conventional psychometric
procedures . There are two reasons why. One is that the motivation for studying
individual differences in the control of attention is based partly on a desire to
predict how well people will operate machinery in highly demanding, time
limited situations. Again aircraft operation is the best examp le. The sorts of
processes being tapped in attentional control studies are simply not an issue in the
educational and business settings applications that fuel many psychological studies of intelligence. There is also an intentionally practical reason for avoid ing
studying attention in a psychometric framework.
The procedures required to evaluate the control of attention are, to put it
mildly, not easily included in the usual psychometric testing situation. The tasks
are complicated so the participants must receive a careful explanation of them. In
some cases up to several hours of practice may be needed before a person's
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performance is stable enough so that he or she can be tested . All of these
considerations mitigate against the "large N" studies upon which psychometric
technology depends. However, there is no way to shortcut the precautions. As
was pointed out earlier, cognitive psychology develops procedures that are justified by their relevance to a theoretical model. Any use of these procedures must
contain internal checks to make sure that the model still applies. In the case of
studies of attention, the procedures and the internal checks will often be so
onerous as to preclude their use in conventional personnel evaluation settings.
This pragmatic fact does not diminish the theory , nor does it diminish our
scientific interest in individual differences in attention.
Previous remarks have focused on the conceptual limits of the psychometric
approach. It is worth noting that in the case of studies of attention, cognitive
psychology has also been myopic . "Attention" has been conceived of as something that a person throws from one place to another, in response to an environment that demands an instantaneous response. This is a realistic model for
skateboarders, all the time , and for airplane pilots some of the time. in most
human endeavors, though , the cognitive environment demands responses within
minutes , hours, or even days . The person doing the thinking usually has a good
deal of freedom in scheduling the order if different cognitive tasks are to be done.
This is a very different situation to study within the technologies of both psychometrics and cognitive psychology, because it means giving control of the situation over to the participant. And once this is done, the examinee has control over
what is to be measured . Understandably both psychometricians and experimental
psychologists avoid such situations. However difficult to measure, the ability to
structure one's environment may be the key to successful thinking . This becomes
apparent when we consider the topmost level of cognitive psychology, the study
of conscious, specialized problem solving.
Complex problem solving is very much influenced by the representations that
problem solvers choose to use , so understanding the process by which representations are developed, selected, and chosen for use has become a central goal of
cognitive psychology. Because the choice of optional representations is very
heavily influenced by learning, any theory of representation in problem solving
has to be , in effect, a theory of how a person acquires and uses knowledge. The
effects of representation owning on representation having are multiplicative, not
additive.
This point has been illustrated in a striking way in studies that show how the
information that a person extracts from a situation depends upon the person's
representation of the situation itself. Chiesi, Spillich, and Voss (1979) offered a
good illustrative study in a rather trivial field , recalling an account of a baseball
game . People who were familiar with baseball could construct a representation of
the plays being described. This caused them to focus on game relevant information, which they were subsequently able to recall. People not familiar with
baseball were not able to do this , although they were able to recall game irrelevant information contained in the broadcast.
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At one level, such an observation is hardly surprising. "Everyone" knows
that people recall more about events that they understand. But this is precisely
the point. Understanding and learning are problem solving situations, in which a
person ' s current knowledge is used to structure new knowledge. The topic of
Chiesi et al. experiment may have been trivial. The principle was not. Exactly
the same point can be made (after a much more complicated analysis) by studying the way in which students acquire knowledge of plane geometry, or of
computer programming (Anderson, Boyle, Farrell, & Reiser, 1984). And consider a still more detailed analysis of a very important activity . Carbonell (1978)
was able to simulate conservative and liberal interpretations of political events
using a program that applied identical information processing mechanisms to
merge the statements with different representations of political and social forces .
What one gets from experience depends very heavily upon one's interpretation of
it.
The psychometric view is quite unsatisfactory here. Saying that people differ
in their ability to use common, culturally defined solution methods (the definition of Gc) hardly captures the process of representation use. Amplifying the
statement by saying that content knowledge extends Gc in specific fields is only a
small step forward, for the psychometrician is still operating within the Euclidean representation of cognition. Regarding 'applying knowledge' as a trait does
not discriminate between the possession of knowledge and the ability to see that a
particular piece of knowledge is relevant to the problem at hand. It is fairly easy
to demonstrate·that the two are not synonymous. People can be given exactly the
appropriate knowledge to use in problem solving, but in a slightly different
context, and be unable to apply it. Some people see connections where others do
not (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) , but why? What processing differences are there
between people who do and don't make generalizations? This is another example
of a question that is central to a science of individual differences but not particularly crucial to a technology for prediction.
The issue being raised here is quite a broad one, for it has to do with the way
in which "culturally acquired knowledge" is used. While some knowledge
consists of ready-made answers to questions of fact, for example, much cultural
knowledge consists of ways of representing problems so that their solution can be
achieved . The representations form skeletons that guide thought, directing one's
attention to key aspects of the problem at hand and suggesting particular solutions. Different theorists have used the terms "schema, " "frame, " and
"script" to describe this process. These terms all reflect what seems to be a
universal characteristic of human thought. The world is often ambiguous or
overwhelmingly complicated. People bring order into this chaos by assuming
that the world satisfies the constraints implicit in their world view. Successful
problem solving is largely a process of trying out one or another constraining
representation until one is found that works. To give a concrete example, consider the problem solving process of expert physicists. They recognize specific
problems as instantiations of a generalized class of problems (e.g., balance of
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force problems). Once recognition has been achieved problem solving methods
associated with the general class can then be applied to solve the specific problem. Novices are likely to focus on aspects of a problem that are not relevant to
the general classification principles (e.g., is a sliding block involved?), leading
to the use of general, but clumsy problem solving methods. (Chi, Glaser, &
Reese, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon , 1980).
The realization that most problem solving is achieved by context specific
methods marks a major change in Cognitive Science. Early work on artificial
intelligence and human problem solving placed great emphasis on the discovery
of general problem solving methods (Hunt, 1975). More recent studies have
emphasized area specific knowledge (Feigenbaum, 1977; Hayes-Roth, Waterman, & Lenat, 1983). The same trend has been evident in cognitive psychology,
where research has shown the extreme importance of topic specific schemata as
guides in problem solving.
If this trend was to be taken to its extreme, generalized psychometrics would
be, if not impossible, at least greatly changed. The whole idea of "intelligence"
is that there is some mental characteristic of the individual that applies to many
problem solving situations. An emphasis on the use of schema in problem solving does not completely deny this notion , for some schema will have wide
applfcability, especially in educational settings. Arguing again by illustration,
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) have shown that understanding of a text is driven
by schema that specify the form of argument in different types of text (stories,
scientific reports, etc .) . Obviously , it is possible to design tests to see whether or
not people possess these general schema. Such tests are likely to be useful
predictors of ability to function in places where general schema are used. Educational settings immediately spring to mind . Tests of general schema use are not
likely to be of much use in predicting performance in situations in which effective local schema operate. People appear to be able to function quite well with a
local schema even though they are not terribly comfortable with a related, more
general problem solving procedure.
Some recent studies of the learning and the use of mathematics and logic
provide excellent examples of this point. Mathematics and logic are often
thought of as the purest, most abstract , and most general problem solving methods. At least in academic circles , an argument can be justified solely by appealing to its logical purity. When children learn mathematical problems they learn
them as schema (Riley, Heller: & Greeno, 1983). Much of the difficulty in
mathematics appears to be in translating from a nonmathematical statement of a
problem into the appropriate schema (Kintsch & Greeno , 1985). At a grander
level , the abstract schema of mathematics are so hard to learn that the ability to
do so is often considered in itself a hallmark of intelligence .
If mathematical reasoning is so difficult, how does the modern world function? To take a specific example, how do people calculate the price of products in
a supermarket? People are quite good at doing so, even though pricing informa-
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tion is not always presented in the most straightforward way (Lave, Murtagh, &
De la Roche, 1984). The same people are not good at solving simple arithmetic
problems, when those problems are presented outside of the shopping context.
Lave et al. found that shoppers made errors on only 2% of the pricing problems
presented in an actual shopping context and on 41 % of the problems presented in
an abstract arithmetical context. This was true even though the same arithmetic
operations were used in each case. Furthermore the two tests were not reliably
correlated! Further probing showed that the shoppers had a variety of problem
solving procedures that were specialized for shopping and that were quite adequate for problem solving in that context.
Shopping is not the only place where people exhibit context-specific specializations of a logic that, in some abstract sense, they really do not understand .
Ceci and Liker (1985) have reported a study similar to Lave's using an even
higher order skill, statistical decision making . Inveterate horse race bettors have
to determine whether the odds offered by the track are actually a good estimate of
whether or not a horse will win. (The racetrack odds are determined solely by the
amount of money bet on each horse, and do not reflect an explicit analysis of the
horse's ability vis a vis its competitors.) Some individuals can "beat the odds"
reliably. It is possible to formulate what they do as a complicated statistical
estimation problem. But the racetrack handicappers were far from being untutored, brilliant mathematicians. In fact, their formal intelligence test scores
were well below undergraduate norms . The skilled handicappers had developed
complicated, race-track specific techniques for handling an unusually complex
problem in decision making.
None of these remarks will be new to those familiar with studies of cross
cultural cognition. Specialists in this field have long pointed out that the Western
emphasis on "intelligence" emphasizes the ability to do problem solving in the
abstract. The very idea of abstract problem solving seems to be related to Western European schooling (Cole & Scribner, 1974) . While this may be true , it does
beg a very important point. The Western European schooling situation, with its
emphasis on abstract problem solving, may indeed be a cultural phenomenon .
However, it is an important, useful phenomenon. Skills in logic , mathematics,
and general problem solving are an important part of our culture, even these
skills are then specialized as people find their niche in society. Therefore identifying people who are likely to become good general problem solvers is a reasonable endeavor.
This is where the concepts of Gc and, to a lesser extent, Gf, are likely to be
useful. Let us accept the fact that high scores on Gc tests identify those people
who have acquired the problem solving schemata of our society. Those are the
very schemata that are going to be used in the classrooms , to aid people in
acquiring further decontextualized knowledge . Perhaps we could design better
tests is we had a better idea of how the educational process proceeds, because we
would then know what schemata are going to be required, when, and (perhaps)
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how they should be learned. Furthermore, at least in theory Western schooling is
supposed to develop an ability to generalize ; that is to see how problem solving
schemata learned in one setting can be applied in another. It may be that tests of
Gf identify people who can make such generalizations. If we had a better understanding of the process of schemata generalization we would know what it is that
these people are doing, and then could develop better tests for their identification.

THE UNION OF THE CAMPS
Cronbach (1957) sought a uniting of two camps of scientific psychology; the
study of individual differences and the study of nomothetic influences on cognition . The prospects for uniting these camps is excellent. However, the study of
individual differences is not identical to the use of a Euclidean representation of
mental abilities. The prospects for uniting psychometrics and cognitive psychology are mixed , and for perfectly good reasons.
The paper and pencil testing technology and its accompanying Eucl idean
representation are hard to beat, so long as one's criteria are cost effective evaluation , and predicting is to a situation that involves very general behavior that
depends on decontextualized reasoning processes . Education and , to a lesser
extent , military life are examples of such situations. Traditional psychometric
evaluation has not , and probably will not , be extended successfully to the prediction of performance in more specific situations, where adequacy depends upon
the ability of an individual to execute situation specific, schema based , and
perhaps complex information processing sequences . Note that the problem here
is not that the paper and pencil technology is inadequate to construct such
situations. The problem is that the underlying Euclidean representation of mental
abilities cannot be used to formulate a process model of cogn ition .
Enter the computer. My frequent references to "paper and pencil technology" may have sounded archaic to those who are already programming
computer presentations of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Armed
Services Vocational Battery, and any number of other intelligence tests . Doing
so will certainly make testing more efficient , as witnessed by current developments in " item banking" and latent trait theory (Green et aI. , 1982). Furthermore, computer presentations are more fl ex ible than paper and pencil presentations, so the Euclidean model can be extended to new domains. Some possibilities are extensions of spatial-visual testing to the situations involving moving
visual displays (Hunt & Pellegrino , 1985) and the development of practical tests
of auditory information process ing (Stankov & Horn, 1980). We may have to
add a few dimensions to the Euclidean model, or we may not. Either way , the
expansion of the traditional model via computerized testing will be a useful
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exercise. In itself, though, computerized testing will not address the conceptual
issues that have been raised here. There is every reason to believe that a theory of
individual differences can be developed as a subtheory of a general theory of
cognitive psychology and will result in a better understanding of how individual
variables such as age, education, sex, and genetics influence the processes of
problem solving. To what extent will or will not this theory influence the technology of testing?
It is now technically possible to develop automated laboratories, so that the
experimental psychologist can collect data on enough individuals to study individual differences. In the abstract, one could conceive of the development of
even larger laboratories devoted to assessment and prediction. Such laboratories
would immediately encounter another economic limit; the expense of the evaluation to the examinee. The sorts of measurements required by cognitive process
theories are often extremely time consuming. The equipment is relatively complex, so that the examinee must spend considerable time learning to use it before
any data can be collected. This and several related problems are very well
discussed in Longstreth's (1984) excellent critique of the misuse that has been
made of choice reaction time paradigms in order to fit them into an evaluation
setting. A point that was made earlier is more than worth repeating . The measures developed from cognitive process theories are valid only when the boundary conditions for measurement are met. This requirement may forever prevent
developing cognitive psychology analogs to the ten to twenty minute tests so
common in psychometric batteries .
These remarks apply with particular force to any testing program based on the
information processing aspect of cognitive science. Because such tests are likely
to be expensive, testing itself will of necessity be limited to those situations in
which prediction is important and in which performance is limited by a person's
information processing capacity, once that person has acquired the specific
knowledge required to perform at all. This suggests two guidelines for applied
research. If information processing models are to be useful, then the test constructor must have a good idea of how information processing limits performance
in the situation to be predicted . Two cases can be imagined. In one the key
information processing requirements are not situation specific, and hence may be
tested using some manageable testing paradigm. In the other case the information
processing limits may be definable only in context, and hence can be tested only
in the actual situation or an adequate simulation of it. If this is so it may not be
possible to test examinees who do not already have a good understanding of the
job for which they are applying . In either case the test constructor cannot proceed
without a situational model. One can imagine such a model for specific situations, such as aircrew or radar operation. A detailed model of the information
processing required in high school is unlikely.
At first glance a theory of the use of representations might seem to be of little
use in personnel evaluation because, by definition, representations are used by

36

HUNT

people who have already acquired experti se in some field of endeavor. Ergo they
must have already been permitted entry to the field . Fortunately this logic can be
reversed . If " becoming an expert " means acquiring certain problem solving
schema, why not evaluate a student by determining the extent to which the
expert's problem solving schema have been internalized? Developments in Artificial Intelligence have led to at least the claim that we can represent expert
knowledge inside a computer (Hayes-Roth et al. , 1983; but see Dreyfu s &
Dreyfus 1984 fo r questions about some of the evidence on which the claim is
based). "All " that needs to be done is to apply the interview methods used to
extract knowledge from an expert to extract (faulty) knowledge from a student.
To aid teaching, the evaluation process can be made the basis for further specialized instruction .
Efforts are underway to develop just thi s sort of intelligent computer aided
instruction system (Anderson et al. , 1984 ). The teaching goals appear to , be
in reach in nontrivial fields (computer programming and geometry). Whether or
not the evaluation goal is feas ible remains to be determined . The present intelligence tutoring programs seem to make a rather general guess at the student 's
current state of knowledge , and use that guess to select problems that are most
educational for that student. Whether or not the program's guess about the
student's representation is sufficiently accurate to be predictive remain to be
seen.

CONCLUSION
Cronbach thought that general theories of psychological process ought not to
ignore individual diffe rences, and vice versa. He was right , and in a general
sense the union of the camps is well underway. In my opinion (and here there
may be a violent di ffere nce of opinion! ) the way to achieve the scientific union is
to concentrate on understanding how individual differe nces variables, such as
age, sex , genetic constitution, and education, influence the processes of cognition. It does not seem particularly fruitful to try to derive the dimensions of the
psychometric Euclidean representation of abilities fro m an underlying process
theory.
This does not mean that the Euclidean model is wro ng, within the context in
which it has been developed . Consider an analogy to what we know about
experti se. Experts develop local schema that apply to their local problems. The
psychometric Euclidean model is an excellent way to deal with personnel prediction and classification. But it does not generali ze well to understanding cognitive
actions. Einstein was certainl y intelligent , in the psychometric sense. However
he did not develop a single one of hi s intellectual conceptuali zations because he
was high on Gc or Gf. He developed them because he had certain sche ma for
problem solving and because he had the info rmati on processing capac ity to apply
these schema.
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Eventually there may be a "Grand Unified Theory " of psychology, similar to
those now being developed for physics. But will we understand it? There seems
to be a role for Newtonian mechanics even after quantum theory. Engineers use
the limited Newtonian notions all the time. Psychometric and cognitive process
theories may similarly co-ex ist for many years. Practical application and power
of conceptualization are both worthwhile goals. They are not necessarily
synonymous.
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INTRODUCTION

Given the demands fo r higher levels of learning in our schools and the press for
education in the skilled trades, the professions, and the sciences, we must develop more powerful and specific methods for assessing achievement. We need
fo rms of assessment that educators can use to improve educational practice and
to diagnose individual progress by monitoring the outcomes of learning and
training. Compared to the well-developed technology for aptitude measurement
and selection testing, however, the measurement of achievement and diagnosis
of learning problems is underdeveloped. This is because the correlational models
that support prediction are insufficient fo r the task of prescribing remediations or
other instructional interventions. Tests can predict fa ilure without a theory of
what causes success, but intervening to prevent fa ilure and enhance competence
requires deeper understanding.
The study of the nature of learning is therefore integral to the assessment of
achievement. We must use what we know about the cognitive properties of
acquired proficiency and about the structures and processes that develop as a
student becomes competent in a domain . We know that learning is not simply a
matter of the accretion of subject-matter concepts and procedures; it consists
rather of organizing and restructuring of thi s information to enable skill ful procedures and processes of problem representation and solution. Somehow, tests
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must be sensitive to how well this structuring has proceeded in the student being
tested.
The usual forms of achievement tests are not effective diagnostic aids. In
order for tests to become usefully prescriptive, they must identify performance
components that facilitate or interfere with CUlTent proficiency and the attainment
of eventual higher levels of achievement. Curriculum analysis of the content and
skill to be learned in a subject matter does not automatically provide information
about how students attain competence about the difficulties they meet in attaining
it. An array of subject-matter subtests differing in difficulty is not enough for
useful diagnosis. Rather, qualitative indicators of specific properties of performance that influence learning and characterize levels of competence need to be
identified.
In order to ascertain the critical differences between successful and unsuccessful student performance, we need to appraise the knowledge structures and
cognitive processes that reveal degrees of competence in a field of study. We
need a fuller understanding of what to test and how test items relate to target
knowledge. In contrast, most of current testing technology is post hoc and has
focused on what to do after test items are constructed. Analysis of item difficulty, development of discrimination indices, scaling and norming procedures,
and analysis of test dimensions and factorial composition take place after the
item is written. A theory of acquisition and performance is needed before and
during item design.
Recent work in cognitive psychology is a good start toward a theory to
underpin such measurement. Modern learning theory is taking on the characteristics of a developmental psychology of performance changes-the study of
changes that occur as knowledge and complex cognitive strategies are acquired,
and the study of conditions that can influence these transitions in competence.
Achievement measurement must be designed to assess these performance
changes. It must be cast in terms of development, or levels of acquisition, and
must be informed by knowledge of sources of difficulty and fac ilitators of the
growth of competence.
In essence, the theme of this chapter is that the measurement of achievement
should be based on our knowledge of learning and of the course of acquisition of
competence in the subject matters that we teach. We begin by sketching some
findings of cognitive psychological research that have implications for achievement test design. We then give additional research examples from various subject-matter fields. A third section describes several analytic methods from our
work that we think can be extended into new testing formats . Throughout, we
emphasize the necessary inseparability of instruction and assessment and we
consider, in this connection, the design of intelligent computer tutors, which
require both an instructional and a testing capability . We conclude with suggested ingredients for a set of cognitive principles for ach ievement measurement.
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COGNITIVE RESEARCH RELEVANT TO THE
MEASUREMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT
A psychology of learning that can inform testing must address two central
problems .
• First, we must understand how subject-matter knowledge is structured and how it
changes with learning. That is , we need to understand the knowledge structure
indicators of achievement.
• Second , we must understand how a particular piece of knowledge, a single
performance rule, or a part of a procedure , becomes more reliable, flexible,
adaptive, and automatic with practice. That is , we need to understand the performance indicators of ach ievement.

Knowledge Structures
A substantial body of research has been carried out on the knowledge structures
that characterize experts in a domain. Unlike past research, which tended to
concentrate on the prerequisites of learning, this work attempts to determine the
nature of competent performance by examining the underlying cognitive structures of the expert. It therefore has the potential to reveal how processes are
transformed in the course of a person 's progress from the novice to the expert
state of performance. The research shows that, compared to novices ' knowledge
structures, experts' knowledge structures are both wider and deeper. That is,
they contain more concepts, with more detail about each and with more interconnections among them . However, since it appears that little can be learned without
at least a partial theory to lend it coherence (Murphy & Medin, 1985), we can
assume that the understanding even of novices is held together by at least a
primitive organizational structure, or personal theory. Since personal theories
evolve as more is learned, bootstrapping further learning, the type of theory a
person currently holds for a domain can serve as an index of and basis for his
progress in acquiring the knowledge of that domain .
Carey (1985) has studied the evolution of theories that children hold at different points in their cognitive development , concentrating on such domains as
basic biology . Her work suggests that related reasoning and problem solving are
greatly influenced by experience with new information. In her research on animistic thinking in children, she has shown how children's knowledge influences
their conceptuali zation of being "alive" and how such a concept becomes more
differentiated with time through school learning and experience in the world. For
instance, a 5-year-old's knowledge of biological properties is organized in terms
of the child 's know ledge of human activities, whereas a I O-year-old' s knowledge
is organized in terms of biological functions. Asked whether worms or plants
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breathe, the younger children respond based on their experience of how human
beings breathe and say "no," since they see nothing like a moving chest in a
worm or plant; older children, who have been exposed to school-taught notions
of respiration, are more likely to answer that worms and plants do breathe . Such
abstract pervasive changes in the child's reasoning and learning abi lities are
repeated as knowledge is gained in various domains.
The theories that we have for domains that are acquired partly on the basis of
everyday experience are extremely stable. They are not easily rejected in the face
of counterevidence, especially if that counterevidence comes from a textbook or
lecture. This has been noted in a variety of studies showing that students do not
relinquish their naive views about force and motion even after a physics course
(Champagne, Klopfer, & Anderson , 1980; Larkin, 1983) , and Carey has made
similar observations. For example, after a long interview in which many internal
organs were discussed , children of ages 4 through 6 were asked what part of their
body was most important. In spite of all the new information about internal
organs, they tended to name an external feature such as nose, toes , or hair,
something related to their self-observations of their activity, consistent with their
activity-based theories about life.
Personal theories seem to have the same sort of resilience and ability to
withstand counterevidence that are seen in scientific theories that are socially
shared, and the abandonment of one personal theory for another may well be
revolutionary rather than evolutionary, just as seems to be the case with scientific
theories (Kuhn, 1962). The robustness of personal theories implies that in order
to facilitate learning, i. e., transitions in knowledge structures, it is necessary to
confront a person's theories with specific challenges and contradictions. Understanding how counterev idence and knowledge confrontation assist in the transition between levels of competence, we should be able to design instruction that
will help students build from their existing repertoires. The research on personal
theory building that will be most usefu l to an improved technology of measurement aims at (1) understanding the stages through which personal theories pass
well enough to be able to detect them, and (2) being able to prescribe forms of
instructional intervention that are appropriate to those stages.

Automaticity, Proceduralization, and Practice
John Anderson (1983) has developed a theory of the development of ski lled
performance based on the work of Fitts (1964). It divides the course of learning
into three parts: the declarative stage, the knowledge compilation stage, and the
procedural stage . Initial performance in a novel situation involves the operation
of general strategies that use declarative knowledge to guide performance. Declarative knowledge refers to verbal rules or facts regarding a task. Accessing
these bits of information may be a slow process in this stage, and the task
procedure is slow , laborious , and requires conscious attention. A chi ld learning
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to tie a shoe or to do subtraction, possibly verbalizing aloud , losing track if he or
she is interrupted, is probably in the declarative stage of acquiring a skill.
The conversion of slow declarative knowledge into faster compiled procedures occurs in the second stage of acquisition , knowledge compilation.
Knowledge compilation is analogous to compilation of a computer program, the
translation of that program from an understandable verbal form to commands, in
the form of bit patterns, that can be directly executed by the computer hardware .
Compiled knowledge, like a compiled program , runs faster but at the cost of
greater difficulty in modification. Compi led procedures are relatively automatic .
They can be represented as systems of condition-action pairs called productions,
which state an action to be performed whenever its associated condition, which is
a specific memory state, is attained. A production normally proceeds without
conscious control except when one of the conditions for productions is a goal
state that has to be set conscious ly . For example, anyone who, after years of
tying shoes, has tried to give verbal directions to a child realizes that even though
he now ties shoes very efficiently, he no longer remembers the instructions he
was once given and doesn't quite know what to say to the child. Knowledge
compilation consists of two processes, proceduralization and composition. Proceduralization can be compared to the primary activity of compi lation in a
computer, but it is driven by experience-estab lished connections rather than by a
parsing process alone. If one successfully uses specific declarative 'knowledge in
a specific setting, then the conditions at the time of the successful action are
combined with the memory state needed to produce the action and stored in
memory as a production. Composition takes place when two productions execute
successfully in immediate seq uence and thus become combined into a single
production. It is similar to local optimization in a computer compiler. Proceduralization , then, is an automation process, whereas composition is an abbreviation process .
In Anderson's third stage the newly acquired productions become tuned. That
is, they become strengthened, so that they prevail over other conflicti ng productions whose conditions may also match the same memory states, and their conditions for execution are more completely specified, through generalization and
discrimination processes reminiscent of those described by Hull (1943) and
Spence (1956).
A theory of sk ill acquisition such as this one has implications for test developers , since it identifies stages of learn ing and practice that are informative for
instructional purposes. Lesgold (1984a; Lesgold, Rubinson, Feltovich, Glaser,
Klopfer & Wang, in press) provided an example of how such a theory describes
one aspect of the acquisition of expertise in medical diagnosis. Consider a
resident who makes a faulty diagnosis during patient rounds. The attending
physician may ask a series of questions that essentially walk the resident through
the correct diagnosis . In spite of demonstration that this resident has the correct
declarative knowledge , he or she is unable to organize the information in a
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manner that would lead to the correct solution because proceduralization has not
taken place. The assessment of what knowledge needs to become organized and
how to facilitate the proceduralization of such knowledge can greatly enhance
instruction.
Of course, learning involves more than the proceduralization of declarative
knowledge. Recall that we asserted in the previous section that new knowledge is
acquired through the filter of one's personal theory. There are strong constraints
on the verbal knowledge the student constructs from the things he experiences
and is told. Consequently , a cognitive psychology of learning that deals only
with what happens after the knowledge is already developed (albeit in fragi le,
declarative form) is not sufficient. Nonetheless, just as we have stated goals
relating to the initial construction of knowledge, we can state some goals that a
cognitive theory of measurement ought to have for dealing with practice and the
automation of knowledge.'
A major emphasis in assessment should be to understand how the successive
stages of learning, declarative, compi led, and tuned, manifest themselves in
measurable performances. Combined with knowledge of how to foster progress
from one stage to the next, this understanding will enable us to diagnose, to
measure performance and to prescribe instruction based on those measurements.
If we can develop both the capability to measure the stage of learning and the
ability to assess which level of personal theory a student holds in a domain, then
we should be able to make even stronger diagnoses.
Instruction might then guide the development of both the necessary declarative knowledge and its subsequent proceduralization and tuning. An emphasis on the conditions that foster the development of procedures, both simple and
composite, will be necessary. Presumably , when teaching beginners we must
build from their initial knowledge structures. This might be accomplished by
assessing and using relevant prior knowledge , or by providing obvious organizational schemes or temporary models as scaffolds for new information. These
temporary theories could be incorporated systematically into instruction. Such
structures , when they are used, tested, and perhaps falsified by novices in the
course of learning and experience, should lead to organizations of knowledge
that are the basis for the more complete theories of experts . As well as assisting
in developing theories, instruction can also systematically provide learners with
the practice necessary for knowledge compi lation and can encourage tuning by
providing multiple contexts affording a chance to learn where certain procedures
are applicable. This instructional emphasis should encourage discrimination and
generalization of productions, leading to more robust, flexible, and efficiently
IWe concede, of cou rse , that these are not necessari ly totally separate enterprises. How well
certain components of a personal theory are automated may playa role in how resistant it is to being
overthrown.
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organized schemata 2 that allow the individual to perform appropriately under a
variety of conditions. Acquiring expertise is to be seen as the successive development of efficient, tuned knowledge structures that facilitate the development of
higher levels of competence.
A somewhat different approach to understanding the development of skilled
performance is found in the work of Schneider (1984), whose research on the
role of practice in training high levels of skilled performance also has several
implications for assessment and instruction. We see Schneider's research as
consistent with Anderson's theory of acquisition. Schneider, however , concentrates on an account of the development of automaticity, corresponding in particular with the knowledge-compilation stage. Environments must be designed , he
asserts, to provide for the development of simple procedures. Once such procedures are developed , the sequence of instruction can facilitate a generalization
between congruent procedures, fostering the composition and compilation process. He also suggests that construction of hierarchical knowledge structures can
be facilitated by providing practice opportunities in multiple contexts, controlling the sequencing of levels of difficulty, and providing sufficient challenge and
opportunities for success.
The areas of his investigations that could influence more diagnostic forms of
achievement measurement to aid instruction include work on (1) identifying and
training subskills rather than concentrating exclusively on total task instruction;
(2) assessing levels of skill acquisition in order to facilitate the proper sequencing
of instruction; (3) assessing individual differences in ceiling performance on a
task; and (4) assessing the motivational aspects of learning the material under
consideration.
In designing practice that is sufficient to produce high skill levels, Schneider
suggests an emphasis on practicing consistent components of the task before
practicing the task as a whole , even before the student understands a consistent
mapping of required actions onto conditions. In other words, it is not just the
amount of practice but also the focus of practice that matters . Schneider's approach places great importance on another goal for cognitive measurement theory: to formulate rules for deciding when a component skill is practiced enough to
be integrated with other components to form a higher-order skill.
These contributions to theories of learning dealing with the role of practice
have provided guides to the shaping of a diagnostic theory for the measurement
of learning . For example, Schneider has suggested that goals for the level of
proficiency to be attained must be set individually for different students , that
different people show different cost-benefit functions for the marginal utility of
2Schemata are modifiable knowledge structures in memory that represent abstractions of experiences , including generic concepts, procedures, and situation s (Glaser , 1984) . They are used to
interpret new instances of related knowledge (Rumelhart, 1975 , 198 1) .
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additional practice at different points in the course of learning. That is, not only
the rate of learning but also the asymptote may vary from student to student. This
poses another goal for diagnostic measurement, the assessment of potential for
benefiting from particular components of an instructional program.
The bulk of the work in developing such a theory remains to be done . What
we ' have now are some indicators of what a cognitive theory of measurement
must be like. It must articulate with theories of learning and concentrate on
shaping how we teach rather than whom we teach.

The Zo ne of Proximal Development
The idea of measurement techniques to measure the potential payoff of different
instructional approaches is reminiscent of Vygotsky's theory of the zone of
proximal or potential development, which was developed in the course of work
on learning disabilities in the Soviet Union (Brown & French, 1979; Vygotsky ,
1978). In this work, a distinction has been made between a child's actual developmentallevel (the level of mental functioning revealed in solo performance on a
standardized test), and the child's level of potential development (the level of
development that the child can achieve when offered certain forms of assistance).
Both measures are considered essential for diagnosis and instruction. Vygotsky
called the difference between these two levels the "zone of potential development," or "proximal development."
This zone of potential development is conceived of as an indication of learning potential. Thus, individuals with the same score on a mental ability test may
vary in terms of their cognitive potential. 3 The relationship between assessments
of the zone of potential and instructional strategies merits further research . The
question is whether we could prescribe differential instructional treatment based
on such a measure. Perhaps students with a large zone would do best being
moved quickly through curricula, even skipping some units , while students with
a small zone might require a slower, more complete treatment. In this manner,
instruction might be prescribed so that learning neither lags behind potential nor
pushes students beyond their capabilities. Presumably , motivation would be
improved, too , if students were less likely to be overtaxed or bored. Extensions
of Vygotsky's work (cf. Bransford, DeIclos , Vye, Burns, & Hasselbring, 1986,
and the chapters in Lidz, in press) represent an important step toward a cognitive
instructional science of measurement.

3The distinction between crystall ized and fluid intelligence (cf. Cattell, 1963) also seems to get at
this issue.
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Self-Regulatory and Metacognitive Skills
Metacognition has been defined in a number of ways across numerous subject
domains and diverse populations. In general, though, metacognitive skills are
generalized skills for approaching problems and for monitoring one's perfo rmance such as knowing when or what one knows, predicting the correctness of
outcome of one's performance, planning ahead , effi ciently apportioning one's
time , and checking and monitoring one's thinking and performance (see Brown ,
1978; Belmont & Butterfield , 1977; Borkowski , Cavanaugh, & Reichart , 1978 ;
and Brown , Bransford , Ferrara , & Campione, 1983; for more extensive reviews).
These skills, which act as control processes fo r cognitive performance, develop
with maturity , and seem to be less developed in children with learning disabilities or those who are retarded. Brown (1 978) suggests that these " executive
processes " are a significant aspect of intelligence , since they determine when
and where particular knowledge is used. Metacognitive skill s are pres umed to
facilitate transfer of training to new situations.
In a sense, metacognitive skills represent , in part , performances that would be
needed to reali ze the potential represented by the student 's zone of proximal
development. If we assess the zone of prox imal development and attempt to
specify and encourage the development of metacognitive skills, we are taking the
first step toward trying to teach people to have larger zones. Thus, the movement
toward task-analytic and instructional work on metacognitive skill is at the core
of our aspirations for a technology of achievement assessment grounded in a
cognitive instructional science.

Expert Performance
Understanding experti se is difficult because skillful performers appear to observe
a set of rules that they themselves have difficulty verbalizing. T his follows fro m
the distinction made by J. Anderson between declarative and proceduralized
knowledge (see p. 45) , since experts can be assumed to have highly practiced
repertoires of mental operations for tasks within the ir fi elds of competence.
Seminal efforts to understand the nature of expert performance involved the
study of skill in chess (Chase & Simon, 1973 ; de Groot , 1965, 1966; Simon &
Chase, 1973) . A series of experiments showed that the master chess player has a
large reperto ire of spec ific patterns that can be accessed in memory and quickl y
recognized. Chess expertise, to a large extent , is driven by rapid recognition
processes that tap acquired structures of knowledge rather than by deep analytical
thinking processes. Chess masters recognize the exact board situation they encounter and the strategies it entails; they do not excel by thinking ahead dozens of
moves, as commonly thought ; indeed they think ahead fewer moves than advanced pl ayers who are not yet at the master level (Chase & Simon , 1973).
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Chess masters seem to have the abi lity to construct a qualitatively different
representation of board positions than novice players, in terms of the aspects that
they can immediately recognize and respond to (Chase & Chi, 198 1) . A similar
phenomenon has been observed in more traditional school learning domains,
such as physics, where highly competent performers also excel in developing an
appropriate initial representation of a problem posed to them (Larkin , McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; Simon & Simon, 1978). This representational
skill allows the knowledgeable physicist to solve routine problems rapidly and
without much conscious deliberation. An expert's representation of a physics
problem tends to be organized around central principles of physics, whereas the
knowledge of the novice is organized around more peripheral information such
as the physical entities or objects described in the problem (Chi, Feltovich &
Glaser, 1981).
The knowledge of experts and the mental representations they construct also
include information regarding the application of what they know. In contrast, the
novice's knowledge structure may be more loosely organized, containing the
most centrally relevant information regarding the problem as stated but lack ing
the knowledge of related principles and their conditions of application . For this
reason, novices may have more difficulty making inferences from the given
problem statement. Their difficulties may be attributed to inadequacies of their
knowledge bases as opposed to limitations on their capacities for carrying out
problem solving processes .
In general, the competent individual can be described as having knowledge
that is organized in a way that facilitates fast-access pattern recognition or encoding, greatly reducing mental processing load. These acquired knowledge patterns
enable individuals to form an appropriate representation of the problem situation .
The adequacy of the initial problem representation seems to be an index of
developing competence , since the quality, completeness, and coherence of internal representations determine the efficiency and accuracy of further thinking. It
seems appropriate then to consider the development of tests that will assess the
learner's initial problem representations and level of knowledge organization .

Mental Models
Another research area with implications for a cognitive instructional theory of
measurement deals both empirically and theoretically with the mental models
that people construct in the course of solving problems. T here are different kinds
of mental models that are involved, and the implications for a theory of measurement may differ from one to the next. The "runnable" device or qualitative .
process model is perhaps the most important form. This type of model is a
qualitative internal representation of a physical device along with a set of mental
procedures for "running" that device , for sim ul ating how the device changes as
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it operates. The appearance model is a related type, in which the person's
procedural knowledge includes the ability to envision the appearance of a complex structure under various transformations. We discuss each of these below. In
each case, we are concerned both with what is known about human capability
and also with formal work attempting to specify what kind of modeling capability is needed to carry out various inte lligent acts.

Qualitative Process Models. Qualitative physics is the effort to develop
formalisms for representing the knowledge one can have about how things work
(cf. de Kleer & Brown, 1984, and the entire issue of ArtUiciallntelligence in
which it appears, " Qualitative Reasoning," 1984). One approach that has been
taken is to represent each device in a system as a set of qualitative constraints (de
Kleer & Brown , 1984). A device such as a resistor has qualitative constraints on
it that are similar to Kirchhoff's current and voltage laws and Ohm's law. For
example, the direction of change of current at one end of the resistor must match
the direction of change in current at the other end, and the direction of change in
resistance will be in the same direction as the change in voltage drop across the
resistor. When devices are assembled into a system, the overall operation of the
system can be envisioned by propagating the qualitative constraints of its components through the system. In a sense, then, running a device model is like solving
a system of simultaneous quantitative equations.
It is very difficult to carry out this propagation mentally in real time. Experts
tend to have highly practiced mental procedures for modeling a variety of common subassemblies of such systems. This makes them much faster, and at the
limit more likely to succeed, in their mental modeling efforts. Further, because
their modeling capab ility for routine situations is more efficient, they are more
able to deal with nove l variations from the routine. It should be possible to build
tests of mental modeling capabi lity by looking at relative speed and accuracy in
an empirical progression of tasks such as (a) being able to state some of the
constraints verbally but not being able to work with them , (b) having access to
the most common, or classic , models in worked-out form , and (c) being able to
modify these models to fit them to novel situations.
.
We have just begun in cognitive psychology to assess people's mental models, but this has been done in a few cases. For example, we can gather some of
this information by asking people to predict the next state of objects in simple
physics mechanics paradigms (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980) or by
asking them to describe simple e lectrical circuits (Gentner & Gentner, 1983,
Riley , 1985). At LRDC, Jeffrey Bonar and his students have begun to develop
environments in which subjects can make qualitative predictions of the effects of
changes in a resistor network on various measurements in the network. We hope
soon to be able to use such a capability to study possibilities for reliable mental
model assessment.
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Appearance Models . Another form of mental model is the appearance
model, which represents how someth ing looks or how it might look from various
viewpoints. In studies we carried out on radiologists at differing levels of training, we realized that subjects varied in their ability to env ision a patient's anatomy while looking at an x-ray picture. To assess their modeling ability, we asked
them to draw, on the x-ray pictures, the contours of specific body structures
(Lesgold, 1984a, Lesgold et aI., in press). It was then possible to quantify
performance by comparing the areas marked by the subjects with standard templates generated from expert protocols and other medical data. Measures such as
proportion of template area covered by the subject's trace and proportion of the
subject's trace that fell within the standard template region were computed. In
this study, these measures were correlated with overall level of training and
could be interpreted quite readily. Further, the subject's response (i .e., the
tracing) cou ld be input directly to a computer via various two-dimensional input
devices , and the scoring done automatically.

Research on Acquisition of Subject Matters
It is in traditional school subject matters, of course, that achievement testing has
had its widest application and most detailed development. Yet, perhaps it is
schoo l subject matters that most obviously demand a testing methodology that
goes beyond normative scaling to become more relevant information for tailoring
a student's instruction. As has been the case in testing methodology so far,
different subject matters are likely to require different test item forms and perhaps even different overall testing approaches. We consider some of these in the
sections that follow .

Reading. Progress has been made in understanding the nature of competence in reading , and there is beginning to be theory that might gu ide reading
achievement test design. We can distinguish four reading processes that measurement shou ld attend to. These four processes are: (a) word recognition; (b)
accessing semantic word information; (c) sentence processing, and; (d) discourse
analysis (see Curtis & Glaser, 1983).
A particularly important question is how the execution of one set of processes
affects the efficiency of other reading processes. One component of the reading
process that requires attention can affect reading comprehension by decreasing
the amount of information maintained in memory and the amount of attention
allocated to other processes. If, during reading, part of the thinking capacity is
given over to word recognition, less capacity may remain for joining concepts
that need to be interrelated in the reader 's mind (Lesgold & Perfetti, 1978;
Perfetti & Lesgold , 1977 , 1979) . That is , when word recognition is slow, comprehension processes become resource-limited (Norman & Bobrow, 1975),
whereas faster recognition allows more effort to be directed to understanding
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what is read . In fact, poorer readers are generally slower at word recognition
(Curtis , 1980; Lesgold & Curtis, 1981; Perfetti & Hogaboam , 1975).
Longitudinal research in the classroom , although difficult to impl ement , is a
strong method for investigating the role of particular components (such as word
recognition) over the course of learning a skill like reading. Rather than defining
the development of learning in terms of grade level or age, the order in which
subskills of reading are acquired can be spec ified directly if the same children are
tested at different points in the course of their learning to read . This approach
was used to observe the development of word recognition efficiency and its
relation to comprehension skill development (Lesgold & Curtis, 1981 ; Lesgold ,
Resnick , & Hammond , 1985) . Students were observed over a 4-year-period.
Lesgold et al. (1985) examined student's reading efficiency in two reading
curricula , one with an emphasis on word recognition training (phonics), and the
other following a popular basal reading instruction program . Although no clear
advantage was found for either curriculum, word processing speed measures did
predict later reading comprehension in both groups. These results suggest that
there are multiple approaches to developing reading comprehension but that
automated word recognition is an important requirement for progress.
An interesting complication is that even though word recognition speed is the
best predictor of reading achievement in the primary grades, as noted in the
Lesgold study , listening comprehension becomes a better predictor thereafter
(Curtis , 1980). This suggests that we do not yet have theories of the reading
acquisition process adequate to support diagnostic testing. An adequate theory
would have to account for the apparent fact that while word recognition ought to
be the primary goal at the beginning of the curriculum , if a student is not doing
well after several years, the focu s needs to shift to comprehension skills. It wi ll
not suffice to use a checklist mastery approach, in which we have a schedule of
subskills to be acquired, check off which ones the student has mastered, and
diagnose that he should do the first thing on the li st that is not yet checked.
A deeper understanding of how individuals retrieve word information can be
used to guide assessment and instruction . There is a strong interdependency
between ability to access the knowledge associated with words and overall comprehension skills. Three aspects of semantic retrieval capability seem to influence higher level processes: accuracy, flexibility, and fluency . (Beck , Perfetti, &
McKeown, 1982). Understanding is not an all or none phenomenon; being
accurate on one vocabulary item that uses a word does not necessaril y mean that
an individual fully understands that word . Items that reflect an individual 's
deeper knowledge of an item in terms of flexibility of usage in different contexts
may be a more meaningful form of measurement. Qualitative differences in the
levels of word knowledge can be assessed by presenting items that require
specific and precise semantic discriminations (Curtis & Glaser, 1983). For instance, instead of a single word meaning question , a sequence of questions that
reflect more detailed levels of understanding might be used , such as (a) Which of
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the following synonyms best defines the word in question? and (b) Which of the
following sentences uses the item correctly? Contingent diagnostic testing sequences can be developed for individuals who vary in skill level. For example, if
a student gets the simplest word meaning item incorrect, a subsequent question
can be presented that gives the word in a context-providing sentence.
Thus, work to date suggests that diagnostic tests can be individualized to
efficiently measure qualitative and quantitative differences in lexical/verbal
knowledge. Efficient testing, in turn, might help make instruction more highly
individualized . However , given the long history of difficulty in isolating multiple
factors in tests of reading facility, it is clear that a sound theory of reading facility
and its acquisition is needed before significant progress can be made. Recent
efforts (e.g., Perfetti, 1985) seem a step toward such a theory.
Measuring comprehension skill raises a different set of issues. Understanding
the sentences in a text requires prior knowledge. Knowledge of the topic or
situation to which a passage refers, and knowledge of schemata, which are
abstracted representations for situations and for discourse forms, can facilitate
the understanding of passage content and its integration into existing memory
organizations. Relevant schemata provide an interpretive framework for organizing the information mentioned in a text and for reading between the lines (inferring propositions which the author assumed did not have to be overtly stated, R.
Anderson, 1978).
Hoepfner (1978) suggested that 10-20% of the items on reading comprehension tests assess schema-based knowledge. However, so long as these items are
not recognized as dealing with a specific issue, their presence, through the
natural selection processes involved in test construction and validation, does not
provide any specialized diagnostic capability. If knowledge of specific schemata
and prior knowledge of certain domains is a prerequisite to text comprehension
and is not always sufficient, then comprehension items should be developed
specifically to test for such knowledge. Another class of potentially useful items
would test for inferential ability. Such comprehension tests would go beyond fact
recall and test the subject's inferences based on the content of the passage.
Presumably, these would be developed for discourse forms and topic domains for
which the subject had previously demonstrated competence.
Another factor to consider when assessing discourse analysis is whether the
examinee is having difficulty with comprehension in general or with reading in
particular. This distinction generally is made by testing both reading and listening comprehension. However , it is important to note that comprehension in
general is not wholly separable from reading comprehension; some argument
forms simply cannot be presented orally, since they require too much temporary
memory and therefore rely on the text itself as an external temporary memory.
To summarize, reading involves word recognition , lexical knowledge, knowledge of the forms in which discourses present information, and background
knowledge for the domain about which any given text is written . Disciplined
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sequential testing strategies appear to have the potential for helping to isolate a
student's reading problems to one or more of these areas . However, the current
state, in which test items are developed without regard to a verified componential
theory of reading acqui sition and proficiency, and in which we lack the knowledge that would tell us that a specific item was measuring an identifiable skill
component, does not permit tests to be used for detailed diagnosis.

Arithmetic. Arithmetic, like reading, is a basic skill that involves considerable procedural facility . It differs from reading in being dependent only upon a
fixed domain of schematic knowledge (reading ski ll depends on schematic
knowledge of the text topic). Because the schemata needed for arithmetic performances are less numerous , more refined theoretical analysis has been possible. A
major program of research began when Brown and Burton (1978) developed
computer models of chi ldren's substraction performance. They decomposed subtraction into very small procedural steps. Then they constructed degraded models, each of which contained all but one, or a small number, of the components of
the full model. Since each degraded model made different performance errors, it
was possible to assess a student's know ledge by trying to match the pattern of his
answers to a set of subtraction problems with the pattern produced by one of the
degraded or "buggy" models.
However, representing arithmetic errors as " bugs," deficiencies of a needed
program step, was not sufficient to account for students' performance (Brown &
Van Lehn, 1980, 1982; Van Lehn, 1983a,b,c). It became apparent that, while
the bug analyses could account for the performance of students with systematic
errors on anyone test, a given student's bug patterns did not remain constant
from day to day. The theory , which evolved from cross-sectional comparisons,
did not transfer well to providing longitudinal accounts. Working with Brown,
Van Lehn worked out a more complex theory which he called "repair theory."
Its essence is that "bugs" do underlie fai lure of arithmetic performance but that
students realize that they have reached impasses in their performance and make
attempts to repair their incomplete procedures. When their knowledge of the
basic conceptual underpinnings of arithmetic is solid , these repairs produce
correct performance, and they manifest no stable error pattern. When their conceptual know ledge is inadequate , they are forced to invent ways of accommodating what they do know. For example, a student who doesn't know how to do
regrouping (borrowing), when faced with a problem like
100
-33
may answer" 133," reasoning that there has to be a number in each column of
the answer. If he can't compute 0 -3, then he computes what he can, 3-0,
instead. However, he knows he is li kely to be wrong , so he doesn ' t stick with the
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specific strategy of always subtracting smaller digit from larger but rather tries
other approaches from time to time.
The important thing to learn from this body of work is that some diagnosis
may require longitudinal data, that the current knowledge of a person cannot
always be determined in sufficient detail to suggest a specific approach to remediation or further instruction from looking only at current performance. A
secondary lesson is that formal modeling approaches and the comparison of
student performance to that of alternative models can be very useful strategies in
designing new approaches to diagnostic assessment.

Word Problems. Quite a bit of work has been done on the kinds of problem
solving that students are asked to do in school, such as the solving of arithmetic
word problems. The general approach taken has been to attempt to specify the
generic knowledge structures, or schemata, that subsume the knowledge needed
to understand different categories of problem situations. As indicated above ,
schemata can be thought of as personal theories that we can test and revise.
Learning can be thought of as being largely schema revision.
Riley, Greeno, & Heller (1983) have demonstrated that a small number of
schemata can account for virtually all the arithmetic word problems that students
are given in elementary school. Specifically, there are the followin g problem
types, each of which requires different knowledge , i.e., a different schema:
• Change. Mary has i marbles and John gives her j more, so she has k in all.
Any two of the three values would be given in the problem, and the student
would have to find the third.
• Combine . Mary has i marbles and John has j. How many do they have
altogether?
• Compare. Mary has i marbles and John has j. How many more does John
have than Mary?

Further, Riley et al. suggested a developmental sequence for acquisition of these
schemata. They found that problem schema type, rather than which arithmetic
operations were required to solve a problem, was the best predictor of how early
solution capability is acquired.
If solving a word problem requires knowing more than the arithmetic operations required to solve it , then the ability to diagnose student learning problems
in arithmetic requires the ability to measure schematic knowledge, or to estimate
it from the pattern of word problem types that a student can solve. Rather than
simply looking at the total number of word problems a child solves, assessment
procedures could examine or infer how students are representing the problem
information . This form of measurement would indicate whether the student is
having difficulty with the operations or with the semantic representation of the
problem.
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Writing . Recent work on the study of error in writing and composition has
emphasized the identification of systematic misconceptions (see Bartholomae,
1980; Hayes & Flower, 1980; Hull , Ball, Fox, Levin, & McCutchen, 1985;
Shaughnessy, 1977). While the same precision of error analysis that is seen in
the mathematics work cannot be achieved in the writing domain, it is now clear
that even students who write very poorly are following crude personal theories
that they have formed for written communication. Systematic misconceptions or
incomplete conceptions lead to errors, and can be detected from students' writing
samples (Bartholomae, 1980). For example, poor writers may systematically
mishandle verb endings, noun plurals, syntax, and sentence structure. If the
current composition rules and schemata of a student can be determined , then
presumably instruction can focus on specific efforts to move the student toward
more appropriate understanding.
Like reading difficulty , poor written composition might, in principle, be due
either to errors in general linguistic competence or to incomplete procedural rules
for the specific medium , in this case writing. In order to rule out general lingu istic competence as the problem in poor writers, Bartholomae had students
read their writing samples out loud . In doing so he found that students, often
unconsciously, corrected errors as they went along. This suggests that they have
the general linguistic knowledge but do not have it, or cannot use it , in the
specialized form needed to produce written products. As we refine our understanding of these procedural errors, we can better assess written composition and
better develop individualized instruction aimed at repairing certain misconceptions and strengthening correct schemata.
Hull et al. (1985) used an extensive study of composition errors to develop
computerized instruction in editing. Their software uses pattern matching techniques to assess systematic errors in writing and then helps students correct their
own errors. Although this approach is still limited due to the complexity of error
pattern detection in natural language texts, it has proven useful. By identifying
errors, feedback can be provided to the learner regarding both the presence of
errors and how to correct them. Highlighting of error regions in text-editor
displays is used to help students learn to recognize and repair grammatical errors.
Furthermore, instruction can be sequenced so that students can move from one
level of skill to another, finding and correcting certain categories of errors and
refining their own mental models. The integration of error identification with
instructional remediation seems more promising as a diagnostic approach than
are current tests of composition ski ll , although it remains unclear whether the
breakthroughs are in diagnosis and individualized instruction or from increased
understanding of the levels of competence in writing skills and of how learners
can be assisted to acquire new knowledge given their current knowledge structures.
Scientific Concepts. An area in which much of instruction involves inducing
change in students' schemata is science. There is now ample evidence that in
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certain cases where our environment provides a biased view of underlying natural processes, students tend to develop naive misconceptions that are extremely
resistant to change (McCloskey, Caramazza & Green, 1980) . For example , our
everyday world, because of the friction effects of air and surfaces on which
objects move, provides many experiences in which objects change velocity without being obviously affected by new forces. Thus, it is easy to conclude that
force is required to sustain velocity , that velocity is proportional to force. After
all, to go a constant speed in a car, you have to maintain constant pressure on the
gas pedal. When students holding such misconceptions are exposed to formal
physics instruction, they learn to solve physics problems that involve knowing
that forces are proportional to accelerations, not velocities, but they do not
generalize this knowledge to everyday life; they do not easily abandon their prior
misconceptions. It seems unlikely that simply applying algorithms learned by
rote will produce the needed learning. Thus, science instruction, like writing and
arithmetic instruction, can be seen as involving diagnosis of a student's current
schemata followed by efforts to move those schemata toward more expert form.
A methodology developed by Siegler (1976, 1978) is another promising approach to diagnostic measurement that is relevant here. Siegler assessed the
underlying rule structure of certain cognitive performances and the progressive
development of performance complexity in children . His "rule assessment"
approach is based on two assumptions. The first is that human reasoning is rule
governed, with the rules progressing from less sophisticated to more sophisticated as a function of age and learning . The second is that a way to assess these
rule progressions is to develop diagnostic sets of problems that yield distinct
performance patterns as a function of the rules a child knows. Just as with the
arithmetic and writing research, this approach can determine what rules an individual uses in performing the task as well as what rules are common to various
groups of individuals and age groups.
The first step in Siegler's procedure is to analyze the concept being studied.
Through task analysis, one develops a first approximation of the condition-action
pairing rules or specific rule knowledge that reflect competent performance on a
task. Then, one attempts to characterize each known developmental stage as the
presence of some subset of the final-stage rules or of rules with imperfect conditions or actions. The final analysis must be verified against actual children's
performance . An acceptable set of rule stages has the property that each stage
consists of only a small change, such as the acquisition of a rule or the elaboration of the conditions of a rule.
Siegler developed his rule assessment approach analyzing the performance of
children on lnhelder and Piaget's (1958) balance beam task . The rules he identified involve understanding how balance is affected by the amount of weight
applied, the distance of the weight from the fulcrum, the coordination of weight
and distance , and finally how to compute the torques when necessary in order to
choose the side of the scale with the greater value. These rules reflect a develop-
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mental progression in understanding the concept of balance. At this point, the
methodology has not only provided a theoretical account of the capability being
studied; it has also provided the basis for an instruction ally diagnostic test. That
is, one cou ld identify a student's current stage and then proceed to teach him the
rule or rule elaboration that enables performance at the next known stage.
Rule assessment approaches ass ume that conceptual development can be
thought of as an ordered sequence of learned, partial understand ings . If individuals learn concepts to various degrees of understanding and they develop
understanding in a reasonably predictable fashion, the assessment of knowledge
can be linked to appropriate instructional decisions. Rule assessment procedures,
such as procedural analysis of arithmetic, error analysis in writing , and performance rules in scientific understanding, lead to diagnostic procedures that can
provide deeper understanding of a subject matter that an individual brings to test
performance . The concept of diagnosing test performance regularities at different
levels of learning suggests a point of contact and possible integration of test
theory, teaching practice, and the psychology of human cognition .

Technical Skill Development. Cognitive research on the assessment of technical ski lls is just beginning. During the past 2 years , the Learning Research and
Development Center has been conducting a study of the feasibility of cognitive
task analysis procedures for use in determining who shou ld be placed in particular Air Force job specialties, how they shou ld be trained, and how their performance should be measured. Our results have important implications for assessment and instruction. In addition to the traditional procedure of using aptitude
tests for selection and using achievement tests at most for correlational evaluation of selection and adaptive instruction, we expect to assess achievement
throughout the learning process. An important characteristic of our work is to
compare the trainees who are most competent on the job with those least competent. When done at several stages in the progression from beginning apprentice to
master, this provides a developmental view of the characteristics associated with
success at different stages in the course of training.
To develop a cognitive task analysis of an area as broadly defined as an Air
Force specialty , we took a job component sampling approach . We generated a
representative sample of the tasks involved and examined their perceived trouble
spots extensively. We were able to compare better to worse performers and to
develop preliminary hypotheses about the different stages of performance in the
course of the airmen 's on-the-job experience. Our goals were to identify the
procedural and conceptual knowledge required for job proficiency in using specialized test stations to isolate parts fa ilures in aircraft navigation equipment. In
these components, what flows through wires can be thought of as a simp le signal
with a small number of defining parameters , such as voltage.
We paid particular attention to how high and low performers differed in both
conceptual and procedural knowledge. We also identified skill s that should be
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automated in order for airmen to concentrate on higher order troubleshooting
issues, and we developed tests of their automaticity. In addition, we tested for
depth and organization of fundamental concepts and for understanding, in terms
of functional systems on the aircraft, of the units that they were required to test.
Through extensive protocol collection we observed the airmen's initial problem
representation and the constraints used to arrive at soluti ons. Each of these
assessment devices was guided by cognitive theory. Much of the remainder of
this chapter, especially the following section, is shaped by our experiences in this
project.

COGNITIVE RESEARCH APPLIED TO TESTING
METHODOLOGY
So far , we have tried to highlight cognitive research on learning and expertise
that is potentially relevant to building a richer theory of educational measurement. Such a theory, though, must have methods as well as principles. In this
next section, we describe several methods that seem promising.

The Assessment of Flexib le Prob lem So lving Skill
Assessing relatively general problem solving skills is quite a different task from
assessing specific, algorithmic performance capabilities that are part of the domain being taught. We have only begun to work on this problem, but a few
possibilities already present themselves, particularly with respect to the more
strategic, or metacognitive, ski lls of problem solving. To give a sense of our
work, we trace the history of our efforts to analyze the performance of electronics technicians when they attempt to troubleshoot complex electronic circuitry . The complex cases are of particular interest because they are the ones where
metacognitive sk ills are needed to organize processes which, in simple cases,
might automatically lead to problem solution.
In our first attack on this problem , Drew Gitomer4 developed a troubleshooting task that involved detection of complex faults in the test station used by our
sUbjects. As a first formative approach, he simply videotaped subjects attempting
to solve such fault detection problems. He then examined the protocols (transcriptions of the tapes) and attempted to count a variety of activities that seemed
relevant to metacognitive as well as more tactical aspects of problem solving in
this domain . While the results , published in his thesi s (Gitomer, 1984), were of
great interest, we wanted to move toward a testing approach that was less

4

At the ti me a graduate student at LRDC.
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dependent upon skilled cognitive psychological training. That, after all , is one
aspect of what test development is largely about-rendering explicit the procedures that insightful researchers first apply in their laboratories to study learning and thinking.
Our breakthrough came not so much from our psychological expertise but
rather from our interactions with an electronics expertS who had extensive experience watching novice troubleshooting performances. He pointed out that it was
not a big chore to specify all of the steps that an expert would take as well as all
of the steps that any novice was at all likely to take in solving even very complex
troubles hooting problems. That is, even when the task was to find the source of a
failure in a test station that contained perhaps 40 cubic feet of printed circuit
boards, cables, and connectors, various specific aspects of the job situation
constrained the task sufficiently so that the effective problem space could be
mapped out. This then created the possibility that we could specify in advance a
set of probe questions that would get us the information we wanted about subjects' planning and other metacognitive activity in the troubleshooting task . For
what is probably the most complex troubleshooting task we have ever seen, there
are perhaps 55 to 60 different nodes in the problem space, and we have specific
metacognitive probe questions for perhaps 45. 6 Fig ure 3. 1 provides an example
of a small piece of the problem space and the questions we have developed for it.
An examination of the questions in the Figure reveals that some are aimed at
very specifi c knowledge (e.g., How would you do this?), while others help
elaborate the subject's plan for troubleshooting (consider Why would you do this ?
or What do you plan to do next?). Combined with information about the order in
which the subj ect worked in different parts of the problem space, this probe
information permits reconstruction of the subject's plan for finding the fault in
the circuit and even provides some information about the points along the way at
which different aspects of the planning occurred. In fact, we went a step further
and also asked a number of specific questions about how critical components
work and what their purpose is.
After reviewing the protocol, we developed six scales on which we scored
each airman. Each of these scales could be further subdivided into subscales to
permit more detailed and task-specific issues to be addressed. T he six scales
were titled plans, hypotheses, device and system understanding , errors, methods
and skills, and systematicity. Table 3. 1 gives two examples for each scale of the
items for which points could be earned (in the error scale, more points means
more errors and thus is a lower score).

5We arc grateful to Mr. Gary Egga n for hi s many ins ights in this work.
6Debra Logan and Richard Eastman have been refining this technology in ou r laboratories (Logan
& Eastman, 1986), and we expect that a more deta iled account will be publi shed by the m at a later
date .
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• What do you think the problem is?

* What do you plan to do next?

Problem space map to guide probed protocol gathering.

3.

TOWARD A COGNITIVE THEORY FOR ASSESSMENT

63

TABLE 3.1

Examples of Criterion Questions Used to Score Protocols for Each
of th e Six Prob l em-So l v in g Sca l es
.PLANS
o Extend and test a card.
0Trace through the schematic of an individual card
• HYPOTHESES
oThere is a short caused by a broken wire or a bad
connection.
oThe ground is missing from the relay .
• DEVICE AND SYSTEM UNDERSTANDING
oUnders tanding and use of the external control panel.
oUnderstanding of grounds and voltage levels in the
test station .
• ERRORS
o 1-1isinterpreting/misreading the prog ram code, called
FAPA , for a test that the test station carries out
under conputer control.
oGetting pin numbers for a t est wrong .
• METHODS AND SKILLS
o Schematic understand ing: Ability t o interpret diagrams
of relays , contacts, coils.
OAbility to run confidence check programs.
• SYSTEMATICITY
oTh e subject returns to a point where he knew what
was going on when a dead end is encountered.
o The path from the power source is checked.

Plans was a count of the number of plans mentioned by the subject during his
problem-solving efforts . Any time that the subject entered a new part of the
problem space, we prompted for a plan, but the lower ski ll subjects, especially,
often did not have one. That is, they more or less randomly acted until a plan or
hypothesis came to mind. A count was kept of the number of hypotheses offered
by subjects at various points in their work. Again, subjects were prompted for
hypotheses at the predetermined boundary points between regions of the problem
space. The high-skill group entertained more hypotheses, which is what we
would expect given that even they are at intermediate skill levels. True experts
could be expected to have a more constrained set of probable hypotheses (cf.
Benbassett & Bachar-Bassan, 1984; Lesgold et aI., in press).
The device and system understanding scale was based on specific questions
that were put to the subjects after they had performed the troubleshooting tasks.
We asked a fixed set of questions about each of the components of the test station
that played a role in the problems we had posed. These questions probed for
knowledge abo ut how the component worked, what role it played in the test
station, what its general purpose in electronic system was, and what it looked
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like. The errors scale was simply a count of the number of incorrect steps taken
by the airman in trying to troubleshoot the system. The methods and skills
measure tallied which of the procedures needed to carry out the troubleshooting
of the test station were successfully demonstrated by the subject. Finally , the
systematicity measure consisted of a set of relatively broad criteria gauging the
extent to which troubleshooting proceeded in a systematic manner rather than
haphazardly or without a sense of goal structure.
With these scales, it is possible to provide a reasonable account of the components of performance. That is, there were no statements or behavior sequences of
the airmen that could not be counted on one of our scales . This demonstrates that
it is feasible to measure directly such complex cognitive performances as fault
isolation in massive circuitry. By carefu l planning and the use of expert consultants with on-the-job supervisory and training experience, it is possible to develop measurement approaches that can help pinpoint a technician's stage of acquisition and, consequently , the level of further training needed. The approach is
still rather expensive, but we feel that it is rapidly reaching the level of rigor
associated with good experimental technique . Given its potential for more direct
ties to theory by sharpening the criteria for the various scales used, it compares
quite favorably with traditional approaches, which involve multiple-choice questions about somewhat simpler and less job-linked knowledge.

Gaining Objectivity and Simplicity
While cognitive psychology provides much guidance on what tests shou ld be
measuring, it has not so far contributed much to the technology of low-cost
measurement. This optimization of cognitive measurement methods is critical to
bringing cognitive science to bear on testing . If cognitive measurements cost two
or three orders of magnitude more, they will not be used, even if they are the best
alternative. We need to start searching for a middle ground between the overlyconstraining 5-foil multiple-choice item and expensive verbal protocol procedures such as that just described. The multiple-choice form ats currently used
present two problems for us. On the one hand, they do not allow all of the
responses subj ects are likely to make to be included as alternatives, so great care
is needed to understand how the range of possible student approaches will map
onto a restricted set of possible answers. On the other hand, they tend to "give
away" some aspects of the solutions to problems. That is, they can only be used
where recognizing that one has a correct solution is sufficient performance .
Below, we discuss some new ways to extend simple forced choice methods into
the realm of complex cogn itive activ ity . These approaches come closer to being
"direct readouts" of knowledge and thus are more useful in building a representation of a person's cognitive capabilities.
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Hierarchical Menus Methodology7
Computer-based menu systems offer the opportunity for extending the multiplechoice technology almost infinitely. Traditional multiple-choice tests require
selection from a small set of alternatives. More elaborate alternatives have not
generally worked well, probably because they impose a greater verbal processing
load on the subject, who must keep in mind too much information at once in
order to use them well. What the computer offers is the possibility of complex,
choice-specific follow-up to individual items without placing any new test-taking
ski lls demands on the subject.
In a sense, all computerized adaptive testing involves contingent sequencing
of multiple-choice items. However, in existing adaptive procedures, the sequencing is not based on the content of the items, but rather on their classification into pools of different difficulty levels and different subscales. The same
basic idea can be used to develop a cognitively oriented adaptive questioning
procedure that is driven by propositional inferences rather than by statistical
inference. The approach can best be understood through an example.
Suppose we wanted to know whether a student knew how to compute the
mean of a set of numbers. If we simply want to determine whether he has this
skill completely or not, we could make up simple multiple-choice items , such as
the following:
The mean of the numbers 1,3, 4,10 , and 15 is (a) 6.6; (b) 33; (c) 5; (d) 4; or (e)
15.

If the student chooses a, then he is correct. However, we can learn from the
errors, since b is the answer one would get if every step but the final division
were carried out, c is the count of the numbers , d is the median value, and e is the
maximum. However, we cannot actually see how the student tried to represent
and solve this problem, so we don't have any ability to separate correct knowledge that is not sufficiently practiced from incorrect knowledge. It would be
useful to be able to give a test that objectively and replicably recovered the actual
content of the student's performance on this problem . From that, we could
construct remediation, additional practice activity, or additional new instruction
that might serve the student better.
Jeffrey Bonar in our laboratories has developed an approach to computerbased programming instruction (called BRIDGE) that can do this. The approach
is based on a hierarchical menu scheme. The subject is asked a broad question

7This section is very much insp ired by an approach Jeffrey Bonar has taken to the development of
menu alternatives to natural-language input for computer-based instructional systems.
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that can be answered by choosing one of several alternatives. The choice of
alternative also determines the nature of followup questioning . Finally, the
whole process can be repeated several times to allow specification of a multistep
solution to a problem. The methodology rests upon a combination of a full
analysis of the task to be performed by the subject and a set of protocols of
people trying to do the task.
In fact, one of the tasks that Bonar has worked with is writing a computer
program to compute the mean of a set of numbers. In most current computer
languages, this is done more or less as follows:
Set a counter to zero
Set a sum register to zero
Read the first number to be included in the average
While the current number is not the termination code do
Increase the counter by I
Add the current number into the sum register
Read the next number
If the counter is not equal to zero
Divide the sum register value by the counter value and
Place the quotient in the sum register
Print the sum register value

Unfortunately, no questioning scheme based on the correct algorithm will
work. This is because there is a very different way that students think about this
problem before learning computer programming. A student asked to describe
what he would do will say something like this:
Get the first number and write it down unless it is the stop code. Then do this
over again for each new number. When you reach the stop code , count the numbers
and add them up. Divide the sum by the count, and that's your answer.

What Bonar has done is to give problems like this to a large sample and then
analyze the procedures they wrote down. After completing these analyses, he
was able to create a hierarchical menu system that allows students to specify their
algorithms in ways that do not make it appear that they understand more than
they really do. For example, it distinguishes between formally specifying an
iterative process and simply stating that some steps must be repeated without
being explicit about which steps or about the condition for ending the iterative
loop . Recently, the same problems were given to a set of enlisted military
personnel. Their performance could be fully accommodated by the set of options
originally generated in response to protocols from college students, so the method seems robust.
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Figure 3.2 shows the computer screen at a point where this interrogation is
underway. Bonar's hierarchical menus allow specification even of very complex
algorithms because of the fo llowup questioning capability, and because each step
already specified is displayed on the computer screen. For example, if the subj ect
picks the REPEAT option from the menu, he is then prompted to indicate which
items should be repeated. He is also asked to specify how to decide when to stop
the repetition. The options for stopping the repetition can include simple tests,
tests based on the resu lt of procedures, and implicit tests (do it for every member
of a defined set). We see this approach as an important step toward the building
of cognitively oriented diagnostic tests. To some extent, Bonar's work bears out
our beliefs. He is using this type of menu capability in a programming tutor as
the basis for coaching the student toward the specification of precise algorithms
and finally the specification of an actual computer program .
To summarize the last sections, we see great promise in such computer-based
approaches to testing. These approaches will go beyond and build upon many of
the best intuitions of current test item writers and computerized adaptive testing
researchers. One new aspect of the work will be deeper, more interactive interrogation via menu-based systems supported by graphics and other verbal-loadreducing aids. A second will be processing of the test responses that is driven by
logical inference from knowledge of the domain and knowledge of how students
learn in the domain rather than only by statistical inference based on normative
item difficulty and internal consistency data.
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Menu illustration from Bonar's BRIDGE programming tutor.
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The Procedural Ordering Task: 8 Measuring Sensitivity
to Constraints
In a number of areas of skilled performance, the range of acceptable responses to
a situation is often quite wide and the constraints often are rather abstract. This
makes the measurement of competence quite difficult. Consider a case recently
encountered by Richard Eastman, one of the research assistants in our group . We
were attempting to measure how well airmen cou ld carry out the task of reassembling a complex part of a jet engine after overhaul. The procedure we thought
likely to work well was an ordering task . We would take the actual steps of the
reassembly task directly out of the manufacturer' s manual , print each step on a
card that also included a picture of that step, and see if the airmen could sort the
cards. This seemed very straightforward until we found that there was no correlation between performance in this task and our other indices of expertise.
This led Eastman to interview several known experts. When he asked them
why they had not used the ordering indicated in the documentation, they pointed
out the underlying constraints on successfu l performance and also clarified how
the procedures specifically listed in the manufacturer's documentation were inefficient ways to satisfy those constraints . The constraints all involved preserving
the calibration of an information pathway between the engine and a gauge in the
cockpit of the plane. The manufacturers, wanting to get foolproof instructions
written quickly, had never included the constraints in the documentation. Rather,
they had chosen to write a set of instructions that, while inefficient, would keep
them out of trouble, since they happened to preserve the constraints.
Making up test items based only on the documentation would have fai led to
capture the full range of knowledge that is included in this particular brand of
expertise. 9 Further, it was necessary to have deeper understanding 'ourselves than
could be gleaned from the printed materials that would have driven most standard
test-writing exercises in this area. Finally, we shou ld note that a particular
expert's favorite alternative to the textbook method could still have two forms:
rote knowledge and conceptually-deep knowledge . That is, a mechanic might
simply be fo llowing someone else's approach rather than the book's but still
understand neither.
To get around this problem, Eastman cleverly designed a family of sorting
tasks that varied in which devices were already fitted to the engine and which still
had to be attached. Knowing the constraints , an expert would sometimes be able
to leave a piece of the system attached rather than having to remove everyth ing
and start from scratch. However, to preserve calibration, it is also sometimes

8This task was developed by Richard Eastman as part of the cognitive task ana lysis project we
conducted for the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory.
9We take no position on whether such instructions should be followed in every case simply to
preserve a disciplined approach to maintenance- that is an Air Force issue .
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necessary to remove an already-installed component which cannot be finally
calibrated until some other device has been attached. Thus, unless the airman has
learned dozens of rote variations of the assembly procedure, he will not be able
to give optimal and sti ll safe performances in these varying situations. Further, it
is possible to model the sorting performance for such a family of tasks.
When Eastman looked at the pattern of errors for a small sample, he found
evidence consistent with two hypotheses. First, the errors made by rank beginners tended to involve orderings of activity that are physically impossible (e.g.,
one can't get device A attached if device B is already attached and in the way).
Later in the course of acquisition , the errors were more deeply conceptual (you
could get all the parts together that way, but the information pathways would not
be calibrated). We have experimented with computerized presentation of this
kind of ordering task , and it seems quite straightforward.
In our preliminary efforts, we present the steps of a procedure as a menu on a
workstation eq uipped with a pointer device called a mouse. When the subject
points to an entry in the menu, the step is illustrated on a high-resolution screen,
minimizing unnecessary verbal load. Pressing a button on the mouse causes the
item to which the subj ect is pointing to be added to an ordered li st of steps. A
simple arrangement allows the subject to rearrange that ordering until he is
satisfied with it. He then points to a box labeled "Done" and presses the mouse
button. By having a list of constraints of each type , the computer can then report
scores for physical adequacy as well as functional adequacy of the proposed
orderings. The testing can be repeated with different starting scenarios to establish the character of the subject's knowledge.
The ability to produce or alter graphical displays is an important new capability. We see many possibilities for new test forms that involve pointing to
locations or tracing regions in graphic displays. This approach, and others that
provide more direct expressions of subjects' knowledge (as opposed to the abi lity
to verbalize about knowledge) , will be helpful to the development of a cognitively based testing technology for technical training .

INTELLIGENT TUTOR ING SYSTEMS: LABORATORIES
FOR INTEGRATING TESTING AND INSTRUCTION
At the Learning Research and Development Center, we have embarked on a
substantial program developing intelligent computer-assisted instructional systems- expert systems for teaching and training. We have done this for at least
two reasons. First, we feel that sufficiently facile tutoring systems can help
teachers improve their teaching skill s as well as directly tutor students. Second ,
we see the expert instructional system as a primary laboratory for testing emerging principles for measurement and instruction. Since expert systems are driven
by explicitly specified knowledge, they are direct empirical tests of the hypoth-
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eses embodied by that knowledge. In this section, we concentrate on possibilities
for testing hypotheses that involve the measurement of performance.

Tutor Architectures and Adaptive Instruction
Intelligent tutoring systems are the ideal laboratory for investigating new assessment techniques, because the fundamental activity of such tutors is driven by
assessment of individual student knowledge. Further, because such tutors embody explicit representations of theoretical assertions about learning, they are
perhaps the least confounded forms of experimental treatment for empirical
investigations of new ideas about assessment and instruction. An explicit set of
roles must be programmed into any intelligent tutor. At times the tutor plays the
role of diagnostician, trying to decide what the student does and does not know.
At times, it plays the role of strategist, trying to decide how to respond to the
student's weaknesses by tailoring instruction. At times it plays the role of colleague or foil, interacting with the student as coach or advisor, or even as game
opponent.
In some intelligent tutors, such as WEST, 10 separate major segments of the
program correspond to these separate roles. There is an expert modeler, a student
modeler, a set of issue analyzers that determine differences between the student's
performance and the ideal and blame those differences on particular student
shortcomings (see Fig. 3.3). There is also a module that plays the game with the
student, and a module that uses a prioritized set of pending issues (things the
student should be taught) to decide how and what to coach.
While the roles to be filled by the WEST tutor are very explicit, the curriculum structure is much more implicit. There is no explicit statement embodied in
the program that makes it clear what any given student will be taught by the
tutor. Rather, a variety of considerations interact to determine what the student is
taught. This can pose two types of problems. First, different schools may have
different emphases. For example, one school might favor arithmetic instruction
over refinement of gaming strategy, while another may emphasize the metacognitive skills involved in successful play. Second, we want to include knowledge
about the course of learning that is not reflected in a model of expert performance
alone, nor even in the sorts of tutoring principles currently found in programs
such as WEST. The first problem is not very severe; one could change the
lOWEST is an intelligent tutor developed by Richard Burton and John Seely Brown ( 1982). It is
based on an instructional game developed by Bonnie Seiler. The game is a variation of Chutes and
Ladders (a children's game) in which the student must deve lop an arithmetic expression instead of
rolling the dice to generate a move. Three randomly generated numbers are presented to the student ,
who can then move his game piece as many squares as are represented by the va lue of anyone
arithmetic expression he can specify that uses on ly the three numbers . WEST provides advice , or
coaching, to the player, on arithmetic issues , game strategy , and the manipulation of arithmetic
expressions.
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Major components of a tutor such as WEST .

prioritizing rules used by WEST to choose which of several potential tutoring
issues is given priority. The second issue, the need to reflect knowledge about
the course of acquisition for a specific domain of expertise, is more serious and
will be discussed below .

Representing Curriculum Knowledge As Well As
Domain Knowledge
In order to separate knowledge about how and what to teach from the expert
knowledge that represents the goals of instruction , a group of us II at LRDC have
been experimenting with a new architecture for tutors. In it, the sections of the
program correspond explicitly to the lessons in a curriculum , and the roles that
the tutor must fill are defined in a distributed manner, as part of the content of
each lesson' s program. This curriculum knowledge " layer" is separate from an
expert domain knowledge layer. This basic intelligent systems design approach
has been proven in the speech understanding research of the past decade or more,
liThe original ideas came from Jeffrey Bonar ( 1985), who continues to paly a central role with us
in developing this new approach . Other important contributors have been Paul Resnick , William
Wei l, Cindy Cosic, and Mary Ann Quay le.
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and we are adapting it to the task of building an intelligent tutor. It permits direct
express ion of hypotheses about instruction and diagnosis in the knowledge base
from which an intelligent system develops specific lessons. Thus, we think it has
promise fo r a technology and science of instruction .
The approach that we have been taking is to specify the knowledge relevant to
tutoring as consisting of three types. First, there is domain knowledge, the
content to be taught. Second , there is curricul ar knowledge, the division of the
domain to be taught into a hierarchy of instructional sub goals . Finally, there is
aptitude-related or metacognitive knowledge, the tailoring of the course of instruction to suit individual student needs. The three knowledge types are shown
in Fig . 3.4 , and we shall discuss each in turn.
Whatever it is that we want the student to know after he has been taught , we
can represent it as a network of concepts connected by predicates . Certain groupings within such a network are organized into schemata, which contain the
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FIG. 3.4.

Layers of a tutor's knowledge base.

3.

TOWARD A COGNITIVE THEORY FOR ASSESSMENT

73

knowledge, both procedural and declarative , needed to deal with particular broad
generic problems. While this higher level organization is central to expert performance, the knowledge one must acquire to become an expert is not neatly
separable into clusters that can be taught or measured independently . Expert
knowledge has the character that each part one might want to teach or measure is
somewhat depedent on other parts which may well not have been taught yet.
Thus, any plan for building expertise must include attention not only to the ski ll s
an expert has but also to the sequencing and forms of instruction used to build
those skills.
An important source of the needed structure is an understanding of how the
expertise being taught is learned. That is, particular pieces of knowledge are
propaedeutic and thus should be taught first. Other pieces of knowledge seem to
be acquired more readily if they are taught only after some particular prerequisite
has been taught first. While many people believe that prerequisite structuring is a
property of the domain knowledge alone, a central assertion of the cognitive
psychology of learning is that prerequisite structuring depends also upon what
sorts of knowledge bundles lead to what sorts of learning and what sorts of
capability for further learning. Two examples may help clarify what has just been
stated.
The first of these examples has to do with acquisition of substantial understanding about the physical world , including scientific understanding. As noted
above, Susan Carey (in press) has noted that the course of development for
certain kinds of scientific knowledge recapitulates the sequences of theories that
have developed in various sciences. We can imagine that some personal theories
are better scaffolding for one kind of later learning than for another just as has
been the case for scientific theories. For example, the alchemy theories were a
very poor foundation for a quantitative chemistry that could be related to an
emerging physics. On the other hand, they may have been better suited to the
fostering of a materials sc ience. Indeed, much relevant descriptive knowledge of
the properties of different materials was temporarily lost when modern chemistry
overthrew alchemy.
The moral in this discussion is that an understanding of the particular aspects
of expertise that are most important, along with understanding of the course of
acquisition for that knowledge, is the basis for splitting the knowledge domain up
into bundles or lessons to be separately taught and separately tested. Those
lessons, or curriculum subgoals, can be thought of as constituting a separate
layer of process and control in an intelligent tutor with connections downward to
the knowledge layer. The particular bundlings that are most optimal will be
determined by analysis of the course of learning.
A second example may help clarify this viewpoint. Consider the learning of
arithmetic. We want children to be able to carry out all four arithmetic operations
on numbers of any size . How do we decide whether to teach addition first,
proceeding only with addition until even the largest numbers can be added easily,
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or to teach two or more operations on small numbers and then recycle through the
operations again with progressively larger quantities? Currently, schools do the
latter, because it turns out that certain parts of each operation reinforce parts of
other operations. However, some have argued that a modest movement toward
providing large-number problems earlier, which might mean working with fewer
operations initially, would clarify certain matters that now seem to cause trouble
(for example, you can't understand how to borrow across zero, as in 403-224,
unless you have had enough experience with 3 and 4-digit numbers to really
establish your understanding of place value). Only when we know enough to
specify the order of instruction can we be sure we understand how to handle the
measurement problem with respect to diagnosis.
We propose that yet a third layer is needed in the knowledge base for a tutor.
We call this the aptitude or metacognitive layer. Basically, this layer is concerned with individualizing the course of instruction to suit different students'
capabilities . We presume that this layer sits on top of the curriculum layer,
observing the student's progress and tuning the system's performance to optimize that progress. Thus, this layer is concerned with capability that is needed
in order to become expert in a domain but is not actually part of the domain.
The optimization of student progress can occur in two ways . The system can
either adapt to aptitude differences, or it can teach the skills that constitute
aptitude. Adapting to aptitude might involve no more than changing the level of
risk taking for the instruction. For example, if we have a student who learns with
great facility, perhaps we should be less concerned if he misses a few problems
in an early lesson, since he will probably pick up what he needs implicitly even if
we give parts of the knowledge minimal explicit treatment. On the other hand,
when we have a slow student, we may not want to take too many risks . Rather,
we may not advance to a new lesson until the prerequisite lessons have been very
well learned. A related form of aptitude optimization involves variation in the
amount of support provided to a student in learning environments which foster
discovery learning. For example, one might have a simulation program for a
physics course that allows a variety of mechanics experiments to be simulated on
the computer screen. For some students, very slight prompting might work very
well, e.g., See what you can figure out about the relationship between force and
acceleration. Other students with less-well-developed skills for exploratory
learning might be led much more carefully through a specific set of experiments
and prompted to specify what they had learned from particular experiences.
A different approach to aptitude is to diagnose the specific skill weaknesses
that make some people learn better or faster than others. Under this approach,
metacognitive skills are taken to be part of every domain of instruction, though
they may be adapted specifically to each knowledge domain. The notion that we
have in mind is one of observing the course of a student's progress in learning,
inducing that certain aspects of metacognitive skill might be weak, and then
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establishing the teaching of those metacognitive ski ll components as high priority
instructional subgoals. For example, the tutoring system might observe that the
student never takes advantage of opportunities to conduct his own experiments in
a simulation env ironment and respond by suggesting occasions when some experimentation would allow the student to test his understanding. Systems that
begin to do this are being developed in our laboratories. With this approach, the
metacognitive layer modifies the content of the curriculum layer by inserting
additional curriculum subgoals. This can be of particular importance in instructional systems that attempt to foster discovery learning, since the student whose
skills are insufficient for making discoveries is not well served otherwise.

Diagnosis With Curriculum Object Structuring
The tutor architectures we have been producing are based on an object-oriented
programming approach. In such an approach, programs consist of independent
modules (or objects). Each module contains a set of variables, the module's
knowledge base, and a set of methods for responding to input messages. Control
in such a system involves sending a message to one object which then carries out
the method signaled by the message. Some of the actions of an object may
involve sending messages to other objects. Variables and methods are defined
via an inheritance hierarchy; they may be local to that object, defined for every
object of a class, or even inherited from more abstract objects.
In our tutors, each subgoal of the curri culum is represented by an object, and
higher-level objects act, in part, by asking their prerequisite objects to teach the
needed prerequisite skills. We call the curricu lum layer in such a system a
curriculum-object lattice structure. The objects for a proposed tutor have the
following content:
Declarative Knowledge
• Variables that identify how a given object's goals relate to the goals of other
objects (i.e., which goals are prerequisite to the current one, and for which goals
the current one is a prerequisite) .
• Variables that identify how the know ledge an object is trying to teach re lates to
the knowledge other obje1ts are trying to teach (po inters to the knowledge layer).
• Variables that represent t~e stude nt 's knowledge of the object's goal knowledge
and functions th at update those variables.

Procedural Knowledge
• Functions (methods) that generate instructional interventions based upon the
student model held by the given object , including both manipulations of the
microworld and various forms of coaching or advising.
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• Functions that decide if the given object is to blame for problems that arise while
objects for which it is prerequisite are in control (that is , if a student has trouble
later on , the prerequisite objects can be asked if they see a reason for reviewing
their lesson contents with the student).

A critical aspect of the diagnostic approach we are taking involves the notion
of blame taking. The idea is to localize diagnosis. Existing approaches used in
intelligent tutors use an overlay (Goldstein & Carr, 1977) approach. That is, they
tend to take a sample of the student's performance and attempt to determine what
sorts of deletions from the knowledge base would produce a system that behaved
as the student does. This is very computationally intensive, and it depends on the
assumption that the student's failings are all due to omissions in his knowledge;
the student may also have misconceptions which cannot as easily be detected. To
reduce the complexity of diagnostic processing in computer-based instructional
systems, we have been developing a more localized view. At any given instant, a
particular lesson is controlling the tutor; if the student has difficulties with that
lesson, then control is transferred to the prerequisites for that lesson . If any of the
prerequisite lesson objects finds reason to believe that what they taught was not
adequately learned, it reteaches. This approach will be much more efficient than
exhaustive, context-free diagnosis if most problems arise because an immediate
prerequisite has not been learned adequately. However, it is likely to be more
efficient any time that the prerequisite structure is adequate, i.e . , that it captures
the range of knowledge that could be missing. This is because the alternative is
simply to search all of the knowledge space for an appropriate gap rather than to
follow an optimizing search strategy.
We have described three layers for the intelligence that constitutes our proposed tutor: the aptitude layer, the curriculum layer, and the knowledge layer.
The curriculum layer will be the driving layer of the system. At any given
instant, a particular lesson object will control the course of processing. It will
contain pointers to portions of the knowledge base and will report on its successes and failures to the appropriate object in the aptitude layer. In the course of
responding to a report message from a lesson , the aptitude layer may take steps ,
such as adjusting risk-taking parameters, that involve changing the variables in
various lesson objects. However, the basic controlling sequence will be driven
by lessons that take control, ask for prerequisite lessons to be taught, integrate
the prerequisite knowledge by presenting composite problems that involve multiple knowledge aspects all at once, and then notify the object that called them (for
which they are prerequisite) that they are done. This lesson-driven approach sets
the stage for eventual specification of a design approach that can be a replacement for the frame-oriented approach that has driven earlier generations of computer-assisted instruction.
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SUMMARY : GENERAL DIMENSIONS FOR A
COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE MEASUREMENT
OF ACHIEVEMENT

In what follows, we attempt to summarize ideas that could comprise a theoretical
bas is fo r the design of tests and assessment instruments to determine levels of
knowledge and skill that are attained in the course of instruction. These ideas
should be considered as a bas is for test item construction coordinate with or prior
to psychometric considerations.
Fundamentally, achievement measurement should be driven by the emerging
cognitive theory of knowledge acqui sition. We now realize that people who have
learned the concepts and skills in a subject-matter domain have acquired a large
collection o f schematic knowledge structures . These structures enable understanding of the relationships inherent in their know ledge . We also know that
someone who has learned to solve problems, to make inferences, and to be
skillful in a subject-matter domain has acquired a set of cognitive procedures
attached to knowledge structu res that enable actions that influence learning, goal
setting and planning.
At various stages of learning, there exist di ffe rent integrations of knowledge,
di ffere nt degrees of procedural skill , differences in rapid access to memory and
in representations of the tasks one is to perform. The fundamental character,
then, of achievement measurement is based upon the assessment of growing
knowledge structures and related cognitive processes and procedu ral skills that
develop as a do main of profi ciency is acquired . These different levels signal
advancing expertise or passable blockages in the course of learning.
Achievement measurement theory, as we envision it , is at an early stage.
Many of the ideas needed are yet to be worked out, but stimul ating work has
been done that gives indication of the shape of a guiding framework. Relatively
speaking, we have most knowledge of differe nces between beg inners and experts, but less knowledge of the intermediate stages and the natu re of the transitions fro m level to level.
We can, however, on the basis of the work reported in this paper propose a
tentative set of " dimensions" that comprise components of developing profi ciency that might underlie the assessment of achievement. These dimensions are
certainl y covered to some extent in traditional for ms of achievement assessment,
but also may requi re new fo rms and methods of measurement. In any case,
whether or not items take on new characteristics, they will be infor med by a
theoretical base which will dri ve more systematic rationales for interpretations of
the meaning of test scores, particularl y for diagnostic aspects necessary fo r
instruction. We consider the following dimensions:
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1. Knowledge organization and structure. As efficiency is attained in a domain, elements of knowledge and components become increasingly interconnected so that proficient individuals access coherent chunks of information rather
than disconnected fragments . Beginners' knowledge is fragmentary, consisting
of isolated definitions, and superficial understandings of the meanings of appropriate vocabulary. As proficiency develops, these items of information become
structured, integrated with past organizations of knowledge so that they are
retrieved from memory rapidly in larger units. The degree of fragmentation and
structuredness and the degree of accessibility to interrelated chunks of knowledge becomes a dimension of assessment.
2 . Depth of problem representation . It is now well known that novices recognize the surface features of a problem or task situation and more proficient
individuals go beyond surface features and identify inferences or principles that
subsume the surface structure. This growing ability for fast recognition of underlying principles is an indication of developing achievement and could be assessed
by appropriate pattern recognition tasks in verbal and graphic situations. Certain
forms of representation may be highly correlated wiht details of the ability to
carry out a task or solve a problem. If this is the case, then test items might
concentrate on assessing initial understanding and depth of representation and
spend less time on the details of arriving at the correct answer.
3. Quality of mental models. People develop mental models of phenomena
and situations with which they work. The nature of these representations is
determined by what is useful for the tasks that need to be performed and the level
of achievement that is required. One's mental model of a computer or a television set, of a mathematical proof, of an electric circuit, or the structure of DNA
is dependent upon levels of knowledge and the processing requirements attached
to performance . As tasks become more complex, these models are amended
appropriately. There is a difference in the kind of knowledge required by the
user, repairman, and designer of a television set. The nature of these models is an
important dimension of achievement assessment; they indicate not only levels of
task complexity that a person is capable of handling , but also the level at which
the school requirements (and job demand) force people to think. The demands of
school problem-solving tasks may require mental models less sophisticated than
the curriculum implies . This discrepancy poses an interesting dilemma because
when proficiency is assessed it is the model required by actual performance that
is acquired and retained .
4 . EffIciency of procedures . Canying out procedures is an important aspect
of many skills and is important also for effectiveness in higher level forms of
problem solving and comprehension. Well-practiced procedures are significant
for understanding and comprehension- for example, rephrasing or summarizing
what one is reading is a performance characteristic of good comprehension;
defining an audience and planning a structure are characteristic of good writing.
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Such procedures need to be carefully assessed, but they cannot be measured in
rote fashion. They must be assessed in terms of the effective goals that are
guiding them. It is not enough to assess summarization and paraphrasing unless
their effects on comprehension are considered . It is not enough to give an
exercise in planning a composition, unless its effect on the writing process is
engaged . The relationship between task understanding and efficient procedures is
an important aspect of cognitive proficiency, and effective achievement measurement should exclude rote and piecemeal assessment of procedural skills that
does not focus on performance goals.
5. Automaticity to reduce attentional demands. In investigations of competence, it has become evident that human ability to perform competing attentiondemanding tasks is rather limited . When subtasks of a complex activity require
simultaneous demands for attention, the efficiency of the overall task is affected .
This fact has particular implications in the diagnostic assessment of the interaction between basic skill s and advanced components of cognitive performance. As
has been indicated , an example of this interaction has been of special interest in
the investigation of reading and text comprehension, where attention may alternate between basic decoding skills of recognizing words and higher level skills of
comprehension that integrate sentence ideas into memory . Although these component processes may work well when tested separately , they may not be efficient enough to work together. A slow , or inefficient , component process in
interaction with other processes can lead to breakdowns in overall proficiency . If
a task, such as reading, consists of an orchestration of basic skills and higher
level strategic comprehension processes, then measurement procedures should
be able to diagnose the inefficiencies in this complex performance.
The instructional implication is that in the development of higher levels of
proficiency, basic skills should receive enough practice so that they become
automatized and can be performed with little conscious attention. This leaves
conscious processing capacity that can be devoted to hi gher level processes as
necessary. A criterion for assessment then, is the level of effi ciency or automaticity required for subprocesses to have minimal interference effects, i.e.,
whether the automaticity of a basic process has progressed to a point where it can
facilitate and be integrated into the total performance of which it is a part. Has it
reached a point so that further , more advanced learning and higher level performance can occur? Specific procedures for assessing automaticity might involve
the measurement of response latency and of susceptibility to disrupting influences by simultaneous attention-demanding tasks.
6. Proceduralized knowledge. Modern learning theory has suggested that the
course of acquisition of components of knowledge proceeds from an initial
declarative form to compiled procedural form. In the early stage, we can know a
principle or a rule or an item of spec ialized vocabulary without knowing the
conditions under which that item of knowledge is applicable and is to be used the
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most effectively. Studies of the difference between experts and novices indicate
that beginners may have requisite knowledge but this knowledge is not bound to
the conditions of its applicability. When knowledge is accessed by experts, it is
always associated with indications of how and when it is to be used appropriately. The implication for measurement is that the progression from declarative
to tuned procedural information is an indication of the development of achievement in an area of knowledge. Task analysis in various technical skills has shown
that this progression can be assessed by qualitative differences in people's descriptions and definitions of their knowledge. Concepts, principles, and procedures can be measured in a way to determine the level of knowledge that is
available to a learner. Test items can be comprised of two elements- information that needs to be known and conditions under which use of this information is
appropriate. Our hypothesis is that advancing achievement will show changes in
the level of knowledge from initial declarative knowledge to more complex
combinations of actions and their conditions of use.
7. Procedures for theory change. As individuals learn, they solve problems
and comprehend materials that foster further learning. This learning takes place
on the basis of existing knowledge structures or theories held by students that can
enhance or retard learning. With appropriate instruction, students can test, evaluate, and modify their current theories of knowledge on the basis of new information, and develop new schemata that facilitate more advanced thinking and
problem solving.
While theories of knowledge held by students are a basis for new learning,
current research has also emphasized that individuals hold naive theories, for
example, at the beginning of a course in physics or economics, that make
learning difficult. Even after a course of instruction, these naive theories persist,
although students have learned, in some mechanical fashion, to solve problems
in the course, but with little understanding. With this in mind , theories of
knowledge become a target for assessment. The characteristics of a theory held
by a student might indicate whether it is a tractable theory, amenable to change
under certain instructional conditions, or whether the theory held is one that
teachers find more intractable, that results in learning difficulties, and that requires additional instruction.
8. Metacognitive skills for learning. Metacognition is defined in a number of
ways in the literature, but we consider here that aspect of it which refers to selfregulatory and self-management skills. Regulatory skills refer to generalized
skills for approaching problems and for monitoring one's performance. These
skills are called metacognitive because they are not specific performances or
strategies involved in solving a particular problem or carrying out a particular
procedure. Rather, they refer to the kind of knowledge that enables one to
usefully reflect upon and control one's own performance. Representative kinds
of regulatory performance include: knowing when or what one knows or does not
know, predicting the correctness or outcome of one's performance , planning
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ahead and efficiently apportioning one's time , and checking and monitoring the
outcomes of one's solution or attempts to learn .
Research has indicated that these regulatory skills develop with maturity and
that they may be less developed in students with learning disabilities or performance difficulties . It is likely that these ski lls appear in various forms and levels
of competence over a wide range of individuals . An especially interesting characteristic of these skill s is that they may be the particular aspect of performance
that facilitates transfer to new situations. Individuals can be taught a rule or
procedure that improves their task performance, but it is also important to learn
how that rule is to be used and how to monitor its use. Self-regu latory activities
of this kind are important candidates for assessment. Tests of an individual's
competence in these metacognitive ski lls might be important predictors of success of the kind of problem-solving ability that results in learning.
Achievement testing as we have defined it is a method of index ing stages of
competence through indicators of the level of development of knowledge, ski ll
and cognitive process. These indicators display stages of performance that have
been attained and on which further learning can proceed. They also show forms
of error and misconceptions in knowledge that result in inefficient and incomplete knowledge and skill and that need instructional attention.
Achievement measurement defined in this way needs to be informed by
theories of the acquisiton of subject-matter knowledge, by the development
of knowledge and ski ll , and by various dimensions of performance such as
degree of structure, automaticity, forms of representation and procedural efficiencies that indicate the growing and developing competence. We have speculated on possible indicators, but anticipate that theories of subject-matter acquisition will suggest both general indicators of competent performance, and also
specific indicators dependent upon the nature of the knowledge and skill being
assessed.
These theories require investigation and research, but work is proceeding
rapidly. We anticipate that increasing sophistication in theory will be brought to
achievement measurement, just as increasing sophistication in psychometric
analyses has been brought to the design of tests after test items have been
constructed. In essence, our paper is a signal for new orientations in achievement
testing that will need to rely on the interrelationships between knowledge of
learning and development , assessment of the indicators of growing competence,
and their relevance to methods of instruction.
Finally , achievement measurement , as we have defined it , is an integral part
of an instructional system. Teaching and testing are not separable events. Perhaps the term " learning assessment" better conveys our meaning than "achievement test, " because the forms of measurement we envision provide information
about the performance characteristics of levels of competence attained and about
steps that can be taken to facilitate further learning .
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The g Beyond Factor Analysis

Arthur R. Jensen
University of California, Berkeley

The problem of g. essentially , concerns two very fundamental questions: (I)
Why are scores on various mental ability tests positively correlated? and (2) Why
do people differ in performance on such tests?

SOME DEFINITIONS
To insure that we are talking the same language, we must review a few definitions. Clarity, explicitness, and avoidance of excess meaning or connotative
overtones are virtues of a definition. Aside from these properties, a definition per
se affords nothing to argue about. It has nothing to do with truth or reality; it is a
formality needed for communication.
A mental ability test consists of a number of items. An item is a task on which
a person's performance can be objectively scored, that is, classified (e.g.,
"right " or "wrong," 1 or 0) , or graded on a scale (e.g., "poor," "fair,"
"good," "excellent," or 0 , 1, 2,3), or counted (e.g., number of digits recalled,
number of puzzle pieces fitted together within a time limit) , or measured on a
ratio scale (e.g. , reaction time to a stimu lus or the time interval between the
presentation of a task and its completion). Objectively scored means that there is
a high degree of agreement between observers or scorers or pointer readings in
assigning a score to a person's performance on an item.
An item measures an ability if performance on the item can be objectively
scored such that a higher score represents better performance in the sense of
being more accurate, more correct, quicker, more efficient, or in closer conformance to some standard-regardless of any value judgment concerning the
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aesthetic, moral, social, or practical worth of the optimum performance on the
particular task . An item measures a mental (or cognitive) ability if very little or
none of the individual differences variance in task performance is associated with
individual differences in physical capacity, such as sensory acuity or muscular
strength, and if differences in item difficulty (percent passing) are uncorrelated
with differences in physical capacities per se.
In order for items to show individual differences in a given group of people ,
the items must vary in difficulty; that is, items without variance (0% or 100%
passing) are obviously nonfunctional in a test intended to show individual differences. A test, like any scientific measurement, requires a standard procedure.
This includes the condition that the requirements of the tasks composing the test
must be understood by the testee through suitable instructions by the tester; and
the fundaments of the task (i .e., the elements that it comprises) must already be
familiar to the testee. Also, the testee must be motivated to perform the task.
These conditions can usually be assured by the testee's demonstrating satisfactory performance on easy exemplaries of the same item types as those in the test
proper.
Mental ability tests (henceforth called simply tests) that meet all these conditions can be made up in great variety, involving different sensory and response
modalities , different media (e.g., words, numbers, symbols, pictures of familiar
things, and objects), different types of task requirements (e.g ., discrimination,
generalization, recall, naming, comparison, decision, inference), and a wide
range of task complexity. The variety of possible items and even item types
seems limited only by the ingenuity of the inventors of test items.

SOME FACTS OF NATURE
When a collection of such items is given to a large representative sample of the
general population under the specified standard conditions, it is found that there
is an abundance of positive correlations between the items; negative correlations
are very scarce and are never as large as the positive correlations, assuming, of
course, that all the items are scored in such a way that what is deemed as the
desirable performance on every item receives a higher score than undesirable
performance. The negative correlations are not only scarce and small, they
become scarcer and smaller as the number of persons increases , suggesting that
the existence of negative item intercorrelations in the abilities domain is largely
or entirely due to error. There is no corresponding shrinkage of the positive interitem correlations with an increase in sample size. If a fair number of items having
authentically and reliably negative correlations with the majority of items could
be found , it should be possible to combine a number of such negative items to
create a test that would have the usual properties of a good psychometric test in
terms of internal consistency reliability and test-retest reliability. Such a test then

4.

THE g BEYOND FACTOR ANALYSIS

89

should show large negative correlations with tests composed by sampling only
from the majority of items that are positively intercorrelated. No such "negative" test has ever been created, to my knowledge. The creation of such a test is
a challenge to those who doubt the phenomenon of positive manifold, that is,
ubiquitous positive correlations among items or tests in the ability domain .
But a correlation matrix will also tend to be predominantly positive by pure
mathematical necessity . While it is entirely possible (and usual) for all of the
correlations among n tests to have positive values ranging between 0 and + 1, the
negative counterpart to this condition is a mathematical impossibility. In a matrix
of zero-order intercorrelations, negative values are constrained. If variables A
and B are negatively correlated - I, it is impossible that both can be negatively
correlated with variable C, or D , or any other variable. While the average size of
all the correlations in a matrix can have any positive value between 0 and + 1 , the
largest possible average negative value of all the correlations in any matrix of n
variables is -lI(n - I); hence , if the negative correlations are large, they must
be few, and if they are not few , they must be small. Although there is a
mathematical limitation on negative correlations, the proportion and size of the
positive interitem correlations actually found in the ability domain far exceeds
the amount of positive intercorrelations that would be expected by chance.
Yet the generally positive correlations between items, as a rule, are rather
surprisingly small. Given the internal consistency reliability (K-R 20), r xx ' of a
test of n items, the average item intercorrelation , Ti} ' is Ti} = rx) [n - r,rx(n - I)].
In the case of even such a homogeneous test as the Raven Progressive Matrices,
the value of Ti} is only about +.12 or + . 13 . The small correlations are partly due
to an artifact, namely , the restriction of variance as the item difficulty of dichotomously scored items departs from .50. Even after correcting for the effect
of this restriction of variance on the correlations, however, it is apparent that
single test items have re latively little of the ir variance in common. In fact,
typically less than a quarter of the variance of single items overlaps the total
variance of any collection of n such items , even when the items are homogeneous
in type . The collection of items may be a random sample from a large pool of
diverse items, in which case the average interitem correlation would be relatively
low, or it may be a selection of highly similar, or homogeneous , items , in which
case the average item intercorrelation will be relatively high . But even the high
interitem correlations will average only something between about + .10 and
+.15.
Nevertheless , interitem correlations greater than 0 and less than .15 are large
enough to create a test with a very substantial proportion of reliable or true-score
variance, provided the number, n, of items composing the test is large enough.
This is inevitable, because the reliable variance of total scores on a test is equal to
the sum of all the interitem covariances in the square matrix of interitem covariances. A test of n items with an average interitem cOll'elation of Ti} will have an
internal consistency (K-R 20) reliability of rxx = nfj [I + (n - I)f;) . Conse-
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quently, by increasing the number of items sampled from the ability domain , as
previously defined , one can create a test of any desired reliability (less than 1) .
Most standard tests have reliabilities greater than .90 when used on samples of
the general population. When a number of such highly reliable ability tests,
comprising diverse contents and item types, are administered to a representative
sample of the general population , the intercorrelations of the tests are all positive
and generally substantial. In other words, the various tests have a lot of variance
in common.
This seems to be an unavoidable fact of nature. It has proven impossible to
create a number of different mental tests, each of highly homogeneous items, and
with high reliability , that do not show significant correlations with one another.
The' 'positive manifold " of test intercorrelations is indeed a reality , a fundamental fact , that call s for scientific explanation.
A hypothesized explanation of the correlation between any particular pair of
different , but singly homogeneous, tests will often point to certain common
surface features of the two tests that may seem to plausibly account for their
correlation. But hypotheses of thi s kind run into greater and greater difficulty as
they try to explain intercorrelations among diverse tests. The surface features of
tests soon prove inadequate to the explanatory burden when the number and
diversity of tests increases but still displays positive manifold . it is well-nigh
impossible, for example, to account for the correlations between vocabulary,
block des igns, and backward digit span in terms of common features of the tests.
Explanations of correlations in terms of the surface features of tests would turn
out to require nearly as many explanations as there are pairs of different , but
correlated, tests. From the viewpoint of sc ientific theory, such a multiplicity and
specificity of explanations is quite unsatisfactory, if not entirely unacceptable ,
and, in fact , no one systematically even attempts it.
Psychometricians since Spearman have preferred to describe the intercorrelations among a number of tests in terms of a smaller number of hypothetical
factors (i.e . , sources of variance) that certain tests have in common. The burden
of explanation , therefore, shifts from explanations of single correlations between
particular pairs of tests to a much more limited number of hypothetical factors
that a number of tests measure in common.

FACTOR ANALYSIS AND THE HIGHEST ORDER
FACTOR
Spearman (1904, (927) hypothes ized that the positive correlation among . all
cognitive tests is due to a general factor that is measured by every test. His
invention of fado r analysis permitted estimation of the proportion of the total
variance in a collection of tests that is attributable to the general factor, g, as well
as the correlation (termed afactor loading) of each test with the g factor that is
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common to all of the tests. Variance that is not attributable to the g factor (call it
the non-g variance), is assignable to (I) other factors, called group factors,
because they account for the non-g correlations among only certain groups of
tests, (2) specificity, or that portion of a test's true score (i.e., reliable) variance
that is not shared in common with any other tests in the collection of tests
subjected to factor analysis, and (3) error variance.
Aside from error variance, specificity is the least interesting from a psychological and psychometric standpoint, because specificity can dwindle as more
tests of simi lar types are added to the collection; then some of the specific
variance turns into additional group factors (also termed primary, or first-order,
factors).
The general factor, g, is the highest common factor in the correlation matrix,
accounting for more of the total common factor variance than any other factor,
and often even more than all of the other factors combined.
A g factor can be extracted by anyone of three methods in current use . It can
be represented by (1) the first principal component of a principal components
analysis, or (2) the first factor of a common factor (or principal factor) analysis,
or (3) a hierarchical factor analysis, in which all of the first-order factors are
rotated to an oblique "simple structure" and the correlation among the firstorder factors are then factor analyzed to yield a second-order factor. The g factor,
the apex of the hierarchy, most typically emerges as the only second-order
factor, although in large and highly diverse collections of tests, g appears as a
third-order factor at the apex of the hierarchy.
It is desirable to "residualize" the factor loadings at each level in the hierarchy, i.e., the variance that is common to the oblique (i .e., correlated) firstorder factors is partialled out and transferred up to the second-order ob lique
factors, and their common variance also is partialled out and transferred to the
third-order factor. This procedure orthogonalizes the entire hierarchy ; that is, all
the factors are uncorrelated with one another, within and between levels of the
hierarchy. This hierarchical analysis can be accomplished by means of the
Schmid-Leiman (1957) procedure , which yields the factor loadings of all the
tests on each of the orthogonal factors at every level of the hierarchy. A schematic factor hierarchy is shown in Fig. 4.1.
Is there a preference among these methods of extracting a g factor? Yes,
although each method has certain advantages and disadvantages . The first principal component is the least affected by sampling error, and the hierarchical
analysis is the most affected, and therefore should be used with samples that are
very much larger than the number of tests. The first principal component will
always yield the largest g in terms of its eigenvalue or the proportion of total
variance accounted for, but this is not a real advantage, because some small part
of that variance consists of uniqueness (i .e., the specific and error variance),
which is more or less evenly spread over all the components in a principal
components analysis. Thus we often find that the various tests' loadings on the
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FIG.4.1. Example of a hierarchica l
factor analys is with three leve ls.

first principal component, although they are slightly larger overall than the
corresponding loadings on the first principal facto r, are somewhat less clear-cut.
Despite this, the first principal component and first principal factor are nearly
always extremely alike . 1 have yet to find a correlation matrix of real tests for
which the congruence coeffi cient between the first principal component and the
first principal factor is lower than + 0 .99, which means that for most purposes
they can be regarded as virtually identical. (This is not true of the subsequent
unrotated components or factors extracted after the first; the congruence between
the corresponding components and fac tors decreases with each successive component extracted .)
The hierarchical g is always smaller than the g represented by either the first
principal component or first principal factor. This is because the process of
extracting a hierarchical g (using the Schmid-Leiman orthogonalizatioo transformation) does not result in any significant negative correlations in the res idual
matrix after the g factor is removed , so that positive manifold of the res idual
matrix is preserved when factors are partialled out at every level of the hierarchy ,
and virtually all of the statistically reliable factor loadings are positive on all
factors. Thi s condition is theoretically desirable in terms of thinking of all abilities as positive vectors and as always faci litating, and never hindering, performance on any cognitive task that is at all affected by the ability . (The preservation of all positive loadings on all factors was originally advocated by Thurstone
(1938, 1947), as one of the aims of factor rotation to approximate simple
structure. )
In extracting g by principal fac tor analysis and hierarchical factor analysis
from the same set of data , I have found that the hierarchical g usually contains
some 10% to 20% less variance than the g represented by the first principal
factor. Yet the relative sizes of tests' load ings on the first principal factor and on
the Schmid-Leiman hierarchical g are usually highly simil ar, with coefficients of
congruence of + 0 .99 or greater. When both the first principal factor and the
hierarchical g are extracted from the intercorrelations (based on the national
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standardization data) of the 13 subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children, for example, the coefficient of congruence between them is +0.999
(Jensen & Reynolds, 1982). I have compared both types of g factors in many
collections of tests and have never found the relative magnitudes of the factor
loadings to differ appreciably. However, an advantage of the hierarchical g is
that it is less affected by variations in the sampling of tests entering into the
analysis. For example, if we included a half-dozen or so more different types of
memory span tests in the Wechsler battery, the first principal factor would be
pushed somewhat in the direction of the memory factor , that is , its loadings on
the memory span tests would be enlarged. The hierarchical g, however, would
remain relatively unaffected by the number of tests of different types in the
battery. In short , the hierarchical g is more stable than the first principal factor
across variations in psychometric sampling .
When the first-order factors are rotated , the first factor loses its status as the
highest common factor; its variance is scattered among the rotated primary
factors, and what could properly be called a g factor disappears. The most
popular rotational criterion is Thurstone's concept of simple structure , which
aims for a factor pattern that contains no negative loadings and a maximum of
zero loadings. An idealized simple structure is shown in Table 4.1. (If the factors
were all orthogonal, there would be no g.) If the rotated factors are forced to be
orthogonal (i.e., uncorrelated), achievement of a clean simple structure has
proved to be impossible in the abilities domain . The basic assumption underly ing
orthogonal simple structure is that test scores are simple in factorial composition.
Simple structure implies the hope that a number of tests cou ld be devised, each of
which measures only one abi lity, so-called primary mental abilities. But despite
TABLE 4. I
A Rot ated Factor Matrix Showing Factor Loa ding s
of an Id ea l i zed Simp l e Structure
Rotated Factors
Variable

A

B

C

D

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

o·
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

3

3

2

2

% Variance 30
30
2
.
h = communality

20

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Eigenvalue

h

2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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concerted efforts, this goal has never been attained . No matter how homogeneous each of a number of tests is, or how' 'factor pure" their constructors have
striven to make them, they are always found to be substantially correlated with
one another in any sizeable representative sample of the general population.
When the correlations among such tests are factor analyzed and rotated to
orthogonal simple structure, which is now most common ly done analytically ,
using Kaiser's (1958) varimax, the desired "simple structure" is never "clean,"
that is, instead of many near-zero factor loadings there are many low but significant loadings scattered throughout the matrix, representing the dispersal of the
general factor throughout all the primary factors. Although varimax or other
simple structure rotation aids in the identification and interpretation of the group
factors because of the fairly sharp contrast between large and small factor loadings that serves to highlight the various primary factors, it has the disadvantage
of scattering and submerging the g factor beyond recognition.
To overcome this problem , Thurstone suggested oblique rotation yielding
correlated primary factors; this achieves a much closer approximation to simple
structure. But the g variance then resides in the correlations among the primary
factors, which, when factor analyzed, yield the g factor at the top of the hierarchy. Hence , in the abilities domain , it is an incomplete and unacceptable
practice to stop factor extraction with orthogonal rotation of the primary factors.
So, too, are oblique primary factors an incomplete analysis, unless one goes on
to extract g (and any other higher-order factors). To pretend that g does not exist
because it can be "rotated away" is merely deceptive. The purely mathematical
argument that any position of the factor axes is as good as any other, is theoretically unacceptable. The argument rests simply on the fact that the same
amount of common factor variance is accounted for regardless of the position to
which the factor axes are rotated, and any factor structure (given the same
number of factors) can reproduce the original zero-order correlations among the
tests equally well. While it is indeed true that an unlimited number of different
positions of the factor axes is possible, and that all of them are mathematically
equivalent in reproducing the original correlations, some factor structures make
much more sense, theoretically, than others. Some possible factor structures may
even create quite misleading impressions . When we "hide" the g factor in the
orthogonal simple-structure primary factors, for examp le, we create the expectation that some of the mental tests are uncorrelated , when in fact this is contradicted by the all -positive matrix of actual test of intercorrelations. Orthogonal
simple structure also does not reflect the fact that the average differences between
individuals on a number of tests are larger than the average differences between
tests within individuals. The g factor, along with the smaller group factors in a
hierarchical analysis, best represents all these salient facts far better than any
orthogonal rotation of multiple first-order factors that dissipates g.
The g factor of a large and heterogeneous battery of mental ability tests differs
in one important way from all the other rotated or unrotated factors that can be
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extracted, besides the fact that g is the single largest factor. The g factor cannot
easily be characterized, if indeed it can be described at all, in terms of the
features of the tests on which it has its most salient loadings, while all the
primary factors can be characterized in terms of test content, such as verbal,
numerical, spatial, and memory. When such diverse tests as Wechsler Vocabulary and Raven Matrices both have almost equally high g loadings when factor
analyzed among a battery of diverse tests, psychological interpretations of g are
difficult and certainly not obvious. The apparent features of the tests and the
overt behavioral skills evinced by successful performance on the tests afford
scant clues as to the basis for their high correlations with each other and with g.
In attempting to characterize g, one is forced to seek a level of generality that
transcends the "phenotypic" features of particular tests and to invoke theoretical
concepts involving deeper levels of analysis. In confronting g, we are dealing
with a highly abstract theoretical construct.
Factors, including g, are not themselves explanatory constructs . They are
constructs which themselves require explanation. The g factor, above all , is a
phenomenon worthy of scientific analysis and explanation. At present, we are
still not very far ahead of the position noted by Spearman in 1927, when he stated
that
This general factor g, like all measurements anywhere, is primarily not any concrete thing but only a value or magnitude . Further, that which this magnitude
measures has not been defined by declaring what it is like, but only by pointing out
where it can be found. It consists in just that constituent- whatever it may bewhich is common to all the abilities inter-connected by the tetrad equation . This
way of indicating what g means is just as definite as when one indicates a card by
staking on the back of it without looking at its face. Such a defining of g by site
rather than by nature is what was meant originally when its determination was said
to be only "objective." Eventually, we mayor may not find reason to conclude
that g measures something that can appropriately be called "intelligence." Such a
conclusion, however, would still never be a definition of g, but only a "statement
about it." (pp. 75- 76)

I believe Spearman was quite correct in tentatively identifying intelligence
only with g rather than with all of mental ability. There is no theoretical limit to
the possible number of ability factors, so long as we can go on making slight
variations in numerous mental tests such that their intercorrelations are less than
1 when corrected for attenuation. Hence, to equate intelligence with all of mental
ability would surely render this concept scientifically undefinable and unmeasurable. If we reject this alternative, and g as well, as definitions of intelligence, we are left either with the problem of deciding which other factor should
be included in our definition or of resorting to pure operationalism, declaring that
one particular test is the measure of intelligence.
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FLUID AND CRYSTALLIZED ABILITY
Cattell (1963, 1971) discovered that, when various tests with contents reflecting
past learning experiences, cultural acquisition, and scholastic knowledge and
verbal and numerical ski lls are factor analyzed along with tests involving novel
problem solving and forms of reasoning based on analogies, series, and matrices
all consisting of abstract or nonrepresentational figures , there emerges at the
second level of a hierarchical analysis two factors which Cattell has labeled fluid
and crystallized G, or G r and Gc ' Fluid ability, G r, can be described as relation
eduction, abstraction, and reasoning in novel problems. Crystallized ab ility , G c '
reflects the acquisition of specific and transferrable skills and knowledge made
available by the individual's culture, education, and experience. The G r much
more nearly corresponds to Spearman's concept of g than does G c ' Since Cattell's hierarchical model does not go beyond the second level, Humphreys (1979)
has described it as an "incomplete hierarchical model" (p. 108). Because G r and
Gc are correlated, and usually highly correlated, in an oblique solution , a substantial g should emerge as a third-order factor-a g which is essentially the
same as Spearman's g. The degree of correlation between G r and G c seems to be
related to a number of conditions:
I. When the persons are of similar cultural background and have had fairly
equal amounts of school experience, G r and G c are highly correlated. In our
university undergraduates, for example, the correlations between various typical
tests of fluid and crystallized abilities are just about as high as the correlations
between tests of the same type . And Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices, a
classical marker test for G r, is more highly loaded (+0 .80) on the overall g factor
(first principal factor) of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale than are any of
the WAIS subtests themselves, even though the W AIS is generally viewed as
being predominantly a test of crystallized abi lities.
2. A random or representative sample of the general population shows higher
correlations between G f and G c tests than samples with a more restricted range of
ability.
3. As the collection of tests becomes larger and more varied in contents and
item types, G f and G c become less clearly distinguishable. The total unweighted
composite score on a sufficiently large and broadly representative sample of
cognitive tasks is almost perfectly correlated with Spearman's g, that is , the
highest-order g. Although I have not seen a definitive empirical demonstration, 1
venture the hypothesis that collections of tests that are considered typical measures of Gc would yield a g that comes increasingly closer to the g of a collection
of tests that are considered typical measures of G r as the number and variety of
Gc-type tests increases. In other words, an increasing amount of G r can be
"distilled" out of typical G c tests as they are sampled more broadly , because the
only factor common to all the highly varied measures of crystallized abilities will
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be fluid ability, G f . The fluid aspect of G c is increasingly siphoned into G f , and
the crystallized residue recedes into the residualized primary factors, or becomes
at best merely a minor second-order factor.
Something very much like this picture is seen in two recent factor analyses of
large batteries of highly varied psychometric tests selected to represent a number
of the second-order factors previously identified in factor analyses by other
investigators and which include G f and Gc ' When a Schmid-Leiman hierarchical
factor analysis is applied to these data, G f and G c clearly appear as second-order
factors. But when the hierarchical analysis is continued to the third level , yielding g, the residualized second-order G f simply disappears; it is completely absorbed into g. In Gustafsson's (1984) analysis, the correlation between G f and g
is + 1.00, and Gustafsson concludes that "the second-order factor of fluid intelligence is identical with a third-order g-factor" (p. 179) . In this analysis, much
of G c is also "absorbed" by g, the correlation between them being +.76.
Undheim (1981a, 198ab, 1981c) re-analyzed the correlations among the 20 tests
of the Horn and Cattell (1966) study which identified G r, G c ' and three other
second-order factors (Gy- spatial visualization, Gr- fluency, and G s - "speediness " ). But Undheim carried the hierarchical analysis to the third level , yielding
g. The residualized G f turns out to be very small, accounting for less than half as
much variance as G c and less than one fifth as much variance as g. Undheim,
with Gustafsson, concludes that Cattell's second-order G f is equivalent to g, as
defined in an orthogonalized hierarchical model- a g referred to by Undheim as
a neo-Spearmanian g, because it is arrived at by a method of factor analysis quite
different from Spearman's outmoded tetrad method . And the residualized G c
should not really be considered a general factor at all, but a minor second-order
factor correlated with primary factors arising from tests of verbal , educational,
and general cultural knowledge . G c is practically equivalent to a residualized
V:ed (verbal-educational) factor in Vernon's (1950) hierarchical model.

SIZE AND INVARIANCE OF 9
As the first (unrotated) principal factor , g inevitably comprises more variance
than any other factor that could be extracted from the matrix of test intercorrelations . But how large a percentage of the total variance does g actually account
for? The answer depends on the number and diversity of the tests and the range of
ability in the subject sample. To get a rough idea of the size of g, I have
examined 20 independent correlation matrices comprising a total of more than 70
tests, such as the Wechsler battery , all the tests used in the Natiomil Longitudinal
Study, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, the General Aptitude Test Battery, and other miscellaneous collections of tests . The tests have been administered to large and

98

JENSEN

fairly representative samples of children and adu lts. (As all scores are agestandardized, the effects of age do not enter into the correlations.) The average
percentage of variance accounted for by g in the 20 data sets is 42 .7% (with a
range from 33.4% to 61.4%) . The average percentage of variance attributable to
all other factors that have eigenvalues greater than 1, and thus can be said to
constitute other common factors, is 15.3% (with a range from 9.6% to 22.8%)call this the non-g common factor variance . The ratio of g variance to non-g
common factor variance was determined for each of the 20 analyses; the mean
ratio over the 20 studies is exactly 3: 1; that is , g accounts for three times as much
variance as the non-g common factor variance. (The g/non-g ratios ranged from
1.6 to 5.2.)
Spearman originally believed that g is invariant across different collections of
tests, but this belief depended on the truth of his two-factor theory, namely, that
the true-score variance of every test comprises only g variance and specific
variance. But the overly simple two-factor theory had to be discarded. With the
acknowledgment of group factors, the invariance of g across different collections
of tests is no longer logically assured, but is an open emp irical question . It is
certainly true that the particular composition of the test battery will affect its g. A
collection of tests in which all of them are verbal will yield a g which is some
amalgam of both general and verbal abi lity and will therefore be a somewhat
different g from a test composed of both verbal and nonverbal tests in roughly
equal proportions. The degree of invariance of g is a function of the number,
diversity, and cognitive complexity of the tests in the collection that is factor
analyzed . Increasing anyone or a combination of these conditions increases the
similarity of the g factor extracted in different collections of tests.
The robustness of g in maintaining its identity when extracted from different
test batteries, however, actually seems quite impressive. Tests with larger g
loadings in one battery generally have large g loadings in most other batteries. It
is a rare finding, for examp le, when a high-g test such as the Raven Matrices has
a g loading below the median g in any collection of psychometric tests . When
this nonverbal test is factor analyzed among just the six verbal subtests of the
WAIS, for example, the size of its g loading is second only to that of Vocabulary. When the Raven Matrices and all 11 of the WAIS subtests, which includes
five nonverbal performance tests , are factor analyzed, the Raven has the highest
g loading among all of the tests.
Another example of the robustness of g: The g loadings of the 12 scales of the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) were obtained for
the 1868 white children in the national standardization sample. In an independent
sample of 86 white children, the same 12 WISC-R subtests were factor analyzed
along with the 13 subtests of the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (KABC), a mental ability test designed with the hope of being quite different from
the WISC-R. I How simi lar are the WISC-R g loadings across two independent
II am indebted to Dr. J. A. Nag li eri for providing these data.
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samples and when the 12 WISC-R subtests are factor analyzed as a 12 x 12
correlation matrix (the standardization sample) and as part of a 25 x 25 matrix
including the 13 K-ABC subtests? The average g loadings of the WISC-R subtests in these two conditions are +0.57 and +0.58, respectively, and the rankorder correlation between the two sets of g loadings is +0.97. In short , the two g
factors are practically identical, even across different samples and different collections of tests .
The robustness of g across diverse test batteries was shown long ago in a study
by Garrett, Bryan, and Perl (1935), who factor analyzed a battery of six varied
memory tests (meaningful prose, paired-associates, free recall of words, digit
span, memory for forms, memory for objects) and extracted the g factor. This
battery of tests then was factor analyzed along with four other diverse tests not
especially involving memory (motor speed, vocabulary, arithmetic, form board).
The g loadings of the memory tests in the two analyses were correlated .80. The
overall correlation between g factor scores based on just the memory tests and g
factor scores based on just the nonmemory tests was .87. This is evidence that
the g of the six memory tests is very close to the g of the nonmemory tests. To be
sure, the memory tests were not as highly loaded on g (average g loading = .42)
as the vocabulary and arithmetic tests (average g loading = .65), but what little g
the memory tests have is much the same g as found in the non memory tests. One
would like to see larger-scale studies of this type based on many diverse psychometric tests, to determine the range of correlations between g factor scores
extracted from different nonoverlapping sets of tests, controlling for reliability.
My hunch is that all the g factors would be found to be highly simil ar.
We now have considerable evidence that g is highly consistent across different racial populations when they share the same language and general cultural
background . In nine independent studies in which test batteries comprising anywhere from six to thirteen tests were admini stered to large representative samples
of black and white Americans and a g factor was extracted separately from the
correlation matrices in the black and white samples, the coefficients of congruence between the g factors obtained in the black and white samples of the nine
studies ranged between +0.993 and +0.999, with a mean of +0.996. Such
congruence coefficients indicate virtual identity of the g factor in the black and
white populations (Jensen, 1985) . (From the same data, the mean group difference in g is estimated at about 1. 2 IT, where IT is the average within-group
standard deviation.)

PRACTICAL EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF 9
The practical predictive validity of intelligence and aptitude tests is mainly
dependent on g. This has been so frequently demonstrated with respect to the
prediction of scholastic achievement as to not bear further reiteration. Other
factors, such as verbal and numerical factors, may enhance prediction of perfor-
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FIG. 4.2 . Frequency distribution of 537 validity coeffic ients of the General
Aptitude Test Battery for 446 different occupations. G score is general inte lligence; multifactor validity is based on an optimally weighted composite of nine
GATB aptitudes (including G) for each job category . The median validities are
+ 0 .27 for G and + 0 .36 for the multi factor composite .

mance in school and college and in the various armed forces training programs ,
because the predicted criterion is factorially complex, but the increases in the
validity coefficient that result from adding other factors after g in the prediction
equation are surprisingly small . The same is true for the prediction of occupational performance , although a clerical speed and accuracy factor and a spatial visualization factor contribute significantly to the predictive validity for certain
occupations . The g factor has predictive validity for job performance in nearly all
jobs , and the validity of g increases with job complexity. I have found that the
average predictive validities of each of the GATB aptitude tests, for 300 occupations, are substantially correlated (+ .65) with the g loadings of these aptitude
tests (Jensen, 1984) . The frequency distribution of 537 GATB validity coefficients for predicting performance in 446 different jobs is shown in Fig . 4.2 . The
G score validity is a simple r, whereas the multifactor validity is a multiple R,
which by its nature can never be less than zero and is always bi ased upwards.
Hence , the small average difference between the two sets of validity coefficients
is noteworthy . It seems very likely that no other mental ability factor or combination of factors, independent of g, has as many educationally , occupationally , and
socially significant correlates as g.

THE "REALITY" OF 9
We are frequently warned of the danger of reifying g, but it is never made very
clear just what this might mean. Is there a danger of reifying the physicist' s
concept of energy, which is also an abstract theoretical construct? One and the
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same energy is assumed to be manifested in various forms, such as "kinetic,"
"chemical," and "potential" energy. Is the physicist guilty of reification when
the concept of gravitation enters into his explanation of certain physical events?
For nearly a century the gene was a hypothetical construct; quantitative genetics
and population genetics were developed entirely in terms of this construct.
Factor analysts and intelligence theorists have always viewed g as a theoretical construct. The status of factors as theoretical constructs has been so
thoroughly discussed by Burt (1940) in the chapter on "The Metaphysical Status
of Factors" in his famous book The Factors of the Mind as to leave hardly
anything more that could reasonably be said on this topic . Anyone who feels
inclined to argue about this matter, I would insist, should first study Burt's
masterful chapter. If it is thought that there is really anything left to argue about
concerning the legitimacy of g as a bona fide theoretical construct, we should not
be deprived of this enlightenment, explicated, one would hope, with the same
philosophic thoroughness and scientific erudition that characterize Burt's
chapter.
Recognition of g as a hypothetical construct is not to say that g represents
nothing more than a mathematical artifact or a fiction entirely created by the
algebraic operations of factor analysis applied to an arbitrary collection of tests.
If this were proven true, g would indeed be of little scientific interest. The g
factor gains interest to the extent that it is found to be significantly related to
variables outside the realm of psychometric tests, from which the g construct
originated. It has already been noted that a g factor dependably appears as a
major hypothetical source of individual differences when we factor analyze any
collection of diverse cognitive tasks on which a person's performance must meet
some objectively quantifiable standard and on which task difficulty is not a
function of sensory or motor skills, that is, the easy and hard tasks do not make
different demands on sensorimotor abilities per se. And the g factors extracted
from different collections of diverse cognitive tasks are much more highly correlated with one another than are the tasks themselves, or than are a simple
unweighted sum of the scores on the tasks in each collection. Even though g is
not absolutely invariant, the considerable congruence of the g factors extracted
even from quite dissimilar collections of tests is consistent with the interpretation
of the observed variability in g as a form of measurement error due to psychometric sampling. Variability in g arises from the fact that tests differ in their g
loadings relative to other non-g factors, and most collections of tests that are
submitted to factor analysis are quite limited in size. Hence there is psychometric
sampling error in the g measured by any particular limited collection of tests. The
resulting variability of g merely attenuates its potential correlation with external
variables that might enhance its interest as a theoretical construct. In spite of such
sampling variability, g is found to be related to a number of theoretically important variables which themselves have no connection whatsoever with psychometrics or factor analysis. Psychometric tests were never devised with the express purpose of predicting these variables. Here are some noteworthy examples.
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Heritability ofWAIS Subtests . A simple method for inferring whether there
is a statistically significant proportion of genetic variance in a metric trait is
Fisher's variance ratio , F, based on the within-pair variances obtained in groups
of monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins; that is , F = Sa.,DZ/ Sa.,MZ' The
rationale for this ratio is that the difference between the members of a pair of DZ
twins (who have, on average, only about half of their segregating genes in
common) is attributable to both genetic and environmental factors , while the
difference between members of a pair of MZ twins (who have identical genotypes) can be attributable only to nongenetic factors. For the genetic traits,
therefore, the within-pair variance of DZ twins is necessarily greater than that of
MZ twins; the F ratio reflects this difference between DZ and MZ twins, and can
be used as a statistical test of its significance. An F not greater than I is
interpreted theoretically as indicating the absence of genetic variance in the trait
in question , and the more that F exceeds 1, the larger is the contribution of
genetic factors to the total variance in the trait. (The precise value of F > 1
required for statistical significance , of course, depends on the level of significance, a, and the degrees of freedom of the numerator and denominator of the
variance ratio.)
There are two independent studies in which the 11 subtests of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (W AIS) were given to samples of MZ and DZ twins and
the F ratios were determined for each of the WAIS subtests (Block, 1968;
Tambs, Sundet, & Magnus , 1984). (The study by Block had 60 pairs each of MZ
and DZ twins; Tambs et al. had 40 pairs each of MZ and DZ twins .) The F ratios
in the two studies range from I. 36 to 4.51 , with a mean of 2.26; 18 out of the 22
F ratios are significant beyond the 5% level. In each study I have calculated the
rank-order correlation between the profile of F ratios on the 11 W AIS subtests
with the profile of g loadings of the subtests obtained from the W AIS standardization sample for ages 19 to 24 years . Thus the F ratios and g loadings are based
on independent samples . The rank-order correlation between the profiles of F
ratios and g loadings is + .62 (p < .05) for the Block data and + .55 (p < .05) for
the Tambs et al. data . These correlations should be compared with the rank
correlation of + .62 between the profiles of F ratios obtained in the two studies .
If that correlation can be regarded as an estimate of the reliability of the F
profiles , the correlation between the F and g profiles corrected for attenuation
becomes + .79 and +.70, respectively . (It should be noted that test reliability
itself does not enter into the F ratios, since measurement error contributes the
same proportion of error variance to the within-pair differences for MZ and DZ
twins alike, and the proportionality factor cancels out in the F ratio, i.e.,
Sa.,DZ/ Sa.,MZ·) In brief, these studies show that there is a relationship between the
size of g loadings of the W AIS subtests and the degree to which the subtests
reflect genetic variance.
Family Correlations. Nagoshi and Johnson (1966) correlated the g loadings
of 15 highly varied cognitive tests with the degree to which the tests are corre-
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lated between different pairs of family members in a large sample (927 families)
of Americans of European ancestry. The correlations of the 15 tests' profile of g
loadings with the profile of family correlations (disattenuated) on each of the 15
tests are as follows:
Between spouses
Father-son
Mother-son
Father-daughter
Mother-daughter
Brother-brother
Sister-sister
Brother-sister

+.90 , P < .001
+.55 , P < .05
+.69, P < .01
+.59, P < .05
+.76, P < .001
+.33
+.42
+ .26

Nagoshi and Johnson note that the heritability of g (to the extent that heritability
can be assessed through family correlations) appears to be higher than that of
non-g, possibly because of greater assortative mating for g than for non-g; e
appears to have greater influence on educational and occupational attainment
than does non-g .
Inbreeding Depression . If the genetic factors (alleles) that enhance the phenotypic expression of a trait are dominant, the effect of inbreeding is to lower the
mean of the trait in the inbred group relative to the mean of a non inbred but
otherwise comparable population- a phenomenon known as "inbreeding depression." The effect depends on the presence of genetic dominance, and the
presence of dominance indicates that the trait has undergone directional selection
in the course of its evolution. Hence the presence of inbreeding depression,
signifying dominance, in the case of psychometric tests of ability suggests that
variance on such tests reflects in part a trait of biological relevance as a fitness
character for which there has been positive selection in the course of human
evolution.
There are now at least 12 independent studies that have reported the genetically predictable effects of inbreeding on mental test scores (reviewed by
Jensen, 1983; Agrawal, Sinha, & Jensen , 1984). The effect of inbreeding depression on the IQs of the children of first-cousins, as compared with children of
unrelated parents, is about one third of a standard deviation for the Wechsler IQ
(Jensen , 1983) and about one half of a standard deviation on the Raven Matrices,
a more purely g-Ioaded test (Agrawal et aI. , 1984).
The degree of inbreeding depression on the various subtests of the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) is directly related to the subtests' g
loadings . The rank-order correlation between the profile of the index of inbreeding depression on 11. WISC subtests and the profile of the subtests' g loadings is
about +0.8 (Jensen , 1983). Varimax rotated factor loadings show markedly
smaller correlations with the index of inbreeding depression than do the g factor
loadings. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that psychometric g
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reflects to some extent a biological aspect of intelligence that acts as a fitness
character which has been subjected to natural selection in the course of human
evolution.

Speed of Mental Processing . A variety of reaction time (RT) tasks , or
elementary cognitive tasks (ECT) , have been found to be correlated with psychometric tests of intelligence and scholastic achievement (Carlson & Jensen, 1982;
Carlson, Jensen, & Widaman, 1983; Carroll, 1980; Cohn, Carlson, & Jensen ,
1985; Jensen , 1982a, 1982b; Jensen & Munro, 1979; Vernon, 1983 ; Vernon &
Jensen , 1984). Not only are subjects' median RTs (measured over a number of
trials) correlated with psychometric tests, but intraindividual variability (measured as the standard deviation of the subject's RTs over a number of trials)
shows comparable correlations. The correlation of RT and ECTs with psychometric tests of ability seems to depend mostly, perhaps even entirely, on g. The
remarkable thing about these simple tasks designed to measure speed of mental
processing is that the tasks usually involve nothing that would ordinarily be
regarded as intellectual content. The tasks are so simple and the error rates are so
low that individual differences in performance usually cannot be reliably scored
in terms of the number of right or wrong responses . RTs measured in milliseconds, however, when averaged over a number of test trials for each subject, yield
measures with satisfactory reliability . The easiness of the tasks is suggested by
median RTs that are generally less than one second.
With a sample of university students, Vernon (1983) used scores on the
eleven subtests of the W AIS in a multiple regression to predict a composite RT
score created by summing subjects' median reaction times and intraindividual
variability after these were converted to z scores. The shrunken multiple R was
substantial (.44) , even in this restricted university sample (Full Scale IQ = 122,
SD = 8) . However, the correlation of only the g factor of the W AIS is - .41; that
is, all the non-g variance in the 11 W AIS subtests increases the multiple R by
only .03. The profile of g loadings of each of the WAIS subtests shows a rankorder correlation of -.73 with the profile of each of the subtests' correlations
with the composite RT score, but this correlation is attenuated in this university
sample which has a restricted range on g. as the lowest Full Scale IQ of any
subject in the study was at the 75th percentile of the W AIS standardization
sample. (The data for this analysis were provided by P. A. Vernon.)
A similar effect is seen in a study by Hemmelgarn and Kehle (1984), who
used a RT apparatus like that described by Jensen and Munro (1979), in which
the subject's RT to either 1, 2,4, or 8 light-button alternatives is measured. (See
Appendix for a description of this paradigm.) In this arrangement, RT is an
increasing linear function of the number of bits of information in the stimulus
array (i.e ., bit = log2n. where n is the number of light-button alternatives), an
effect known as Hick's law. The slope of this function is regarded as a measure
(inverse) of the speed of information processing, in milliseconds per bit. Hem-
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melgarn and Kehle correlated individual differences in the RT slope measure
with scores on each of the 12 subtests of the WISC-R in a group of 59 elementary
school pupils. (Chronological age was partialled out.) The profile of 12 correlations showed a rank-order correlation of - .83 (p < .01) with the profile of the
subtests' g loadings. That is, the degree to which a WISC-R subtest is correlated
with a RT index of information processing speed is related to the size of its g
loading. The overall correlation between RT slope and Full Scale IQ was only
- .32, but a larger correlation would hardly be expected, considering the generally low test-retest reliability of the slope measure. RT measures, and particularly the slope, are quite sensitive to physiological state, which fluctuates for
individuals from day to day .

Evoked Cortical Potentials. Various parameters of the electrical potentials
of the cerebral cortex evoked by visual or auditory stimuli have been found to be
correlated with IQ. Haier, Robinson, Braden, and Williams (1983) conclude:
Perhaps, the most startling conclusion suggested by this body of work is not just
that there is a relationship between brain potentials and intelligence, but that the
relationship is quite strong. This supports the proposition that the variance of
intelligence, with all its complex manifestations, may result primarily from relatively simple differences in fundamental properties of central brain processes. (p.
598)

Eysenck and Barrett (1985) derived a measure from the average evoked
potential (AEP) that reflects the complexity of the waveform as indicated by the
contour perimeter of the AEP wave in a given time-locked epoch. Higher IQ is
associated with greater complexity of the AEP waveform; correlations in excess
of + .60 have been found between IQ and AEP. Eysenck and Barrett factor
analyzed the correlations among the II subscales of the W AIS obtained on 219
subjects on whom there were also obtained a composite measure of AEP complexity, which subtracts the complexity measure from the variability of the AEP,
as variability is negatively correlated with IQ. When the composite AEP measure
was included in the factor analysis along with the II W AIS subtests, the AEP
had a loading of + .77 on the g factor. Moreover, the profile of g loadings of the
WAIS subtests showed a rank-order correlation of +.95 (p < .01) with the
profile of correlations of each of the W AIS subtests with the AEP. (When all the
correlations in each profile were corrected for attenuation, the rank-order correlation dropped to + .93 [p < .0 I].) In short, the g factor of the W AIS is shown to
be highly reflected in an electrophysiological measurement of cortical activity in
response to simple stimuli (auditory "clicks") that cannot be regarded as cognitive or intellectual by any conventional definition of these terms.
Following a lead from Eysenck, Schafer (1985) independently has discovered
a highly similar effect based on the AEP. In a sample of 52 adults of average or
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superior intelligence (WAIS Full Scale IQs of 98 to 142), Schafer measured the
amplitudes of AEPs to two blocks each of 25 stimuli (auditory clicks). The
percentage difference between the averages of the first and second blocks was a
measure of EP habituation. (Subjects show a decrease in EP amplitude over
repeated trials.) This measure of EP habituation correlated + .59 (p < .01) with
WAIS Full Scale IQ. (When corrected for the restricted range of IQ in this
sample, the correlation is +.73.) A range-corrected multiple R of .80 was obtained when another index derived from the AEP was used along with the
habituation measure. Schafer correlated the profile of WAIS subtest loadings on
the first principal component in his sample with the profile of correlations between each of the subtests and the EP habituation index ; the rank-order correlation is +.91. When the same analysis is done using the first principal factor
(instead of the first principal component) to represent the g of the W AIS , the
results are as shown in Fig. 4 .3. The rank-order correlation is +.77 (p < .01).
The g loadings of the WAIS subtests in Schafer's sample show a congruence
coefficient of +.98 with the loadings of the same subtests in the W AIS national
standardization sample and therefore can be regarded as representing the same g.
The idea that g is really no more than merely an artifact peculiar solely to
conventional psychometric tests and the mathematical manipulations of factor
analysis applied to the intercorrelations among tests is utterly inconsistent with
these findings showing that the g factor , rather than other components of variance in psychometric tests , is the most highly correlated with such variables
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outside the realm of psychometrics as heritability, inbreeding depression, reaction times in elementary cognitive tasks , and certain parameters of cortical
evoked potentials . The alotted space does not permit a proper summary and
evaluation of a number of other physical correlates of g. such as stature, brain
size, myopia , blood types, and body chemistry. (l am presently preparing a
detailed critical review of all the evidence on the physical correlates of g.)
The evidence reviewed here also seems to contradict the notion expressed by a
modern factor analyst, Undheim (l981c), who, in criticizing the Spearman and
Cattell interpretation of g as a "free-floating capacity" states that" ... there is
no difference between intelligence and intellectual achievements. There is no
measure of 'capacity ,' only different measures of achievement" (p. 257). It is
hard to understand in what sense g-cOiTelated reaction times and evoked potentials can be described as "achievements" by any generally accepted meaning of
that word.
One can make various statements about g while not fully understanding its
nature. In light of our present understanding, it would seem safe to say that g
reflects some property or processes of the human brain that is manifested in many
forms of adaptive behavior, and in which people differ, and that increases from
birth to maturity , and declines in old age, and shows physiological as well as
psychological or behavioral correlates, and has a hereditary component, and has
been subject to natural selection as a fitness character in the course of human
evolution, and has important educational , occupational, economic, and social
correlates in all industrialized societies. The behavioral correlates of g bear a
close resemblance to popular or commonsense notions of intelligence . But
whether the word " intelligence" is attached to g is unimportant, scientifically.
An advantage of pursuing g is that we have a specified set of operations on a
specified class of empirical data that dependably yields a phenomenon that we
can study in generally the same analytic manner that science approaches any
other natural phenomenon .

REFINING 9

The notion that g comes about because test constructors intentionally make up
tests so that they will all be positively correlated with one another, and that they
discard all tests (or test items) that are not positively correlated with all the rest,
is simply false . In fact, psychometricians have often striven to devise mental
tests that would not be correlated with one another. Thurstone (1935) , for example , devoted years to trying to produce a number of tests that would yield
uncorrelated measures of what he then regarded as independent factors of ability ,
termed primary mental abilities (PMA). No amount of psychometric refinement
of the various PMA tests could eliminate their substantial intercorrelations, and,
in a review of Thurstone's work, Eysenck (1939) factor analyzed all of the
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Thurstone tests and found that a large g factor could be extracted from their
intercorrelations. All but a very few of the tests had larger factor loadings on g
than on the particular primary mental ability factors that they were specially
devised to measure as purely as possible .
However, it can be argued that a correlation between two tests is not necessari ly evidence that the tests measure an abi lity that is common to both, except in
a trivial sense. That is, the common factor implied by a correlation need not be
anything we could legitimately regard as an abi lity or a cognitive process. Common factors can arise from different causes, some more profound or intrinsic
than others . If psychometric g could be shown to be the result of some relatively
superficial common factor , it would drastically change the complexion of g
theory . Factor analysis per se makes no assumptions about the causes of correlation and is totally indifferent to the fact that two variables may covary without
sharing any common process. It could be hypothesized, for example , that g
merely reflects cultural differences that affect a broad spectrum of cognitive
skills acquisition, or nutritional differences that affect motivation and performance of all kinds. To illustrate the point in the simplest way, I can make up an
analogies test on which all of my relatives will obtain much higher scores than
can be obtained by any other group of people on earth . The analogies would
consist entirely of items like this:
Linda is to Lydia as Leo is to: Art, Bob, Eddie, Lou. All of the names in such
items are of relatives who are related as spouses, siblings, parent-child, cousins,
etc . If such a test, based on the names of my relatives , were given to all my
relatives and to all of yours, there would be plenty of variance, very high item
intercorrelations, and a big g factor. This g, however, would have arisen entirely
from the between families component of the correlations, and the g would diminish drastically, or even disappear entirely , if the correlations were obtained
within families.
The methodology for obtaining between-family and within-family correlations
among tests and for contrasting the factors extracted from the two types of
correlation matrices is a way of assessing the relative proportions of wheat and
chaff that we have in our g factor and in the g loadings of any given variab le in
the analysis. (The same can also be said in regards to any other factors.) I have
explicated th is methodology elsewhere (Jensen, 1980).
Does the existence of g depend on those sources of test score variance that
differ between families , such as cu ltural and social class influences on intellectual development? If so , a g factor should show up only in a between-families
factor analysis; the g of a within-fam ilies analysis should be negligible, or at least
quite different. Cultural and social class sources of variance exist only between
fami lies. By far the larger part of what most psychologists and sociologists mean
by "environment," when they speak of environmental differences that affect
performance on IQ tests, refers to the between-families aspect of environmental
variance. Siblings reared within the same fami ly share the same cultural and
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social class influences. By factor analyzing correlations among tests between and
within families, we can determine the degree to which the extracted factors are a
function of between-families variance . If a factor is essentially the same both
between and within families, it can be said to reflect a more intrinsic or basic
source of individual differences than if it exists only between families.
Between-families (BF) and within-families (WF) correlations require a sample of N families, each with two or more full siblings, to each of whom are
administered two or more tests on which scores are age-standardized. A BF
correlation between tests X and Y, for example, is obtained by correlating the N
family means of each set of siblings on text X with the corresponding means on
test Y. A WF correlation is obtained by correlating the signed difference between
siblings on test X with their difference on test Y . The WF correlation, therefore,
can reflect none of the BF variance. When BF and WF correlations are obtained
on a number of different tests , we can extract a g from each correlation matrix
and compare the BF and WF g factors by means of the coefficient of congruence,
an index of factor similarity on a scale from 0 to ± I.
So far we have no really ideal study of this type in terms of a sufficiently
broad sample of tests . But three independent large sets of sibling data that I have
analyzed give such consistent results as to suggest that other collections of
cognitive ability tests would probably lead to the same conclusion. In one study
(Jensen, 1980), children in 1,495 white families and 90 I black families in grades
2 to 6 were given seven tests: memory , figure copying, pictorial IQ, nonverbal
reasoning (figure analogies , matrices) , verbal IQ, vocabulary, and reading comprehension . Only the two siblings most similar in age in each family were used.
BF and WF intercorrelations of the tests were factor analyzed separately for
black and white samples. The coefficients of congruence between the BF g and
the WF g were + .985 and + .987 for the black and white samples, respectively .
In other words , the g factors extracted from the BF and WF correlations are
practically identical in this collection of tests, for both black and white children.
(The average congruence coefficient between the black and white g factors is
+ .991.)
In an independent study, being prepared for publication , four of Thurstone's
Primary Mental Ability tests (Verbal , Numerical , Spatial, and Reasoning) and
Cattell's Test of g (from Cattell's 16 P.F. battery) were obtained on 313 siblings
in 135 white families. The coefficient of congruence between the BF g and WF g
is +.98.
It has been hypothesized that the intercorrelation of otherwise uncorrelated
abilities, thereby giving rise to g, comes about as a result of cross-assortative
mating for various abilities (Price, 1936) . If each of two abilities is influenced by
entirely separate sets of genes, and if both abilities are socially perceived as
desirable , there will tend to be cross-assortative mating for the abilities. That is ,
not only will like attract like for either ability alone, but the separate abilities will
be perceived with some degree of equivalence in terms of desirability , and there
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will be a marital correlation between the two abilities. This common assortment
of the genes that affect two traits results in a genetic correlation between the traits
in the offspring-but it is only a between-families genetic correlation. Because
the separate genes segregate in the process of gametogenesis and each offspring
of a given pair of parents receives a random half of each parent 's genes, there
will be no within-family genetic correlation between the traits that are genetically
correlated in the population.
Hence a test of the hypothesis that g arises from genetic correlations due to
cross-assortative mating for otherwise genetically independent abilities consists
of a comparison of the BF and WF correlations between measures of different
abilities.
The correlation of about +.2 between height and IQ appears to be this type of
adventitious genetic correlation due to cross-assortative mating for stature and
intelligence. Although the population correlation between height and IQ is a
quite reliable phenomenon, no correlation has been found within families. Gifted
chi ldren, for example, are taller than their nongifted age peers in the population,
but they are not taller than their nongifted siblings.
A within-family genetic correlation between traits is usually attributab le to
pleiotropy, that is, the same gene affects two or more phenotypically distinct
traits.
So far there have been too few studies of the genetic basis of correlated traits
to permit any compelling conclusions. The results of the two BF and WF factor
analyses previously mentioned, however, suggest that the correlations between
abilities are probably not explainable in terms of cross-assortative mating for
different abilities. But a satisfactory answer must await more detailed and systematic BF and WF correlational studies that are specifically designed to answer
this question . The outcome of studies based on WF factor analys is has extremely
important implications not only for the theory of g, but for the structural representation of all the abilities identified by factor analysis. The same method can be
applied to chronometric measurements of processing components.
If there is any hope at all for identifying independent or uncorrelated elementary cognitive processes , it will be realized in the study of WF correlations. The
study of abilities, throughout most of its history , has shown an obsession with
independence. Many theorists have pursued it , hoping to discover components of
abi lity that are truly independent in a more real sense than part of the uncorrelated residual variance of two (or more) ability tests after their common factor is
partialled out. The desire for real components that are uncorrelated has been the
philosopher's stone of psychometrics; it seems to be a philosophic position, not
one dictated by scientific necessity . Since psychologists have not succeeded in
devising psychometric tests that are uncorrelated, the search for this presumably
desirable condition has moved on to the measurement of elementary cognitive
processes . By measuring smaller and smaller components of performance on
cognitive tasks, presumably, correlations between them, and hence g, will van-
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ish. But it might well turn out that positi ve correl ations between any measurable
components of ability will vanish only at the point where correlation becomes
impossible, that is, where there is no true variance in one (or both) of the
correlated components . Just where in a reductioni st analysis that point will be
found we cannot say at present , but it is not impossible that variance and
intercorrelations could be found all the way down to the level of neural structure
and biochemical activity , just short of the molecules, or even atoms, that compose the brain . The well established substantial heritability of individual differences in g indicates that there is some biological substrate of individual difference in g, presumably in the neural structure and physiology of the cerebral
cortex.

TASK COMPLEXITY AND g
Probably the most undisputed fact about g is that the g loadings of cognitive tasks
are an increasing monotonic function of the perceived complexity of the tasks.
Subjective judgments of task complexity are a fairly accurate predictor of the
rank order of the tasks' g loadings . In general, g loadings decrease monotonically
for tasks cl ass ified as relational , associative, perceptual, and sensorimotor. An
especially clear demonstration of this is a factor analytic study by Maxwell
(1972) , who regards the relationship between g and task complexity as highly
consistent with Thomson 's (1948) sampling theory of g, which pos its overlapping neural elements or bonds sampled by different tests. More complex tests
presumably sample a larger proportion of the total available elements and therefore would have a greater amount of overlap than relatively simple tasks. But
Spearman 's theory of g as a general mental energy that is available for any
cognitive task is equally consistent with Maxwell 's results. Successful performance on the more complex tasks simply requires more mental energy. Spearman characterized g as "the eduction of relations and correlates" on the basis of
his finding that tests involving relation eduction consistently had the largest g
loadings of any of the many types of tests that he included in his fac tor analyses .
The fac t that much simpler tasks than those involving relation eduction , even
tasks that do not require any kind of reasoning at all , are also g loaded, albeit to a
lesser degree, indicates that Spearman's own characterization of g is much too
limited.
The apparent failure of the Galton and Cattell attempts to measure intelligence
with quite simple " brass instrument" laboratory tests, such as various types of
sensory discrimination and reaction time, and Binet' s success, using much more
complex tasks, led to the strongly entrenched belief among psycholog ists that
complex tasks are an essenti al condition fo r the measurement of intelligence. Yet
if intelligence tests are distinguished by very high g loadings, it is then also true
that they differ from the much simpler tasks of the Galton-Cattell variety only in
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degree, for tests' g loadings vary in a perfectly continuous manner, ranging from
values close to 1.00 on down to near O.
A high level of task complexity, therefore, appears to be a sufficient but not
necessary condition for the emergence of g. Some significant, positive, nonzero
g loading is evident even in simple sensory discrimination tasks and simple
reaction time (RT). As these simple tasks are made slightly more complex, their
g loadings increase. Choice RT is more g loaded than simple RT , dual sensory
discrimination tasks are more g loaded than single discrimination, and backward
digit span is more g loaded than forward digit span. Various elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) can be rank ordered in degree of complexity on the basis of
the mean response latencies in performing the tasks. The rank order is highly
correlated with the rank order of the tasks' correlations with psychometric g
derived from unspeeded complex tests of reasoning and general knowledge. The
ECTs here referred to are so simple that their mean response latencies are less
than 1.5 seconds for average adults. Yet even these simple tasks are g loaded ,
and the loadings increase with task complexity as indexed by mean latency.
Figure 4.4 shows the correlation of each of eight very simple ECTs with g factor
scores derived from the ten subtests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB). (The tasks are described in Jensen, 1985, p . 209.)
It will be noticed in Fig. 4.4 that the correlations of the single ECTs with the
ASV AB g scores are all quite low, ranging from less than +.10 to about +.35.
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FIG. 4.4. Correlation of ECTs with ASVAB g factor scores as a function of task
complexity as indexed by mean response latency (RT in msec.) on each task in a
vocational college sample (N = 106) . The dual tasks (#3, 4, 6, 7) are shown as
circled dots and are connected to their single-task counterparts (#2 , 5, 8) by
straight lines. The tasks are described in the Appendix. (The numbers beside the
data points indicate the specific processing tasks: I- RT , 2- DIGIT , 3- DT2
Digits, 4- DT3 Digits, 5- SD2, 6- DT2 Words , 7- DT3 Words, 8- SA2.)
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The shrunken multiple R between all eight of the ECTs and the ASV AB g,
however, is .47 , which can be compared with the average of the correlations
among the ten ASVAB subtests: f = +.36, SD = . 19 .
Findings such as this raise the interesting question of whether all of the g
variance derived from very complex psychometric tests of reasoning, problem
solving, and the like, can possibly be predicted by a composite score on a
sufficient number of elementary cognitive tasks, none of which involves more
than a very simple level of complexity. Another way of asking the same question: Is there nothing in g that depends upon the higher mental processes, or the
so-called metaprocesses?
This is one of the key questions in this field , and it has not yet been adequately
investigated . It is not enough to use just a few simple tasks, however reliable the
scores may be made by repeated measurements. By simple tasks I mean ECTs
that provide chronometric data such as choice RT in the Hick paradigm, speed of
scanning short-term memory in the S. Sternberg paradigm, and speed of access
to overlearned verbal codes in long-term memory as in the Posner paradigm. (I
have described these paradigms elsewhere [Jensen, 1982a] .) Each such task is
much like a very homogeneous psychometric test in which all the items are of the
same type. Most such homogeneous tests have a great deal of specificity (i. e.,
task-specific variance) and consequently not much g or other common-factor
variance. Yet these ECTs are positively correlated with one another, and each is
also correlated with the g factor of psychometric tests. But these single-task
correlations are generally quite low, mostly falling between .3 and .4 in unrestricted samples, and even with proper corrections for attenuation, the upper
limit of correlation is not greater than .50. A composite score derived from
several different ECTs, however, can show larger correlations with psychometric
g, because the total vari ance of a composite reflects the covariances among the
components more than the variances that are specific to each component, and the
covariances contain the g of the ECTs, some part of which is the same as the g of
psychometric tests. It seems a likely poss ibility that if response latencies on as
many as a dozen or so simple but distinctly different chronometric ECT paradigms were optimally combined , the composite score would correlate about as
highly with psychometric g as do , say, the Raven Matrices, or Cattell's CultureFair Test of g, or the Wechsler, or the Stanford-Binet. Yet none of the ECTs
entering into the composite score would involve anything that would ordinarily
be regarded as intellectual content or as requiring reasoning or problem solving
in the generally accepted sense of these terms.
Although correlations of the magnitudes being found between single ECTs
and single psychometric tests may seem rather small , they should not be cause
for despair. Remember that chronometric ECTs have virtually no method variance in common with unspeeded psychometric tests. It is instructive to compare
the typical .3 to .4 correlations between ECTs and psychometric tests with the
correlations between various psychometric tests in terms of each of their com-
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4.2

Components of Correlations a Among Subtests of the WISC-R Derived from Factor Loadings in a Schmid - Leiman
Orthogonal Hierarchical Factor Analysis, with g Correlations Below the Diagonal, and Correlations
Based on the Group Factors (Verbal, Memory, and Performance) Above the Diagonal
WISC - R Subtest
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~

V

C

16

Similarities

45

17

Vocabulary

48

Comprehension

40

40

43

13

A

~

38
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29

29

32

26

Tapping span
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Cod
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M

34

---------memory
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23
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21
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25
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Picture completion
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Picture arrangement
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21
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18

Block design

43

43

47
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Object assembly
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22
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25
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25
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27
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19
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a Decimals omitted.
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33
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mon factors. Table 4.2 shows the factor-generated correlations among the
WISC-R subtests in the white standardization sample, representing the full range
of ability in the white population . Below the diagonal are the correlations due to
the g factor , in a Schmid-Leiman hierarchical analysis. Above the diagonal are
the correlations among tests due to the group factors, Verbal, Memory, and
Performance, orthogonal to g and to one another. (Correlations not significantly
greater than zero at the .05 level, with N = 1868, are not included.) If ECTs are
correlated on ly with the g factor of psychometric tests, we should expect the
correlations to fall in the same ballpark as the correlations among psychometric
tests that are due entirely to g. Such correlations, shown below the diagonal in
Table 4.2, range from + . 13 to +.48, with a mean of +.28.

Experimental Manipulation of Complexity . The g loadings of tests may be
related to their complexity because responses to test items are scored as pass or
fai l (i.e., "right" or "wrong") and individuals ' scores are determined by the
threshold on the continuum of item difficu lty at which the information processing
system is inadequate to the task. The efficiency or capacity of the processing
system may be revealed most clearly when the system is pushed or strained.
Individual differences in the threshold of breakdown of the system may provide
the most efficient measure of g
The processing difficulty of an item can be measured in terms of percent
failing the item, if it is difficu lt enough to allow failure , or in terms of mean
response latency when the item is easy enough for subjects to pass it. This
hypothesis was tested in an extreme fashion by one of my graduate students
(Paul, 1984). The Semantic Verification Test (SVT) consists of 14 item types, or
conditions, each presented six times with different permutations of the three
letters ABC. The 14 conditions are shown in Table 4.3. Following each item is
TABLE 4.3
The Fourt e e n Conditions of the Semantic
Ve rification Te st

SVT

Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14

semantic
Condition
before
- not before
-after
-not after
-first
-not first
last
- --'not last
-between -&
-not between-&
- before
&~ -not before-&
-after
&-not afur&

116

JENSEN

some permutation of ABC which either agrees ("true") with the preceding
statement or disagrees with it ("false") . The subject responds True or False to
each item. When the SVT is given as a chronometric task to university students,
the correlation between their median RTs and scores on the untimed Advanced
Raven Matrices test is about - .50. Considering the great simplicity and lack of
intellectual content of the SVT, and the restricted range of abi lity in the university group, this is a remarkably high correlation. A high level test of verbal
knowledge and reasoning, Terman's Concept Mastery Test, is correlated about
+ .50 with the Advanced Raven Matrices in the university population, and WAIS
Vocabulary, the most highly g loaded of the 12 W AIS subtests, is correlated only
+.44 with the Raven.
The SVT was given as an untimed paper-and-pencil test to 77 third-grade
pupils to determine the percent failing each item . The SVT test was also given as
a chronometric task to 50 university students. The mean median RTs to the 14
conditions of the SVT ranged from about 650 msec to 1200 msec, and the overall
error rate was 7%. The task was obviously of trivial difficulty for university
students. The interesting point, however, is that the difficulty levels (percent
failure) of the 14 conditions for the third graders shows a rank-order correlation
of + .79 (disattenuated = + .83) with the mean median RTs of the 14 SVT
conditions in the university sample. In university students taking the SVT as a
chronometric test, the correlation of mean error rates on the 14 SVT conditions
with the corresponding mean median RTs was + .82. Twenty-five university
students were also asked to rank the 14 SVT conditions in the order of their
complexity, according to the students' subjective judgments of complexity. The
average correlation between subjects' rankings was +.80 and the reliability of
the composite rank order of the 25 complexity rankings was +.99. Thi s judged
complexity of each of the 14 SVT conditions was correlated + .86 with the
difficulty levels of the l4 conditions in the third graders and + .82 with the mean
median RTs of the university sample. Hence there is a close relationship between
judged item complexity, item difficulty (measured as percent failing), and item
processing times.
These SVT RT data, however , present a seem ing paradox with respect to
psychometric g as measured by the Advanced Raven Matrices. Although the
correlations between Raven scores and the median RTs of the 14 SVT conditions
range between - .30 and - .50, the degree of correlation is inversely related to
task complexity as indicated by median RT or judged complexity. The correlation between tasks ' median RT and their correlation with the Raven is - .67, that
is , the less complex SVT conditions show the higher correlation with Raven
scores. Another paradox: although the positive SVT conditions (e.g. , A before
B) are less complex and have RTs that average 210 msec less than the negative
SVT conditions (e.g., A not before B), the mean correlation of the RT for
positive SVT items with the Raven is - .42, as compared with - .39 for the
negative items (disattenuated, these are -.45 and - .43 , respectively). And
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when the RTs of the 14 SVT items are factor analyzed, the positive items have
the higher mean loading on the first principal factor (.91 vs .. 88; disattenuated, .99 vs . .96) . It had been hypothesized that the negative condition would
necessitate an extra mental manipulation in the processing to produce a correct
response and that this increased complexity would increase the item' s g and its
correlation with the Raven. Although the negative items are clearly judged as
being more complex and have longer RTs (by 210 msec , on average), they are
not more highly correlated with a marker test of psychometric g. It is surprising
and puzzling. We plan to repeat the study to see if this paradoxical result is
replicated.
Another experimental manipulation of complexity is by means of comparing
RTs to single and dual tasks. If tasks A and B are performed separately in such a
way that performance on one does not affect performance on the other, they are
termed single tasks . If they are presented simultaneously or in close temporal
proximity in such a way that performance on either A or B is significantly
affected by their proximity , then the task on which performance is measured
(usually chronometrically) is termed a dual task . (Dual tasks are also referred to
as competing tasks .) The effect of dual tasks is common ly interpreted as dividing
attention and straining processing capacity. The effect of this generally is to
increase the g loading of the dual task relative to its g loading as a single task. In
a dichotic li stening task , for example, the subject simultaneously hears a different pattern of three notes in each ear (e.g., left ear: high , low, high; right ear:
low, high, low) and is then randomly postcued to report the pattern presented to
one ear. Using such paradigms, Stankov (1983 ; also see Fogarty & Stankov,
1982) discovered that performances are more highly intercorrelated and therefore
more g loaded when presented as dual than as single tasks. Dual tasks were also
more highly correlated with subjects' educational level than their single-task
counterparts. In the most thorough study of a wide variety of dual tasks that I
have come across in the literature, Fogarty (1984) found that dual tasks have
higher g loadings than their single-task counterparts only when the latter have
relatively low g loadings. Tasks that have high g loadings when presented as
single tasks, however , have somewhat lower g loadings when they are presented
as a dual task. Presumably , when a task is already high g as a single task, mak ing
it a dual task strains processing capacity to the point of breakdown , which lowers
the reliability of the performance by increasing the rate of chance successes and
consequently attenuates the task 's g loading. Fogarty's factor analysis of single
and dual tasks also suggests, although not very strongly, that dual tasks are
factoria lly more complex than the single component tasks and that dual tasks
may involve cognitive processes that are not operative in single tasks. But the
evidence for this is weak and ambiguous, and in a study explicitly addressed to
this question , Lansman, Poltrock, and Hunt (1983) found no ev idence for any
distinct abi lities to divide or focus attention.
The importance of the relationship between single vs. dual tasks and g is that
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the increase in g loading must be purely a process phenomenon arising from the
greater strain placed on cognitive capacity by dual tasks. There is no increase in
the informational content of the dual task.
In our own lab we have worked with four single and dual tasks (Jensen , 1985;
Vernon, 1983; Vernon & Jensen, 1984). Our various ECTs, in which performance is always measured in terms of median RT, are described in the Appendix
(taken from Jensen, 1985, p. 209) . Returning to Fig. 4.4, which shows the
relationship between task complex ity (as indicated by the mean latency, or RT,
on the task) and the task's correlation with the g factor scores derived from the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in a sample of 106
vocational college students, we see that the correlation between these variables is
quite large, r = -.98, p = -.93. It appears anomalous, however, that one of the
four dual tasks (#6) has a slightly lesser correlation with g than its single-task
counterpart. These correlations are so similar, however , that this reversal might
be due to sampling or measurement error. Another way of looking at this relationship is in terms of mean differences in median RTs between two groups that
differ in general ability, or g. The mean differences between two contrasting
groups should be less attenuated by measurement error. Figure 4 .5 shows the
correlation between the complexity of the processing tasks, as indicated by their
mean latency (RT), and the mean difference between vocational college students
and university students; both groups are normal youths of comparable age, and
both groups are of above-average intelligence, although they differ about one
standard deviation in psychometric g. As seen in Fig. 4.5, there is a high
correlation (r = +.97, P = +.98) between task complexity and the degree to
which the tests discriminate between the vocational and university groups. Also,
in every case, the dual tasks show greater discrimination than their single-task
counterparts. These data are highly consistent with the hypothesis that dual tasks,
or task competition, increases g loading.
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THEORIES OF g

Ever since Galton originally propounded the notion of intelligence as a general
ability which could be channelled into any kind of intellectual activity, and Binet
advanced the idea of intelligence as the average level of a number of different
abilities and skills, various theories of intelligence, and of g, have been classifiable into two broad categories: unitary theories and multiple theories. The same
divisions might also be labeled power theories and sampling theories, respectively. This division of theoretical conceptions has continued down to the present
day. One of the major challenges to the field at present is to achieve a satisfactory
theoretical resolution and consensus on the problem of the unitary or multiple
nature of g based on empirical evidence. The answer may depend on the level of
analysis we choose for our study of cognitive abilities. In formulating laws of
mechanics, matter can be regarded as unitary-the solid, seeable, touchable,
solid objects in our surroundings. For most of the laws of chemistry, matter is
seen as multiple at the level of mixtures, compounds, and molecules, but as
unitary at the level of atoms. In subatomic physics, atoms are no longer unitary
but are seen as composed of multiple particles- protons, neutrons, etc. , which
are also analyzable into more elemental components, the quarks , and there is still
no assurance that even the quarks are the ultimate units of matter that defy further
analysis.

Unitary Theories of g
Spearman's "Mental Energy". Spearman suggested that g is a "mental
energy" of which there is a limited amount for each individual and in which
individuals differ. The brain's "energy" can be directed to any kind of mental
activity executed by different "neural machines ." Individual differences in the
"machines" show up as group factors and, along with their complex interactions, as specificity. The overall positive correlations among these activities is all
being powered by the same general energy, in which individuals differ. To quote
Spearman's (1923/1973) own most succinct and explicit statement of this theory:
'The brain may be regarded (pending further information) as able to switch the
bulk of its energy from anyone group to any other group of neurons; as before,
accordingly, the amount and the direction of the disposable energy regulate
respectively the intensity and the quality of the ensuing mental process" (p .
346). Elsewhere he elaborates: "In this manner, successful action would always
depend, partly on the potential energy developed in the whole cortex, and partly
on the efficiency of the specific group of neurons involved. The relative influences of these two factors could vary greatly according to the kind of operation;
some kinds would depend more on the potential of the energy, others more on the
efficiency of the engine" (1923/1973, p. 6).
I have used the word "energy" in quotes in this context, because it is not
always clear whether Spearman endows the term with the meaning it has in the
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physical sciences, which is its only scientifically legitimate meaning, or whether
he intends it merely as an analogy or metaphor. If g is equated with energy in the
accepted physical sense of the term, then , as Thomson (1948, p. 58) pointed out,
Spearman's theory can be rejected in its literal form, because the brain (or the
cerebral cortex) does not act as a reservoir of free-floating energy that can be
consolidated and shifted around from one group of neurons to another. Whatever
energy exists in the brain resides within the individual nerve cells as an electrochemical reaction propogated along the neural membrane. If, on the other
hand, Spearman's use of "energy" is merely metaphorical, it contributes little,
if anything, to the scientific understanding of g. It merely underscores Spearman's belief in the unitary nature of the cause of g but does not suggest what this
unitary cause is in empirically testable terms. Spearman's "mental energy"
theory of g has always been regarded metaphorically by most psychologists , and
consequently has not been taken very seriously. As metaphor, it has been peculiarly unfruitful in generating empirical investigation, and today Spearman's
"energy" theory has only the status of an historical relic .

Burt's Neurophysiological Theory. Burt (1940, p. 217; 1961) proposed a
unitary theory of g that is not metaphoric, but anatomical and physiological. He
held that g reflects the general character of the individual's brain tissue, such as
the degree of systematic complexity and organization in the neural architecture,
and he cites histological evidence that the cerebral cortex of some mentally
deficient persons shows less density and branching of neurons than is seen in the
brains of normal persons . To account for the ubiquity of g, Burt hypothesizes
that the general quality of an individual 's cerebral cortex is more or less homogeneous throughout; hence every intellectual function would reflect this homogeneous quality of the nervous system. As with Spearman's theory, specialized
areas or neural structures, in addition to particular classes of acquired knowledge
and skills, give rise to group factors and specificity. Burt's theory , being nonmetaphoric , has the virtue of being testable, at least in principle, but I am not
aware that, so far, there have been any systematic histological investigations of
individual differences in the brain's architectonics in relation to psychometric g
among normal persons. There is little that psychologists as such can do to
confirm or substantiate Burt's theory, and so it has attracted little attention.
Motivation or Drive Theories of g. A number of Spearman's contemporaries, such as Maxwell Garnett, suggested that g results from individual differences in will , motivation , or drive level, which affects performance on all
cognitive tasks (see Spearman, 1927, pp. 88-89). Essentially the same notion
has been recently revived by Macphail (1985), who equates g with Hull' s D (for
drive). This theory runs into difficulty on at least three grounds.
First, no independent evidence has been brought forth to show that high-g
persons are more highly motivated in test-taking situations than low-g persons.
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Differences in range and intensity of intellectual interests are more likely a result
than a cause of di fferences in g.
Second , a theory of gas D runs into trouble with the Yerkes-Dodson law , the
empirical generalization that the optimal dri ve level for error-free or efficient
performance of a task is lower for simple than for complex tasks. Yet cognitive ly
complex tasks are generally more g loaded than simple tasks, and high- and
low-g individuals differ more on complex than on simple tasks. We should
predict just the opposite if g were equated with D . (No one has yet proposed an
inverse equation of g with D .)
Third, there is direct empirical evidence showing that higher levels of ability
in a cognitive task are not associated with higher motivation or arousal during
task performance, as measured independently by pupill ary dil ation , a sensitive
indicator of motivational arousal and effo rt. Ahern and Beatty (1979) measured
the degree of pupillary dil ation as an indicator of effort and autonomic arousal
when subjects are presented with test problems. They fo und that (l) pupillary
dilation is directly related to level of problem difficulty (as indexed both by the
objective complexity of the problem and the percentage of subjects giving the
correct answer) , and (2) subjects with hi gher psychometrically measured intelligence show less pupillary dil ation to problems at any given level of di fficulty.
(All subjects were university students.) Ahern and Beatty concluded:
These res ults he lp to clarify the biological bas is of psychometrically-defin ed intelligence. T hey suggest that more intelligent individuals do not solve a tractable
cognitive problem by bringing increased activation, " mental energy" or " mental
effort" to bear. On the contrary, these indi viduals show less task- induced activation in solving a problem of a given level of di fficulty . T his suggests that individuals differing in intelligence must also differ in the effi ciency of those brain
processes which medi ate the parti cul ar cognitive task. (p . 1292)

Speed of Processing and Neuronal Errors in Transmission as the Basis of
Unitary theories of g necessarily hypothesize individual diffe rences in some
extremely bas ic attribute that plausibly could affect every kind of cognitive
performance. Galton originally hypothesized mental speed , and proposed using
RT to visual and auditory stimuli as a measure of general ability.
Galton 's own efforts and those of his leading American disciple , James
McKeen Cattell , were notabl y unsuccessful in establishing any substantial relationship between RT and independent criteria of intellectual ability , and the
pursuit of intellectual correlates of RT was virtually abandoned for more than
half a century.
In the past decade, however, with the development of relatively sophisticated
chronometric techniques in experimental cognitive psychology (e .g . , Posner,
1978), this line of research has been vigorously pursued by many investigators.
As a result , many different g- Ioaded psycho metric tests have been found to show
g.
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significant correlations with RT measurements derived from a considerable variety of cognitive tasks ranging in complexity from simple RT (response to the
onset of a single stimulus) to response latencies in verbal and figural analogies. I
have reviewed the research on many of these RT tasks and their relationship to
psychometric g elsewhere (Jensen, 1982a, 1982b).
Correlations between RTs measured in different paradigms are highly
positive, indicating a large general speed factor that loads in a wide variety of
ECTs. This general speed factor is correlated with the psychometric g derived
from nonspeeded traditional tests of intelligence, both verbal and nonverbal.
The correlation between psychometric g and speed on ECTs increases with
the complexity of the ECT only up to a point; beyond it the correlation diminishes with increasing task complexity. The reason is probably that the more
complex tasks invite different strategies for attaining the prefelTed response and
these tend to confound individual differences in sheer speed of mental processing
with individual differences in choice of strategy. In the great variety of psychometric test items, on the other hand, strategy effects become relegated to specificity or narrow group factors, and the g factor reflects the more fundamental
attribute of mental speed. Hence psychometric g is more highly correlated with
relatively simple ECTs that do not invite a variety of solution strategies .
Not on ly speed is correlated with g, but also the consistency of RTs to the
same task over repeated trials. We measure intraindividual variability in RT in
terms of the standard deviation of RT over n trials, signified as (ii' This measure
is often more highly correlated (negatively) with psychometric g than is the
median RT, despite the usually higher reliability of the median RT .
Mean differences in these parameters between criterion groups selected from
different regions of the IQ distribution have shown more consistent and clear-cut
results than correlations between these parameters and psychometric test scores
within groups. The reason for this seems to be that correlations are always
attenuated by unreliability of measurement and restriction of the range of ability,
whereas a mean group difference is little affected by these factors. Differences
between clearly separated criterion groups are more capable than correlations of
detecting the more subtle effects in various RT paradigms.
One of our recent studies (Cohn, Carlson, & Jensen, 1985) illustrates the
contrasts in mental speed between academically gifted and nongifted youths
(ages 12 to 14 years) on a variety of ECTs (described in the Appendix) ranging in
complexity from simple and choice RTs, to S. Sternberg's short-term memory
scan for digits, to discriminating physically same vs. different word pairs, and
discriminating simple synonyms vs. antonyms. All but the simple and choice RT
tasks were presented both as single and as dual tasks (DT) . The gifted (G) group
(N = 60), with an average age of 13.5 years, consisted of manifestly talented
youths whose scores on the SAT were on a par with university students five to six
years older. The G subjects were enrolled in university courses, competing
successfu lly in a predominantly math and science curriculum. The nongifted
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(NG) group consisted of 70 white junior high school students averaging about 1

SD above statewide norms on the California Test of Basic Abilities. The G and
NG groups differed 1.9 SD on the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices. For
both the G and NG groups, the chronometric tasks were of trivial difficulty, with
mean response latencies never as long as 2 seconds, even in the NG group.
Figure 4.6 shows the mean latencies on the eight mental processing tasks for
the G and NG groups and a group of 50 U.c., Berkeley undergraduates (Un).
The rank-order correlations between the shapes of the profiles are all +.98 or
above. Groups G and NG differ significantly (p < .0 1 to .00 1) on all of the
tasks, but G and Un show no significant differences. (G and Un differ only a
nonsignificant 2 points on the Raven Matrices.) The within-group multiple correlation of the eight processing tasks with Raven Matrices is .60 and .50 for
groups G and NG, respectively.
Most remarkable is the difference between the G and NG groups on the Hick
paradigm, since it has the least intellectual content of any of the tasks, requiring
only that the subject release a pushbutton when a light goes on among an array of
either I , 2, 4, or 8 lights (corresponding to 0 , I , 2, and 3 bits of information) .
Figure 4.7 shows the results. The groups differ beyond the .00 1 level at every
level of task complexity from 0 to 3 bits, for both RT and MT (the interval
between releasing the home button and pressing the button adjacent to the light).
Also, the slopes of RT for the G and NG groups differ by .70 SDs, which is
highly significant (p < .00 I) , and intraindividual variability in RT differs significantly at every level of bits .
Such findings show that psychometric g can be measured by means of tests
that have little or no knowledge content and that require no complex problemsolving strategies. In these respects, they are very unlike ordinary IQ tests, yet
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FIG. 4.6. Mean latency of various processing tasks in three groups: university
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they are clearly correlated with IQ and discriminate between groups that differ in
terms of generally accepted criteria of intelligence. These findings also suggest
that the processes underlying g may be essentially simpler than their manifestations in complex problem solving and other "real-life" behavior, just as the
cause of a disease may be simpler than its multifarious symptoms.
The speed factor that we are measuring with these tasks should not be thought
of as intentional, overt speed at the level of gross behavior. It is not the kind of
speed that suggests hurrying and rushing through the performance of a task.
Speed can be thought of in two senses: cognitive and conative. Cognitive speed
is speed of information processing . Conative speed is speed due to conscious
effort, minimizing rest pauses , and the like. Conative speed as it affects performance on psychometric tests cannot begin to explain the correlation between RT
and test scores. Complete abandonment of this overly simple and superficial
explanation is long overdue. In our own work, we have taken pains to minimize
the speed factor in test taking . All psychometric tests are given without time
limit; subjects are urged to take their time and to attempt every item . We have
also found that when tests were given with a time limit and scored and then
subjects were given as much additional time as they felt they needed to earn a
maximal score, subjects remained in approximately the same rank order under
both methods of scoring, so that the correlation of the scores with another
variable would be scarcely affected whether the test was timed or untimed. Also,
we have found that speeded tests show no higher correlations with RT tasks than
untimed tests. Clerical checking tests, which are the most dependent on speed,
have the lowest g loadings and the poorest correlations with RT measures. For
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example, the Coding test, the most speed-dependent test of the ten tests in the
ASV AB battery, has the lowest g loading in this battery and the lowest correlation with the general speed factor extracted from a battery of eight R T tests
(Vernon & Jensen , 1984) . The same thing is true of the speeded Coding (or Digit
Symbol) subtest of the WAIS (Vernon, 1983) . The clincher is that we have found
a correlation close to zero between individual differences in total test-taking time
(under untimed conditions) and total scores on the test.
How then can we explain the correlation between RTs in ECTs and psychometric g?
Several well-established concepts and principles of cognitive psychology provide a rationale for the importance of a time element in mental efficiency. The
first such concept is that the conscious brain acts as a one-channel or limitedcapacity information-processing system. It can deal simultaneously with only a
very limited amount of information; the limited capacity also restricts the number
of operations that can be performed simultaneously on the information that enters
the system from external stimuli or from retrieval of information stored in shortterm or long-term memory (STM or LTM). Speediness of mental operations is
advantageous in that more operations per unit of time can be executed without
overloading the system . Second, there is rapid decay of stimulus traces and
information, so that there is an advantage to speediness of any operations that
must be performed on the information while it is still available. Third, to compensate for limited capacity and rapid decay of incoming information, the individual resorts to rehearsal and storage of the information into intermediate or
long-term memory, which has relatively unlimited capacity. But the process of
storing information in LTM itself takes time and therefore uses up channel space,
so there is a "trade-off" between the storage and the processing of incoming
information . The more complex the information and the operations required on
it, the more time that is necessary, and consequently the greater the advantage of
speediness in all the elemental processes involved. Loss of information due to
overload interference and decay of traces that were inadequately encoded or
rehearsed for storage or retrieval from LTM results in "breakdown" and failure
to grasp all the essential relationships among the elements of a complex problem
needed for its solution. Speediness of information processing should therefore be
increasingly related to success in dealing with cognitive tasks to the extent that
their information load strains the indi vidual's limited channel capacity . The most
discriminating test items would thus be those that " threaten" the informationprocessing system at the threshold of "breakdown." In a series of items of
graded complexity, this "breakdown" would occur at different points for vari ous individuals. If individual differences in the speed of the elemental components of information processing could be measured in tasks that are so simple as
to rule out "breakdown" failure , as in the various RT paradigms we have used,
it shou ld be possible to predict individual differences in the point of " breakdown" for more complex tasks. This is the likely basis for the observed correla-
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tions between RT variables measured in relatively simple tasks and total scores
on complex g-Ioaded tests.
The speed of elemental information processing may not be the most basic
source of individual differences in intelligence but may be only a secondary
phenomenon, derived from a still more basic source of individual differences-a
hypothetical construct I have termed "neural oscillation," which would account
for individual differences in intertrial variation in RT as well as in individual
differences in RT averaged over a given number of trials (Jensen, 1982a, pp . 610). Eysenck (1982a) also regards differences in mental speed and RT as derivative , in the sense that a person's average RT is not directly attributable to the
speed of neural conduction or synaptic transmission. He hypothesizes that speed
differences arise from individual differences in the rate at which errors occur in
the transmission of neural impulses in the cortex. The stimulus message must
persist until the "pulse train" of neural impulses exceeds a certain fidelity
threshold . The more random "noise" or error tendency in the neural system, the
more time this takes, and hence speed of reaction is a derivative phenomenon.
So far, there has been no way empirically to decide between the hypotheses of
processing speed and errors, or "noise," in the neural transmission of errors as
basic to g. Whether these concepts will be able to account for all or only some
fraction of the true-score variance in the g derived from a large and diverse
sample of psychometric tests has yet to be determined. It will be necessary, first
of all, to determine how large a correlation with g can be obtained from a battery
of various simple chronometric tasks of sufficient number and diversity to minimize the proportion of task-specific variance in the composite score. The best
composite correlations we have obtained thus far would account for at most on ly
about half of the variance in g.

Multiprocess Theories
Thomson' s Sampling Theory of g. E . L. Thorndike ( 1927) was the first
systematic proponent of the theory that g is explainable in terms of the hypothesis
that human abilities consist of independent multiple bonds or neural connections
acquired through experience, and that successful performance on various tests
enlists somewhat different but overlapping "samples" of all the myriad bonds
that constitute ability. Thorndike believed that individuals differ innately in the
potential number of bonds they can acquire, the total number being limited by the
number and degree of branching of the neural elements. As this theory proposes
no inherent structure or organization of the bonds themselves, Spearman (1927,
Ch. V) termed all theories of this type "anarchic."
Sir Godfrey Thomson, who spent a year's postdoctoral followship working
with Thorndike, developed Thorndike 's bond-sampling theory further, formalizing it mathematically in his now famous book The Factorial Analysis of Human
Ability (1948, Ch. XX) . Essentially, he showed that the correlation between two
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tests, X and Y, could be represented as rxy = (PxPy) 112, where p is the proportion
of the total pool of elements or "bonds of the mind" "sampled" by a given test.
From this formulation, Thomson was able to demonstrate mathematically how
both g and specificity could come out of the factor analysis of a number of tests
that call upon different but overlapping samples of elements. Thomson's sampling theory, as it has come to be known , is illustrated in Fig. 4.8 . It can be seen
that in this model the factors yielded by factor analysis do not represent anything
in the mind, which consists only of innumerable disparate bonds or elements of
some kind. The organization or structure represented by factors is seen as an
artifact of the tests, which can be devised to sample large or small numbers of
elements. Complex tests would sample more elements than simple tests, and
complex tests would therefore be apt to be more highly correlated with other
tests , and consequently would be more g loaded . To simulate the typical results
of Spearman's factor analyses, the sampling model only requires, in Thomson's
(1948) words,
that it be possible to take our tests with equal ease from any part of the causal
background ; that there be no linkages among the bonds which will disturb the
random frequency of the yarious possible combinations; in other words, that there
be no "faculties " in the mind . . . . The sampling theory assumes that each ability
is composed of some but not all of the bonds, and that abi lities can differ very
markedly in their " richness," some needing very many " bonds ," some only a
few. (p. 324).

Thomson left the number and nature of the hypothetical bonds , or elements,
of the sampling theory completely unspecified . This deficiency is the core of the
theory'S weakness in terms of its testability as empirical science. It can be proved
mathematically that any number of composite aggregates of whatever degree of
correlation with each other can always be expressed as functions of elements that
are themselves uncorrelated (Spearman, 1927 , p. 59). Despite its superficial
plausibility, Thomson's sampling theory does not qualify as a scientific theory .
Although it has enjoyed much greater uncritical popularity in recent years than

FIG. 4.8. Illustration of Thomson's
sampling theory of abilities, in which
the small circles represent e le ments
or bonds and the large circles represent tests that sample different sets of
elements (labe led A, B, and C). Correlation between tests is due to the
number of elements sampled in common , represented by the areas of
overlap.
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Spearman's theory of " mental energy," it has been no more fruitful in advancing empirical research on the nature of g or intelligence. Loevinger's (1951)
verdict seems inescapable:
The sampling theory hardly qualifies as a true theory, for it does not make any
assertion to which evidence is relevant. Perhaps the large number of adherents to
this view is due to the fact that no one has offered evidence against it. But until the
view is defined more sharply , one cannot even conceive of the possibility of
contrary evidence, nor, for that matter, confirmatory evidence . A statement about
the human mind which can be neither supported nor refuted by any facts , known or
conceivable , is certainly useless . Bridgman and other philosophers of science
would probably declare the sampling theory to be meaningless. (pp. 594- 95)

Along with Spearman's theory of "mental energy," Thomson's rival sampling
theory can be consigned to the museum of psychology's past history , but unlike
phlogiston, without ever having enjoyed the scientific virtue of being empirically
disproved.
Modern descendants of the sampling theory are scarcely more definite as to
the number and nature of the sampled elements. A number of modern theorists
conceive of intelligence, or g, as the entire repertoire of an individual's knowledge, skills, and problem-solving strategies available at a given point in time
(e.g., Humphreys, 1984; Tyler, 1976, pp. 24- 25; Undheim, 198Ic) . In the same
key, the g factor has also been attributed to individual differences in the number
of well-learned cognitive skills that generalize across a broad spectrum of problem-solving situations.
All theories of this type run into difficulty with the empirical finding that a
relatively small variety of tests, which can in no way be construed as a representative sample of the entire repertoire of knowledge, ski lls, and strategies, are
capable of measuring g. One obviously does not require a sample of the entire
repertoire of knowledge, ski lls, and strategies to measure g. A few relatively
content-free tests of the "fluid g" variety are even more g loaded than are tests
that aim to sample individuals' entire cognitive repertoire. It is also hard to see
how these theories can accommodate the substantial correlations between RT
measures derived from quite simple ECTs and psychometric g. What repertoire
is sampled by these ECTs, most of which seem entirely too elementary to be
described in terms of "knowledge, skill s, and strategies"? If most of the g
variance could be predicted by chronometric measures on a number of ECTs, or
by a physiological measure such as the evoked potential, which involves no
conscious behavioral aspects at all , these neo-Thomsonian sampling theories
(perhaps better termed "repertoire" theories) would be empirically falsified in
terms of any of their meaningful implications.

Component Process Theories oj g. Process theories of g are essentially
sampling theories , but with an important difference from Thomson's bond-sampling theory and from theories that identify g with the entire repertoire of knowl-
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edge, ski lls, and strategies. The essential difference is that process theories posit
some limited number of basic information-processing components, each of
which can be described in terms of the particular functions it performs-functions that , when viewed in isolation , are usually too elemental to be thought of as
skills or strategies at the level of overt behavior. An information-processing
component is itself a hypothetical construct, defined as a process that operates on
sensory inputs or internal representations of objects or symbol s. These elementary cognitive processes have been described by terms such as stimulus apprehension, sensory encoding, iconic memory , short-term memory (STM) ,
memory scanning, retrieval of information from long-term memory (LTM),
transformation of encoded information , transfer, discrimination, generalization ,
eduction and mapping of relations, visualization and mental rotation of fi gures in
2- or 3-dimensional space, and response execution . A less elemental class of
operations are metaprocesses, which are acquired strategies for selecting, combining and using the elementary processes, problem recognition, rule application , planning, organization of information , time allocation, and monitoring of
one's own performance.
Processing theory explains psychometric g in terms of a small number of
components or metacomponents that are required for performance in an extremely broad variety of tests. Individual differences in the presence or absence
or efficiency of operation of these general or common components and metacomponents are what account for the positive intercorrelations among practically all
complex mental tests and the consequent emergence of g when all the intercorrelations are factor analyzed . The interpretation of g in terms of componential
theory has been quite thoroughly explicated by Sternberg and Gardner (1982).
Figure 4 .9 depicts the hypothesized relationship between the processing variables and psychometric variabl es . The horizontal dashed line in Fig. 4.9 separates the behaviorally measurable or inferred psychological variables (above the
line) from those that are measurable only physiologically, such as evoked brain
potentials, or inferred physiological processes, such as cortical conductivity
(Klein & Krech, 1952), synaptic errors (Hendrickson, 1982), neural osci llation
(Jensen, 1982a), and the like. The physiological level is represented as one
general fac tor, gB (8 for " biological "), although, given our present state of
knowledge, th is level could just as well be represented as several distinct physiological processes or as correlated processes, due to their sharing one common
process , i.e ., gB' The nature of this physiologic underp inning of human abilities
is a major focus of Eysenck's (l982b) theorizing about the findings of correlations between feat ures of the average evoked potential and psychometric g, or
gpo which is depicted in the hexagon at the top of the hierarchy in Fig. 4.9. All of
the solid lines in the figure represent correlations. (Correlations could also be
shown between elements at every level and every other level of the hierarchy , but
these have been omitted for the sake of graphic simplicity .)
The various elementary cognitive processes (P) are correlated through their
sharing of common physiological processes. Different parts of the brain or di ffer-
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FIG. 4.9. Simplified represe ntation
of hypothes ized relationships among
process ing components and psychometric variables: g,,- psychometric
g, F- group factor , T- test, MPmetaprocesses , P- elementary cognitive process, gB- a general biologic substrate, as refl ected in physiological indices such as evoked
potentials.

ent neural assemblies are presumably specialized for various aspects of information process ing. The processes in this model, depicted here as being closely
connected with some biological substrate, can all be measured by means of
chronometric tasks, either directly or through derived scores. By subtraction of
response latencies of simple tasks from the latencies of more complex tasks, one
can measure individual differences in the additional processes involved in the
latter.
Different sets of elementary processes, P, can be utilized by a given metaprocess (MP). Because metaprocesses are further removed from the biologic
substrate and are probably mainly products of learning and practice, their connection to the biologic substrate is via the elementary processes which enter into
the metaprocesses. Different metaprocesses are intercorrelated because they
share certain elementary processes in common and also because the experiential
factors which inculcate metaprocesses are correlated in the educational and cultural environment. It is probably at the level of metaprocesses that cultural
differe nces have their primary impact.
Both processes and metaprocesses enter into performance on complex psychometric tests (n . Even a single complex test item may well depend on a number of
Ps and MPs for successful performance . Various tests are intercorrelated, moreover, not only because they share certain common Ps and MPs, but also because
they may share common info rmation stored in long-term memory . Note that at
each level in this hierarchy , something new is added in terms of environmental
inputs. The cumulative impact of these acquired elements is at its max imum at
the level of single items in psychometric tests. Item variance is largely specificity, which may arise from individuals' idiosyncratic experiences, making for
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unique and uncorrelated bits of information, or from complex and unique interactions among the P and MP demands and the informational content of a PaI1icuiar
test item. In fact, all primary psychological measurements are saturated with
task-specific variance. Chronometric measurements of elementary processes in
specially contrived laboratory tasks are no exception. Specificity, which is the
bane of individual differences research, can be reduced only by using composite
scores or factor scores (which are a particular weighted composite of the component scores) derived from a number of varied tasks or tests, thereby "averaging
out" the specificity of the individual tasks .
The top part of the hierarchy in Fig. 4.9, including T, F, and gp, encompasses
the realm of traditional psychometrics, including various test scores and hierarchical factors extracted by factor analysis. Here, for the sake of simplicity, are
represented only two first-order factors (F I and F 2 ) and one second-order factor,
psychometric g, or gpo (The most general factor, of course, may emerge as a
third-order or other higher-order factor.) Each successively higher factor level
excludes some sources of variance. The primary factors, for example, exclude
the test-specific variance, and the second-order factors exclude the variance that
is peculiar to each primary factor, and so on. The most general factor, gp, is the
variance common to all the sources below it in the hierarchy .
Some homogeneous tests , such as Raven's Progressive Matrices , contain
relatively little specificity and are therefore quite good measures of gpo Other
tests, like the Wechsler scales, although containing quite heterogeneous items
and subtests with considerable specificity, yield composite scores from which, in
effect, the specificity is "averaged out," providing a good measure of gpo
Superficially very different tests, such as Verbal Analogies, Digit Span, and
Block Designs, are intercorrelated presumably not because of common content
or correlated educational experiences, but because they have a number of elementary processes and metaprocesses in common. Because the more superficial
differences between tests contribute mainly to their specificities, these differences are not reflected in gpo Hence it has been found that g factor scores are
more highly correlated with chronometric measures of elementary processes than
are any particular types of tests. Thus, although gp and PI' P 2 , etc., appear
widely separated in the schematic hierarchy , they actually seem to have greater
variance overlap, as shown by the correlation, than do some of the more proximal variables. This picture may also help to elucidate the otherwise surprising
finding that, although gp is derived from factor analysis of psychometric tests
which bear virtually no superficial resemblance in format, content, or method of
administration to the RT techniques used in elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) ,
gp shows correlations with ECTs almost as large as with the psychometric tests
from which gp is derived.
One of the crucial theoretical questions, with reference to Fig. 4.9, regarding
which there is presently little consensus, is whether more of the variance in
psychometric g (g,) is attributable to the processes (P) or to the metaprocesses
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(n can already
be virtually ruled out as an important source of g variance, because tests that
differ markedly in their information content, such as vocabulary and matrices,
are nevertheless highly saturated with one and the same g. The multiple correlation of several simple ECTs with gp has been so substantial in some studies as to
suggest that perhaps as much as 50% of the gp variance is accounted for by
individual differences in elementary cognitive processes. If task specificity were
further minimized in such studies , by using at least three or four different techniques for measuring each of the elementary processes that have already been
shown to yield substantial correlations, it seems likely that even more than half
of the g variance would be associated with the elementary processing variables.
Also, the existing studies have not taken sufficient account of the reliability of
these processing measures. Proper corrections for attenuation might appreciably
raise the correlations between ECTs and gpo Split-half or other internal consistency estimates of the reliability of ECTs usually overestimate the test-retest
reliability, and it is the test-retest reliability which should be used in correcting
correlations for attenuation when the correlated measurements have been obtained in different test sessions, on different days , for example, or even at
different times of the same day, such as before and after lunch. Some of the ECT
measurements are so highly sensitive to an individual's fluctuating physiological
state from morning till night and from day to day as to have quite low test-retest
reliability as compared with most psychometric tests. Theoretical interest, of
course, focuses on the true-score multiple correlation between the elementary
cognitive processes and gpo Individual differences in metaprocesses, or strategies, might even obscure task correlations with g . Hughes (1983), for example,
found that a measure of learning rate is more highly correlated (r = - .59 , p <
.001) with g (i.e., Raven Matrices) when all subjects are constrained by instructions to use the same strategy for learning than when they are not so instructed
and can choose their own strategies (r = + .16, n.s.). This is just the opposite of
what one should predict if metacomponents (strategies) were the chief sources of
variance in learning rates or in g. One goal of componential research is to
determine the proportions of variance in g accounted for by each of a number of
clearly identifiable processes and metaprocesses . This has not yet been accomplished.
There is a crucial difference between factors and processes that is often
overlooked . Factors arise completely out of individual differences , and factors,
including g, reflect only individual differences in whatever causal mechanisms
are involved in the factors. Because of their exclusive dependence on variance,
therefore, factors do not necessarily represent the operating principles of the
mind . Processes that were so essential to individual survival in the course of
human evolution as to be left with little or no genetic variance would not show up
as factors. As far as I know, it has not been determined if there are any cognitive
processes of this nature , that is, processes that might show age differences but

(MP). The learned information content in the psychometric tests
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not reliable individual differences among biologically normal, healthy persons. It
is at least a safe assumption that various processes may differ in the extent of
their individual differences variance, and this can be assessed when individual
differences are measured chronometrically, since such measures are on a ratio
scale, which permits comparisons of variability based on the coefficient of variation (V = (J/f!.-). The point is that processes will be reflected in factors in
proportion to their coefficients of variation. (For example, the g factor is always
smaller, relative to other factors, in college students than in the general population, because students are selected essentially on g.) Unlike a factor, a process
can be identified and its importance in the mental economy assessed without
need to take account of individual differences. RT is measured on a task (e.g.,
simple RT) which it is hypothesized requires processes A and B, and RT is
measured on a task (e.g. , choice RT) which requires processes A, B, and C. The
difference in milliseconds beween the mean RTs on the two tasks is taken as
evidence for process C and indicates its magnitude in relation to other processes
assessed by the same type of experimental paradigm , known as the subtraction
method, originated by Donders (1868 - 6911969) in the early years of mental
chronometry. The processes that best account for g will not necessarily be those
that experimental cognitive research determines are the most important in terms
of their mean effects, but those on which there is the largest variance. These two
features of processes mayor may not be related.
Although Sternberg believes that the bulk of g is attributable to variance in
metaprocesses, this view is not an essential feature of componential theories in
general. Moreover, its truth has not yet been demonstrated. A proper test would
logically require that an adequate number of measures of elementary cognitive
processes be entered first into the stepwise multiple regression, fo llowed by the
metaprocess measures, for predicting g factor scores, thereby determining the
independent contribution of metaprocess to the variance in g. The outcome of
such a study would be of great theoretical importance. My guess at this point is
that Sternberg'S belief is wrong, and that most of the g variance will be accountable in terms of elementary cognitive processes, with little if any variance left for
the residualized metaprocesses. I conjecture that the opposite would be found for
many narrow group factors or, in particular, certain types of tasks that lend
themselves to various strategies. A lack of some clear demarcation between
processes and metaprocesses would invite further debate. Studies permitting
"strong inference" are most needed.
If processes (or metaprocesses) are uncorrelated, then, of course, we must
explain g in terms of a number of common processes that enter into performance
on a wide variety of tests. This seems to be the gist of Sternberg'S componential
theory of g (Sternberg & Gardner, 1982). But if the processes themselves are
correlated with each other and yield a g much like psychometric g, then the
theoretical picture is quite different. How do we explain the correlations between
the process measures? In terms of sti ll other, even more elemental, processes?
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And what if they too are correlated? How far down the reductionist hierarchy will
this "infinite regress" extend?
There is every indication that elementary cognitive processes are, in fact,
quite highly correlated. This fact has frustrated some of Sternberg's componential analyses, the clarity of which depends on there not being very high correlations between measures of putatively different processes. For example , Sternberg and Gardner (1982 , p. 249), using chronometric techniques, measured
individual differences in three different tasks which were intended to yield parameter estimates of three distinct components. But the three tasks (analogies
[AJ, classification [CJ, and series completion [S]) were all so highly correlated
(r AC = .86, r AS = .85, r cs = .88) that when the common factor was partialled
out, the little remaining variance attributed to the residualized components was
unreliable. The loadings of the three tasks on their common factor are A = .91,
C = .94 , S = .93, without correction for attenuation. It leaves one to wonder if
there are individual differences in components independent of the common factor, which may be the ubiquitous g. Sternberg himself has specifically noted that
when the time taken for each of the component processes in his chronometric
analogies tasks are factor analyzed with psychometric reference tests of g, individual differences in the average time for all the components (what Sternberg
calls the regression constant) show a higher correlation with g than any of the
single component latencies. Sternberg (I979a) writes:
Information-processing analyses of a variety of tasks have revealed that the "regression constant" is often the individual differences parameter most high ly correlated with scores on general intelligence tests. This constant measures variation that
is constant across all of the item or task manipulations that are analyzed via
multiple regression. The regression constant seems to bear at least some parallels to
the general factor. (p. 24)

Referring to the same point elsewhere, Sternberg (l979b) says this about the
"regression constant": " ... we can feel pleased to be rediscovering Spearman's g in information processing terms." This is not an admission of failure for
the componential theory of g, but an important discovery for which Sternberg
deserves credit. But it also suggests that the search for g has to be pushed below
the level of metaprocesses and elementary cognitive processes . Look again at
where that leads us in terms of Fig . 4.9 . Any kind of sampling theory , at least at
the level of cognitive processes, may prove wholly unnecessary for explaining g.
Do people differ in psychometric g because they are strong or weak on different
components? Or is the g of the processing components essentially the same as
psychometric g? Although there are distinctly different information processes, as
demonstrated in experimental mental chronometry (e.g. , Posner, 1978), individual differences in these processes may be very highly correlated because of
some general property of the nervous system that acts in all of them.
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One of the best known ECTs, the S. Sternberg short-term memory scanning
paradigm (S. Sternberg, 1966, 1975), can be used to illustrate the problem of
seeking the explanation of g in terms of tests sampling a number of elementary
cognitive processes that are common to many tests, but which are themselves so
saturated with some common source of variance, perhaps the same g they are
intended to explain, as to force us to seek the explanation of g at a still more basic
level of analysis . In the Sternberg memory-scan (M-scan) paradigm, the subject
is shown (either simultaneously or sequentially) a set of digits, varying in set size
(s) from 1 to 7 digits. After the subject has studied the series (termed the positive
set) for a few seconds, the set disappears , and 1 or 2 seconds later a single target
digit appears on the screen. The subject responds as quickly as possible by
pressing buttons labeled either YES or NO in terms of whether the target digit
was or was not a member of the positive set. The subject's RT is measured in
milliseconds . Numerous studies have shown that it takes slightly longer to respond NO than YES, and RT increases as a linear function of set size. (The serial
position of the target digit in the positive set has no effect on the RT .) Studies
have also shown that the intercept and slope of this function, or the overall mean
RT, are negatively correlated with psychometric g (e.g., Chiang & Atkinson ,
1976; Keating & Bobbitt, 1978; McCauley, Dugas, Kellas, & DeVellis, 1976).
The intercept of the linear function relating RT to set size reflects E, the time
required for encoding the target digit; B, the time for making a binary decision
(Yes or No); and R, response production (releasing or pressing a button). The
slope of the function reflects S, the speed of scanning short-term memory,
specifically the time required per digit. A subject's mean RT for any given set
size is hypothesized to comprise the time required for each of the informationprocessing components (i.e., E, B, R, S).
The reverse of this M-scan paradigm is called visual scan (V-scan) . Everything is exactly the same except that the single target digit is presented first,
followed by the positive set. The subject must visually scan the positive set and
respond YES or NO as to the presence or absence of the target digit in the
positive set. No scanning of STM is involved, just visual scanning of the physically displayed set of digits.
Visual scanning and STM memory scanning are obviously completely different processes . Yet in the four studies in which both the V -scan and M-scan
paradigms have been used with the same group of subjects, there were no
significant differences between V -scan and M-scan in intercepts, slopes , or
overall mean RT (Ananda, 1985; Chiang & Atkinson, 1976; Gilford & luola ,
1976; Wade , 1984) . But the really important point, in terms of implications for
the componential sampling theory of g, is the finding that individual differences
in the RT parameters are very highly correlated across the V-scan and M-scan
tasks, so much so , in fact, as to swamp the possibility of demonstrating any
independent abilities in the two types of task. Ananda (1985) found a correlation
of + .69 between mean RTs on M-scan and V -scan; Wade (1984) found a
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correlation of + .85. There is no telling how much higher these correlations
would be if they could be corrected for attenuation. (Neither study determined
test-retest reliability.) Chiang and Atkinson (1976) gave their subjects more trials
and therefore obtained considerably more reliable measurements of individual
differences. Their correlation between V-scan and M-scan was + .97 for intercepts and + .83 for slopes. These very high correlations (not corrected for attenuation) were obtained despite the restricted range of ability in the Stanford
University students who served as subjects . (Corrected for attenuation [using
Day 2-Day 3 test-retest reliabi lity], the above correlations are 1.20 and 1. 13,
respectively.) Chiang and Atkinson state, "It might be argued that performance
on these search tasks is related to a general factor, speed, and that it is not useful
to break down performance into several component processes or to distinguish
between parameters of these processes" (p. 668). But this conclusion is a nonsequitur. Distinctly different processes may be involved in M-scan and V-scan, but
the different processes may not be distinguishable in terms of individual differences because some more basic general factor that affects speed in all cognitive operations is common to both processes . In fact, we generally find such
high correlations among the RTs to various ECTs that on ly one factor accounts
for nearly all of the intercorrelation among the ECTs. Nonspeeded psychometric
tests of g also have considerable loadings on the same general speed factor.
If the condition I have described with respect to the M-scan and V -scan tasks
is found in future research to be generally typical of most other ECTs that
presumably involve distinctly different processes , and if it is their largest common factor , rather than any subordinate factors, that is correlated with psychometric g, it would seem clear that an adequate theory of g will most probably
have to invoke some even more basic level of analysis than is provided by the
processing-component sampling theory . It seems likely that continuing effort to
achieve a scientifically adequate theory of one of the most controversial psychological constructs will force it out of psychology altogether and arrive at an
empirically testable formulation in genuinely physiological terms . But this may
be the ultimate fate of any truly important construct of psychology . Is it not the
ultimate "psychologists' fa llacy" to be satisfied with a psychological explanation of a psychological phenomenon?
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APPENDIX

Two types of RT apparatus were used . The first is shown in Figure A. Templates
are placed over the console, expos ing either I , 2, 4, or 8 of the light-button
combinations. When one of the lights goes on , the subj ect removes his finger
from the central home button and presses a button adjacent to the light, which
puts out the light. Fifteen trials are given at each level of complex ity- I , 2, 4, or
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FIG. A. Subject's console of the reaction time aparat us. Pushbuttons indicated
by c ircles, green jewelled li ghts by ci rcled crosses. The " home" button is in the
lower center.

8 light-buttons. RT is the time taken to get off the home button after one of the
lights goes on. I shall refer to this task simply as the RT task (RT). The other
tasks all use a two-choice console pictured in Figure B. In the Memory Scan task
(DIGIT), a set of digits consisting of anywhere from I to 7 digits is simultaneously presented for 2 seconds on the display screen. After a I-second interval, a single probe digit appears on the screen. The subj ect's task is to respond as
quickly as possible, indicati ng whether or not the probe was a member of the set
that had previously appeared by raising his index finger from the home button
and pushing one of the two choice buttons labeled " yes" and "no ." The
subject's RT is the interval between the onset of the probe digit and the subject's
releasing the home button. The subject's score (the average of his RTs to 84 such
digit sets) provides a measure of the speed of short-term memory processing, that
is, the speed with which information held in short-term memory can be scanned
and retrieved.
The Same- Different tasks (SD2) measures the speed of visual discrimination
of pairs of simple words that are physically the same or different, for example,
DOG- DOG or DOG- LOG. The instant that each of 26 pairs of the same or
different words is presented, the subject raises his finger from the home button
and presses one of the two choice buttons labeled S (same) and D (different).
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FIG. B. SUbject's console used for the digit memory scan, physically samedifferent words, and synonyms-antonyms test , showing display sc reen , the twochoice response buttons , and the " horne" button (lower center).

Again, the subject's RT is the average interval between onset of the word pair
and releasing the home button.
The Synonym- Antonym task (SA2) works much the same way, but in this test
pairs of words are presented that are semantically either similar or opposite in
meaning , for example, BIG- LARGE or BIG- LITTLE. All the synonyms and
antonyms are composed of extremely common, high-frequency words , and all
items can be answered correctly by virtually any third-grader under non speeded
test conditions. The only reliable source of individu al differences is the speed
with which the decisions are made. This task measures the subject's speed of
access to highly overlearned verbal codes stored in long-term memory .
In the Dual Processing tasks, the subject is required to do two things, thus
creati ng some degree of cognitive trade-off, or processing efficiency loss, between storage of information in short-term memory and retrieval of semantic
information from long-term memory. In this task, we sequentially combine the
digit Memory Scan task and the Same- Different task, or the Memory Scan task
and the Synonyms-Antonyms task. First, the subject is presented with a set of 1
to 7 digits for 2 seconds. This presentation is immediately followed by a SameDifferent (or Synonym-Antonym) word pair, and the subject must respond
"same" or different" (pressing buttons labeled S or D) . Next, the probe digit
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appears, and he must respond " yes" or " no" to indicate whether or not the
probe was a member of the digit set shown previously. The RT (release of home
button) is measured for the Same-Different responses to the words (DT2
WORDS) and for the yes- no responses to the probe digits (DT2 DIGITS). The
very same dual task procedure is also used with synonyms-antonyms (in place of
physically same-different words) and digits (DT3 WORDS and DT3 DIGITS).

The Assessment of Cogn itive
Factors in Academic Abilities

Stephen L. Benton

Kansas State University
Kenneth A. Kiewra

Utah State University

Nearly 30 years ago, Lee Cronbach (1957) distinguished between the two disciplines of correlational psychology, which investigated naturally occurring individual variance in behavior, and experimental psychology, which examined the
effectiveness of certain treatments on behavior. Essentially, correlational psychology examined individual differences using factor analytic techniques; whereas experimental psychology attempted to eliminate individual differences using
appropriate interventions. Cronbach believed that these two disciplines should
join together to promote aptitude-treatment interaction (A Tl) research that would
identify effective treatments for certain types of individuals. With this combined
approach, different tratments could be prescribed for skilled and less skilled
individuals.
The ATl research methodology had limited success, however, because of
inconsistency in findings and because of difficulty in replicating some of the
treatments (Tobias, 1985). In addition, results rarely revealed disordinal interactions (which indicate that treatments differentially affect those on the lower and
the higher ends of the performance continuum) . One explanation for the lack of
disordinal interactions was that methods for identifying skilled and less skilled
students on a given academic behavior were not far advanced (Tobias, 1985).
What was needed were precise methods for measuring specific skills required for
successful academic achievement.
Recent developments in cognitive psychology have provided more precise
methods that may help to advance both ATl research and the field of measurement. Sternberg (1977), for example, has investigated the underlying cognitive
processes in intellectual behavior using componential analysis. Essentially, componential analysis investigates the underlying componenets involved in task per145
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formance. By specifying these components and the various combination rules
one might employ, differences can be observed among individuals in the number
of components utilized, the combination rules employed, the order of the component operations, the mode of processing (e .g., serial vs . parallel), and the time
required to execute a component. This approach is more precise than the previous factor analytic approaches of correlational psychologists, because the latter
measured only the end products of behaviors and not the components of mental
organization (Vernon, 1970, p. 100).
A more recent trend in cognitive psychology has been to examine differences
in mental abi lities between experts and novices in particular subject matter areas
such as math and reading. Such cognitive curriculum analysis can not only
specify cognitions that distinguish experts and novices, but can promote the
construction of tests in particular subject-matter areas that can diagnose the
cognitive difficulties underlying performance. By identifying the underlying
components involved in academic performance, differences may then be observed that allow for more precise measurement and more effective treatments.
The cognitive approach to assessment suggests that there are several factors
that contribute to successfu l or unsuccessful academic behaviors. These generally interactive factors are the learner's declarative knowledge, procedural
knowledge, control processes, cognitive strategies, and metacognitive processes.
Cognitive psychology has advanced to the point where it can offer tools for
measuring these factors that may help to clarify the specific interventions that
must be made. In many instances, however, the tools are sti ll being developed
and applied to specific academic areas so that subject-matter remediation can be
more precise.
The purpose of the current chapter, then, is to investigate how these cogn itive
factors may be measured within the academic domains of reading, writing,
mathematics, and science . What immediately fo llows is a brief overview of the
cognitive factors and a description of how they may be assessed, in general. (A
more detailed account can be found in Meyer, 198 1.) Following that overview,
methods for assessing these factors within the various academic domains are
discussed.
DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE

Declarative knowledge refers to knowledge of facts and information . Several
researchers stress the importance of having appropriate declarative knowledge
for demonstrating expertise in problem solving or in higher-order thinking. This
view is well supported by Resnick (1984), who purports that thinking can only be
taught in knowledge-rich areas, and by proponents of artificial intelligence who
now share the view that intelligent thinking is knowledge based (Minsky &
Papert, 1974).
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Experts and novices working in a particular area differ in both the quantity
and the quality of their domain-specific knowledge. Expe11 chess players, for
example, have more knowledge about chess positions than do chess novices
(Chase & Simon, 1973). Not only do novices have less knowledge, but their
knowledge is often not as hierarchically organized as is the knowledge of experts
(e.g., Chi , Glaser & Reese, 1982). Novices also appear to have fewer links or
pathways among their memory nodes, thereby decreasing the activation of related knowledge. This limits both encoding and retrieval processes, which, of
course, are necessary for effective problem solving, memorization, and comprehension.
Experts not on ly have sufficient declarative knowledge abo ut the particular
domain of inquiry, they also have knowledge abo ut the structure of knowledge
that helps them to learn and to understand. Someone trying to comprehend a
story about baseball, for example, not only needs baseball knowledge , but also
knowledge about the structure of stories. As we hear or read a story, we expect
the events of that story to correspond to our story schema that may include an
introduction, a characterization , a resolution, and so forth. When we comprehend, we selectively modify the story's events to conform to our current
schema. Therefore, stories presented in a manner inconsistent with our story
schema are more difficult to comprehend (Thorndyke, 1977). Differences between good and poor readers (discussed later in greater detail) are, in fact, often
due to the readers' immature story schemata. This is why Resnick ( 1985) maintains that meaning is as much within the learner as it is upon the printed page.
Resnick therefore advocates that particular story schemata be taught, because
adequate schemata have transfer value that will increase the likelihood of comprehension across content areas.
If content knowledge and knowledge about the structure of knowledge contribute to expertise, then researchers and educators need methods for assessing
such declarative knowledge . Cognitive psychologists have recently provided the
tools for such measurement. The cognitive approach to assessing declarative
knowledge involves analyzing verbal knowledge into composite units and indicating the structure governing those units. A structure model of a person's
knowledge is represented in the form of a network or a tree, both of which
indicate symbolica lly the major elements of a person's knowledge and the relationships among those elements- much like a sentence grammar indicates the
parts and relations within a sentence. One derives a story schema, for example,
by first breaking a story down into simple sentences. Each sentence is then
placed within one of the designated components of a story schema. Story schemata are thought to include information about setting, theme, plot , and resolution. Each of these structures can, in turn, be analyzed into component parts. A
setting contai ns information about characters, location, and time; a plot contains
various episodes further comprised of subgoals, attempts to reach subgoals, and
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outcomes. Thorndyke (1977) has suggested , for example, that the following
parsing rules or categories capture most sentences contained within a narrative:
Rul e
Rul e
Rul e
Ru le
Rule
Rule

I: Story = Setting + Theme = Plot + Resolution
2 Setting = C haracter + Location + Time
3: Theme + Events + Goa l
4: Plot = Episodes
4a: Episode = Subgoa l + Attempts + Outcome
5: Resolution = Event or State

The structural model developed for a particular story can then be compared to the
actual recall performance of individuals who have read the story . Because individuals generally use story schemata when comprehending stories (Thorndyke,
1977) , such a compari son can identify specific gaps in an individual' s knowledge
about the topic and , perhaps more importantly , about the structure of that
knowledge .
It appears that cognitive structures are formed and used in various areas. As
examples, Kintsch (1974) has identified a schema structure for scientific reports,
and Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, and Voss (1979) have developed schema structures for understanding radio broadcasts of baseball games. The task, then, is for
cognitive psychologists and psychometricians to develop these sorts of schematic
structures in other areas. Doing so can permit instructors to teach the particular
story schemata relevant to a particular area, and can help instructional des igners
design instructional materials consistent with the organizational structure of a
content area.

PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE
Effective learners not only have adequate decl arative know ledge, but also procedural knowledge that ass ists them in using declarative knowledge (Resnick,
1976; Woods, Resnick , & Groen , 1975). Skilled math students, for example, do
not simply learn or memorize countless solutions to math problems; they are able
to solve novel problems such as 638 divided by 19 because they have learned
higher-order procedures or rules for doing so.
Cognitive psychologists, interested in the procedures incorporated by the
expert and the procedural errors made by the novice in a given fi eld, have
developed two similar methods for representing and assessing procedural knowledge . One method is called a program, which is a step-by-step li st of actions to
be taken ; the other is a flowchart, whi ch is a set of boxes and arrows used to
represent the processes and decisions one makes when solving a problem . A
process model for solving a particular type of problem is derived by observing
several individuals solve problems of that nature, and by interv iewing them
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about their procedures. A program or flow chart that corresponds to apparent
procedu res is then generated. The validity of the process model is then tested by
comparing the processes and performance of other individuals solving similar
problems to the processes and performance des ignated by the model. This sort of
analys is can successfully pinpoint the specific procedural error(s) that a student is
making.
An important example of the use of a process model for determining procedural errors was offered by Brown and Burton (J 978) , who developed a
computer program called BUGGY that identifies process bugs or errors in the
solving of subtraction problems . Thi s program can determine the precise procedural error a student makes when subtracting. For example, a learner may
always subtract the smaller number from the larger regardless of which number is
on top; or the student may have difficulty borrowing across zero . The BUGGY
program , then, does not only speci fy the correctness of a student' s response, but ,
more importantly , it identifies the particular procedural error(s) made by the
student. With this type of information , teachers can become more effective in
teaching specific procedures, rather than waiting and hoping that students discover them.
Cognitive tool s like the BUGGY program certainly have implications for
educational measurement as well. More programs spec ific to particular academic
areas need to be constructed for developing tests that assess procedural errors and
that determine the procedures used by res ident experts . T he stage has especially
been set in the area of mathematics (Groen & Parkman , 1972; Resnick , 1976) ,
which depends heavily on procedural knowledge. The importance of procedural
knowledge in mathematics and other academic areas are discussed in later
sections.

CONTROL PROCESSES

Recent research has indicated that individual s who di ffer on intelligence tests
(e.g., Sternberg, 1977) and on ability tests (e.g., Hunt , 1978) also differ in their
information-processing capabilities. Earl Hunt and hi s colleagues (Hunt , 1978;
Hunt , Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973; Hunt , Lunneborg, & Lewis, 1975 ) have developed or modified several tasks that distinguish the particular in formation-process ing components (sensory memory, short-term memory, working me mory ,
and long-term memory) and/ or control processes (attention, rehearsal, chunking,
manipul ating information in working memory, encoding, and searching longterm memory) associated with individual di ffe rences in verbal ability. In general,
their work has indicated that differences between high- and low-verbal individuals can be more precisely interpreted as cognitive information-processing
differences . In particul ar, they found that high- and low-verbal indi viduals differ
on cognitive tasks involving search speed through long-term memory, the hold-
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ing capacity of short-term memory, and the speed of manipulating information in
working memory.
Developmental research on human information processing suggests that individual differences on cognitive tasks are due more to the effective use of control
processes than to differences in the cognitive machinery or memory structures
among individuals. Apparently , structure or hardware changes (e.g., number of
holding slots in short-term memory) are negligible after early chi ldhood (see Chi,
1978; Harris, 1978) . Cognitive processes, like rehearsal and encoding, are,
however, modifiable within certain limits. In fact, even learning disabled students (e.g . , Torgesen, 1977), and retarded students (Campione & Brown, 1977),
have shown significant improvement in memory performance following brief
instruction in using rehearsal. (Research on the developmental aspects of control
process training is reviewed by Chi, 1976; and by Hagen & Stanovich, 1977.)
Although substantial experimental memory research indicates that those who
remember more are apt to use control processes more often or more effectively
(see, for example, Bransford, 1979), it is, of course, impossible for researchers
to directly assess these processes. Because these memory processes are not
amenab le to direct assessment, some researchers have corroborated the inferred
processes through self-report techniques or through observation . Torgesen
(1977), for example, observed the mouthing of words to infer rehearsal, and has
observed picture rearrangements to infer organization processes in working
memory.
Although cognitive psychologists have largely determined that differences in
intelligence and verbal ability are due to cognitive processes, there remain questions about exactly what those processes are and how to more objectively measure them . As the pioneering work of Hunt and Sternberg continues to be applied
to specific academ ic areas, perhaps these issues can be more successfully addressed. Furthermore, only by looking at control processes in specific areas can
we be sure of their relative effectiveness for determining expertise when other
cognitive factors, such as subject matter knowledge, are also considered.

COGNITIVE STRATEG IES

Another factor involved in solving general ability or specific academic problems
is the cognitive strategies incorporated by the learner. Cognitive strategies are
thoughts that influence how learners select, acquire, organize, or integrate new
knowledge . These strategies represent a plan of attack for achieving a designated
goal. In determining the types of strategies people use in solving problems,
cognitive psychologists have presented people with problems and have asked
them to think aloud as they solved them. From these self-reports, psychologists
have identified the strategies that humans use-often programming them into a
computer-and have, then, tested the programmed strategies against actual
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human performance. Through this method , psychologists have identified the
strategic behaviors that distinguish experts from novices with regard to solving
general ability problems or problems associated with particular content areas.
Although there are several documented general strategies for problem solving
(e.g . , means-end analysis, working forward, reasoning by analogy, and brainstorming), cognitive psychologists have focused investigations on means-ends
analysis. Ernst and Newell (J 969) and Newell and Simon (J 972), for example,
constructed a computer program called General Problem Solver (GPS), using the
self-report procedures described earlier, that uses means-ends analysis. GPS
solves problems, as do many humans, by first determining a problem space
consisting of one's goal state, starting state, and all possible solution paths. (It
should be apparent that appropriately structured declarative knowledge is critical
for constructing the problem space.) Second, a goal-directed search is made by
searching planfully through the problem space. This planful search is executed
through the cognitive strategy of means-ends analysis, which entails generating
and solving subgoals necessary for achieving the terminal goal. (A more complete description of GPS and means-ends analysis can be found in Ernst and
Newell , 1969.)
The investigation of problem solving in particular content areas seems critical, because problem solving appears to depend substantially on the declarative
knowledge one brings to the situation. Expert chess players, for example, actually behave less strategically , in some cases, than do novices. Expert players
often do not use means-ends analysis to reduce the gap between their current
state and the goal state, as novices are apt to do . Instead, experts respond almost
automatically to the problem situation; namely , the current positioning of the
chess pieces (e.g., Feltovich, 1981 ; Newell & Simon, 1972). Perhaps this is
because of the expert's superior knowledge and experience with a variety of
possible chess positions. Thus, it is believed that the major differences beween
experts' and novices' problem-solving abilities in a particular area are due to the
following knowledge-derived factors: (a) Experts represent the problem more
effectively than do novices; (b) experts have more subj ect-matter knowledge that
is usuall y organized hierarchically ; and (c) experts, because of their more rich
and coherently structured knowledge, are able to hold more in formation in memory and therby entertain several hypotheses at a time. Novices, however, operate
in a piecemeal fashion, reacting to the latest cue and forgetting to consider
previous information . (See Gagne, 1985, pp. 136-161 for a description of problem-solving factors that distinguish novices and experts.)
Although the literature has reported modest success in teaching general problem-solving strategies like means-ends analysis (e.g., Covington , Crutchfie ld , &
Davies, 1966), it seems that knowledge in an area is critical for applying effective strategies. Therefore, cognitive psychologists should not only continue to
advance the technology of systems like GPS to more closely simulate human
problem representation and solution search, but should especially foc us these
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efforts in particular areas where the amount and the structure of knowledge
affects strategic behaviors. Subsequent sections describe the use of cognitiive
strategies in knowledge-rich domains .

METACOGNITION
Metacognition refers to what a person knows about his or her cognitive processes
and the ability to control these processes by planning, choosing, and monitoring.
A learner with good metacognition engaged in problem solving would likely be
aware of his or her procedural and declarative knowledge relative to the problem,
and would call upon appropriate control processes and cognitive strategies when
necessary. Furthermore, he or she would periodically monitor the current state
relative to the goal state. Thus, metacognition allows the learner to orchestrate or
to control the cognitive factors previously discussed .
There is abundant research indicating developmental differences in metacognition between children of different ages. (See Brown, 1978, for a review .)
Younger children, for example, are often unaware of their own knowledge
relative to older children. Young children, given deliberately incomplete instructions for a card game, do not realize that instructions are inadequate until they
play the game (Markman, 1979). Older children more readily realize the inconsistencies. Another metacognitive ability that often distinguishes developmentally different individuals, is the ability to assess the demands of the task. Older
children relative to younger children realize that more study time for learning
pictures results in better recall, and that paired associates that are opposites
(good, bad) are easier to learn than are random pairs (ball, cigar) (as in Kreutzer,
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975). Furthermore, older children relative to younger
children know that active strategies of learning are more likely to result in
superior learning than less active strategies (Kreutzer et aI., 1975). Other areas
identified by Brown (1978), in which children's metacognitive deficiencies have
caused problems, include predicting the outcome of strategy employment both
before and after the use of strategies (Brown & Lawton, 1977), and monitoring
the success of their attempts to learn (Brown & Barclay, 1976; Brown , Campione, & Barclay, 1978). Many of these metacognitive factors are also responsible
for performance differences between learners who are classified as "normal"
and those who are considered cognitively disadvantaged (e.g. , learning disabled
and mentally retarded). In fact, Brown and Barclay (1976) point out that the
greatest problem with retardates may be their inability to use what they know.
Although research consistently indicates that metacognitive abilities distinguish cognitively disadvantaged learners and normal learners, as well as
younger and older learners, the critical point is that metacognitive deficiencies
are among the problems of most novices regardless of age. Novice chess players,
for example (Chi, 1978) , have metacognitive problems similar to those of young
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card players (Markman, 1979). Similarly, novice x-ray technicians show inept
scanning patterns (Thomas , 1968) like those of young children first learning to
search a visual array (Mackworth & Bruner, 1970). It seems, then, that metacognitive abilities are related, at least in part, to the knowledge one brings to a
situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that experts in particular academic areas ,
such as reading and mathematics, not only have more knowledge, but also
display more effective metacognitive behaviors that permit them to apply their
knowledge and cognitions.
Each of the cognitive factors discussed thus far contributes to successful or
unsuccessful performance across a variety of academic domains. Because of this
contribution, educators are interested in measuring these factors so that appropriate remediations can be made. Psychometricians must, therefore, draw upon the
plethora of research in knowledge-rich areas that has been conducted by cognitive psychologists . In the following sections, research investigating the cognitive factors of knowledge, control processes, cognitive strategies, and metacognition within the academic domains of reading, writing, mathematics, and
science are discussed . In addition, the implications of this research for measuring
academic abilities are considered.

READING
The cognitive processes involved in reading have generally been divided into the
two main components of decoding and comprehending (LaBerge , 1980; LaBerge
& Samuels, 1974). In decoding, the reader matches the printed code to a known
memory pattern and recodes the pattern into a string of sounds. In comprehending the reader imposes meaning upon the text. Automaticity in decoding is
necessary for good reading ability because readers have a limited amount of
processing resources they can allocate, and automatization of decoding frees up
resources for comprehension. The relationship between decoding and comprehension has , in fact, been supported, because children instructed in decoding
skills have subsequently improved their reading comprehension (Pflaum, Walberg, Karegianes, & Rasher, 1980).
The comprehension component of reading involves both literal and inferential
comprehension. Literal comprehension requires the dual processes of lexical
access and parsing . Put simply, lexical access is the process by which words are
assigned meaning, and parsing is the process by which words are connected to
form ideas. In inferential comprehension, the reader goes beyond the literal
meaning of the text to integrate ideas , to summarize, and to elaborate upon the
text with inferences and extrapolations.
Although it is sometimes useful to speak of decoding and comprehension as
being separate components , they are actually interrelated and do not necessarily
follow a "bottom-up" sequence going from the decoding of letters up through
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literal and inferential comprehension. For example, Bartlett's (1932) early work
with story schemata, in which he observed reconstructive aspects of text recall,
suggests that a "top-down" sequence is more parsimonious . Specifically, Bartlett believed that the reader's declarative knowledge of the subject matter and of
text structure guided the processes of decoding, lexical access, and parsing, such
that meaning was constructed and not merely extracted by the reader. Further
consideration is, therefore, given to the role that declarative knowledge plays in
reading ability and to how such knowledge can be assessed.

Assessing Readers' Declarative Knowledge
Several reading specialists have suggested that two sources of variance in reading
ability are the degree of organization and elaboration of information in memory
(Anderson & Reder, 1979; Frase, 1973; Meyer, 1977) . Organization refers to the
quality of hierarchical structures among categories and subsets of information in
memory, whereas elaboration refers to the amount of links or pathways among
memory nodes through which the activation of information can spread. Such
characteristics of memory may be used to explain why, for example, skilled
readers outperform less skilled readers on simple word matching tasks . For
example, Ehri and Wilce (1983) compared young readers' speed at reading
familiar printed words such as "hat," "boy," or "car" with their speed at
reading one digit numbers. Their resu lts indicated that less ski lled readers were
slower at reading words than they were at reading digits; whereas, no such
differences were observed among skilled readers. These findings suggest that
differences in word matching ability may have more to do with semantic knowledge than processing speed. Other investigators have also found that, at younger
ages, less skilled readers are slower at labeling letters and words (Frederiksen,
1981; Jackson & MClelland, 1979; Perfetti, Finger, & Hogaboam , 1978; Perfetti
& Hogaboam, 1975; Vellutino, 1979). Notably, such differences between skilled
and less skilled readers have not been observed beyond the fourth grade, however, which suggests that less ski lled readers' decoding processes may be slower
because they have not developed well-organized and elaborate semantic knowledge structures .
Lack of well-organized and elaborate declarative knowledge may also help
explain comprehension deficiencies. Bower , Black, and Turner (1979), for example , investigated how having knowledge about a topic facilitates inferential
comprehension. Specifically , Bower et al. asked students to read a story about
visiting the doctor and then had them recall what they had read. Because visiting
the doctor was a familiar experience to most of the students, 20% of their recalls
included information not found in the original story. They had filled in the details
with information obtained from prior experience with visiting a doctor. The
extent to which the readers' recalls included such elaborations beyond the text
may presumably reflect the amount of prior knowledge they had about visiting
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the doctor. Such a technique cou ld be used as a prereading test for measuring a
student's prior know ledge about a topic. Typically, teachers pretest students on
their semantic knowledge of vocabulary that will be included in a reading assignment. Perhaps it is just as important that teachers pretest students on their
experience with and knowledge about events that will be described within a
passage. By having students read and recall short passages similar in content to
the main reading assignment, teachers can then identify the extent to which
readers' recalls include elaborations beyond the text. Although this process
might be tedious from a pedagogical standpoint, less ski ll ed readers should
nevertheless be pretested and be given additional declarative knowledge about a
topic prior to reading.
Good readers not only have sufficient declarative knowledge about a particular topic, they also have knowledge about the structure of the specific discourse
grammar (e.g., narrative, expository, or argumentative). Comprehension is, in
fact, enhanced if readers have well-organized and elaborate discourse schemata
in memory that serve to facilitate encoding and retrieval processes. Research has
shown, for example, that skilled readers rely more upon the structure of a
passage in developing a summary then do less skilled readers (Bartlett, 1978;
Meyer, Brandt, & Bluth , 1980; Taylor , 1980). Specifically , Meyer et al. (1980)
found that about three-fourths of good readers, one-half of average readers , and
less than one-fourth of poor readers used text structure in their recall summaries.
Those readers who did not use the text structure tended to simply list ideas from
the text in a random fashion. These results suggest that good readers use text
structure in recall because it is adaptable to their own schematic representation of
text in memory . Essentially , then, meaningful interpretation of text requires
well-structured and elaborate declarative knowledge about various discourse
schemata.
Psychologists and educators are, of course, interested in how such discourse
schemata may be assessed. The cognitive approach to assessing such schemata
involves comparing a reader's recall of a passage with a structural model that
indicates the major elements of a text and the relationships among those elements. The structural model of the passage serves as a scoring template used to
examine both the amount and the type of information recalled by the reader,
thereby revealing differences between the text structure and the reader's organization in recall . From this analysis, psychologists then infer the amount of
discrepancy between the structural model and the reader's schematic structure for
a given discourse in memory.
Cognitive psychologists have developed different approaches for analyzing
text structure (e.g., Frederiksen, 1975; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Meyer, 1981),
but have, as yet, failed to converge on a simple, widely accepted method . Meyer
(1981) cites several reasons for this lack of agreement. First, interest in describing text structures has historically come from disciplines as diverse as rhetoric,
folklore , linguistics, education, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Such
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plurality in backgrounds makes it difficult for academicians to reach consensus.
Second, because of these diverse disciplines, the purpose for which structural
analyses were developed has varied from that of assessing recall of main ideas to
that of assessing the integration of logical relationships. Finally, since reading is
a "top-down" process, the structure of a text will be described differently by
readers who possess different prior knowledge and experience. This will be
particularly problematic when the inherent structure of a text is more implicitly
than explicitly stated.
Despite these confounding variables that affect how text structure is analyzed,
psychometrians should attempt to establish a standard analytical method not open
to the subjective affects of prior knowledge. Perhaps computer programs would
be beneficial for building objective structural models of various discourse types .
The programmer could specify the type of discourse to be analyzed and the intent
(e.g., to identify main ideas or to identify logical relationships), and then enter
the specific passage into the system so that an objective structural analysis could
be conducted. Subsequently, each reader's recall could be entered into the system so that a "goodness of fit" comparison could be made between the computer-generated model and the reader's recall protocol. Upon making the comparison, the computer could then specifically identify , for the reader, what
discrepancies might exist between the organization of the structural model and
the organization of the readers' discourse schema in memory .
The importance of assessing declarative knowledge among readers has been
well-established. An equally important cognitive factor that must be assessed is
the control processes that operate within the information-processing system during reading. A discussion of these processes and how they may be measured is
addressed in the following section.
Assessing Readers' Control Processes
Individual differences in control processes may account for differences observed
between skilled and less skilled readers in recoding ability. Recoding , which
involves connecting a string of sounds, requires holding small bits of information
in temporary storage until sufficient amounts have been received in order to
apprehend meaning (Baddely, 1970; Conrad, 1972). Presumably, then , recoding
might involve the control processes of attention, rehearsal, chunking, and the
manipulation of information in working memory.
Research investigating speed of recoding reveals that less skilled readers are
slower at starting to say pseudowords than are skilled readers (Frederiksen ,
1981). Such deficits in recoding speed would be expected among less skilled
readers, because their decoding processes have not yet become automatized. It is
important to note, however, that differences in recoding ability have been observed to disappear by the third grade (Venezky & Johnson, 1973) and, consequently , one must again consider the role knowledge plays in performance of
these tasks.
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Additional research by Perfetti and Roth (1 98 1) illustrates di fferences among
skilled and less skilled readers in their ability to integrate sentences. Sentence
integration requires the holding and the manipulating of information in working
memory, because the reader must combine successive sentences in order to
integrate ideas. Specifically, Perfetti and Roth (198 1) asked students to listen to
pairs of related sentences in which the last word in the second sentence was
missing, and to then predict the last word in the second sentence. An auditory
presentation was used in order to focus on the comprehension process and not on
the decoding process. The results indicated that skilled readers, relative to less
skilled readers, produced a greater number of appropriate sentence-ending words
on moderate-constraint sentences. (These are sentences that can be ended with a
moderate selection of poss ible words. ) Apparently , then, less skilled readers
were more likely to produce inappropriate words to complete the sentence because they were unable to hold the relevant info rmation from the first sentence in
working memory.
Related findings by Frederiksen (1 98 1) indicate that less skilled readers'
reading speed is slowed down when the second sentence in a pair contains a
pronoun reference or an implicit reference to a noun phrase in the previous
sentence. Presumably, the slower reading rate occurs because readers cannot
hold an adequate amount of information in working memory and must, consequently , look back to the prior sentence to identify the noun . One expl anation for
why less skilled readers perform poorly on thi s task is that they have limited
working-memory capacity. Findings that support this view include those that
reveal deficits in short-term memory recall of digits (Corkin , 1974; Bakker,
1972; Jorm, 1977) and of word strings (Bauer, 1977 ; Torgeson & Go ldman,
1977) among less skilled readers .
Despite the abundance of research supporting a capac ity hypothesis, alternative hypotheses must be noted . One hypothes is is that individual di ffere nces in
readers' working memory capacities are due more to di fferences in control processes than to di fferences in hardware . Such control processes as rehearsal and
chunking are limited in their simultaneous application and , therefore, compete
for the readers' attenti on. Most memory-span tasks require readers to simultaneously attend to incoming data while rehearsing information already temporarily stored in working memory. Therefore, it is the competition between
these control processes, and not the capac ity of working memory, that hinders
performance on such tasks . A second hypothesis, tested by Daneman and Carpenter (1 980) , posits that less skilled readers do poorly on memory-span tasks
because they do not perfo rm some of the simpler literal comprehension processes
(i.e., lex ical access and parsing) as automatically as do skilled readers. Specificall y, the authors devised a reading-span task whereby subjects read sentences
aloud at their own pace and then attempted to recall the last item from each
sentence. Res ults found the read ing-span task to be a better predictor of verbal
ability and of reading comprehension than was a conventional digit-span task.
Daneman and Carpenter ( 1980) concluded, therefore, that less skilled readers
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performed poorly on the reading-span task not because they have a limited
working-memory capacity, but because they have difficulty assigning meaning
to words or putting words together.
Research investigating differences in control processes among readers has
implications for the field of measurement. First, based on Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) findings , it would be unwise to draw conclusions about the
nature of a reader's working memory capacity unless he or she does poorly
across a wide variety of memory-span tasks . Second, performance deficits on
memory-span tasks do not necessarily indicate a fixed capacity limitation in
working memory . Developmental research suggests that individual differences
observed on these tasks are due more to the use of control processes than to
differences in architecture. Besides, the prospect of a fixed capacity limitation
leaves little hope for the possibility of appropriate remediation . It is perhaps
more reasonable for psychometrians to investigate methods for assessing the
underlying deficiencies in control processes that characterize poor readers .
Assessing Readers' Cognitive Strateg ies

Another factor to consider in assess ing reading ability is the reader's cognitive
strategies. Cognitive strategies are methods for reaching some goal in an optimal
way (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) . They require conscious, controlled, cognitive
representations that dominate the moves of an action sequence. The fact that
cognitive strategies are conscious makes them amenable to measurement through
verbal reports of individuals as they solve problems. Examples of what might be
discovered from such reports are that individuals may break a problem down into
subproblems, they may attempt to obtain more information to solve the problem,
or they may return to previously solved states of a problem if an error is made.
Language strategies, which operate during reading, are unlike typical cognitive strategies because they are not consciously controlled. They occur almost
automatically , particularly with continued practice. A number of actions are
involved, for example, in reading that occur rather unconsciously, such as identifying letters, constructing words, analyzing syntactic structures, and understanding sentential and textual meanings. In spite of the effortless nature of these
processes , van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) believe it is appropriate to speak of
strategies that operate in discourse comprehension for the fo llowing reasons: (a)
The language user is confronted with the task of understand ing an action; (b)
such an action has a well-defined goal (comprehension); (c) the solution occurs
step-by-step, and may be broken down into subtasks; and (d) the solution is not
always obvious , and therefore alternative routes may need to be taken (pp .
71-73). Essentially , the authors suggest that discourse comprehension is an instance of human problem solving and, therefore, necessarily requires the use of
language strategies.
Language strategies are different from language rules (which more generally
specify correct structures for phonology, morphology , or syntax) because they
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are context-dependent. That is, rules describe proper structure for clauses , sentences, and paragraphs; strategies describe how these rules are employed within
the context of the semantic analysis of a passage. Rules, then, have to do with
syntax, whereas strategies have to do with semantics. The importance of language strategies for reading is that they efficiently apply abstract language rules
in such a way that several levels of discourse can be processed simultaneously .
The specific nature of these strategies, as described by van Dijk and Kintsch
(1983), is now discussed.

Propositional Strategies. A proposition is a composite unit that includes a
predicate and one or more arguments, where a predicate is defined as being a
property or a relation, and an argument is defined as being a thing or a person.
The unit "a boy" would not be considered a proposition, because it only contains an argument. The unit "a boy ran home" would be considered a proposition, however, because it contains both an argument and a predicate. Propositions are constructed by the reader based on the context of the passage and word
meanings activated from semantic memory. Propositional strategies guide the
reader in placing predicates and arguments into configurations, and in helping
the reader make best guesses about the likely structure or meaning of incoming
data. An example of a propositional strategy is assigning a noun or a pronoun as
the subject of a proposition even before the rest of the clause has been analyzed.
If such an assignment turns out to be wrong, then a second strategy would be to
go back over the clause applying the rules of syntactic structure. These kinds of
propositional strategies operate continually and facilitate automaticity in reading.
Research indicates that skilled readers are more proficient at using propositional strategies. Specifically , Frederiksen (1981) asked high school students to
read sentences that had the last word missing and, after they had read each
sentence, to press a stimulus that released the missing word. Students were then
to pronounce the word as fast as they could. Frederiksen (1981) reasoned that if
they were expecting the word, the students would pronounce it faster than if they
were not expecting it. Two types of sentences were provided: those providing
"weak context" and those providing "strong context. " Again, the author reasoned that if good readers were more proficient at propositional strategies, they
would benefit more from having the strong context than would the poor readers .
Results, in fact, found that good readers did show a greater difference in reaction
time between weak and strong context sentences than did poor readers .
Frederiksen concluded, therefore , that skilled readers used propositional strategies to make several best guesses about word meaning possibilities, and were
therefore prepared to pronounce anyone of them.
Local Coherence Strategies . Local coherence strategies help to establish
meaning among successive sentences. The assumption underlying local coherence strategies is that language users attempt to establish some coherent
relation before they have fully processed a pair of sentences. They will do so by
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relating fragments of the new sentence to the sentence previously processed.
More specifically, local coherence will be established among sentences by
searching for propositions that contain related facts or potential links, or by
recognizing argument repetition that may be both explicitly and implicitly stated.
Essentially, then, local coherence is strategic because relatedness among sentences must be established by the reader.
Research indicates that skilled readers are more proficient than less skilled
readers at estab lishing local coherence. As has been previously described , Perfetti and Roth (1981) asked 8 to 10 year old students to listen to pairs of related
sentences and to predict the last word in the second sentence. To perform well on
this task, one must establish commonalities among the two sentences in order to
make an accurate prediction. Again, Perfetti and Roth's results indicated that
skilled readers were more accurate than were less skilled readers with sentences
that contain moderate-constraint sentences. These findings suggest that skilled
readers are better able to integrate sentences efficiently because they emp loy
strategies for integrating common propositions between sentences.

Macrostrategies. Macrostrategies operate at the level of macrostructures
that describe the overall meaning or gist of a passage. Macrostructures are
different from schema structures because the latter represent the form of a discourse grammar (e.g., a story schema contains information about plot, setting,
resolution , and so forth) . A macrostructure, on the other hand, is the global
meaning inferred from a passage. In order to establish this global meaning, the
reader must continually form best guesses about the main idea , even before he or
she is finished reading. Macrostrategies , consequently, use propositions to form
best guesses about a macrostructure that can, in turn, be used to understand
subsequent sentences. This type of macro strategy is described by van Dijk and
Kintsch (1983) as semantic inference. Semantic inference is influenced by prior
knowledge , by redundancy of propositions, and by macropropositions that are
topical or thematic expressions that signal what the main idea is about. Such
expressions often appear at the beginning or at the end of paragraphs, or may be
signaled by larger print or by italics. Macropropositions that appear at the beginning of a section help the reader form hypotheses about the meaning of sentences
to come; whereas those that appear at the end of a section serve to evaluate
already established macrostructures.
The notion of discourse comprehension strategies seems useful if comprehension is considered to be a problem solving activity. The reader continually makes
best guesses about how to solve the problem that concerns what the discourse is
about. If, as van Dijk and Kintsch suggest, these strategies are not consciously
controlled, how , then, can psychometricians devise tests to measure them? The
traditional method of assessing cognitive strategies through verbal reports seems
hardly valid in this case. The previously described tasks employed by
Frederiksen (1981) and Perfetti and Roth (1981), however, seem useful for
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assessing propositional and local coherence strategies, respectively. Such tasks
are amenable to computer administration and scoring, and seem to come from a
theoretical base closely aligned with the notion of language strategies. Steps
should be taken to make these kinds of tasks readily available to those interested
in assessing propositional and local coherence strategies. At the level of macrostrategies, cognitive psychologists have for years analyzed the free recalls of
readers in order to assess the proportion of macropropositions they can remember. Educators should continue this type of testing so as to monitor whether
readers can infer the main idea from a passage.
To validly and reliably assess discourse comprehension strategies, tests must
require the examinee to actually connect propositions such that local and global
coherence is established. The tasks cited above are a beginning, but innovative
assessment devices must sti ll be created . Recent research in the assessment of
discourse production strategies (Benton & Kiewra, 1985), to be discussed within
the writing section of this chapter, may provide insight into how comprehension
strategies may be assessed.

Assessing Readers' Metacognitive Processes
Investigations into the metcognitive processes of reading reveal differences between good and poor readers in their comprehension monitoring. Comprehension
monitoring is a two-stage process of goal checking and remediating. In goal
checking, the reader checks to see if he or she is achieving the goal of com- .
prehension. Goals may vary according to whether one is reading for the purpose
of skimming or for the purpose of obtaining a thorough understanding of a
passage. During remediation, the reader looks back to previously processed
discourse in order to pick up relevant information that was missed.
Differences have been observed between mature and less mature readers in
their goal-checking strategies (Harris, Kruithos, Terwogt, & Visser, 1981). Specifically , Harris et al. (1981) asked th ird and sixth grade students to read stories,
some of which contained an anomalous sentence relative to the title of the story
(e .g ., the sentence " He sees hi s hair getting shorter" within a story titled "John
at the Dentist. "). Other stories containing the same sentence were more aptly
titled "John at the Hairdresser's." Results found that reading speed was slower
in the inappropriately titled stories for both grade levels, which suggests all
students were cuing themselves that something was wrong with the anomalous
sentence. Interestingly, however , 30% of the third graders cou ld not identify the
anomalous sentence, compared to only II % of the sixth graders who could not.
Apparently, then, students in both grade levels produced signals that their comprehension was faltering (because of a slower reading speed), but sixth graders
were able to check the source of that signal. The authors contend, therefore, that
mature readers are more adept at goal checking.
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In order to investigate remediation skills, Garner and Reis (1981) examined a
"Iookback" strategy among students in the fourth through tenth grades. Specifically, students read passages containing successive paragraphs, each followed by
three questions that required looking back to preceding paragraphs. Skilled readers, across all grade levels, looked back on an average of 30% of the questions as
compared to less skilled readers who did so on only 9% of the questions . In
addition, the six oldest readers looked back on 80% of the questions. Such
findings suggest that mature readers employ remediation strategies in monitoring
their comprehension.
The techniques used by Harris et al. (1981) and by Garner and Reis (1981)
may prove useful as assessment devices for determining which students employ
goal checking and remediation strategies during reading. Students should also be
questioned individually about their use of metacognitive strategies in order to
precisely identify the source of their deficiencies . Weinstein (1978), for example, has developed a questionnaire to assess readers' strategies for elaborating
upon a text. The questionnaire directs students to think about the purpose for
their reading and to relate the passage to their own knowledge and experience.
Similar questionnaires could be developed that assess the degree to which readers
monitor their comprehension through goal checking and remediation strategies.
Such questionnaires would presumably query readers about whether they understand the meaning of a passage and about their use of lookback strategies.

Summary
Research in cognitive psychology suggests that readers should be assessed with
regard to their declarative knowledge, control processes, discourse comprehension strategies, and metacognitive processes. In assessing readers ' declarative
knowledge, teachers must be encouraged to provide prereading assignments that
test the reader's knowledge about a given topic . In addition, in assessing the
organization of declarative knowledge, psychologists need to establish a standard
method for the structural analysis of text amenable to computer scoring. Second,
before drawing conclusions about a reader's working memory capacity limitations, he or she should be tested on a variety of memory-span tasks . Such
limitations may actually have more to do with deficient control processes, however, than with deficient information-processing hardware. Third, discourse
comprehension is established at the levels of propositional strategies, local coherence strategies, and macrostrategies. Propositional and local coherence strategies can be assessed with tests that require readers to integrate propositions both
within and between sentences. Macrostrategies can be conveniently measured
with free recalls of the main ideas contained within a passage. Finally, metacognitive processes , such as comprehension monitoring, can be assessed using tests
that determine readers' goal checking and remediation strategies. By focusing on
these specific cognitive factors that operate during reading, educators can hopefully define specific skill deficits and provide precise interventions.
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WRITING
Within the academic domain of writing, John Hayes and Linda Flower (1980) of
Carnegie-Mellon University have developed a model of writing formulated
through direct analysis of writing processes. Their model proposes three interacting components within writing: (a) the task environment, (b) long-term memory,
and (c) the writing processes. The task environment refers to the conditions
surrounding the writing behaviors; that is, the writing assignment itself and the
text generated thus far. The long-term memory component includes the writer's
declarative knowledge about the topic, the informational needs of the intended
audience, and the overall plans that guide the writing processes. Within the third
component of the model, Hayes and Flower (1980) describe three processes:
planning, translating, and reviewing. Within the planning process , there are
three subprocesses: goal setting, generating, and organizing . Goal setting refers
to the purpose for writing and to the goals writers set for themselves. Generating
involves accessing relevant information from long-term memory and the task
environment to generate ideas for writing . Finally , in the organizing subprocess,
the writer attempts to establish both cohesion and coherence in writing. Cohesion
refers to the use of linguistic devices (e.g., pronouns, conjunctions, and implicit
linguistic ties) that integrate related ideas. Coherence, on the other hand, refers
to how well an entire passage fits together.
In translating, ideas (semantics) are transformed into external symbols (syntax). This is actually the direct opposite of decoding in the reading process, in
which symbols are translated into ideas. Finally , in reviewing, the writer evaluates what has been written and makes revisions where needed. This process,
therefore, involves the two subprocesses of evaluating and revising.
The components of the Hayes and Flower (1980) model are both iterative and
interactive, because the writer continuously passes back and forth across these
components during writing. Although the Hayes and Flower (1980) model is
useful for identifying the various writing processes , it is, nonetheless , inadequate
for investigating individual differences, because it fails to specify the cognitive
factors that influence such processes. For this reason, a discussion of those
cognitive factors follows , with particular attention given to how each may be
assessed .

Assessing Writer's Declarative Know ledge
Writing is perceived as an instance of information processing, because information must be retrieved from long-term memory to impose meaning on the specific
writing task and to generate ideas for writing (Hayes & Flower, 1980). In order
to write effectively then, writers must possess appropriate declarative knowledge
in long-term memory. What kinds of knowledge contribute to expertise in writing ability? According to Perfetti and McCutchen (in press), relevant knowledge
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for writing includes a) discourse schema knowledge, b) lexical knowledge, and
c) syntactic knowledge. Other authors (Benton & Blohm, 1986; Moore, Moore ,
Cunningham, & Cunningham, 1986) also include topic-specific knowledge as
essential for effective writing.
Discourse schema knowledge refers to knowledge of discourse forms (Meyer,
1975; Stein&Glenn,1979; Stein&Trabasso , 1981) . More specifically, discourse
schemata "include knowledge of the general structure and ordering of information within a given discourse , the typical qualitative nature of that information,
and the kinds of linguistic ties that link that information into a coherent discourse" (Perfetti & McCutchen, in press, p. 42). Discourse schema knowledge
would, for example, be important for someone trying to write a story. As we
write a story, we construct the events of that story to correspond to our story
schema which may include an introduction, a characterization, a resolution, and
so forth. We do this because stories that are presented in a manner consistent
with story schema structure are more comprehensible (Thorndyke, 1977).
Knowledge of discourse structure seems essential, then, for expertise in writing,
because such knowledge influences how prose is structured.
With regard to the Hayes and Flower (1980) writing model, the organizing
and reviewing processes would seem to be most affected by such knowledge.
Individual differences have been observed among writers, for example, in their
ability to produce well organized text. Specifically , McCutchen and Perfetti
(1982) compared text structures written by fourth and sixth graders. Students
were asked to consider several constraints about a topic (e.g., the topic had to be
about something both fun and dangerous), because the authors believed that the
ability to simultaneously satisfy several constraints at once produces well-organized prose. Fourth graders tended to produce text with a listlike structure,
considering one constraint at a time, whereas many sixth graders produced text
with a zigzag structure that weaved back and forth across constraints . McCutchen and Perfetti also compared the students' writing with an ideally coherent
text produced by the authors . They found that 60% of the sixth grade texts
resembled the ideal structure, whereas only 44% of the fourth grade texts were so
structured. Older students' essays were apparently better structured because of
their more mature discourse schema structures. It seems , then, that ski lled writers have acquired well-organized schema structures that assist them in organizing
prose.
Similarly, discourse schema knowledge influences the reviewing process in
writing. In fact, individual differences in the reviewing process are considered
largely developmental in nature (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1983) , which underscores the importance of having adequate knowledge of discourse. Writers cannot, for example, effectively evaluate prose unless they have adequate schematic
representations in memory with which to compare it. Writers with better organized and elaborate schemata for different discourse types will likely be more
adept at establishing a goodness-of-fit between their prose and an ideal structure
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within memory. Consequently, they will be more proficient at both evaluating
and revising their writing.
Stallard (1974) found that students differ in both the quality and the quantity
of their revisions. Educators may want to use this diversity by employing cooperative writing methods that pair skilled with less skilled writers. Research has
consistently demonstrated that cooperative learning facilitates academic achievement (Dansereau et a!. , 1979; Sharan, 1980; Slavin , 1980) as well as transfer to
individual learning (McDonald, Larson , Dansereau, & Spurlin, in press). Cooperative learning has, in fact, been proposed as a useful instructional device in
teaching writing (Gebhardt, 1980; Jacko, 1978). Educators have used this technique by creating peer response teams comprised of from two to five students
who evaluate what each has written (Moore et al. , 1986). In using peer response
teams, however, teachers should encourage students to a) focus initially on what
is done well, b) state negative reactions as questions, c) use either oral or written
responses, and d) initially listen to all feedback before responding to criticism.
Cooperative learning is effective because it presumably provides the opportunity for observational learning and for immediate peer evaluation. Students
who pair off and then write , exchange, and revise may assist each other in
evaluating the quality of their schematic structures necessary for organizing and
revising prose. This method seems more effective than the traditional pedagogical techniques of correcting errors and writing comments that require no
academic response by the learner. Educators must realize, however, that additional findings suggest that teachers shou ld still be involved in the evaluation of
writing , because many students apply evaluative criteria significantly different
from those of their instructors (Newkirk, 1984). Teachers who urge students to
write solely for their peers may, therefore, reinforce writing that fails to meet the
expectations of academic audiences.
Besides discourse schema knowledge, writers must possess lexical knowledge-knowledge of words and their meanings-as well as syntactic knowl edge, along with procedures for coordinating that knowledge. Lexical and syntactic knowledge assist in the manipulation of ideas into their correct ordering
within a sentence. The process in writing influenced by such knowledge would
most likely be translating.
Writing blocks, which hinder automaticity in the translating process , may
presumably occur if the writer lacks adequate lexical and syntactic knowledge. If
the writer continually struggles to access a word or agonizes over concerns with
grammatical structure, then the fluent translation of ideas will be blocked .
Effective writers apparently have methods for acquiring additional information so that translating is more automatic. They may read texts on writing style,
or perhaps flip through a thesaurus if searching for the correct word. Whatever
the method, one would expect that good writers have acquired the lexical and
syntactic knowledge needed for facilitating automaticity in translating. Again ,
educators may assist writers in assessing their lexical and syntactic knowledge
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through cooperative learning methods. Peer editing teams can help the writer
monitor features of writing mechanics by providing feedback about spelling,
punctuation, and word usage (Moore et aI., 1986). Whereas peer response reacts
to the writing as a whole , peer editing reacts to the specific structure of sentences .
In assessing lexical knowledge, educators may also want to pretest their
students on vocabulary that would be relevant to a given topic. It may be of even
greater value to test whether students can then generate sentences that contain
certain vocabulary, because practice in using the words in writing may facilitate
automaticity. In addition, tests that assess basic grammar, such as the Test of
Standard Written English (TSWE) of the College Board (1983), shou ld continue
to be used for the purpose of assessing students' knowledge of syntax, punctuation, and word usage.
In addition to knowledge of discourse and mechanics, expert writers must also
have sufficient knowledge of specific topics. The extent of one's knowledge
about a particular topic would presumably influence the generating process in
writing, because such knowledge contributes to the elaborateness and the relevance of ideas produced in writing (Voss, Vesonder, & Spilich, 1980) . Voss et
aI., for example, asked college writers with equal verbal abi lity, but with varying
degrees of knowledge about baseball, to write an account of one-half inning of
baseball. Students' written texts were then analyzed by categorizing propositions
according to those dealing with game actions, auxiliary game actions, relevant
nongame actions, and irrelevant nongame actions. Results indicated that writers
with greater baseball knowledge generated a higher proportion of auxi li ary game
action propositions (e.g. , elaborations about where a ball went when hit) than did
those with limited baseball knowledge , whereas those with limited baseball
knowledge generated a higher proportion of irrelevant nongame actions (e.g.,
propositions concerning the fans' behaviors) .
Recent advances have been made in measuring the influence of knowledge on
the generating process based on structural analyses of students' writing (Benton
& Blohm, 1986). Specifically, Benton and Blohm contend that the generating
process in writing can be measured by considering the extent to which writers
elaborate upon their ideas with explanations and examples . Because ideas should
be well organized, methods for measuring such elaborations in writing must be
sensitive to the relationships between superordinate and subordinate ideas contained within a passage . This relationship can be broken down into three basic
concepts that reflect both elaboration and hierarchical relationships : top-level,
mid-level, and base-level ideas (Meyer, 1977) . Specifically, ideas are top-level
when they are related to an idea of central importance that relates several concepts together. Mid-level ideas are explanations, definitions, or descriptions that
clarify the relationship directly stated or inferred in a top-level idea. Finally,
base-level ideas provide specific details that exemplify a mid-level explanation
or a top-level relationship . Consider the following example from a text generated

5.

COGNITIVE FACTORS IN ACADEMIC ABILITIES

167

by a student who wrote on the topic "Wastefulness is a necessary part of the
American way of life":
We, as Americans, are very wasteful (top-level idea) . Each day millions of us
get up out of bed and immediately begin being wasteful (mid-level idea). Soaps,
powders, lotions, cosmetics, tissues, and other elements are consumed (five baselevel ideas).

This type of structural analysis is useful for assessing generating in writing
because it provides both a quantitative and a qualitative measure of elaboration.
Within the preceding passage, for example, one can count a total of seven ideas.
More importantly, however, there are five base-level ideas for each mid-level
idea , and one mid-level idea for the single top-level idea. These types of measures indicate to what depth the writer elaborates upon mid- and top-level ideas.
Appropriate prior knowledge is an important prerequisite for good writing,
and must therefore be assessed within the context of the various processing
components of the writing model. Other aspects of the writer that should be
considered are the control processes that operate within the translating component.

Assessing Writers' Control Processes
Recent investigations within the domain of writing have identified individual
differences in the information-processing system (Benton, Kraft, Glover, &
Plake, 1984). These differences between good and poor writers (as defined from
holistic impressions of writing samples) are reflected in the holding capacity of
short-term memory, and the manipulation of information in working m~mory.

Holding Capacity of Short-Term Memory. In writing, as verbal information
is transferred from long-term to short-term memory, it must be held there while
translating processes are carried out. One must be able to hold letters together so
that they may be put together to make a word , and words must be held together to
make a clause. If the holding capacity of short-term memory is small, then
presumably the process of language production will require more time and be
less automatic.
In order to measure the holding capacity of short-term memory among good
and poor writers, Benton et al. (1984) used a modified version of a task developed by Peterson and Peterson (1959). Subjects were presented with four consonants on a screen, one at a time , for .50 s followed by a distractor task of reading
numbers from the screen for a variable amount of seconds. They were then asked
to recall the four letters in their correct order. This task assessed holding capacity, because it required a person to hold information in short-term memory while
concentrating on something else. Similarly, writing involves holding information
in memory while deciding how to connect it to other information.
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In a high school sample, good writers recalled significantly more letters in
their correct order on this task than did poor writers, controlling for reading
comprehension, reading speed, and scholastic achievement. These results suggest that the holding capacity of short-term memory is one factor that discriminates good from poor writers.
Manipulation of Information in Working Memory. Another important control process that is crucial for language production is the ability to perform rapid
operations on information held in working memory. In order to write, a person
needs to combine letters into words, words into clauses, and clauses into
sentences.
When Benton et al. (1984) sought to assess writers' abilities to manipulate
information in working memory, they developed a letter reordering task. Good
and poor writers were exposed to a sequence of five randomly selected consonants displayed for .50 s on a microcomputer display screen . They were instructed to hold the letters in working memory and to recall them in alphabetical
order. Results found that good writers recalled significantly more letters in
correct alphabetical order than did poor writers . These differences were observed
in both high school and college samples when reading speed , reading comprehension and achievement were controlled.
The methods devised by Benton et al. (1984) are amenable to simple administration and scoring, particularly when using a microcomputer. As has been
suggested with regard to working memory capacity among readers, however,
writers should also be tested with several tests before conclusions are reached
about any translating deficits. In addition, it would be wise to obtain post-hoc
verbal protocols of writers that describe the cognitive strategies they may use
while performing these tasks.

Assessing Writers' Cognitive Strateg ies
As mentioned previously, Kintsch and van Dijk's (1978) model of strategic
discourse processing posits that comprehension strategies operate at several levels of discourse. Specifically, their model describes propositional strategies,
which integrate words and clauses; local coherence strategies, which integrate
successive sentences; and macrostrategies, which integrate macropropositions of
the overall text. Although their model was originally developed for discourse
comprehension analys is, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) contend that the basic
mappings between surface structure expressions and semantic representations are
the same for both comprehension and production of prose, even though the
reader and the writer are concerned with different aspects of strategic discourse.
The model, therefore , seems appropriate for analyzing strategies employed during the writing process.
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Recently, methods for assessing discourse strategies among good and poor
writers have emerged. Specifically, good writers have been observed to perform
more effectively on tests involving word reordering within scrambled sentences,
sentence reordering within scrambled paragraphs, and paragraph assembly,
which requires the ordering of sentences into multiple paragraphs (Benton &
Kiewra, in press; Benton et aI., 1984) . Notably, good writers outperformed poor
writers on these tests, in both high school and college samples, when reading
comprehension, reading speed, general knowledge, verbal ability, and achievement were controlled. Each of these specific tests and their intended level of
measurement is now discussed in greater detail.

Word Reordering Test. This test was designed to assess propositional strategies used in writing that integrate propositions within a sentence. Specifically,
students are presented items that contain a scrambled sentence and are directed to
unscramble each sentence as rapidly as possible and to write in the correct
version of the sentence. Although there may be more than one correct ordering,
students are told to provide only one response. An example of a scrambled
sentence and its COlTect form appear below:
Scrambled version: Fight feels him with teases anyone must he boy who the.
Correct version: The boy fee ls he must fight with anyone who teases him .

The word reordering test presumably measures the writer's abilities to detect
clause boundaries and to integrate propositions. Specific propositional strategies
that might be employed in this kind of test item include the following sentence
parsing strategies.
1. Whenever you find a determiner, begin a new noun phrase (Clark & Clark,
1977) . In the previous example, the writer who employs this strategy would
begin a phrase with "The boy ," because that is the only logical noun-determiner
combination.
2. Whenever you find a relative pronoun (that , which, who, whom), begin a
new clause (Clark & Clark, 1977) . Again , drawing upon the example given, the
writer who uses this strategy would attempt to begin clauses with "w ho must ,"
"who feels," or "who teases ."
It seems reasonable to assume, then, that such strategies for discourse production would be employed in the word reordering test , which requires writers to
integrate scramb led propositions . Differences observed between good and poor
writers on this test might, then, be attributed to differential use of propositional
strategies.
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Sentence Reordering Test. This test was devised in order to assess local
coherence strategies. In this test, students are presented with a series of items,
each containing a chronological paragraph whose order of sentences has been
scrambled. Students are directed to order the sentences chronologically by placing the correct order number for events in the blank alongside each sentence .
Although there may be more than one correct ordering, students are told only to
provide one solution. An example of a scrambled paragraph with one possible
solution appears below.
8
7
1
3
5
2
4
6
9

Subsequently, each day that Hugh did a better job of putting the food in
his mouth instead of elsewhere, I rewarded him with peaches.
Hugh received no peaches.
Hugh had a great fondness for peaches.
I showed him the peaches he could expect and pointed out that he
should put the food in his mouth , not on the floor.
I gave him the peaches .
I told him that he could have peaches for dessert if he did not mess his
food up so much.
He did better, although liberal amounts of food still fell on the floor.
The next day Hugh was in an exuberant mood and scattered his vegetables far and wide .
He improved rapidly and was eventually willing to substitute other
fruits for his reward .

The sentence reordering test measures local coherence strategies, because
writers must connect successive sentences in a chronological fashion by searching for related propositions and potential links. In order to perform well on this
test, writers must consider both previous sentences as well as the present sentence being processed. Using this logic, one can strategically determine that the
sentence' 'Hugh had a great fondness for peaches" is the only one not dependent
upon a previous idea. Consequently , this sentence is ordered first. Upon further
investigation, the writer infers that the sentences number 2 and 3 above must
necessarily be successive, because they contain the common ideas of "told him
he could have peaches ... " and" ... showed him the peaches he could expect ... ;" as well as " ... not mess up his food so much ... " and " ... not
on the floor. " One would expect, then , that writers who perform well on this test
also efficiently employ local coherence strategies during writing.

Paragraph Assembly Test. The paragraph assembly test was designed to
assess macrostrategies employed during writing . Specifically, students are presented with items containing one set of three scrambled paragraphs taken from an
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essay originally generated by Bruning (1968) . (In that original essay, each paragraph contained one topic sentence and three subordinate sentences.) Students
are directed to correctly group the sentences into three, four-sentence paragraphs
by placing a letter (A , B, or C) in the blank before each sentence. An example of
a three paragraph set is presented below with the letters in the blanks representing
an ordering into the three correct paragraphs.
B
C
A
A
B
C
A
C
B
A
B
C

There are only 450 miles of paved roads in Mala.
The only non-military high official in Mala is the premier.
Aluminum mining has been espec ially productive for the northern
region.
The economy of Northern Mala is based on mining.
There is only one telephone for every 15 ,000 inhabitants of Mala.
The cabinet of the premier must be approved by a panel of military
officers.
About two-thirds of the work force in the north are involved in mining.
The government of Mala can be classified as a military dictatorship.
There are only 300 miles of railways in the entire country.
Mining of all types provides about 80% of the income in the northern
region.
Mala's communication system would probably rank as the worst of all
African nations.
Whoever controls the Malan army controls the country of Mala.

The paragraph assembl y test presumably draws upon the macrostrategy of
semantic inference, because writers must infer three basic topics from twelve
sentences. Specifically , the writer must make subtle differentiations among the
sentences because all twelve sentences deal with the same basic topic- the
mythical nation of Mala. Because semantic inference is influenced by prior
knowledge , different readers will derive differe nt inferences from the same text.
Knowing this , writers must attempt to constrain this kind of personal variation in
interpretation through textual signaling of the main theme or topic throughout the
passage, such that the sentences within the text share similar ideas. It is imperative, then, that good writers be able to differentiate between closely related
concepts, so that only similar ideas are grouped together in a paragraph. The
paragraph assembly test attempts to assess this ability , because writers must
impose meaning upon groups of sentences that do share similar ideas. Macrostrategies thu s come into play because the writer forms best guesses about the
theme that connects a group of sentences, and then reads further to evaluate
whether such hypothes ized macropropos itions are correct.
Recent research by Benton and Kiewra (in press) has investigated the concurrent validity of the word reordering , sentence reordering, and paragraph assem-
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bly tests with measures of writing ability. Results have indicated that these tests
are significantly correlated with holistic impressions of writing samples.
Admittedly, however, it is difficult to actually construct tests that uniquely
assess these strategies. Within the sentence reordering test, for example, propositional strategies are involved in reading each sentence. Similarly, within the
paragraph assembly test, both propositional and local coherence strategies are
involved in finding common propositions between sentences. According to the
Kintsch and van Dijk model , however, one can not devise a test that uniquely
measures macrostrategies or local coherence strategies, because such strategies
are interrelated.
These language strategies are apparently involved in the organizing component of the planning process. Speculatively, writers use propositional strategies
to organize words and clauses, local coherence strategies to organize sentences,
and macrostrategies to organize paragraphs. Psychometricians should , perhaps,
use measures such as the word reordering, sentence reordering, and paragraph
assembly tests to assess these strategies that facilitate well-organized prose. Such
measures can be easily administered and scored , and may have more validity
than verbal reports, because language strategies are not consciously controlled.
Processes that are more consciously controlled, referred to as metacognitive
processes , are discussed in the next section.
Assessing Writers' Metacognitive Processes
Although research investigating metacognitive processes involved in writing is
still in its infancy , methods for assessing such processes, as they influence the
translating and reviewing components of the writing model, have emerged.
One writing process influenced by metacognition is translating. As has been
previously mentioned , automaticity in translating may be hindered by blocking,
a common psychological phenomenon that hinders effective communication in
any setting. Cognitive therapists (e.g., Arnkoff & Glass, 1982; Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979) have identified cognitive components of blocking (e.g.,
distorted thinking, automatic thoughts, inferences, and assumptions that appear
in "self-talk" of patients) that inhibit effective therapeutic intervention. Generally , these therapists help patients recognize and record fau lty cognitions and
teach them new "self-talk" statements that are more adaptive.
Similar progress has been made in the investigation of self-talk during writing
(Boice, 1985) . Boice has identified seven components of faulty metacognitive
processing that impede effective translating (1985 , pp. 97-98): (a) self-talk about
the aversiveness of writing; (b) self-talk that justifies avoiding or delaying writing; (c) self-talk that reflects burnout, anxiety, panic , or groundless worries ; (d)
self-talk concerned with ach ieving more in less time or of unnecessary deadlines ;
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(e) self-talk indicating internal criticism that allows no mistakes or imperfections ;
(f) self-talk about fears of rejection; and (g) self-talk about maladaptive strategies
for writing (e.g., favorin g a single draft over revisions).
It seems apparent that these kinds of mal adaptive thoughts will prevent effective communication in writing. Perhaps effective writers are characterized not
just by specific writing skill s, but also by " healthy" metacognition. Educators
may do well , then, to interview students who find writing aversive in order to
identify faulty cognitions that impede the translating process.
Metacognitive strategies also influence the reviewing process in writing. During the early elementary school years, writers first learn to evaluate whether
something is wrong with their prose, but they may not be capable of revising it
until the later elementary school years (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1983). Scardamalia and Bereiter, for example, asked elementary students to evaluate and
revise each sentence as they wrote an essay. The quality of both the evaluating
and the revising was then judged by expert adult writers . Results found that 85%
of the time fourth grade students could recognize that something was wrong with
their writing, but 70% of the time they could not remediate problems they had
identified. Older students, on the other hand , were consistently successfu l at
revising a problem they had recognized. These findings suggest that less skilled
writers have the necessary knowledge for evaluating their writing, but often fai l
to take the required steps to revise . What can educators do to facilitate those
steps? Again , the peer editing and peer response teams described earlier may be
useful , because students learn to edit and revise errors they would not normally
identify themselves.
Research into the metacognitive strategies employed during writing have
implications for the field of measurement. Most multiple-choice tests of writing
ability assess the writer's sk ills at recognizing errors in sentence structure, punctuation , and syntax. If, as the previously cited findings indicate, most writers can
recognize problems in their writing, but may fail to remediate them, then the key
variable in the reviewing process-revising- is not actually being tested. Mu lti ple-choice tests may , then, be of questionable validity. In fact, the Conference
on College Compos ition and Communication , declared in the 1970s that multiple-choice measures of writing were narrowly foc used and provided gross distortions of writing competence (Troyka, 1982). These kinds of tests, nonetheless,
continue to be widely used .
Recently, however, writing samples have also been used with greater frequency for the purpose of measuring writing abi lity. Although writing samples appear
to be more valid measures, they are too frequently first drafts, because the writer
is only allowed a set time period in which to write. Consequently , the essay is
then handed in , with no opportunity for revisions. Both multiple-choice tests and
writing samples, then, fa il to assess the writer's ability to rev ise, which is an
essential component of writing. In fact, Stallard (1974) has observed that one
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important distinction between skilled and less skilled writers, which is often
overlooked, is that skilled writers make more revisions.
Psychometricians must direct their efforts, therefore, toward assessing how
writers make revisions in their writing. One method for doing so would be to
employ short-answer items that require writers to rewrite sentences or even
paragraphs that contain flaws. The drawbacks of such items are many in terms of
scoring; but unless writing assessment moves in this direction, tests of writing
abi lity will remain of questionable validity.

Summary
Research into the cognitive factors that influence writing has several implications
for the fie ld of measurement. First, educators must be encouraged to assess prior
knowledge as it affects the generating , translating, organizing, and review ing
components of the writing model. Specifically, students should be tested concerning their prior knowledge of the writing topic, their vocabulary, and their
knowledge of basic grammar before writing actually begins. In this way, instructional interventions can be made that will facilitate the generating and the translating processes in writing . In addition, teachers should be encouraged to write
an ideally coherent essay with which to evaluate the structure of students' essays.
Structural models of both the teacher's and the students' essays can then be made
in order to compare the organizational structure within each. Students ' essays
can also be assessed using an analysis by Benton and Blohm (1986) that counts
the number of top-, mid-, and base-, level ideas within an essay . This type of
scoring system indicates both the quantity and the quality of elaboration in
writing . Finally , students can assess their own knowledge of discourse structure
by exchanging their essays with one another and by receiving immediate feedback about their own skills at evaluating and revising their prose.
With regard to control processes, writers should be assessed on several kinds
of memory-span tests before being diagnosed as having a limited working memory capacity. In addition diagnosticians who use such tests should be cautioned
against interpreting results as being indicative of a fixed capacity limitation.
Finally, post~ hoc verbal reports might be employed to ascertain the control
processes writers use on these tests.
Strategies for discourse comprehension have been successfully measured by
tests designed specifically to assess propositional strategies , local coherence
strategies, and macrostrategies. Specifically, the word reordering, sentence reordering, and paragraph assembly tests might be used along with writing samples
or multiple-choice tests to measure local and global coherence in writing ability.
Finally, research into the metacognitive processes involved in writing suggests that tests must be designed to assess writers' revising skills, because most
students can recognize errors in their writing , but may fail to revise them.

5.

COGNITIVE FACTORS IN ACADEMIC ABILITIES

175

Unfortunately, most multiple-choice tests of writing ability assess evaluating but
not revising.
The study of cognitive factors in academic abilities has been quite extensive
with regard to reading and writing. Although less work has been done in the
areas of mathematics and science, individual differences in cognitive factors are,
nonetheless, apparent in those domains as well. The exact nature of those differences and how they can be measured is now discussed.

MATHEMATICS
Generally, educators separate mathematical ability into two broad components:
(a) computation, which involves the application of algorithms and rules for
carrying out mathematical operations; and (b) conceptualization, which requires
problem representation and the application of heuristics and problem solving
strategies. Although Briars (1983) has suggested that cognitive factors, especially prior math achievement, are the best predictors of math computation and
conceptualization, the literature is sparse with regard to how such factors may be
measured. A discussion follows, nonetheless, of how prior knowledge, control
processes, cognitive strategies, and metcognitive processes in mathematics performance can be assessed.

Assessing Math Students' Prior Knowledge
Several investigators have observed that skilled math students organize their
declarative knowledge differently than do less skilled math students (Chartoff,
1977; Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977; Krutetskii, 1976; Silver, 1979). Silver
(1979) , for example, found that skilled math students organize knowledge according to categories of solution methods, whereas less skilled math students
organize knowledge according to categories of problem contents. Specifically,
Silver asked seventh-grade students to categorize 16 word problems that varied
in both their content and in their solution methods. Students subsequently solved
the same 16 problems and, based on their performance, were categorized into
good, average, and poor math problem solvers. The author found that good math
problem solvers grouped problems together on the basis of solution methods.
Poor math problem solvers, on the other hand, had grouped problems together on
the basis of the problem content. In addition, Silver found that the ability to
categorize problems on the basis of solution similarities was strongly cOlTelated
with standardized measures of mathematics ability.
Chartoff (1977) employed a similar procedure with secondary and postsecondary level students. The students in that study were asked to rate the similarity of
algebra word problems. The results again showed that the most important dimension for categorizing algebra problems was how they were solved.
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These findings suggest that proficient math students are able to grasp the
formal structure of math problems, and that they possess schemata for various
types of problem solutions. What this implies is that good math students perceive
a problem structure prior to its solution. Apparently, they establish a goodness of
fit between their schemata for solution methods and a given math problem before
solving it.
The knowledge discussed thus far has most to do with problem representation,
an aspect of the conceptualization component of mathematics. Besides possessing well-organized structures in memory for problem representation, however,
skilled math students likely possess adequate procedural knowledge for various
mathematical computations. R. M. Gagne and Paradise (1961), for example,
advocated the importance of assessing prerequisite procedural knowledge (intellectual ski lls) required for solving linear equations. Such preassessment, obtained by employing rational task analysis, can uncover lower-order skills that
must be mastered prior to performing higher-order skills. By specifying which
prerequisite skills must be mastered, psychologists have discovered that low
achieving math students commit errors because they lack prerequisite procedural
knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how to find a common denominator or of how to
simplify fractions). Brown and Burton (1978), who refer to lack of procedural
knowledge as "bugs," developed the BUGGY program specifically to assess
errors made in subtraction. They translated subtraction procedures into a computer program capable of 100% accuracy in computation. Changes were then made
in the program to mimic students' errors in order to see if the same patterns of
errors emerged from the computer. These kinds of analyses are valuable because
they provide a map for more specific diagnosis of students' errors. In using the
methods of rational task analysis and computer programming , then, educators
can diagnose specific deficient skills by testing less ski lled math students at each
prerequisite step. In this way , specific remediations can be made and the student
can advance to the next skill level.
Essentially, then, educators must assess two types of knowledge in mathematics performance: declarative knowledge of problem representation, and procedural knowledge of mathematical computation. These two types of knowledge
presumably require different kinds of tests . Specifically, knowledge of problem
representation requires discriminatory tests such that students "may progress
almost without limit in such functions as understanding, critical thinking, appreciation, and originality" (Anastasi, 1982, pp. 97-98). Tests assessing conceptual knowledge of mathematics need to allow for individual differences among
students' achievement, because complete mastery of this domain is not possible.
Tests that assess procedural knowledge of mathematical computation, however, require mastery tests in order to determine whether or not the examinee has
acquired the prerequisite skills. Ultimately, the purpose of such tests is to deter-
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mine whether or not more instructional time is needed for each student, and not
to determine individual differences (Hanna, 1981).

Assessing Math Students' Control Processes
Another cognitive factor that affects mathematical computational ability that
must be considered is that of control processes. Several researchers have studied
the relationship between mathematical computational ability and performance on
memory-span tasks. Speigel and Bryant (1978), for example, examined the
relationship between speed of information processing, intelligence, and math
achievement in 94 sixth grade students. They used a sentence-picture comparison
task, a pictorial simi larities-and-differences task, and a matrix analysis task,
similar to the Raven's Progressive Matrices. They found processing speed to be
correlated -.40 with math computation scores. With intelligence controlled, however, the relationship between these measures was almost neglible . Such findings
suggest, then, that processing speed does not contribute uniquely to math
achievement, and is probably more related to general intelligence.
Webster (1979) examined differences in memory-span between mathematically proficient students (those performing at or above grade level on the
WRA T arithmetic subtest) and a group of "mathematically disabled" students
(those performing 2 or more years below grade level). Subjects were tested using
memory span for seven digits and for strings of seven nonrhyming consonants
that were presented both aurally and visually at one second exposure and one
second intervals. Results indicated that the mathematically disabled group had
significantly lower memory-span scores than did the mathematically proficient.
Overall , these findings suggest that memory-span performance is related to
mathematical computation skill s, but that speed of information processing is not.
As has already been suggested within the domains of reading and writing , multiple assessments of memory-span performance should be made before conclusions are reached about deficits in a student's control processes or informationprocessing machinery. Again, differences in memory span do not necessarily
imply that proficient math students have larger working memory capacities. It is
more likely that they are able to allocate attentional capacity economically such
that they can simultaneously hold and manipulate information in working memory. It has been suggested that such attentional capacity develops concomittantly
with proficiency in mathematics achievement , and is not necessarily a precursor
to good computational ski lls (Briars, 1983).
Another promising area of test development may be that of assessing cognitive strategies related to mathematics achievement. Because of the limited
amount of studies in this area, however, the assessment of cognitive strategies
and metacognitive processes in mathematics are addressed in one section.
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Assessing Math Students' Cognitive Strategies and
Metacognitive Processes
The strategies used by proficient math students generally may be broken down
into three types: (a) heuristics, (b) awareness of problem-solving processes, and
(c) belief systems (Briars, 1983) . Heuristics would fall into the general category
of cognitive strategies as described in this chapter, whereas awareness of problem-solving processes and belief systems would be considered metacognitive
processes .
Heuristics are more or less rigid operating routines that serve to narrow the
potential behavioral alternatives considered by a student when confronted with a
problem . These types of strategies are independent of content, because they may
be applied within the context of any problem. Examples of heuristics used in
solving math problems include drawing a diagram or thinking of a similar problem solved previously. These types of heuri stics enable math students to impose
a more meaningful representation upon a problem.
Awareness of one's problem-solving processes, a metacognitive skill in mathematics, can help math students recall and execute appropriate routines . This
awareness is beneficial in making two types of decisions: (a) tactical decisions
about selecting the appropriate method, and (b) strategic decisions , which involve decisions about how one allocates time (Schoenfeld, 1979) . Poor strategic
decisions may be the most costly among less skilled math students. Schoenfeld
(1979) has observed , for example, that less skilled math students do not make
good strategic decisions, because they do not monitor their progress toward a
solution (e.g., they spend 10 minutes calculating the area of a triangle without
considering what that will contribute to the final solution.)
Finally, belief systems and expectations about math can affect math performance . Examples of faulty beliefs that impede math performance include the
following (Lester & Garofalo , 1982; Silver, 1981):
I . The difficulty of a problem depends on the size of the numbers .
2. Problems require the application of only one math principle for their
solution .
3. Key words appear only in the last sentence of a problem.
4. There is only one correct way to solve a problem .
5. Problems should take only a few minutes to solve.
It is easy to understand how beliefs such as these can impede success in
mathematics .
Cognitive strategies and metacognitive processes in mathematics performance
have been neglected by psychometricians, even though they appear to be important factors in such performance . Some heuristics could be easily assessed by
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having students hand in their worksheets, which show how they solved the
problems, along with their test. Other types of heuristics will presumably have to
be measured through verbal reports of math students as they solve problems.
Students should also be asked to keep a time log of their solution steps, so that
the strategic decision making of time allocation can be assessed. Finally , beliefs
about mathematics can be assessed with questionnaires that ask students to
evaluate the truth or falsity of statements such as those listed above.

Summary
It seems that psychometricians have done a good job of designing mastery tests

to measure procedural knowledge in mathematics computation. They may need
to do more, however, in developing discriminatory tests that measure other
cognitive factors related to math achievement (e.g., organization of declarative
knowledge, heuristics, and metacognitive processes) . The methods used by Silver (1979) and Chartoff (1977) for assessi ng students' declarative knowledge,
for example, should be adapted for testing students' organizational structure for
math concepts in memory. Asking students to record their sol ution strategies on
paper, along with an approximate time log, may also go far in identifying those
students who make poor strategical decisions in solving math problems . Again,
the need for assessing these kinds of cognitive factors in mathematics may
encourage psychometricians to move away from the mastery model and toward
the realm of discriminatory tests.

SCIENCE
As in mathematics , the domain of science is sparse with regard to studies investigating individual differences in cognitive factors. Two factors that seem most
relevant to studying individual differences within science, however, are prior
knowledge and cognitive strategies.

Assessing Science Students' Prior Knowledge
The assessment of prior know ledge in science must access both procedural and
declarative knowledge. In measuring procedural knowledge , rational task analysis and the mastery model have been applied in science as they have in mathematics. Okey and Gagne (1970), for example, performed a task analysis of the
prerequisites needed to solve sol ubility-product problems in chemistry. (The
solubility problem, common in chemistry classes, concerns the question of
whether or not a solid matter wi ll form when two chemicals are mixed together.)
Based on a hierarchy of prerequisite skills needed for solving solubility prob-
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lems, the authors instructed and tested the students at each level of those skills.
They then tested the students on solubility type problems and found that performance increased as knowledge of prerequisite procedures increased. The authors
concluded, therefore, that success in science problem solving is associated with
knowledge of prerequisite procedures .
In addition to knowledge of prerequisite procedures, the organization and the
content of one's declarative knowledge influence science problem solving. Specifically , Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) gave Ph.D. physicists and students,
who had had one course in physics, twenty category labels for describing physics
problems . In response to these labels, the subjects were to tell all they could
about problems subsumed within the label and how they might be solved. Based
on these responses, the authors constructed a network of declarative knowledge
to reflect each subject's organizational structure for scientific declarative knowledge in memory. Results found that the experts' memory structures contained
more physics principles and a more hierarchical organization than did the
novices'. As in the previously discussed domains of reading, writing , and mathematics, then, expert science problem solvers have more elaborate and better
organized memory structures than do novices.
The observed differences between experts' and novices' prior knowledge
have implications for the measurement of scientific abi lities simi lar to those in
mathematics assessment. As in mathematics , educators should test their students
on prerequisite procedural knowledge required for solving science problems . In
so doing, they will be able to diagnose specific ski ll deficits that, with proper
instruction, can be remediated . In addition, structural models of students' declarative knowledge can be constructed and compared to well-organized structures of scientific principles (e.g., as in the structure contained within science
textbooks). Analyses of students' memory structures could presumably reveal
the "missing links" that need to be learned for better understanding of specific
scientific principles.

Assessing Science Students' Cognitive Strategies
Of equal importance to prior knowledge are cognitive strategies, which aid in
both understanding and in solving science problems. Specifically, individual
differences have been observed in the strategies used for understanding a problem , and in the types of problem-solution paths generated.
Within the realm of the social sciences, for example, Voss, Tyler, and Yengo
(1983) discovered differences between novices and experts in how they represented a problem . These authors focused on one type of social science problem:
an undesirable state of affairs that requires improvement. Specifically , they
compared the thinking-aloud protocols of political scientists, whose specialty
was Soviet politics, with those of college students taking a Soviet political
science course. Each subject was asked to assume the role of the Soviet Ministry
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of Agriculture and to consider the problem of how to improve productivity after
experiencing low agricultural productivity during the previous 5 years. Voss et
al. found that 24% of the experts' protocol statements were devoted to defining
the problem , whereas almost none of the novices' statements were so devoted.
More specifically , experts began by defining the constraints of the problem (e.g. ,
Soviet ideology, soil conditions, and so forth) , whereas novices simply began by
listing possible solutions. What these findings suggest is that experts seek a
deeper understanding of a problem before attempting to generate solutions .
Further findings suggest that individuals differ not only in how they represent
a problem, but also in their problem-so lution paths. It has been observed, for
example, that novices engage in solution searching by attempting several paths
toward reaching the goal of the correct solution; experts, on the other hand ,
follow one solution path (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980) . These
authors asked novices and expelt physicists to think aloud while solving a problem for determining velocity . The experts used a "working forward" solution
path, because they began with that which was known and proceeded step-by-step
to the so lution . Novices, on the other hand , used a " working backward " approach, because they began with the goal (solving for velocity) and tried to so lve
for it immediately before completing prerequisites steps. Based on this kind of
finding, Gagne ( 1985) has drawn an analogy between being lost in a forest and
solving science problems that captures the essence of the expert-nov ice distinction:
If one is lost in a forest, one is better off determ ining the direction (N,S,E,W) of
one's goal and limiting one's search for a path to this direction th an wandering
around at random. The difference betwee n nov ices and experts is that experts are
not lost; they know a path that leads to the goal and follow it. (p . 282)

Even with regard to problem-solving strateg ies in sc ience, then, one cannot
underestimate the importance of prior knowledge , because one must have some
knowledge of the constraints involved before representing a prob lem adequately .
Simi larly , in order to se lect the appropriate solution path, one mu st also have
prior knowledge of what will or will not work . An important di stinction between
the novice and the expert, however, may be that novices do not bother to acquire
the needed prior knowledge before generating possible solutions.

Summary
As in mathematics, psychometricians have probably been successful at assess ing
procedural knowledge in sc ience problem solving us ing rational task analysis and
mastery tests. More can be done, however, in constructing discriminatory tests
that meas ure the organization of declarative knowledge and the application of
problem solving strategies. Tests that require students to categorize scientific
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problems (as in Chi et aI. , 1981) may be useful for assessing the organization of
structures for science concepts in memory. In addition, verbal protocols could
help to reveal the cognitive strategies employed by students as they solve science
problems. Such protocols would presumably vary within as well as between
students, however, depending upon their prior knowledge of the content area.

CONCLUSION

Research in cognitive psychology has identified underlying cognitive factors that
contribute to intellectual performance across academic domains. If psychometricians are to follow the lead of cognitive psychologists, they must devise tests that
measure domain-specific prior knowledge, control processes, cognitive strategies, and metacognitive processes. In so doing, measurement will become more
valid and precise, and instructional treatments will presumably become more
effective.
A major goal of measurement should be to assess the declarative knowledge
structures that influence performance in various academic tasks, as "the nature
and power of students' organized structure of knowledge is a key aspect of
educational achievement, because it either facilitates or hinders what he or she
can do in a subject area" (Messick, 1984, p. 217). In fact, Glaser (1984)
criticizes much of the research favoring the importance of control processes,
because it was conducted in "knowledge- lean" domains (p. 94). Glaser further
argues that it is the interaction of control processes with domain-specific knowledge that produces expertise. Psychometricians shou ld , therefore, develop tests
that assess students' knowledge structures within each academic domain, using
the structural model approach of cognitive psychologists. In this way , network or
tree structures can be constructed that indicate symbolically the elements of a
person's knowledge and the relationships among those elements . These structures can then be compared to ideally organized knowledge structures so that
teachers can identify students ' schemata that need to be restructured or elaborated.
In addition to declarative knowledge, learners should be assessed with regard
to their procedural knowledge. Educators have actually been quite proficient in
measuring procedural knowledge, as in the domains of mathematics, and science
by using rational task analysis. They must, however, make greater use of computer programs (e.g ., BUGGY) , which list step-by-step actions to be taken , and
of flowcharts, which present processes and decisions to be made , in order to
specifically pinpoint students ' procedural errors. Ultimately , then, teachers will
become more successful in identifying and in remediating specific procedural
deficits .
In assessing control processes , memory-span tests, similar to those described
in previous sections of this chapter, should be used to measure attentional capacity, rehearsal , chunking , and manipulation of information in working memory.
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Theoretical Implications from
Protocol Analysis on Testing
and Measu rement

K. Anders Ericsson
University of Colorado at Boulder

One of the goals of psychology has always been to describe, understand, and
measure individual differences. The diversity of human behavior makes it particularly challenging to seek to identify general and stable underlying elements that
correspond to systematic individual differences . A major problem in the efforts
to identify such elements is that the elements cannot be observed directly. The
primary method has been to use the current psychological theory to develop
procedures to measure such hypothetical elements. In this chapter I present a new
theoretic framework, based on verbal reports from subjects , for identifying and
measuring individual differences. I argue that this framework is superior to the
previous ones; hence, I briefly review some of the earlier approaches to measurement of individual differences.
When scientific psychology was first established over 100 years ago , the
predominant method of investigation consisted of eliciting introspective verbal
reports from trained observers. During the introspective era, the research was
directed toward uncovering the basic sensations and cognitive processes that
provided the building blocks of the varied and complex human experiences.
Within this theoretical perspective, it was assumed that observable individual
differences in normal cognitive functioning were a consequence of differences in
basic cognitive processes. It was furthermore assumed that individual differences
in performance on simple tasks, like simple reaction time, letter cancellation ,
and sensory discrimination, would directly reflect individual differences in the
corresponding basic processes. However, the first studies of individual differences on simple tasks showed disappointingly low correlations among tasks as
well as to grades in school and other indices of ability (Guilford , 1967) .
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Particularly damaging for this view of simple tasks reflecting basic processes
was the finding that substantial improvement in performance was observed with
practice (Binet cited in Varon , 1935). Although subsequent successful attempts
to measure intelligence reliably relied almost exclusively on complex tasks involving comprehension, the view that individual differences are due to differences in basic processes was never completely discarded. Exceptional ability
(exceptional memory) was consistently interpreted as a result of differences in
such basic processes .
The behavioristic era had interesting implications for measurement, in that a
theory of cognitive structures was explicitly rejected. Among extreme behaviorists, all individual differences were attributed to differences in learn ing, or
exposure to relevant experiences. Hence, measurement of basic cognitive functions would be meaningless. The measurement of individual differences in complex tasks had to be conducted in an inductive mode, where stable patterns of
individual differences were discovered empirically rather than deduced theoretically. Lacking a cognitive theory, a general theory of measurement was
developed and refined through the years. This theory of measurement was incorporated as an integral part of the methodology of experimental psychology. A
central problem with the behavioristic approach was to understand what the
observed performance on a test actually measures.
Using the computer as a metaphor, theories of human information processing
were proposed in which the focus was placed on the intermediate processing
stages necessary to produce observable behavior. Many of the old concepts of
attention and different types of memory stores were reintroduced in these theories with more explicit definitions and characteristics. The emphasis of these
models on process rather than final responses led to a concern for observations
providing information about the process, like latencies , eye-fixations, and verbal
reports. It became important to use converging evidence from many different
types of observations to identify the ongoing cognitive processes .
For the purpose of this chapter one could divide contemporary cognitive
research into the mainstream of cognitive psychology , which only uses traditional performance measures, like accuracy and latency, and other research
emphasizing supplementary data on the cognitive processes, like eye-fixations
and verbal reports. The aim of the first category of research has been to provide a
finer grain analysis of what the psychometric test measures. Some of this research has measured individual differences on tasks assumed to provide pure
measures of critical capacities according to current cognitive theory. These pure
measures were then related to compound abilities like verbal IQ (Hunt, 1978).
Other researchers, notably Sternberg (1977) , have analyzed the latencies and
errors for performing tasks simi lar to test-items on psychometric tests, to identify
measurements of critical information processes. In both the above approaches the
composite performance (reaction time and accuracy) is factored into components
using theoretical assumptions, which cannot be directly tested and evaluated
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within this framework. At least one of the reasons for the remarkable impact of
these theoretical efforts on research on individual differences and testing is the
methodological compatibility between test theory and these theories of cognition.
Another research approach within cognitive psychology has been directed
toward understanding the detailed structure of cognitive processes. The aim has
been to develop models of cognitive processes at a level where one can simulate
the observable behavior of subjects by a computer program . The pioneering work
of Newell and Simon (1972) showed that building such models required very
detailed information about subjects' cognitive processes . The method used by
Newell and Simon (1972) to elicit such detailed knowledge about subjects'
cognitive processes was to instruct subjects to "think aloud," i.e., verbalize
their thoughts, as they solved the presented problems. In a recent review of
research using verbal reports, Ericsson and Simon (1984) showed that this methodology has been successfully applied to research problems in all major areas of
psychology- memory, decision-making, educational psychology, instruction,
and clinical psychology . Although much of that research has implications for
measurement of individual differences, I know of only a limited number of
studies using verbal reports of cognitive processes to directly address issues of
measurement and assessment of individual differences.

AN OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER
The goal of this chapter is to argue for the importance of verbal report data in
understanding what current psychometric tests actually measure and for the
usefulness of verbal report data in the design of future test instruments. The
argument has three parts. First, I need to present a convincing case that particular
kinds of verbal reports provide valid data and that a rigorous methodology for the
analysis of verbal reports is available. Then, I present a theoretic framework that
relates verbal report data to other, more traditional kinds of data, like correctness
of response and latency. Finally, I show that studies using verbal reports have
significantly altered our understanding of the processes measured by prevailing
tests .
The chapter has three major sections that roughly correspond to the different
parts of the argument. The first section provides an introduction to how verbal
reports on cognitive processes can be used as valid data. This section summarizes
my work with Herbert Simon (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984) and describes a
model of how some types of verbal reports yield reliable data on the sequence of
thought in tasks. 1 briefly show how these forms of verbal reports differ from
other disreputable forms of verbal reports, like introspection and rationalization.
The second section presents a theoretical framework for identifying and encoding sequences of cognitive processes from verbal reports . Hence , protocol
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analysis provides a tool for gaining empirical data on the sequence of cognitive
processes elicited in a given task for a certain subject. Such data is shown to give
us an empirical method for determining what process or sequence of processes
are mediating performance in a test. Theoretical assumptions of mediating processes can therefore be empirically evaluated in a more direct manner. This
section also describes inductive approaches, where important cognitive processes
are abstracted from the verbal protocols to give generalizable accounts of cognitive mechanisms in different domains.
In the final section, I illustrate how verbal reports have extended our understanding of individual differences. For example, within the context of tests
measuring spatial ability, I demonstrate differences in strategies used by subjects
of high- and low-spatial abi lity and how verbal reports can improve our understanding of what available psychometric tests actually measure. In another example, I show how verbal reports can give insights into the structure of practiceeffects and the structure of exceptional memory.
Let me first turn to an introduction to the analysis of verbal reports on
cognitive processes.

PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND VERBAL REPORTS

The use of verbal reports on cognitive processes has a long history filled with
many methodological controversies. The early pioneers of psychology used introspective reports in an attempt to describe the sensory images underlying
perception and thinking. Following several contradictory findings by different
research laboratories, the introspective method was seriously criticized. Many
moderate psychologists (for example, Woodworth, 1938) suggested that introspective analysis (which directed attention toward underlying sensations) was
misguided, and said this method should be replaced by verbal reports that expressed thoughts . A careful historic review shows that the founder of behaviorism, Watson, rejected introspection, but accepted verbalization of thinking . In
fact, Watson (1920) was the first investigator to publish an analysis of the
verbalized thoughts of a subject while he was "thinking aloud ." Even so, the
rejection of introspection by behaviorists was so complete that it generalized to
any use of verbal reports.
With the emergence of information-processing models of cognition, several
researchers started to consider verbal reports as a means to get more direct and
detailed access to the cognitive processes of subjects. In contrast with most early
introspective studies, these investigators coll ected extensive performance data
and hence were able to evaluate the veridicality and converging validity of verbal
reports. With his ~ewly developed blank-trial technique, Levine and his associates (Frankel, Levine, & Karpf, 1970; Karpf, & Levine, 1971) showed essentially perfect correspondence between verbally reported concepts and specific
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judgments about instances. In studies of memory, subjects' verbal reports on
mediating associations were found to have remarkable effects on memory performance (for a review see Montague , 1972) . Newell and Simon's (1972) analyses
of verbal reports during problem solving was the most extensive and intensive
use of such data . On the basis of verbal reports they were able to construct
computer programs powerful enough to both solve problems and regenerate
essential aspects of the reported thought processes. Newell and Simon (1972)
instructed their subjects to verbalize their thoughts concurrently , i.e., "think
aloud," whereas subjects in the memory studies often recalled their thoughts
retrospectively . Other investigators using other kinds of instructions found that
subj ects giving verbal reports performed differently from subj ects who were not
required to give verbal reports- thus throwing some doubt on the validity and
representativeness of verbalized thought.
The basic concern of Ericsson and Simon (1980) was to propose a model in
which the cognitive processes responsible for verbalization of thoughts in attention(heeded thoughts) could be explicated . In its most general and abstract fo rm ,
information processing theory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Newell & Simon,
1972; Simon, 1979) postulates that a cognitive process can be seen as a sequence
of internal states successi vely transformed by a series of information processes.
Moreover, each of these success ive states can be described in large part in terms
of the small number of information structures, or chunks, attended to, or available in the limited-capacity short-term memory store (STM). Information in the
vast long-term memory (LTM) and in the sensory memories (of brief duration)
can be accessed, but the results of these access processes will be attended to
(heeded) and available in STM. In Fig . 6.1 I have illustrated a sequence of
successive states, showing how new thoughts are expressed verbally as they
enter attention , and hence become observable as verbalization segments.
The general relation between heeded thoughts, i.e., thoughts in attention , and
the observable verbalizations is much easier to understand in the context of
specific examples. In Table 6. I , the thinking-aloud protocol of a subject mentally mUltiplying 36 times 24 is given. Most of the verbalized in formation consists of generated intermediate steps, like "4," "carry the 2," "144." There is
no differe nce in principle between these intermediate steps and the final res ult ,
"864." Even when one asks students to answer questions like, "What is the
number of windows in your parents house?," their thinking-aloud protocols are
remarkab ly similar. A representative example of such a thinking-aloud protocol

STM

FIG . 6.1 . A thought process represen ted as a sequence of states of
heeded inform ation. Each state is assoc iated with verbali zation of new in formation e ntering attention.
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TABLE 6. 1
A Transcript of a Thinking -A l oud Protocol From a Subject
Mental l y Multiplying 36 Times 24
OK
36 times 24

36*
24

um

144

4 times 6 is 24

720

4

864

carry the 2
4 times 3 is 1 2
14

144
0

2 times 6 is 12
2

carry the 1
2 times 3 is 6
7

720
720
144 plus 72

so it would be 6
6

864

On the right side, the same mult iplication is per formed
us ing th e traditional paper and pencil method.

is given in Table 6.2. Notice that the subject verbally expresses intermed iate
steps (heeded thoughts) rather than explaining or describing her thought processes.
From this model of concurrent verbalization it is clear that the subj ect has to
have time to complete the verbalization of the heeded information before new
thoughts enter attention. For tasks where subj ects have extensive experience, the
TABLE 6.2
A Transcript of a Thinking - Al oud Protoco l From a Subj ect
Recal l ing t he Number of Windows in Her Pa rent's House
Let ' s see , there's 3 windows in the living room,
3 windows in my room, 1 in the bathroom , 2 in the
sewing room; that's 5 and 3 , 6, 7, 8 , 13--4 in the
kitchen which wou ld make 17; 3. , 4 in the TV room
which would make 21 , 2 in my broth er ' s room, 23 ; and
1 in the u pstairs bathroom, 24 ; and 3 in my parent ' s
room, 27 ; and then 1 in the attic , 28
Adapted from Ericsson and Simon (1984).
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sequence of thoughts is so closely connected that a concurrent sequential verbalization of the spontaneously occurring thoughts is not possible. In such situations, the subjects can report their thoughts in retrospect by recalling the sequence of thoughts just after the completion of the task. When the time taken to
complete the task is relatively short (about 5-30 seconds) our model predicts a
rather complete retrospective report of all heeded thoughts . For tasks with longer
duration, concurrent reports (thinking-aloud) will be more detailed than the
corresponding retrospective reports.
One would not expect either retrospective reports or thinking-aloud protocols
to change the cognitive processes under study . If the essence of the cognitive
process is the sequence of heeded information , then thinking-aloud doesn' t
change that sequence. A large number of studies have compared subjects thinking aloud with silent subjects doing the same task (for a review see Ericsson &
Simon, 1984). None of these studies has shown evidence for changes in structure
of the process due to thinking aloud , as measured by ability to solve problems ,
type of solution , eye-movement pattern , etc . Several studies have shown that
subjects thinking aloud take more time than silent control subjects. This follows
from our model, because verbally expressing a thought takes additional time.
A recent analysis (Deffner & Ericsson, 1985) of the temporal structure of
subj ects thinking aloud showed that they verbalize their thoughts rapidly in
speech bursts (at 100- 150 words per minute), while most time is spent in
silence. If the time spent actively verbalizing is measured and then subtracted,
the mean solution time is no different for silent and think-aloud subjects. Hence,
it appears that the effect on solution time can be accurately predicted by assuming a local slowing-down of cognitive processes during verbalization .
Ericsson and Simon 's (1980, 1984) analysis of studies that do show effects of
concurrent verbalizing demonstrates that these studies used quite different instructions to subjects. Typically , subjects are required to verbalize motives or
reasons for their actions and thoughts. From subject's thinking-aloud protocols
on the same or similar tasks we know that only a subset of the generated thoughts
are based on deductions or retrievals with explicit premises verbalized . Forcing a
subject to provide reasons for all reported thoughts would therefore clearly
change' the subj ect's thought processes. This means, of course, that the sequence
of heeded thoughts is changed , which in turn influences performance and the
structure of the solution process. For example, many students are accustomed to
the situation of solving a mathematics problem at the blackboard in front of class .
Some subjects confuse the instruction to think aloud with such a systematic
generation of explanations, and investigators of mathematical problem solving
explicitly tell subjects: " Do not try to expl ain anything to anyone else. Pretend
there is no one here but yourself. Do not tell about the solution but solve it"
(Krutetskii , 1976, p . 93). It is useful to give subjects "warm-up " tasks, where
thinking aloud is particularly easy . Examples of such tasks are mental multiplication and anagram problem solving.
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In a well-known paper criticizing the validity of verbal reports, Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) showed that in many studies of social psychology, subjects report
incorrect reasons in response to why-questions. For example, a subject selecting
among a set of displayed stockings will argue, if asked , that the selected stocking
is better in terms of some of its physical attributes. Such reasons are given by
subjects even when the displayed stockings are identical , although they are not
informed of that. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argued that in responding to the
why-question , subjects do not try to remember their thoughts while the associated behavior was generated, but theorize and try to infer reasons for their
behavior. Our model of verbal report is consistent with Nisbett and Wilson 's
argument as · long as the subjects generate the incorrect reasons without recalling
their corresponding thoughts during the task .
In some situations, the why-question is asked after such a delay following the
corresponding behavior that subjects cannot recall their thoughts or are not
willing to spend the effort required for successful retrieval. In other situations,
the behavior is elicited without mediating thoughts and hence there are no
thoughts to be retrieved and used in answering the why-question . For example,
when normal subjects generate a word starting with "a," a high proportion
simply report that "apple" emerged. When you ask such subjects why they
generated "apple" rather than any of the other words starting with "a," they
may not be unwilling to speculate. Often they suggest that perhaps they learned
the association between "a" and "apple" while learning the alphabet. Regardless of the truth of these subjects' hypothesis, I can agree with Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) that the validity of these subjects' specu lations about their own
behavior would not be any greater than that of subjects speculating about the
reasons for other people's selection behavior.
Our model of verbal report also provides considerable guidance for how
verbal reports should be encoded and what inferences can legitimately be made .
During the era of introspection, experienced and respected observers made observations on their own thought processes. These observations were assumed to
represent facts-a subject reporting X would imply that X was true . Within our
framework, we would argue that the fact is that the subject reports X. The rather
uncontroversial inference we want to make is that the subject attends to X.
Let us clarify this by returning to the protocol on mental multiplication. A
traditional psychologist might only accept the validity of the verbalization of the
final answer. From the verbalization of the fina l answer we infer that the final
answer was generated and heeded. In an analogous way we infer from the
sequence of verbalized intermediate products a corresponding sequence of
heeded information . The verbally reported thoughts are data, and a model is
needed to account for how relevant thoughts are generated-hence a fu ll model
would regenerate the heeded information. In many cases, one will find that a
simulation model able to regenerate the verbally reported intermediate steps will
be powerful enough to generate the final solutions to the presented problems.
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It may appear that I am unduly cautious in accepting inferences drawn from
verbal reports. However, much of the poor reputation of verbal reports comes
from the debatable validity of psychodynamic analysis of dreams and fantasy.
Furthermore, all too often general statements like, " I always do X," are interpreted to be unconditionally true , and when inconsistent performance data are
obtained, the inference is made that all verbally reported information is questionable. Herbert Simon and I interpret such verbalizations to simply indicate that the
subject at that time believes (correctly or incorrectly) that he always does X.
Traditionally, subjects have been interviewed at the end of experiments and
test-taking sessions about their strategies and thought processes during the experiment. At the end of the experiment subjects have poor memory for their
actual sequences of thoughts leading to specific solutions. Furthermore, investigators often encourage subjects to describe a general strategy that encourages
them to make inferences and speculate rather than attempt to recall specific
memories for actual solutions. It is not surprising that strategies assessed through
such postexperimental probing provide a poor fit to the subjects' performance
during all phases of the experiment.
For most tasks it is easy to determine what constitutes a thought. In Table 6.3
I have reproduced a protocol from a subject solving an anagram problem, where
TABLE 6.3
A Transc ript of a Thinking - Aloud Protocol From a
Subject So lvin g the Anagram 'NPEHPA' Reco rded by Sargent (1940)
N-P , neph, neph
Probably PH goes togethe r
Phan

C:PH*
A:phan

Phanny

A:phanny
A:phan-ep

I get phen-ep
Phep-an, no

A:nap
A:phep-an

E is at th e end
Phap-en

A:phap-en

People , I think of

A:people

Try PH after the other letters
Naph, no

A:naph

no.

Nap-

I thought of paper again
E a nd A sound alike

C:E (end )

C:PH (e nd)
A:paper

couldn I t go togeth er without a consonan·t
Try double P

C:PP

happy

A:happy

Happen

A:happen

*On the right si de encodings of the verbalized thoughts are
given. Adapted by Ericsson and Simon (1985).
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the object is to rearrange the letters to form a single English word . On the righthand side of Table 6.3 I have given corresponding encodings of the verbalized
thoughts. There are two types of task-relevant thoughts . First, the subject selects
likely letter combinations and decides where in the solution word they are likely
to occur. I denote these constraints or cues as C### (position). Second, the
subject generates alternative possible solution words (denoted by A:###).
These encodings can then be used as data for further model-building and hypothesis-testing.
By necessity , this description of the model for verbal report generation and
protocol analysis, developed by Simon and myself, is brief. The interested reader
should consult the more extensive discussion of these issues in our recent book
(Ericsson & Simon, 1984) . In spite of its brevity, I hope I have conveyed to you
that protocol analysis stands on sound methodological ground and that findings
from analyses of verbal protocols can be accepted as facts in our attempts to
understand the human mind .

IMPLICATIONS OF VERBAL REPORTS FOR
MEASUREMENT AND THEORETICAL ABSTRACTIONS
Verbal reports on cognitive processes provide a much more detailed description
of the cognitive processes in a task than the traditional forms of data, i.e.,
response accuracy and latency. The stuation is structurally simil ar to the differences between observations made by the naked eye and the same observations
made with a microscope or a telescope . Objects appearing to be similar or even
identical to the naked eye are demonstrated to either remain identical or to appear
very different with the availability of more information about their detailed
structure and components. There are two rather differe nt approaches to systematizing the newly acquired , detailed information. The first method is to focus on
objects assumed to be similar or identical, and examine their detailed properties
to validate or refute the assumption of similarity. This method exam ines theoretical assumptions in essentially a hypothes is-testing mode. The other method
is primarily inductive and considers the detailed information directly . From the
detailed information , critical entities are identified and attempts to form meaningful abstractions are made. In this section , I examine how these two methods
can be and have been used to relate verbal reports on cognitive processes to
compound measures, such as reaction time and response accuracy. I start by
examining some theoretical assumptions about the similarity of cognitive processes elicited by a given task or collection of test items.
Traditionally , investigators select test items such that some or all elicit the
same process or sequence of processes for all tested subjects. This selection is
based on intuition or some considerations based on informal or forma l theories.
In Fig. 6.2 I have illustrated the data recorded for three individuals on two test
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I

Individual 2

RT"I

RTZ,I

-I
Response

A,B

III

A,B

Response
Individual 3

RT3 ,I

.1

C,D,E

Response
Test Item II
Individual I

RTt,n

II I

F,G

Response
RTz,n
Ind i viduol 2

Individual 3

-I
Response
RT3 ,n

"

F,G

H,I,J

Response

FIG. 6.2. Traditional data (latency and response) and verbal report data from
three subjects' so lutions to two test-items.

items. For each subject and test item, both the correctness of the response and the
reaction time to respond are recorded.
If the theory used for item selection is correct, then we would be entitled to
aggregate the data over test items to attain a more accurate measure of accuracy
and latency for the measured process. There are only limited techniques for
testing the assumption that all test-items evoke the same process or sequence of
processes. Only the lack of positive correlation between different subjects' performance on two items would provide evidence against the assumption . Even
small positive correlations would be consistent with the theoretical claim.
The situation is quite different when verbal reports on the cognitive processes
are available. According to our earlier-presented model, I assume that for every
heeded thought there is a process responsible for its generation. Hence, when I
talk about a sequence of heeded thoughts, the corresponding sequence of processes is implicit. In the lefthand panel of Fig. 6.2 I have abstractly represented
sequences of verbally reported thoughts for each test item. For sol utions to the
same test item one can compare the sequence of heeded thoughts directly. Such a
comparison for the two test items indicates that two of the subjects relied on the
same sequence of thoughts, whereas the third subject relied on a different sequence. The fact that all the subjects' thought sequences differ across test items
is to be expected as the content of the two test items are different.
By introducing the theoretical idea of processes one can argue that a different
sequence of thoughts are the reflection of the same sequence of processes. It is
necessary that the processes are explicitly defined prior to the empirical analysis .
In Fig. 6 .3 I have illustrated a number of processes , which would characterize
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FIG. 6.3. Illustration of how two different sequences of verbally reported
thoughts can be described as the realization of the same sequence of processes.

the relation between generated thoughts and different content in test items (input). Through the assumption of processes, I can now argue that the aggregation
of test items provides a legitimate estimate of the speed of the component
processes. However, for only two of the subjects the same sequence of processes
are measured . It is important to note that processes are theoretical entities, which
mayor may not correspond to some unitary psychological process.
Out of the large number of possible relations between sequences of reported
thoughts to two test items, we can identify two cases where one can legitimately
argue that the protocol information is consistent with the claim that the same
process or sequence of processes is measured by the two items.
The first case is the extreme case, where no mediating thoughts are verbalized
for either of the two test items. Such a lack of mediating thoughts would be
expected for highly automatic reactions, like naming familiar objects , reading,
etc. It is commonly assumed that rapid reactions (faster than 2 seconds) assure no
mediating states. However, I later present evidence showing that such a view is
not correct.
The second case is the most interesting, where the sequences of reported
thoughts for the two test items can be seen as the realization of the same sequence
of processes. For example, a subject performing a mental addition of two 2-digit
numbers can follow the same process sequence even though the specific numbers
are different for the two test items. By assuming the existence of a general
addition process for any two digits , one can see those two different mental
additions as two realizations of the same general process sequence . Even in this
uncontroversial example one can question the theoretical status of the general
addition process. There is evidence showing that the simple addition of two
digits takes different amounts of time depending on the digits involved (Miller,
Perlmutter, & Keating, 1984). For adult subjects the differences are small
enough to make the abstraction of general adding processes completely
acceptable.
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It is unlikely to find classes of test items for which the second case is absolutely true. It is reasonably likely that situations will be found where equivalence
of the cognitive pr'ocesses on the different test items is a good approximation.
Through the collection of verbal reports on the cognitive processes on test items,
it si possible to identify blatant violations of the assumptions of measurements of
the same general process sequence, by identifying systematically different strategies among the tested subj ects. Before I turn to a discussion of how different
investigators have analyzed verbal protocols to abstract general processes, we
briefly consider an example of analysis of verbal reports for a task with fast
latencies (less than 2 seconds).
Ericsson and Simon (1984) reviewed the relatively extensive evidence showing that subjects' retrospective verbal reports provide reliable information to
predict the latencies for a variety of task domains. The validity of retrospective
verbal reports extended to tasks with average latencies of less than 2 seconds.
Systematic attempts to derive a processing model to predict the observed reaction
times on the basis of retrospective reports are much more rare . Two English
investigators, Hamilton and Sanford (1978), studied subjects who made simple
judgments of whether two presented letters, like "RP" or " MO," were in
alphabetical order or not. In accord with previous investigators , they found that
the reaction times were longer when the two presented letters occurred close
together in the alphabet as opposed to when they were far apart. From the
reaction-time data alone, one would infer a uniform retrieval process, where
factors internal to the retrieval process required more time for order decisions for
letters occurring close together in the alphabet. Retrospective verbal reports for
subj ects doing individual decisions indicated two types of cognitive processes.
For some of the trials , subj ects reported no mediation or direct access of their
order judgment. For the other trials, subjects reported they ran through brief
segments of the alphabet before making a decision of order. For example, when
the letter-pair "MO" was presented, a subject reported retrieving "LMNO"
before the subject reached the decision that the letters were in alphabetical order.
In another case a subject reported retrieving "RSTUV" before rejecting the
letter-pair "RP" as not being in alphabetical order. In a subsequent analysis of
the reaction times , Hamilton and Sanford (1978) found very different relations
with the separation of the two letters for trials with direct access, versus trials
with retrieval of segments of the alphabet. For trials with retrieval, the observed
reaction time was a linear function of the number of retrieved letters. The
estimated rate of retrieval corresponded closely to rates obtained in studying
simple recital of the alphabet. For trials with reports of direct access, no relation
of reaction time to the amount of separation of the two letters was found .
Hami lton and Sanford (1978) concluded that the original effect was due to a
mixture of two quite different processes, and that closeness of the letters influenced the probability that recall of letters would be necessary before an order
decision cou ld be made.
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Hence, even in simple tasks with rapid responses , one can see variability in
cognitive processes or reported thought sequences leading to differences in observed reaction times. As the complexity of the task increases, the range of
possible thought sequences giving the correct response increases dramatically.
With practice on a task , the availability of short-cuts and emergence of different
and more efficient representations and corresponding strategies makes the space
of possible thought sequences mediating correct solutions intimidatingly large.
In a later section I more directly address the issues of assessing the avai lability of
strategies and representations for subjects. The conclusion I draw at this point is
that protocol analysis provides a sensitive measure to help us define equivalent
classes of processes for which proper measurement of the speed of component
processes is valid. Consistent individual differences in mean reaction time cannot
and should not be interpreted as evidence for stable characteristics of basic
processes. For many types of test items , considerable diversity in frequency of
use of short-cuts and strategies is possible.
On the detailed level of description provided by verbal reports, the variability
between individuals appears so large that any attempt to search for general
theories of cognitive activities might appear futile.
Before turning to the fina l section with applications of protocol analysis to
tests and measurements, I briefly review research from three areas of general
psychology where protocol analysis has been related to such general models . The
three areas are problem solving, decision making, and memory. In each of these
areas , I show how detailed descriptions of processes can be reconciled with
abstract and general, sometimes mathematical, descriptions of processes.
It is appropriate to start with a discussion of problem solving, because it was
the analyses of problem solving by Newell and Simon (1972) that led them to
produce the first computer simu lations of cognitive processes. In their pioneering
work of subjects proving theorems in propositional logic they collected thinkingaloud protocols from subjects solving such tasks. The verbalized thoughts were
identified as being results of induced general information processes, which could
be explicated as routines in a computer program. Newell and Simon (1972) also
induced a general organization of problem solving, which they called meansends analysis. They found that a simulation model of human problem solving
was sufficiently powerful to produce the solution, and at the same time the
mediating steps of the program corresponded closely to the verbally reported
thoughts of subjects. The correspondence of subjects' verbal reports and the
theory or simulation model was on the level of types of intermediate steps rather
than exact order of intermediate steps leading to the solution.
Subsequent evidence for means-ends analysis has been demonstrated for a
wide range of problems (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). For example, I can illustrate
the simil arity of verbalized thought across different subjects for the 8-puzzle. In
the 8-puzzle, subjects are presented with a 3x3 matrix of numbered tiles as
shown in Fig. 6.4. By sliding one of the directly adjacent tiles into the empty
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space, the arrangement of tiles can be changed . Subjects are instructed to move
tiles until they attain the goal configuration given on the right in Fig. 6.4.
According to means-ends analysis, subjects should solve this problem by
finding diffe rences between the goal configuration and the current arrangement
of tiles. From an analysis of the task it is poss ible to a priori predict the space of
possible thoughts (problem space) that subjects will generate in response to a
problem like the 8-puzzle. T he first diffe rence they encounter is that the tile with
number I is not in its correct location. In Table 6.4 I have illu strated a small
sample of the times subjects verbalized their intention to put T ile 1 in its correct
place.
The verbalizations in Table 6.4 differ in exact wordi ng but the thought is the
same. Once they placed Ti le I they would proceed to place Ti le 2, etc. A more
complete account of subjects' problem solving in the 8-puzzle is given by
Ericsson (1 975) .
Means-ends analysis appears to provide a general account of subjects' behavior on problems with which they are naive or unfamili ar. With expertise and
considerable experience, the structu re of the problem solving is quite differe nt
and becomes a function of the subject's extensive knowledge of the task domain
(Chi , Feltov ich , & Glaser, 198 1; Larkin , McDermott, S imo n, & Simon , 1980).
TABLE 6 .4
Exampl es of Ve r ba l izat ions to Atta in Cor rect Pl aceme nt of Til e I
I 'm going to try

to ge t 1
get 1 up there

I must
I sha l l try

to get 1
first

get 1

I shall
I want to

here
t h ere in stead of 4

have 1 u p
have the 1 up there
move 1 up where it shou ld be

t h inking of movi n g
t h at I shall

1 u p at o n ce
get 1

h ere

to get 1 up (and get 2 t h ere , first 1 up )
in any case
now I want to

get 1

in place first and foremost

have 1 up righ t from the beginning

try to get them in order
to start with

1 upmost to t h e left a n d get it in
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The demonstration of general problem-solving methods has received considerable attention from educators, who have explored the possibility of teaching
students such methods . In the final section I discuss this attempt to describe
individual differences among subjects in terms of the availability of such general
methods to subjects. Training subjects to use means-ends analysis appears to be
somewhat misguided, as virtually all subjects exhibit such a method spontaneously in unfamiliar tasks .
Another domain with consistent patterns of cognitive processes is decision
making. In the paradigmatic decision-making situation, a subject is presented
with a set of alternatives. Each alternative is characterized by different attributes
on several common dimensions. The prevailing model of how decisions are
made is that all attributes are combined using a mathematical weighting function
to form a single evaluation score. Deciding which is the "best" alternative in the
set would then correspond to selecting the one with the highest evaluation score.
Few, if any, investigators have argued that such a mathematical formula mirrors
the cognitive processes of human subjects making decisions.
Verbal protocols of subjects making decisions have shown cognitive processes quite different from a sequential full evaluation of each alternative (Payne ,
1976; Svenson, 1979). Instead, subjects begin by rejecting alternatives because
they have unacceptab le values on important dimensions. When only a couple of
viable alternatives remain, subjects switch to a more intensive analysis, where
differences on some dimensions are traded off or compared to differences on
other dimensions . Other data, recording what information subjects attend to ,
have provided converging support for the existence of these different processes.
Analogous to the previously discussed work on problem solving, general processes sufficiently powerful to account for the observed behavior have been
identified .
Research on how subjects evaluate alternatives (judgment) has found that
verbally reported categorical decisions can describe a series of judgments equally
as well as an empirically fitted linear regression model (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, &
Kleinmuntz, 1979) . In one of their experiments, Einhorn et al. (1979) observed a
subject thinking aloud while judging many cereals on a five-category scale. From
the thinking-aloud protocols they identified a number of rules used by the subject. These rules predicted the subject's categorizations of a new set of cereals
remarkably well , in fact as well as a regression model identified for the first set
of judgments . Einhorn et al. (1979) established the correspondence between
these different types of models by showing how a linear regression model can
closely approximate categorical rules as reflected in a verbal report. This last
result is particularly important as it demonstrates that prevailing mathematical
models can be reconciled with the more detailed evidence from verbal protocols .
The research in both problem solving and decision making has shown the
types of cognitive processes revealed through protocol analysis provide a sufficient and general account of subjects' performance . The consistency across
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subjects is intriguing, and many investigators have argued that general information processing constraints lead subjects toward adopting such processes and
strategies. At least, these analyses show that the adopted processes are compatible with the well-known limits of attention and short-term memory.
Studies of memory and retention have always been one of the central areas in
general psychology. Ever since Ebbinghaus (1964, 1885) invented the nonsense
syllable, there has been explicit concern to study pure memory, that is, memory
and retention uncontaminated by previous knowledge. During the behaviorist
era, few investigators challenged the assumption that no intermediate processes
were involved during memorization . In the 50s, it was demonstrated that nonsense syllables were differentially difficult to memorize and that this difficulty
could be independently predicted from the meaningfulness of the nonsense syllable (Noble, 1952). In the 60s and early 70s , investigators asked subjects to
verbally report their thoughts during study. These investigators found a remarkable diversity of different mediating thoughts reported by different subjects. I
have extracted some examples of mediating thoughts in Table 6.5 from studies of
Martin, Boersma, and Cox (1965), and Prytulak (1971).
The central issue concerned whether different reported mediators during study
of items were related to subsequent recall performance on the corresponding
items. Several different encoding schemes were developed to use explicit criteria
for the goodness of the generated mediating responses, like those in Table 6.5.
Although the biggest difference appeared between some mediating response
versus no mediating response (rote rehearsal) these encoding schemes were also
able to capture differences between types of mediating responses. This extensive
research is fully reviewed by Montague (1972). Subsequent research in which
subjects formed meaningful associations via visual images or constructing sentences have demonstrated very large effects compared to uninstructed subjects'
TABLE 6.5
Exampl es of Mediating Thoughts in Memorizing Indi vidua l
Nons e nse Syl l ab l es and Paired Associ a t es
Individual CVC

a

Reported Mediator

CAZ
CIB
BUH
JEK
Paired Associate

a

case
sibling
bunch
jerk
b

Verbal Report

b

Sagroie - Polef

Each word contains an OLE.
Sagrole begins with Sand Polef
with F, thought of State Police

Renne t - Quipson

Changed Rennet to Bennet and saw
Quips in Quipson--thought; Bennet
Cerf Quips on TV

~From Prytu1ak, 1971.
From Mar t i n, Boersma, and Cox, 1965.
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performance (Bellezza, 1981; Bower, 1972). From an individual difference perspective, it is interesting that some subjects report using such effective means for
memorization without instruction (Bower, 1972).
Detailed descriptions of the associations making up the memory trace are by
no means inconsistent with current mathematical theories of memory. These
theories represent memory traces as associations of different strengths. Verbal
reports allow us to assess the micro-structure of these associative bonds.

Summary
Verbal reports on cognitive processes in a task provide a series of intermediate
steps (heeded thoughts), which are generated by corresponding cognitive processes. Hence, verbal report data can be used to confirm that subjects' responses
to test items are generated by the same sequence of component processes. In the
case that verbal reports show different sequences of processes for a set of test
items as evidenced by short-cuts or different strategies, average reaction times
and accuracies for items in a test will not measure differences in stable characteristics of assumed underlying processes, and thus these average results of the
test reflect a composite of factors and cannot be interpreted as a pure measure of
anything.
For the domains of problem solving, decision making, and memory, systematic analysis of verbal reports allows for the abstraction of postulated cognitive
processes. These cognitive processes, like forming meaningful associations or
interactive visual images (memory), or means-ends analysis (problem solving),
were generally found for all individuals in the corresponding task domain and
appeared to account for previous findings based on traditional performance data.
These and other demonstrations (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) that generalizable
aspects of cognitive processes can be induced from analyses of verbal reports
give considerable confidence that simi lar analyses of cognitive processes elicited
by tests will be successful.

Protocol Analysis in Assessment and Measurement
The purpose of this final section is to select a small number of important measurement issues and illustrate how protocol analysis has been applied to further
our understanding. The first issue concerns how one can identify actual and valid
cognitive processes. The fact that it is possible to verbally describe a hypothetical
cognitive process does not assure its empirical validity. After a brief historical
review of earlier attempts to identify processes and representations of general
applicability, I concentrate on more recent efforts to specify such general processes in the analysis of mathematical ability.
The second issue regards the importance of differences in strategies for performance on psychometric tests . I focus on some recent research on tests measur-
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ing spatial ability . In the introduction I mentioned that one of the fe w individual
differences consistently explained by differences in bas ic processes concerns
exceptional abilities, especially exceptional memory (Wechsler , 1952). Drawing
on my collaborative research with Bill Chase, I will examine whether such
memory processes are basic and direct, as evidenced by a lack of mediating
states in the verbal reports.

Use of Verba l Reports to Assess Individual Differences
Some of the earliest studies using verbal reports identified general differences
between subjects' reported cognitive processes and representations. The importance of differences in cognitive processes was shown by Heidbreder (1 924) ,
who found consistent differences in concept form ation between subj ects actively
generating and testing hypotheses and subj ects more passively waiting until
hypotheses occurred to them . The importance of differences in representation
were demonstrated by several independent studies of human maze learning,
which found striking differences in learning rate as a function of the mode of
encoding (motor , spatial , or verbal) reported by subj ects when they had to
memori ze solution paths. (For a review see Ericsson & Simon , 1984 .)
Since the publication of Bloom and Broder's influential study of prob lem
solving in 1950 , research on individual differences using the verbal report methodology primari ly has focused on identifying general and task-independent processes and strategies . Although the results of thi s research on general processes
have been rather di sappointing, it is worthwhile to describe some of these studies
and discuss reasons for the lack of success of such approaches. Later I discuss
other research focusing on more task-specific processes and knowledge .
Bloom and Broder ( 1950) were interested in processes of thought and reason ing rather than simple fact retrieval, as emphasized in many educational tests. By
selecting test items requiring reasoning, they found intriguing differences between think-aloud protocols of subjects with high and low aptitUde scores. Low
aptitude subj ects tended not to be able to represent the problem in such a way that
their relevant knowledge could be retrieved or used fo r in fe rences in generating
solutions. The weakness of low aptitude subjects was taken as a focus for a
remedial program for training low aptitude subjects. The training program was
successful , and Bloom and Broder (1 950) attribute its success to training in
general cognitive processes. However, the lack of methodological controls in
their study makes their results only suggestive.
In the domain of mathematics, similar ideas have been explored with explicit
concern for methodological issues. Many have the belief that mathematical abil ity is something more general than a composite of specific abilities to solve types
of mathematical problems. Polya (1 957) is one of the few theori sts who has
explicitly proposed general methods (heuristic questions) in mathematical problem solving. Examples of such heuri stic questions are' ' What is the unknown ?" ,
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"Will a figure help?", "Have I solved a related problem before?" , "Can I see
that it is correct?" (Polya, 1957).
In his pioneering dissertation, Kilpatrick (1968) took these questions and
attempted to describe cognitive acitivity that would provide evidence for the
existence of such general problem-solving heuristics. After considerable exploratory work, he identified a revised set of heuristics relevant to the mathematical
problems solved by 8th-grade subjects. From the thinking-aloud protocol of each
subject, Kilpatrick (1968) would determine if evidence for the application of any
one of the heuristics was available.
Kilpatrick's attempt to predict mathematical problem-solving performance
(time , percent age correct) from the frequency with which heuristics were used
failed. Ericsson and Simon (1984) have summarized simi lar negative results of
several other studies using encoding schemes based on Polya's work (1957).
In examining the failure to identify heuristics , it is important to realize that the
hypothesized processes were not induced or abstracted from the protocols, but
derived theoretically. Even more important is the fact that these heuristics were
not (and possibly could never be) explicated in such detail that one would know
when and exactly how to apply them. It is implicitly assumed in Kilpatrick's
(1968) aggregation procedure that application of anyone of the heuristics will
always be helpful in solving any problem. A subsequent study Gimmestad
(1977) showed that application of various heuristics was differentially useful for
FREQUENCY (F,) OF PROBLEM SO LUTION S WITH EVIDENCE FOR
HEURISTIC

ABC
F,

EVIDENCE
FOR USE OF
HEURISTIC
A

B
C
D

D

F2 F3 F4

.

/~

YE S
NO
NO
YE S

No
YES
NO
YES

THINK -A LOUD
PROTOCOL I

THINK - ALOUD
PROTOCOL 2

FIG. 6.5. The aggregation of information about judged use of spec ified
heuristics for a given subject. Each thinking-aloud protocol is first scored with a
dichotomous decision regarding use of a given heuristic. An aggregate measure is
obtained for each subject by counting the number of problems where a gi ven
heuristic was used.
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solving different problems. In fact, application of some heuristics was found to
be negatively related with success on some problems.
The best ev idence against the implicit generality of these heuristics comes
from studies of training subjects in applying these heuristics . There appears to be
little or no transfer of heuristics to problems different from practice problems
(Lucas, 1972). However, some transfer in use of heuristics has been observed for
problems similar (but not identical) to the problems used in training (Schoenfeld,
1979). It appears safe to conclude that application of general heuristics requires
knowledge of when and how to apply them. This knowledge is necessarily
relatively specific to types of problems.
Studies assessing the use of heuristics have provided important additional data
on factors determining performance on mathematics tests. Webb (1975) found
that basic tests of mathematical achievement accounted for 40% of the variance
on mathematics tests , which was considerably more than any predictor related to
the use of heuristics .
In their classic work on problem solving, Newell and Simon (1972) argued for
the importance of knowledge on effective problem solving, and for the specificity of problem-solving methods. Lesgold (1984) reviewed evidence from a wide
range of domains and demonstrates the importance of specific knowledge in the
acquisition of skill for each domain.
In parallel with the studies relying on Polya's heuristics , other researchers
have studied mathematical problem solving with much more emphasis on knowledge and domain-specific methods. Hins ley, Hayes, and Simon (1977), for
example, showed that subjects would reliably sort algebra word problems in
categories or problem types (e.g., mixture prob lems, distancelrate/time problems). From an analysis of thinking-aloud protocols they found that subjects
appeared to categorize a given problem early during the solution of that problem
and use knowledge about that type of problem to aid in the solution process.
Subjects' ability to sort mathematical problems into types with the same mathematical structure was shown by Silver (1979) to be predictive of subjects' performance on a related mathematics test, even after IQ scores and scores on tests of
mathematical concepts and computation were controlled for. Similarly Kennedy,
Eliot, and Kru lee (1970) analyzed students' thinking-aloud protocols while solv ing algebra problems in content-defined steps, which were determined separately
for each problem. Their major result was that students of lower ability were less
able to generate the necessary physical inferences from the information in the
problem statement, rather than having any basic deficits in knowledge about
algebra and mathematics .
The most successful attempts to identify individual differences come from
rather complete analyses of very simple and specific tasks. Children in school are
taught explicit procedures to solve different types of problems in arithmetic. By
matching the target procedure against the observed seq uence of processing steps
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it has been possible to identify school chi ldrens' systematic errors and misconceptions. In some early work , Buswell and John (1928) identified around 150
types of errors from students solving arithmetic problems aloud .
The importance of verbal reports for assessing many types of errors becomes
clear from the three types of errors in division shown in Table 6.6 .
In more recent work, several investigators (Brown & Burton , 1978; Brown &
VanLehn, 1980; Young & O'Shea, 1981) have developed simulation models that
can account for and describe errors in the subdomain of subtraction problems,
with reference to general rules for carrying out the subtraction procedure. These
attempts do not rely on verbal reports , but induce the type of error from consistent patterns of incorrect results on several problems. This means that diagnosis of errors can be conducted automatically through a computer program,
which also can serve as a tutor by explaining to the student the nature of his or
her specific types of errors.
This brief review of studies on individual differences in mathematical abi lity
shows essenti ally no evidence for the mediation of very generalizable cognitive
processes . The protocol data suggest the importance of cogn itive processes related to problem types as well as specific procedures and knowledge. However,
protocol analysis can only provide a partial answer to the question of how general
or specific the cognitive processes are that generated the thoughts given in the
verbal reports. It can provide a lower bound for the generality, in that when
subj ects verbalize recognition of specific types of problems, like' 'distance-timerate" problems in mathematics or "conservation of energy" problems in mechanics, the inferred processes need to be equally general. The inferences about
the generality of processes generating intermediate steps/thoughts is an empirical
issue that can only be clarified by observing subj ects' so lutions to a specified
TABLE 6.6
Thr ee Examples of Ve rba l Report s From St ud e nt s Thinking Aloud Whil e
Div iding two Numbers (Show n to the Le ft)

Used Remainder Without New Dividend Figure
16

306
576
48

96

Another p upil said, " 16 into 57 goes 3 times [mul tiplied
and subtracted]; 16 into 9 won't go [wrote 0 in the quotie nt];
16 into 96 goes 6 times. "

96
Added Remainder to Quotient

2

442
964

The pupil sa id, " 2 into 9 is 4 times a nd lover; 2 into 6 ,
3 times and 1 i s 4; 2 into 4 , 2 times."

Began Dividing at Units' Digit of Divide nd
26
7 31 542

One boy said , "7 into 42, 6; 7 into 1 5 , 2 a nd lover. "
He was puzzled b ecaus e 7 would not go into 3 a nd 26
did not l ook right but could think of n o other method.

Each verb al report illustrat es a common type of error.
From Bus"ell a nd John, 1928, pp. 184, 186.
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class of problems and tasks. It is clear that verbal reports will be indispensable
data in these emp irical tests of generality.

Assessing Strateg ies in Tests of Spatial Ability
In a recent article in Psychological Review, Just and Carpenter (1985) present a
very interesting analysis of cognitive processes involved in the performance
measured by a psychometric test of spatial ability. Examples of a couple of test
items from a cube comparison test are illustrated in Fig. 6.6.
The task is to decide if the two drawings could or could not be views of the
same cube. The general psychological process generally assumed to account for
subjects' abi lity to make correct judgments is called mental rotation . Just and
Carpenter (1985) went further, defining several types of possible strategies for
solving this task and developing complete simul ation models in the form of
computer programs. For my intended discussion of the verbal reports on cognitive processes in this task , a brief description of three of these strategies is
sufficient.
The first strategy corresponds to mental rotation of the cube along the standard ax is of the cube. In order to rotate the cube at the left to overlap with the
correspond ing cube on the right , one might first rotate the E towards the top and
then turn the cube so the E will match in orientation (see Fig. 6.7-1). A second,
and in many cases more efficient, strategy would be to select a nonstandard
rotation axis as illustrated in Fig. 6 .7-11. With such a selection of a rotation axis a
single rotation is sufficient.
With the third strategy, orientation-free descriptions, subj ects encode the
information for the presented cube on the left as two symbolic descriptions where

~ 618
@ @
E

FIG. 6.6. Examples of three possible test-items from the cube comparison test.
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Example of verbal report:

"If you first rotale the E on the fronl 10 th e top and
then turn the cube so that the E will match (in orientation}.!!

II A single rotation along

000-

standard axis

EKample of verbal reporl:
I spun it around the co rn er of the three sides until
Ih e letter s mol c hed up ."

II

m

Orienlatian -free deSCriptions
Encode

~~ ~
A

/'

E

Match

The bottom of the H is directly
above the lop of Ihe E
"'-...
The right of the E is direct l y to ,,/'
Ihe l e fl of Ihe right of Ih e four

~

,J:

~

FIG. 6.7. An illustration of three different strategies for solving items in the cube
comparison test.

one of them could be "the bottom of the H is above the top of the E." This
encoded information of one of the cubes can be validated or invalidated by
comparing it to information provided in the second cube. [n comparing the
retrospective reports of subjects with high scores on spatial tests to subjects with
low scores, Just and Carpenter (1985) found reliable differences in reported
cognitive processes. Three of the high-ability subjects used predominantly nonstandard rotation axes when applicable, whereas low-abi lity subjects used standard axes. One of the high-ability subjects relied on orientation-free descriptions.
From analyses of the temporal sequence of eye-fixations, Just and Carpenter
(1985) could validate the verbally reported cognitive processes as responsible for
the different pattern of latencies for high- and low-ability subjects. In addition,
the high-ability subjects using the orientation-free description displayed a different pattern of latencies from subjects using the other two strategies. Just and
Carpenter (1985) argued for the importance of determining and describing strategies to better understand spatial ability as measured by psychometric tests. They
also noted that "trivial" changes in aspects of cube comparison tests can change
the strategies subjects use. Just and Carpenter (1985) collected verbal reports
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from subjects taking the original Thurstone version of the cube comparison test,
which differs only in that arrows, circles, and pluses are used instead of letters.
For that version, subjects predominantly used the strategy of orientation-free
descriptions rather than the strategies using rotation.
The role of verbal reports in identifying strategies is even more clear in earlier
studies of spatial ability . In two earlier studies (Barratt, 1953; French, 1965)
subjects were asked to think aloud and verbalize their solution processes to
sample items from many psychometric tests, which they had previously taken
under standardized conditions. The methods for extracting strategies for solving
items from specific tests were only briefly described , but given that high interrater agreement of encod ing was obtained, the findings should be considered
seriously . Barratt (1953) showed that assessed solution methods or strategies
were reliably related to performance on several psychometric tests measuring
spatial abi lity. In his original dissertation Barratt (1952) provides more detail
about his methods of assessing subj ects' strategies. For example, Barratt (1952)
identified about half of the subjects as mentally rotating whole figures in the
Figures Test on the bas is of verbal reports like these:
Subject # 18: " .. . . I would look at all these various choices here, and I would
take the problem and try to switch it aro und , turn it arou nd in the same form as
these here; after I turn it around , I see that they can be made to coinc ide . . . . "
Subject #44: "I'm trying to turn the figure around in a way that it is in the same
position that the key problem would be .. .. " (pp. 58- 59)

Most of the other subjects appeared to rotate only parts of the figures as indicated
by the following verbal reports :
Subj ect #4: " ... . The semic ircle is pointed in one direction, and the V is to
the bottom of it , and if the figure were the same way, we ll , the semicircle would be
pointed in the same direction , or if it were lay ing down or opposite , the semicircle ,
uh , the V would always be to the left. ... "
Subject #79: " .. . . I' d look at this V here; I would look for ones that would
be this way if turned thi s way . . . . . I would look at thi s bar on the bottom; that
would be my distinguishing mark here; the bar is turned aro und in B, etc.
(Barratt , 1952 , p. 59)

French (1965) divided his subjects into two groups on the basis of their
strategy for solving items in a given test. For each group the intercorrelations on
all psychometric tests were recomputed separately. Subsequent factor-analys is of
each group showed remarkably different factor structures for several of the
strategies. French ( 1965) summarized his findings by saying "Systematizing is a
tendency which leads a person to use specialized or symbolic thought processes;
this changes what the tests measure , and consequently affects the correlations
between the tests" (p. 28).
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The research on performance of tasks measuring spatial abi lity is particularly
interesting as it illustrates how quite different sources of data (reaction time, eyemovement data, verbal reports, training studies and experiments) provide converging support for the importance of strategies in accounting for individual
differences (Lohman & Kyllonen, 1983; Snow & Lohman, 1984). It also nicely
demonstrates the need for information-rich data, like eye-movements and verbal
reports, to fu lly describe complex cognitive entities such as strategies.

EXCEPTIONAL ABILITY vs. ACQUIRED SKILL
Given the reports on successful elicitation of verbal reports on cogn itive processes described in the two preceding sections, one might rightfully ask which
abilities are basic and yield no or unin formative verbal reports. In the introduction I mentioned that exceptional abilities, like exceptional memory, have consistently been attributed to innate differences in the structure of memory. Implicit
in the definition of exceptional basic abilities is the claim that normal subjects
cannot attain such abi lities even after extensive practice . Furthermore, it is
claimed that demonstration of such abilities in, for example, a memory task, will
not allow the subject to report any mediating cognitive processes. In the first part
of this section I describe some research I conducted with the late Bill Chase
examining practice on a specific task . I then discuss analyses of people with
alleged exceptional memory.

Effects of Practice on Performance on Memory Tests
Bill Chase and I intentionally selected digit span , because several investigators
had proposed that digit span provided the best measure of the fixed capacity of
short-term memory (STM). The fast rate of presentation of digits was assumed to
force subjects to exclusively rely on STM in this memory task .
Our research approach consisted of providing subjects with extensive practice
on the digit-span task and monitoring any improvements by requesting retrospective verbal reports from a selected portion of the trials. All significant
changes in the reported thoughts were validated by a specia lly designed experiment (Chase & Ericsson, 1981, 1982; Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980) .
The focus of this account is on our first subject (SF) , who discovered the
means to improve his memory performance. SF was selected to be a representative and average college student with respect to intelligence and memory abi lity.
His original digit span was about seven.
During each session SF was read random digits at the rate of one digit per
second; he then recalled the sequence. If the sequence was reported correctly, the
next sequence was increased by one digit; otherwise it was decreased by one
digit. The performance on the last sequence in the preceding session determined
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the length of the digit sequence presented on the first trial on the following
session. Figure 6.8 shows SF's average digit span as a funct ion of practice for
over 200 practice sessions distributed over 2 years.
Figure 6.8 shows that SF increased his digit span from 7 to over 80 digits . A
naive interpretation of this dramatic increase in memory performance is that SF
simply extended his short-term memory by a factor of 10. In comparison, subjects with alleged exceptional memory have digit spans of less than 20 digits .
The relation to exceptional memory is discussed later.
However, after most of the digit-span tests, SF gave a retrospective verbal
report on his cognitive processes during the trial. From an analysis of these
verbal reports, we find that SF's memory performance can be accounted for in
terms of an acqu ired sk ill rather than expansion of some basic capacity . The main
findings were confirmed by experimental tests.
During the first session with the digit-span task, the verbal reports show that
SF relied almost excl usively on rehearsal of all presented digits to remember
them. In the second session he started trying to commit the first three digits of a
series to memory and to rehearse the remaining digits of the presented series.
Once the rehearsed digits had been committed to memory, he would retrieve the
first three and initiate recall. The primary mode of encoding was repetition of
digits and different numerical relations.
During Session 5, SF reported that he suddenly realized that a 3-digit sequence could be interpreted as a running time for a mile. For example, 418 could
be a 4-minute, 18-second mile-time. His average digit span for this session
jumped four standard deviations from the session before. SF was a long-distance
runner with extensive knowledge of both specific and general categories of
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FIG . 6.8. Average digit span for SF
as a function of practice .
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running times for a large number of different races. During the following sessions, SF retrieved a set of races (y4-mile, Y2-mile, V4-mile, mile, 2-mile) that
would cover the range of most 3-digit numbers from 100 to 959. However, no 3digit numbers with a middle digit of 6, 7, 8, or 9, (e.g., 483, 873) can be
interpreted as meaningful running times . In one experiment we presented digit
sequences made up of only such uncodable 3-digit sequences to SF and his
memory-span was reduced almost to the level prior to practice. Later SF started
to encode 4-digit groups as running times. The different types of encodings are
illustrated in a typical retrospective report given by SF shown in Table 6.7.
Finally, SF used an encoding as ages of people for digit groups that could not
be meaningfully encoded as running times or dates.
In parallel with the emergence of new and more effective encodings of 3- and
4-digit groups, SF started to store up to four different groups in memory in
addition to the four to five digits in the rehearsal buffer. In order to recall these
digit groups in their correct order, SF encoded the order of presentation of each
digit group as first, middle, or last. At the time of recall, SF could use this as the
main cue to retrieve the encoded digit groups in the presented order. The encoding of these additional cues, integrated with memory traces for the purpose of
subsequent retrieval , we call retrieval-structure. In order to be able to store more
groups in memory SF introduced a new level of organization, and used two
super-groups to organize encoded digits as either 4-digit groups or 3-digit
groups. This hierarchical organization is illustrated in Fig. 6.9, and was evidenced in SF's retrospective verbal reports on how he encoded the digit sequence, as well as in the pauses and intonation patterns of his recall of the digit
sequence. Before our experimental study of SF ended, he had extended his
retrieval structure to successfully hold 84 digits.
TABLE 6.7
An Example of SF's Retrospective Reports From a Digit-Span Trial
Presented sequence:
4 1 3 1 7 7 8 4 0 6 0 3 4 9 4 8 7 0 9 4 6 2
Segmented digit groups:
4131 - 7784 - 0603 - 494 - 870 - 9462
Retrospective report:
Starting from the beginning.
I made the four thirteen point one a mile time.
I just remembered the seventy-seven eighty-four.
Ok? Ok? Right. Seventy-seven eighty-four.
Then ... then ... then I ...
(Any pattern?)
What ?
(Any pattern?)
No. No. Nothing. Just like seventy-seven eighty-four.
Ok. Then I made the oh six oh three, I made that a mile time.
Then I remembered the four nine four and the eight seven oh.
I just had to remember those.
Then I remembered the nine forty-six point . .• two!
It's definitely point two, two-mile.
I said, so I said to myself "What did you run it in?"
I ran it in nine forty-six point two. Nine forty-six point two. Right.
The digits, presented orally at 1 second/di git, are shown at the top of the table
along with SF's segment ation into digit-groups for this trial. Adapted from Chase
and Ericsson (1981).
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LEVEL 3

LEVEL 2

LEVEL 1

7401

2319

5559

5675

426

457

133

49800

FIG. 6.9. Proposed hierarchical organization of SF's memory encoding of thirty
presented digits. The first level contains mnemonic encodings of digit groups and
the second level consists of super-groups, where the relative location of several
digit groups are encoded.

SF did not rely on short-term memory for his recall of the digits. His digit
span was essentially unaffected by performing other tasks in the interval between
the presentation and the recall of a digit sequence, even when these interpolated
tasks required the full capacity of short-term memory. More conclusive evidence
for storage in long-term memory is obtained from SF's ability to recall about
90% of 200-300 presented digits after the session.
Finally, SF's memory skill did not lead only to an ability to remember a larger
number of digits. In a self-paced situation, SF showed that shorter digit lists (1050 digits) could, after practice, be memorized at more than twice the original
presentation rate.
In sum, SF's final performance is based on radically different cognitive processes and capacities than his initial performance prior to practice. In our study
of three additional subjects practicing the digit-span task, we found evidence for
the same components of skill. Two subjects given fewer practice sessions surpassed the magical limit of 20 digits. The third subject attained a digit span of
more than 100 digits and is still improving with further practice. The fact that our
subjects could attain digit spans surpassing subjects with alleged exceptional
memory after only 50-100 hours of practice raises the possibility that the exceptional subjects were simply misdiagnosed.

Alleged Exceptional Memory Ability
When people attribute to exceptional subjects an innate ability, there is little or
no evidence to substantiate such an inference. In fact, such attribution is based on
the lack of alternative explanations (Ericsson & Faivre, in press). Some of the
affirmative evidence comes from the subject's own verbal descriptions. The
famous subject S of Luria (1968) reported storing visual images of matrices
without any mediational activity involving meaning. The exceptional memory of
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lnaudi was alleged to be based on sound (Binet, 1894) . More commonly subjects
report a complete lack of mediation, which is often interpreted as evidence for
innate basic ability . These general verbal descriptions are quite different from the
thinking-aloud protocols and retrospective reports I advocated earlier. Further,
there appears to be a conflict of interest that might bias and contaminate the
verbal reports from exceptional subjects. In our culture a mysterious ability is
deemed more interesting than one that is understood (cf. an act by a magician
before and after the detailed steps of the act are explained). If one's livelihood
depends on the income from public performances of one's ability, which is the
case with several people of alleged exceptional memory, one ' s willingness to
describe any available details of the cognitive processes might be reduced.
First, I report on some comparisons between the memory performance of our
trained subjects, whose memory structure is known, and the performance of
subjects with alleged exceptional ability. I then describe some analyses of other
memory experts using protocol analysis.
Binet (1894) analyzed the digit memory of two mental calculators and a
mnemonist. The emphasis on memory for digits was fortunate for Chase and me
because it provided an interesting test for our trained subjects (SF and DD). One
of the tasks Binet used was memorization of a 25 -digit matrix . Luria (1968)
reported on memorization of a 50-digit matrix by his subject, S. Ericsson and
Chase (1982) compared the trained and the exceptional subjects on time taken to
memorize each of these two matrices, and found that the trained subjects could
memorize the digits as fast or faster than the exceptional subjects . After the digit
matrices were committed to memory, the subjects were asked to recall the digits
from the matrix in a wide range of different orders (backward and forward recall
of rows, recall of columns of digits starting at the bottom , etc.). It had been
argued by Binet (1894) that the observed recall times could differentiate between
auditory and visual memory representations. A reanalysis of these recall times
showed a remarkable similarity between all exceptional subjects and our two
trained subjects. In fact, relying on the retrospective verbal reports of one of our
trained subjects, Chase and I constructed a mathematical model of the retrieval,
which described the retrieval times of all subjects (exceptional or trained) with
remarkable accuracy (Ericsson & Chase, 1982) .
When Luria (1968) argued that his subject, S, had an exceptional memory, it
was based on a combination of performance data and verbal descriptions from S
on how he memorized information. A review of a surprisingly large number of
case studies of memory experts shows that the subjects showing the most exceptional memory performance do not claim to have structurally different memories
(Ericsson , 1985) . Extensive laboratory studies of Professor Rueckle (Mueller,
1911, 1913, 1917) and of a professional mnemonist, lsahara, (Susukita, 1933 ,
1934) provide detailed accounts of their methods for memorization directly consistent with the three attributes of acquired memory skill discussed earlier (Chase
& Ericsson, 1982). For example, a contemporary analysis of a waiter with
exceptional memory for dinner orders showed that thinking-aloud protocols and
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designed experiments could uncover the mnemonic associations and retrieval
structure used to store the information in long-term memory (Ericsson & Polson,
in press). The empirical evidence indicates that extraordinary memory performance is due to acquired memory skill regardless of claims for exceptional
ability (Ericsson, 1985) .
When exceptional memory performance is demonstrated by mentally retarded
subjects, such performance is often assumed to reflect " pure" memorization
without mediation. From verbal reports of some mentally retarded subjects with
exceptionally good memories, however , we find evidence that these retarded
subjects are able to use mnemonics in a manner similar to that of trained memory
experts. Jones (1926), for instance, analyzed a subjects's (IQ = 75) memorization of digits under laboratory control. The following is a verbal protocol taken
from the subject as he memorized the number 30249385274. It bears a striking
resemblance to those of our trained digit-span experts.
30 is the number of days in a month . 249- if that were 149 it would be the
distance from Chicago to Peoria, Illinois. 385-1 once paid $3.85 railroad fare
going from Cheyenne, Wyoming to Wheatland , Wyoming. 274- 1 can remember
that by putting a 6 in front of it for the time being. 6274 is the seating capacity of
the Hippodrome. (Jones, 1926 , p. 372.)

On a more general level it appears that most people with remarkable skills are
surprisingly unable to describe them and the corresponding cognitive processes.
However, the same subjects are able to give detailed concurrent or retrospective
verbal reports while performing specific tasks in their domain of expertise . In the
beginning of this section I raised the question of what performance or ability is
basic, or at least unmediated by reportable cognitive states. At this time I don't
know where the boundary will fall , although the documented ex istence of unmediated retrieval and recognition processes provides a lower bound (Ericsson &
Simon, 1984). The clear importance of mediating cognitive processes in perceptual skills and many exceptional abilities in mentally retarded subj ects (Ericsson
& Faivre, in press) shows that many investigators' intuitions about the location
of such a boundary have been incorrect and require a serious reevaluation .

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter I have shown how data from verbal reports can be represented in
the same theoretical framework as traditional performance measures, such as
reaction time and correctness of response. The intermediate states of cognitive
processes (revealed by encodings of verbal reports) provide detailed descriptions
of the processes. The claims that certai n tests measure specific cognitive processes can be empirically evaluated by examining verbally reported thought
sequences. Drawing on three different areas of research , I have argued for the
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richness and validity of verbal reports and how the verbal report data have been
used to change commonly held views of underlying processes.
The issues of measurement are much broader, and in this final section I
describe the relevance of protocol analysis to measurement issues. The arguments in this chapter can easily be extended to apply to the central issue of
understanding the correlation between scores on different tests. Understanding
what individual tests measure.is a prerequisite for understanding the observed
correlation between scores on two different tests. Protocol-analysis would allow
us to evaluate the importance of two different sources of correlation. The first
possibility is that superior test performance is due to the application of the same
process or knowledge for both tests. The second and complementary possibility
is that superior performance on one of the tests is determined by quite different
processes and knowledge from those of the other test. Accounting for correlations due to the second possibility would require an account much different from
the first.
In identifying broad issues of future measurement research, I was very influenced by Gene Glass' (1985) recent critique of current measurement research.
One of his central arguments was that the information provided by tests was too
general and measured abilities on such an abstract level that test scores did not
provide any useful or diagnostic information to educators and the people concerned with remedial training. To describe a subjects' cognitive processes for
some task requires a lot of information if this description should provide an
educator with possible incorrect processes and strategies, lack of relevant knowledge, etc. Such an assessment goal is quite different from the traditional measurement of stable capacities or processing characteristics. In the body of my
chapter I have tried to illustrate how protocol data can supply such information.
However, the relation between verbally reported knowledge and teachability of
the corresponding cognitive processes is more complex than it might appear at
first glance.
It is clear that uncovering mediational elements in cognitive processes responsible for some superior or inferior performance on a task raises the possibility of
improving the inferior subjects' performance through instruction. This does not,
however, imply that subjects following the instruction instantly attain the superior performance of the subjects spontaneously exhibiting that strategy. Furthermore, we know that mediational cognitive processes are involved in many forms
of expert performance, which can be attained only after years of practice by
highly motivated students. Hence, stable individual differences in tasks are by no
means irreconcilable with the existence of mediating cognitive processes. In our
earlier discussion of memory skill, we showed that normal, motivated subjects
could obtain exceptional memory performance after 50-100 hours of practice.
The major obstacle subjects had was the fast presention rate. To deal with the
limited time available to develop retrieval structures, they needed to speed up
their encoding processes. This is particularly well-illustrated by our second subject, who was instructed in the cognitive processes used by our first subject.
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Given that the second subject was the running partner of the first subject, we can
assume that his knowledge about running times was comparable. Although the
second subject improved faster during the initial training, the advantage disappeared at a digit span of around 20 digits . This suggests that instruction can
effectively guide the subject toward the correct sequence of cognitive processes,
but that acquiring the necessary speed and integration requires practice. In this
and other respects, mental skills resemble sports and other motor skills.
In the discussion of individual differences in mathematical ability, we noted
that global strategies and general heuristics identified by experts did not provide
a good conceptual system, either for characterization of individual differences or
for instruction. Much better success was obtained with descriptions using domain-specific methods and different types of organization of knowledge.
The realization that any accurate characterization of individual differences in
some ability requires a rather detailed description of knowledge and solution
methods is important, yet somewhat disappointing. It is important because it
should stimulate a closer collaboration between educators and people involved in
measurement and assessment. Furthermore, it could lead to the emergence of
standardized, individualized testing, with thinking aloud for the purpose of specific assessment of deficiencies as well as computer-based assessment. It is
disappointing in that the task of measuring generalizable stable individual differences appears difficult or even impossible. Differences in available specific
knowledge and strategies will always confound and cover any basic differences.
By extracting information about strategies through verbal reports, we will explicitly address such influence and hence understand better what tests actually
measure.
There is, of course, a rather different view, which argues that general individual differences are made up of differences in acquired methods and organized
knowledge. The dramatic improvements after practice on all types of tasks
(especially simple tasks used to measure basic capacities and processes) appear
to provide strong support for this emphasis on skill. The research exploring
effects of extensive practice has shown that practice does not simply make the
performance quantitatively better but also leads to qualitative changes in performance. This means that many abilities assumed to require such structurally
different characteristics might still be a function of practice- extensive practice.
Within this skill-based view of individual differences, verbal reports and other
descriptions of processes , like eye-fixations, will be absolutely essential in allowing us to characterize the components and organization of performance.
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Structure and Process in
Cognitive Psychology Using
Multidimensional Scaling and
Related Techniques
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Brian H. Ross
University of Illinois

INTRODUCTION
The goal of cognitive psychology is to provide a general understanding of human
cognitive processes through the development of general , formal models of cognition . Although it is clearl y true that some areas (such as memory) have been
more highly developed than others, it is undeniable that cognitive psychology
has witnessed a proliferation of models in the past decade. Perhaps researchers
are find ing it increasingly difficult to discriminate among competing memory
models because the constraints are so weak. One possibility that will be explored
in this chapter is the prospect of using multidimensional scaling (MDS) and
related procedures as a means of providing constraint for theorizing .
In this chapter, we initially provide a brief description of the problem of the
inability to distinguish among models . Subsequently, we sketch some scaling
and clustering procedures. We then discuss a number of applications of MDS and
related procedures to domains of interest to cognitive psychologists . Particul ar
attention is given to the constraint provided by these techniques on cognitive
theorizing. Subsequently , we outline how one might choose the correct procedure and how one might circumvent some problems raised by using these
procedures to study cognitive domains . Next , we provide a brief application of
these procedures to the domain of cognitive psychology models . Finall y, we
attempt to provide an assessment of the utility of MDS and related procedures in
cognitive psychology.
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DISTINGUISHING THEORIES: AN ILLU STRATIVE
EXAMPLE
One particularly salient example of the difficulty in telling seemingly contradictory theories apart is the recent dispute over the viability of the semantic/episodic
distinction in human memory. Briefly, Tulving (1983) has proposed that the
human memory system can profitably be divided into memory for general world
knowledge (semantic) and memory for personal events (episodic). In contrast,
other theorists have claimed that a unitary theory of memory provides a better
account (Anderson & Ross, 1980; McKoon, Ratcliff, & Dell, in press).
It would certainly seem that two theoretical viewpoints that differ in the
desirability of partitioning the memory system along such fundamental lines
should be easy to tell apart. In fact, this goal has proven elusive. To date, the
most conclusive kind of evidence on this issue is the dissociation experiment in
which one examines the effects of an independent variable on an episodic memory task and a semantic one. If we find that the variable has different effects on the
two tasks, then according to Tulving (1983) we have evidence for the distinction.
Although one might reasonably believe that these dissociation experiments
might resolve this issue, they have not. Proponents of a unitary view argue that
when the task changes it is often necessary for the cognitive operations to change
also and consequently we should expect these kinds of dissociations. More
explicitly, the confusion over the semantic/episodic distinction can best be understood in terms of the distinction between structure and process in cognitive
psychology. Basically, any model must specify a set of structural assumptions
and a set of processing assumptions. The problem is that whereas one set of
assumptions might nicely account for some set of data, it is also the case that a
very different set of structural assumptions, usually accompanied by a very
different set of processing assumptions, can also account for the same set of data.
Compounding the problem is that many models are not sufficiently detailed as to
have both an explicit set of structural assumptions and an explicit set of processing assumptions.
In the case of the semantic/episodic distinction, both problems are operative.
Proponents of the distinction explain the dissociation by appealing to the different memory structures involved. Unitary theorists claim that different tasks will
necessarily involve some different processes and therefore dissociations are far
from unequivocal evidence for a structural distinction. Without explicit processing assumptions, it is impossible to determine who has the stronger claim.
One obvious solution to this problem is to require our theorizing to be more
precise. McKoon, Ratcliff, and Dell (in press) have made this suggestion quite
eloquently and have also proposed a somewhat more detailed version of the
unitary theory. However, it would be naive of us to suppose that precision in
theorizing will naturally occur because vagueness leads to problems in telling
theories apart. What is needed are techniques that enable us to develop more
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detailed theories. One possibility is any technique that provides some constraint
on structure. Although it is not immediately obvious to us that multidimensional
scaling will help with making these accounts of the semantic/episodic distinction
more distinguishable , we do believe that multidimensional scaling and kindred
procedures may, in general, provide this very necessary kind of constraint.
One typically uses MDS to obtain a structural representation of a stimulus
domain. It will not provide a process model, although the structure recovered
may suggest one. One way to examine the claim that MDS will provide constraint to cognitive theories is to examine some previous uses of the method to
determine if its use has provided any constraint on theorizing in the area of
application.

KINDS OF MDS AND RELATED PROCEDURES
Before examining the applications of MDS in cognitive psychology, it is useful
to make some preliminary distinctions among procedures that correspond to
conceptual differences among applications. The most important differences are
whether the recovered representation is continuous or discrete and whether individual differences are taken into account.
Carroll and Arabie (1980), in their review of multidimensional scaling propose a detailed taxonomy of MDS methods, of which only a portion will be used
here. Two-way MDS is the oldest of these procedures. Originally developed by
Shepard (l962a, 1962b) and Kruskal (l964a , 1964b), the original program has
evolved considerably over the last 2 decades. In the most modern version,
KYST, the input data are a matrix of proximities in which the rows and columns
of the matrix represent stimulus objects. KYST uses this type of input matrix that
contains the similarity (or dissimilarity) of each object to each other object. The
output of the procedure is a graphical depiction of the stimulus objects in k
dimensions. In contrast to this continuous measure , there are also discrete twoway procedures. One of the most promising is MAPCLUS, the Arabie and
Carroll (1980) algorithm for fitting the Shepard-Arabie ADCLUS (1979) model.
This procedure takes the same input data as KYST and returns a solution of k
clusters of stimulus objects with a cluster weight (and an additive constant).
Goodness-of-fit is measured somewhat differently in the two procedures:
MAPCLUS provides variance accounted for whereas KYST reports STRESS, a
badness-of-fit measure.
A similar classification can be made of three-way procedures , which take
individual differences I into account. These procedures all take an input matrix
IStrictly speaking, the third " way " need not be variation among individua ls; it may instead be
differences in groups of people or stimu lus context, but the most common use is individua ls. We
employ the most common use here because it is easier to understand .
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whose rows and columns represent stimu lus objects, as in the two-way matrix ,
but whose extra third dimension represents individuals. Conceptually , one can
think of this matrix as a series of two-way matrices where each individual
contributes one two-way matrix. The most common three-way analogue to
KYST is INDSCAL, developed by Carroll and Chang (1970), or its fasterrunning successor SINDSCAL (Pruzansky, 1975). Like KYST, INDSCAL outputs a spatial representation of the stimulus objects in k dimensions. However, in
addition to this object space , INDSCAL also provides a subject space, a plot of
the weight that each subject assigns to each dimension.
For discrete models, Arabie and Carroll (1983) have developed an individual
differences variant of MAPCLUS named INDCLUS. This procedure takes a
three-way matrix of proximities (exactly as in SINDSCAL) and outputs k clusters where each cluster contains elements of the stimulus domain, but INDCLUS
also provides a cluster weighting for each individual subject. Thus, just as
INDSCAL provided a weighting for each subject on each dimension, so too
INDCLUS provides a weighting for each subject on each cluster.
Generally speak ing, researchers have employed two-way models when they
sought to describe a stimulus structure that was assumed to be common to all
individuals and a three-way method when the underlying representation was
assumed to vary across individuals. There have been two types of exceptions to
this rule. First, because three-way methods can often extract higher dimensionality , some investigators have employed these methods even when variation over
individuals was not an issue. Second, there have been several creative uses of
three-way methods in which the third way was not individuals , but some other
factor, such as age of the particular group of subjects (in developmental studies)
or context. Third, three-way methods yield unique orientation of axes, while the
axes provided by the two-way methods are usually arbitrary, and so are subject to
rotation.

MDS AS A METHOD FOR DETERMINING STRUCTURE
Much of the early work in cognitive psychology that used MDS did so exclusively for descriptive purposes. For examp le, in one of the largest collections
of scaling work,Fillenbaum and Rappaport (1971) used a precursor of KYST to
scale a large number of semantic terms ranging from verbs to classes of nouns.
Similarly , Clark (1968) scaled a large number of common prepositions. After
presenting the graphic solution , the main problem remaining was to label the
dimensions . Although we discuss some solutions to this problem below, the
standard of 15 years ago was simply to examine the dimensions and label them
intuitively . Even under these relatively relaxed standards, it is clear that some of
this research was quite fruitful.
One of the most widely analyzed data sets is the confusion matrices collected
by Miller and Nicely (1955) on consonant phonemes. Shepard (1972) incorporat-
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ed the idea of fitting an exponential decay function on the original confusion
proportions before performing the MDS analysis. He recovered a two-dimensional solution in which the first dimension distinguished voiced phonemes (za
and da) from unvoiced ones (fa and ka). The second dimension separated the
nasals (ma and na) from the other consonant phonemes. Within these remaining
phonemes, there was also a separation between those that are formed at the front
of the mouth (fa and ba) and those that are formed at the rear (ga and zha). These
results thus gave considerable support to the featural interpretation of consonant
phonemes.
The color domain has also been of long-standing interest to users of MDS
(Ekman, 1954). In fact, color was the primary example that Shepard used in his
original paper (1962a). Using the judged similarity of the common color names,
Shepard found that the data were well fit by a two-dimensional solution in which
the names were arranged in a color circle in which there was a gap between the
color with shortest wavelength (violet) and the one with the longest wavelength
(red). In the circle, the points are arranged in terms of their wavelength, such that
connecting the points in the circle orders the colors monotonically in terms of
their wavelength. In addition, the fact that red and violet are quite close to each
other (even though they are maximally different in wavelength) accords quite
well with our intuition that these colors are psychologically quite similar.

Semantic. In contrast to the perceptual and sensory domains, the results of
using MDS with semantic domains are generally less clear-cut. There are several
possible reasons why the results of MDS analysis are not always salutary with
this kind of domain. First, it is the case that most semantic domains are of
functionally infinite size (although there are exceptions to this general principle,
such as kin terms and Engli sh prepositions). Thus, some selection of exemplars
from a domain must be made , and, somewhat surprisingly , this selection is often
done haphazardly. Different subsets will yield different results . Second, the
meaning of various terms can change with the context. This change can be either
a function of homonyms or some more subtle change. For a subtle change, the
meaning of eagle may be different in the context of other birds than is its
meaning in the context of other predators. For a radical change the location of bat
in a multidimensional space is going to be different if bat is among other rodents
or among other types of sporting equipment. We discuss context effects in
greater detail in a later section. Third , semantic domains are potentiall y more
heterogeneous than other domains we have considered. Thus, while all color
names can be compared on hue, brightness, and saturation, it is difficult to
imagine even a single dimension on which one could relate drunkenness, lion,
and chair. Fourth, some semantic domains, such as categories, that are frequently subjected to MDS analysis may pose technical problems for many of the
MDS programs that are presently used. We discuss this issue in a later section .
One of the most commonly scaled semantic domains is categories and one of
the most commonly scaled categories is animals. Beginning with Henley (1969),
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there have been a number of MDS analyses of this particular domain. Henley
presented a three-dimensional solution in which the first dimension ordered the
animals along the continuum of size. The second dimension, which Henley
(1969) labeled ferocity had predators at one pole and domesticated animals at the
other. The third dimension was largely uninterpretable. It did seem to set off the
anthropoid apes from the other animals, and perhaps for this reason, Henley
elected to label it as humanness. However, relatively intelligent animals like the
elephant ranked near the bottom of this dimension, and it thus seems that a just
conclusion is that this third dimension is uninterpretable.
There has been minor controversy over how many dimensions are appropriate
for this domain. Using INDSCAL, Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) obtained a
satisfactory fit to their data in two dimensions, which they labeled size and
predacity. Their second dimension was much like Henley's in that it separated
the predators from the farm animals; they felt that ferocity was misleading and
therefore employed the obscure term predacity. In addition to the satisfactory fit
that Rips et al. (1973) obtained, they also were able to use the distances obtained
from the solution to predict categorization latencies. Generally speaking, exemplars that were further in the space from the category label took longer to
categorize. Shoben (1976) also found that mammals could be fit in these same
two dimensions, although he used only 6 mammal exemplars and 6 bird exemplars. Many other researchers have been unable to obtain an adequate fit without
going to a largely uninterpretable third dimension. For example, King , Gruenewald, and Lockhead (1978) argued for a three-dimensional solution, and
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were unable to use the distances from a twodimensional solution to generate predictions in an analogies task where distances
obtained from a three-dimensional solution provided a very good fit.
Although the results using animal names are certainly not definitive, the
results are at least interpretable in terms of plausible, denotative, semantic dimensions. There are many examples to the contrary, and the number extant in the
literature probably understates the number of failures considerably because of the
difficulty in publishing negative results . Often these negative results are mentioned in a context with results that are more heartwarming to the author. For
example, Shoben (1976) was unable to interpret a solution he obtained for fruits
and vegetables. Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982) report a number of
scalings in which the first author was involved, and none of those solutions had
readily interpretable dimensions.
Semantic stimuli that are heterogeneous present a different problem. The
resulting solution is often interpretable, but usually in terms of connotative
dimensions. One example is a study by Arnold (1971) in which his heterogeneous group of concrete and abstract nouns yielded a three-dimensional solution that included the dimensions evaluation, potency , and activation (Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1954). In large measure, such an outcome makes sense
because it is highly unlikely that a heterogeneous group of objects will have
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common denotative dimensions. The only common dimensions for such a collection are the connotative attributes.

APPLICATIONS OF MDS TO COGNITIVE TASKS
Although early applications of MDS often took the solution as the end result,
some later applications have attempted to use the resulting solution to predict
behavior. Rips et al. (1973), for example, used the distances between the exemplars of a category and the category name to predict latencies in a categorization
task. In a reaction time (RT) task, subjects were asked to decide if, for example,
a duck was a bird. Rips et al. (1973) found that the time to make this judgment
could be predicted quite well by the distance between duck and bird in the
multidimensional space produced by INDSCAL.
Shoben (1976) extended this technique in a same-different task. He assumed
that short distances should facilitate positive judgments and inhibit negative
ones. Shoben used the derived distances to predict both same and different
latencies in a task where subjects were presented with pairs of exemplars and
decided if the exemplars were from same or different categories. Thus, the
correct answer is same for goose-chicken and different for goose-bear. For same
responses, Shoben (1976) found that the distance between each exemplar and the
category name contributed significantly to the prediction of Same RT. Interestingly, and in contrast to processing accounts espoused by Schaeffer and
Wallace (\ 970) , the distance between the two exemplars had no effect on latency . In a similar way, the distance between the exemplar and the category name
also predicted Different RT. Not surprisingly, the distance between the first
exemplar and its true category contributed significantly to RT. Somewhat less
obviously, the distance between the second exemplar and the first category also
contributed significantly to RT . Once again , the distance between the two exemplars had no effect. Let us consider the pairs bear-goose and bear-robin. For
both pairs , bear is quite close to its superordinate mammal so this aspect of the
decision should be quite easy . However, robin and goose vary in their proximity
to the superordinate mammal. For a bird exemplar, goose is quite close , while
robin is quite distant. Consequently, we expect bear-goose to be more difficult
than bear-robin.

MDS RESULTS AS A SOURCE OF PROCESSING
EXPLANATIONS
From the regression analyses described above , Shoben (1976) came up with a
processing account of performance in the same-different task . He assumed that
subjects processed the exemplars sequentially and he presented evidence that
people did indeed follow his admonition to read the first word first. Subjects then
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categorized the first exemplar and the difficulty in performing this operation was
a function of the distance between this exemp lar and its category name. Subsequently, subjects compared the second exemplar to the category determined in
the preceding operation. Here, increasing distance made it more difficult to
conclude that the second exemplar was a member of the category, but increasing
distance made a negative decision easier. This model thus provides a satisfactory
account of performance in a same-different task, and seriously questions the
processing explanation offered previously by Schaeffer and Wallace (1970).
Although Shoben (1976) used the MDS analysis to help devise an information
processing account of a cognitive task, there are more formal accounts that are
tied to scaling data more closely. In particular, the Rumelhart and Abrahamsen
(1973) model of analogy is an excellent example. Although more sophisticated
theories of analogical reasoning are now avai lable (Sternberg, 1977), Rumelhart
and Abrahamsen's theory is one of the best examples of a formal theory derived
in large part from MDS analysis .
The task employed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) was a 4-term analogy problem. Subjects solved analogies such as fox:horse::chipmunk: _ _ . They
selected the best alternative (in one experiment) from a list of four alternatives: in
this example, antelope, donkey, elephant, and wo lf, where elephant is the best
answer in this case. In spatial terms, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) noted
that the ideal point could be determined by constructing a parallelogram given
the three vertices specified by the three given terms of the analogy. In other
words, one must determine the relationship between the first two terms of the
analogy and then apply those relationships to the third term to determine the ideal
point. In this domain (animal names) , one must determine these relationships in
all three dimensions. For the present example, fox is smaller than horse , somewhat more ferocio us than horse, and sli ghtly less human than horse. The ideal
point is thus :"rger than a chipmunk , less ferocious than chipmunk , and sli ghtly
more hurr an than chipmunk. Elephant is the closest of the four alternatives to
this ideal. It shou ld also be noted that one can rank order the alternatives in terms
of proximity to the ideal, as Rumelhart and Abrahamsen did, and one finds that
antelope is the second-best completion, donkey is third, and wolf is last.
In additi on to predicting subjects' so lutions, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen
(1 973) also leveloped a theory to account for the distribution of responses. They
assumed that subjects ' choices would be in proportion to their distances from the
ideal point. More formally, they suggested that the distribution of responses
would follow Luce's (1959) choice rule.

x )=

'n

n

2:

v(dJ

(1)

v(d j )

j

Here , d i = X i - 1: the distance between alternative Xi and the ideal point, and
v ( ) is a monotonically decreasing function and p(Xi lX l ' . . . ,X n ) is the proba-
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bility of selecting the ith item from the n alternatives. Because Shepard (1972)
had obtained good fits to recall data by using an exponential decay function,
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) assumed that vex) = exp (- ax) where a is
constrained to be positive.
Using this one parameter, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were able to
obtain good fits to the data at both a quantitative and a qualitative level. Even the
data for the third and fourth choices show a strikingly good fit. Moreover, this
high level of correspondence was invariant when the distances among the alternatives was varied.
The work of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) is an excellent example of
how MDS analysis can lead to a formal processing model. The ability to determine the distances of the alternatives from the ideal was an important prerequisite to the application of Luce's choice rule.

MDS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SEMANTIC MEMORY
Although MDS analysis has certainly proven useful in a number of cases, to what
degree are semantic memory models constrained by MDS results? Viewed most
negatively, the answer is that MDS analysis has not provided much of a constraint on semantic memory theorizing. Some theorists (Collins & Loftus, 1975)
argue that the appropriate metaphor for semantic memory is a network, while
others have argued that a set-theoretic account is more appropriate (McCloskey
& Glucksberg, 1979). From the perspective of the categorization literature, such
fundamental questions as whether prototype models or exemplar models are
more appropriate remains an open question (Smith & Medin, 1981) . From this
account, it seems clear that MDS analysis (or any other kind of analysis) has
provided relatively little constraint on theorizing in semantic memory.
However, viewed most positively , MDS has provided considerable constraint. From the work just reviewed, it is clear that there is structure in semantic
memory that any model must account for, and that that structure is based on
meaning. If, for example, we are interested in the processing of analogies, then ,
on the basis of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen's (1973) work, we must take into
account the simi larity in meaning as indicated by the three dimensions derived
from Henley's (1969) original scaling of animal names . Although it is correct
that this analysis does not specify what form the "correct" model of semantic
memory shou ld take, it does specify an important constraint of which any viable
model must take notice. Th is evidence for dimensional processing, for example,
is more readily incorporated into set-theoretic accounts than it is into network
accounts.
Thus, judging from the semantic memory literature , it is important that the
amount of constraint provided by MDS analysis not be oversold . The power to
distinguish among broad classes of models is not in the power of the method. In
fact, it appears to provide very little in the way of processing constraint. It does,
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however, provide some index of structure for which any reasonable model must
account.

MUSIC PERCEPTION

The area of music perception is a rapidly growing and exciting field within
cognitive psychology. Most of the advance has been within the past 6 years and it
has been largely concerned with the psychological structure of music. Given this
structural emphasis, it is not surprising that the contribution of MDS analysis has
been large.
Early work in music perception was largely sensory and focused principally
on pitch height (Stevens & Volkmann, 1940). Subsequent work (Shepard , 1964)
has indicated a more complicated structure that is characterized by its emphasis
on the octave. According to this account, the notes of a musical scale are
properly thought of in terms of a chroma circle , analogous to the color circle
discussed earlier.
The more recent work on music perception differs from the earlier studies by
using an explicit musical context. From the subject's perspective, the more
recent studies are examining the perception of music rather than the perception of
tones. Some recent studies, for example, have asked subjects to judge the similarity of two tones in the context of a diatonic scale or to judge the similarity of
two passages in the context of a melody. The use of richer context has enabled
experimenters to recover (using MDS analyses) much more complicated structures.
Perhaps the seminal work of these studies has been performed by Krumhansl
(1979). She presented subjects with a variety of musical contexts: a major chord
triad, an ascending major scale, or a descending major scale. Subjects in each of
these context conditions rated the similarity of a pair of tones in the context.
Differences among these three contexts were slight. Looking first at the raw
similarity measures, some very regular results emerge. First, for stimuli in the
major triad, other tones in the triad were judged most similar. Diatonic tones
were judged next similar, followed by nondiatonics. For the diatonic tones (those
not in the major triad) , the same pattern was observed. For the nondiatonics ,
there was little effect of this categorical variable; whether a particular tone was
diatonic or nondiatonic mattered little. Pitch height was the primary determinant
of similarity between a nondiatonic tone and another tone .
The MDS representation that Krumhansl (1979) obtained is a complicated
variant of the chroma circle. In her three-dimensional solution one can see the
richness captured by the MDS analysis. The structure resembles an inverted
cone. The components of the major triad form the base of the cone. For the C
major scale she employed, these components are C, E, G, and high C, reading
clockwise around the circle. At the next level are the diatonic tones. Reading
clockwise around the circle at this level, we find D, F, A, and B. Finally, at the
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base of the inverted cone (the circle with the largest diameter) we find the
nondiatonic tones. Like the tones at the other two levels, the tones are arranged
in ascending order if one reads them in a clockwise order.
Thus it appears that more than a chroma circle emerges when tones are
presented in a musical context. Even subjects who had little or no musical
training classified tones in the fashion suggested by music theory. Here we have
a case where it is difficult to think of a method other than MDS that might have
been able to recover this structure.
Krumhansl and her colleagues (Krumhansl, Bharucha, & Kessler, 1982) have
generalized this result from tones to chords . In the context of a C major scale, for
example, Krumhansl et al. (1982) demonstrated that the major chords (CEG,
FAC, and GBD) were central in an MDS representation. For a minor key
(Krumhansl et al. used A minor), the corresponding chords were A minor 0
minor, and E major, respectively. Chords that were not a part of the scale
sequence were at the periphery of the space.
More recently, Pollard-Gott (1983) has used MDS analysis to examine the
perception of passages of classical music. She had subjects listen repeatedly to a
Liszt sonata. Pollard-Gott encouraged her subjects to listen carefully and to take
notes . At the end of each session, she gave 28 pairs of stimuli that were constructed from the eight passages from the sonata that she selected. The passages
varied in length from 4 to 16 measures.
The similarities were analyzed using SINDSCAL (Carroll & Chang, 1970;
Pruzansky, 1975). The data are particularly interesting when examined across
sessions. The dimensions extracted, for example, progress from relatively naive
and unsophisticated distinctions in the first sessions to a fairly sophisticated one
in the final session . More specifically, the dimensions recovered from the similarities obtained after the first session reflected fairly gross physical features of
the passages: happy-sad, high-low, simple-complex, and loud-soft. After the
second session, however, the more sophisticated dimension of theme emerges .
Here, this dimension separates, without any overlap, passages that deal with
theme A from those that deal with theme B. This separation is even greater after
the third listening session, suggesting that this more sophisticated dimension
becomes increasingly important as subjects become more knowledgeable about
the composition.
Strong support for this interpretation is provided by the results obtained in an
expert condition. Pollard-Gott (1983) obtained the same ratings from a group of
subjects who had received extensive musical training. For these subjects, she
obtained a SINDSCAL solution that accounted for 84% of the variance in one
dimension. This thematic dimension again clustered those passages that dealt
with iheme A at one end of the dimension and those that dealt with theme B at
the other end of the dimension.
At even a higher level, Halpern (1984) has investigated memory organization
for familiar songs. She posited that relations between songs could involve extramusical similarity or musical similarity. To assess the organization, she gave
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subjects 60 songs and asked them to sort them into groups of songs that were
similar either in terms of their musical similarity (such as tempo, rhythm, and the
like) or in terms of their nonmusical similarity (described simply as on some
basis other than how they sound) .
Halpern analyzed her results using both KYST and ADDTREE. Her scaling
solutions were difficult to interpret and yielded poor fits (though using a maximum dimensionality of three and stress formula two may have contributed to the
poor fits she obtained). In any event, the ADDTREE solutions for nonmusical
similarity were readily interpretable and accounted for a high proportion (.92) of
variance. A number of distinctive clusters emerged . For example, all of the
Christmas songs clustered together in the nonmusical solution and these songs
were further distinguished into groups of solemn Christmas songs (such as The
First Noel) and children's Christmas songs (such as Rudolf the Red-Nosed Reindeer). The musical sol ution produced neither as satisfactory a fit (.71 of the
variance) nor as interpretable a solution . However, some interesting results occurred. The two groups of Christmas songs were no longer classified together;
solemn Christmas songs were grouped with patriotic ones (such as God Bless
America) while children's Christmas songs were classified with other chi ldren's
songs (such as Happy Birthday). However, many songs retained similar positions in the tree structure across the two instructions. Although one might argue
that this result is an artifact of the experimental procedure in which each subject
performed both sets of ratings, it seems more likely to us that songs that are
related by topic may simply be inherently more similar musically than pairs of
songs not so related. For example, Beatie songs are sim ilar to each other on the
basis that they were all recorded by the same artists, yet they are also similar
musically .
Halpern (1984) went on to demonstrate that the distance in the tree structure
was able to predict performance quite well in two cogn itive tasks . In one task,
she presented subjects with a song title and the music of a song and asked them to
verify that the presented title was correct for the song. When title and song
mismatched, she found that the discrimination was more error prone when the
two songs were near each other in the tree diagram. In a free recall task, she
found that adjacent songs were more likely to be recalled together than songs that
were far apart. Halpern's results are consistent with the idea that familiar songs
are organized in memory by conceptual (nonmusical) characteristics.
In many respects, music perception is ideally suited to MDS analysis. The
research is currently at a stage where it is important to learn how the psychological representation differs from a representation that merely mirrors physical
characteristics. In contrast to the research on semantic memory , for example, we
really do not have any theories of music perception . Instead, we are searching for
constraints on such a theory and MDS analysis has provided us with a number of
them. They range from the perception of tones in various contexts to the perception of passages in a piece of classical music to the organization of familiar
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songs. We have now perhaps reached the point where cognitive psychologists are
ready to develop a theory of how people make these judgments of similarity.

MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE IN STRUCTURE
Some of the most impressive applications of MDS analyses have been in demonstrating a change in structure. This change can be the result of a change in
conditions, context , or age. By the examination of a set of stimuli in various
circumstances, it may also be possible to extract higher dimensionality from the
materials in question . At a minimum , it provides good evidence fo r change.
Perhaps the most obvious place to look for an application of MDS that
demonstrates a change in structure is in the area of cognitive development.
Several investigators in this area have attempted to show that younger children
organi ze stimuli along perceptual dimensions while older children employ more
abstract dimensions. One study that illustrates this point very nicely was performed by Howard and Howard (1977). They selected 10 animal names from
Henley' s (l969) original set and had their simil arity judged by children of varying ages. The subjects were first-graders, third-graders, sixth-graders, and college students. Using Carroll and Chang's (1 970) INDSCAL , they obtained a
three-dimensional solution in which the three dimensions were size, domesticity ,
and predativity . Although these last two are usually thought of as equivalent ,
Howard and Howard make a good case that these dimensions are distinguishable.
For the predativity dimension , lion and bear are at one extre me and mouse,
rabbit, and deer are at the other. For the domesticity dimension , all fi ve objects
are on one side of the dimension , with horse, cow , sheep, pig, and dog at the
other.
Howard and Howard (1 977) looked for a change in structure by examining the
weight assigned to each dimension in the subject space. When they averaged
over subj ects in each age group , they found that younger children emphasized the
perceptual dimension : size. Older children in contrast, emphas ized the more
abstract dimensions of domesticity and predativity. Sixth-graders, for example,
pl aced equal weight on the size and predativity dimensions and less weight on the
domesticity dimension . Younger children pl aced greater weight on the size dimensions, whil e college students placed less weight on the size dimension . Thus,
it does seem that increasing age leads to increas ing reliance on more abstract
dimensions, at least with these stimuli.
Mi ller and Gelman (1 983 ) have recently demonstrated a similar point with a
more complicated analysis. They investi gated the concept of number in children
using techniques developed by Arabie, Kosslyn, an9 Nelson ( 1975). Miller and
Gelman ( 1983) obtained similarity judgments for the digits 0 to 9 from groups of
kindergartners, third-graders, sixth-graders, and graduate students. They used a
modification of the method of tri ads in which subjects determined which of two
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digits was more similar to a third . In order to reduce drastically the number of
judgments required of very young children, Miller and Gelman used a balanced
incomplete sampling procedure developed by Arabie et al. (1975).
Miller and Gelman (1983) obtained two-dimensional solutions for each of the
four groups. For the younger children , the solution resembled a semicircle in
which the digits were ordered by magnitude . For sixth-graders and adults, there
is clearly an odd-even dimension in addition to one based on magnitude. For
adults, moreover, a paradoxical finding is that the powers of two (2, 4, and 8) are
closer together than they should be in terms of magnitude; the digits 2 and 8 are
actually closer than the digits 2 and 7 , for example.
Although the results of the MDS analysis were certainly enlightening, Miller
and Gelman's most interesting results were observed in their clustering analysis.
Using INDCLUS, they obtained seven clusters. Five of them pertained to counting, and the other two were the odd numbers excluding I (3, 5, 7, 9) and the
powers of two (2, 4, 8). For the children in the two youngest groups, the five
counting clusters were all assigned higher weights than these last two clusters.
For the adults, however , the powers of two was the cluster with the highest
weight, and the odd numbers excluding one was the fourth highest. Sixth-graders
were between these two extremes.
The results of the INDCLUS analysis nicely complement the results from the
MDS analyses in that both show increasing complexity as a function of age.
There is a clear developmental trend away from counting as the sole dimension in
digits and toward dimensions that reflect more complex relationships among the
digits (such as the powers of two) . Methodologically, it is interesting to note that
the clustering analysis performed by Miller and Gelman (198 3) parallels the
scaling analysis done by Howard and Howard (1977). Both sets of authors used a
single result , a set of seven clusters for Miller and Gelman, and a three-dimensional solution for Howard and Howard, and then examined the change in
weights as a function of age . Both observed that more complex dimensions or
clusters tended to be weighted more heav ily by older children and adults accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the weighting for more primitive dimensions or clusters. We might also note that the Miller and Gelman (1 983) paper is
particularly convincing in this respect because these authors also obtained MDS
representations for each group of subjects and the analyses of these solutions
were highly consistent with this interpretation .
One other unusual application to assess a change in structure has been performed by Schoenfeld and Herrmann (1982) . They investigated the perception of
the similarity of difficult word problems in mathematics. Earlier studies (e.g.,
Chi , Feltovich, & Glaser, L981) had shown a strong, but indirect, relationship
between expertise and problem perception , with novices tending to use surface
features and experts using deep , structural feat ures. This study examined
whether a course in problem soLving would lead to changes in problem perception. Each problem was characterized by both a deep structure representation
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(refening to the principles necessary for solution , such as uniqueness arguments
to be proved by contradiction, DeMorgan's Law, or linear dophantine equation)
and a surface structure (referring to the salient mathematical objects involved or
the subject area, such as polynomials, subset sums, or limits). Schoenfeld and
Herrmann asked groups of subj ects to sort the problems and then looked at the
strongly clustered problems to see whether these problems were more alike in
surface structure or in deep structure. Using Johnson's (1967) HICLUS program,
they defined strongly clustered pairs as those whose proximity value exceeded .5. The subjects were freshman and sophomores who had completed 1 to 3
semesters of college mathematics. One group subsequentl y enro lled in a problem
solving course and the other group instead enrolled in a computer programming
course. The sortings of the two groups did not differ initially. Subsequent to
these courses, the same problems were sorted again .
The results were quite striking . Prior to course enrollment , most of the strongly associated clusters (67%) were accounted for by surface similarity. Approximately II % of the clusters matched the deep structure characterization and
approximately 22% matched neither. For the group that took the computer programm ing course, the percentage changed very little; 64% of the clusters were
still simi lar on the basis of the surface structure (with a deep structure percentage
of 9) . For the group that took the problem solving course, however, the results
changed markedly. Now , 55% of the cl usters matched the deep structure characterization, while only 9% matched the surface structure characterization . As a
further control , Schoenfe ld and Herrmann had these problems sorted by a group
of mathematics professors. For these experts, 67% of their strong ly c lustered
pairs were similar in terms of deep structure and 25% were simil ar in terms of
surface structure.
T hus, it seems that taking a course and increasing one's knowledge about a
particular domain can have fairly radical effects on one's perception of problems
in that domain. It would have been interesting if Schoenfeld and Herrmann had
applied MDS techniques to their data and used an analysis similar to the one
performed by Miller and Gelman. Even so, they have succeeded in showing a
large change in structure in a complex domain .

CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS
One of the most important uses of MDS analys is in cogn itive psychology is also
one of the most underutilized. MDS analysis provides an excellent means to
assess the effects of context. Examining stimuli in a number of contexts may
have the coroll ary benefit of extracting more dimensions .
O ne straightforward application of this strategy was performed by LaPorte
and Voss ( 1979) in which they presented subjects with a set of nouns taken from
one or two simple stories. Initially, subjects rated the simil arity of all possible
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pairs of nouns. For one story, the nouns were: fields. clouds. vegetation. train.
approach. decade. troops. plague. eggs. and food . MDS analysis of this initial
simi larity matrix yielded a two-dimensional solution in which the first dimension
separated man-made objects from natural ones , and the second dimension was
interpreted by the authors as separating animals from nonanimals with eggs and
food at one extreme and clouds and fields at the other.
Subsequent to this initial rating task , subjects read a story that described how
grasshoppers become a pest every 10 years . These subjects then performed the
same rating task as before. The first dimension recovered by the MDS analysis
was the same as before and reflected the distinction between natural and manmade objects. The second dimension , however , was radically different and reflected the temporal ordering of the objects as they occurred in the story.
Bisanz, LaPorte, Vesonder, and Voss (1978) developed a more extensive
framework for studying the effects of prose context. Like LaPorte and Voss
(1979) , Bisanz et al. were able to demonstrate an effect of context by comparing
representations. However, they were also able to recover the thematic structure
of the prose context. Finally , and perhaps most importantly , Bisanz et al. were
able to show that the recovered representation cou ld also predict memory
performance.
Bisanz et al. (1978) presented subjects with pairs of animal names either
before or after reading a short story that contained each of these names. When
subjects judged the simi larity of these animals before reading the story, the
resulting MDS solution was very similar to the one obtained by Rips et al.
(1973) ; the two dimensions cou ld be characterized in terms of size and ferocity.
Subjects then read a story in which all of the animals were portrayed in terms of
their leadership and their helpfulness. Subsequently , they were asked to judge
the similarity of the animals in terms of their relationship as expressed in the
story. Both themes were recovered as dimensions in the MDS analysis, although ,
interestingly , these themes were not recovered equally well.
Bisanz et al. (1978) also used this poststory MDS solution to predict performance in a memory task . They presented subjects with pairs of anima l names and
asked subjects to decide if they were both helpful or both not helpful. At least for
affirmative responses , it was clear that the distance between the two animals in
the multidimensional space predicted the latencies fairly well . Pairs that were
close to each other were responded to more rapidly than pairs that were far apart.
Although Bisanz et al. found a relationship between distance and latency, it
might have been possible to obtain greater predictability in their task . The only
distance that they examined was the distance between the two stimuli in the pair.
It is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the distance between each of the
items and the point for helpful might influence decision time for affirmative
responses. Further, these di stances might be even more important for negative
responses. Let us assume that lion is helpful and tiger is not. If one also assumes
that lion is processed first , then a straightforward processing model suggests that
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the lion-helpful distance is related to the speed with which one can determine that
a lion is a helpful animal. The question then becomes whether or not tigers are
helpful. Here, the distance between tiger and helpful is the critical determinant.
Because the correct answer is negative, we expect that short distances will make
it more difficult to conclude that tigers are not helpful. Thus , small distances are
inhibitory and large distances facilitative for negative decisions.
Obviously, this analysis is purely speculative. However, it does explain why
Bisanz et al. (1978) obtained better predictability with affirmative responses .
Additionally, usi ng a categorization task, Shoben (1976) found that the distance
between the exemplars and the appropriate superordinate was always a better
predictor than the distance between the two exemplars in a same-d ifferent task. It
is our contention that similar research could profit from this kind of MDS
analysis as it leads to a fairly direct comparison of several alternative processing
accounts.

CONTEXT AND INCREASED DIMENSIONALITY
Using several contexts can increase the dimensionality of the solution recovered
by MOS. Although increased dimensionality is quite properly not the principal
goal in investigating the effects of context, the ability to recover additi onal
dimensions is a byproduct that should not be ignored. Although there is not a
hard and fas t rule that increas ing the number of contexts will increase the number
of recoverable dimensions, it is at least suggestive that Howard and Howard
(1977) were able to extract three dimensions from their INDSCAL solution
(using four contexts) of 10 animal names whereas Rips et al. ( 1973) could extract
only two dimensions from their INDSCAL solution even though they employed
14 animal names.
The most striking example of the higher dimensionality arising from increasing the number of contexts is a study by Soli and Arabie (1979) of consonant
phonemes. They used the classic Miller and Nicely ( 1955) data which Soli and
Arabie (1979) transformed to conform better to the INDSCAL model (see Arabie
& Soli, 1982, for the justification and details of thi s procedure). In contrast to
earlier analyses of the Miller-Nicely data using scaling techniques, Soli and
Arabie (1979) used the full set of confusion matrices, including those where the
judgments were made under severe levels of distortion .
Soli and Arabie (1979) obtained a four-dimensional solution that accounted
for 69% of the variance. The ir first dimension ordered the consonants in terms of
periodicity/ burst with m l and nl at one end of the dimension and pi, tI, k/, fI,
and sl at the other. The second dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of first
formants and thus separated the vo iced consonants from the voiceless ones. The
third dimension simil arl y ordered the consonants in terms of their second formants. Finally , the fourth dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of spectral
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dispersion, with two groups of fricatives separated from the other phonemes.
This fourth dimension is largely relevant to a particular listening condition.
Soli and Arabie (1979) showed that the salience of a particular dimension
varied greatly with the listening condition. In general, increasing levels of degradation increased the reliance on the periodicity/burst and first formant dimensions and decreased the contribution of the second formant and spectral dispersion dimensions . Thus, Soli and Arabie were able to extract additional information out of an old and very well-analyzed data set. By making the data conform
more closely to the INDSCAL model, they were able to extract more justifiable
dimensions from these data than any prior researchers had been able to do. More
importantly, this higher dimensionality enabled them to make some arg uments
concerning the relative importance of acoustic as opposed to phonemic properties
in the underlying representation. From these examples, it appears that MDS can
be a very powerful tool in assessing contextual change. In many respects, it is
unfortunate that researchers in cognitive psychology have not taken greater advantage of this opportunity. Particularly given the trend in the past decade away
from the view that concepts have invariant meanings and toward the view that
meanings are flexible, it would seem that these procedures cou ld be put to good
use. For example, one of us has been involved in research on context effects in
semantic memory. Roth and Shoben (1983) argued that context determined the
goodness-of-example of an exemplar for any category. They found that robin
was a typical exemplar of the bird category in many contexts, but that it was a
poor example in contexts such as "The bird walked across the farmyard" or
"The hunter fired too quickly and the bird flew off." Roth and Shoben (1983)
even discussed this change in goodness-of-example in terms of a spatial metaphor in which the stimu lus space must be completely restructured and not simply
refocused. The addition of the different spatial representations would certainly
have added weight to Roth and Shoben's argument. If, for example, the solutions
obtained for the bird exemplars from MDS analyses were quite different depending on whether the ratings were performed in the context of "The bird sat on a
telephone wire" or "John removed the bird from the oven ," then one would
have very good evidence for the restructuring hypothesis.
Similarly, Cech and Shoben (1985) have argued that linear order judgments in
which subjects must determine which of two objects is greater (or lesser) in
magnitude are also subject to rather strong contextual effects. They investigated
the way in which subjects determined which of two animals was larger or
smaller. In a normal context in which the animals varied in size from flea to
elephant, they observed the normal congruity effect (Banks, 1977). For small
animals, it was easier to determine the smaller of the pair; for large animals, it
was easier to determine the larger of the pair. Cech and Shoben (1985) found that
it took less time for subjects to determine the smaller of rabbit-beaver than to
determine the larger of rabbit-beaver. They also found that it was easier to
determine the larger of sheep-crocodile than the smaller of sheep-crocodile.
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However, when rabbit and beaver were the largest items in the study, Cech and
Shoben observed that they behaved like large animals; in this context, it was
easier to determine the larger of rabbit-beaver than the smaller of rabbit-beaver.
A parallel result was obtained for large items.
Although Cech and Shoben employed a number of other contexts to strengthen their contention that memorial size was not invariant, it seems that MOS
analysis might also have profitably been applied here as well. According to the
claims of Cech and Shoben (1985), animals that are small shou ld behave as large
animals in certain contexts. If this claim is correct, then one should be ab le to
compare the MOS solutions from the two different contexts and see a size
dimension in both cases. However, if we are comparing only small animals in the
restricted context condition , we should find at least some of these small animals
on the large side of the neutral point of the dimension. The size dimension for the
normal context condition should divide the animals into those that are generally
thought of as large and small. Such a result would strengthen Cech and Shoben's
more theoretical claim that people recode sizes in order to be able to use the full
range of the magnitude scale.
It thus appears that MOS can be very helpful in understanding the effects of
context. It can tell us how dimensional weights change as a function of context or
age (Bisanz et aI., 1978; Miller & Gelman, 1983) and it can also provide us with
increased dimensionality in some cases (Howard & Howard, 1977; Soli & Arabie, 1979) . We have also argued in the immediately preceding paragraphs that
MOS analysis can be used to provide confirmation of many theoretical claims in
cognitive psychology.

MDS AND THE UNDERLYING REPRESENTATION
In our discussion of applications of MOS, we have obviously used the term quite
broadly. We have included not only two-way and three-way MOS, but also
discrete, clustering algorithms such as MAPCLUS. It is a natural question to ask
which of these models provides a best fit to data from cognitive experiments.
Although the question may arise naturally, the answer does not. Even if the
statistics concerning the goodness-of-fit are nominally identical, it is seldom the
case that one can simply compare the numbers and determine which model fits
better because the number of parameters is invariably different. In many respects, the adv ice to be given is simi lar in spirit to Shepard's counsel on dimensionality: use the one that fits the data the best.
One approach to this problem is theoretically based . If one has a theory that is
inherently spatial, then it makes sense to test the viability of the theory by
ascertaining whether MOS analysis will provide a satisfactory account. Friendly
(1977) has followed this procedure for recall data. A similar approach has been
performed by Reitman and Reuter (1980) . Although their technique is only
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peripherally related to MDS, they used their theoretical notions to identify
chunks in free recall, which they then converted into a lattice and finally into an
ordered tree. Hirtle (1982) has recently extended this line of work.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to compare theories directly is the work
by Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982). They compared the fit of a simple
additive tree, as exemplified by Sattath and Tversky's (1979) ADDTREE to
MDS as exemplified by KYST. They first demonstrated that each of these
algorithms provided a better fit to artificial data when the underlying representation was consistent with the assumptions of the program . Specifically, when the
artificial data was generated from a tree, ADDTREE provided a better fit; when
the artificial data were generated from a plane, KYST gave a better fit to the
data . This relationship held up over many levels of noise in the data and over
wide variations in number of stimuli. Thus it seems that there is no uniform
advantage of one procedure over the other.
Pruzansky et al. (1982) found two empirical measures that predicted which of
the two models would provide a better fit to data (as measured either by product
moment correlations or by stress formula 2). The first was skewness, defined in
the standard way as the third central moment divided by the cubed standard
deviation . The second measure was elongation. Pruzansky et al. defined elongation in terms of triples of nodes. From the nature of binary rooted trees, they
observed that it is usually the case that for any triple of nodes , two will form a
subcluster. For a triple that includes i, j, and k, ass ume that i and j form the
subcluster. If we look at the triangle formed by connecting these three points,
then it is expected that <Pij ::5 <Pjk ::5 <P ik . It would simil arly be expected that the
differences of the distances would have the relationship <Pik - <Pjk ::5 <Pjk - <Pi)'
Phrased geometrically, the middle side is closer in length to the long side than it
is to the short side. Pruzansky et al. defined elongation as the proportion of
triangles in the data where this re lationship holds .
Looking at real data , Pruzansky et al. (1982) computed these two measures
for 20 data sets. In general, when the elongation measure was high and skewness
was low , ADDTREE provided a better fit than did KYST. More explicitly when
the elongation measure was .65 or higher and when the skewness was less than
-.4, ADDTREE provided a better fit; otherwise KYST did. Interestingly , these
two measures never conflicted for the data sets that Pruzansky et al. examined
and the two measures tended to be negatively correlated.
An important result of this analysis is that data sets whose stimuli could be
described as perceptual (colors, forms , and letters) were better fit by KYST, but
data sets whose stimuli could be described as conceptual (such as exemplars from
semantic categories) were better fit by ADDTREE. Although Pruzansky et al.
noted that factorial designs tended to favor KYST and that such designs tended to
be employed when perceptual stimu li were investigated, these authors offered no
other explanation of this result.
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Although there is no doubt that Pruzansky et al.'s ( 1982) finding is suggestive, we believe that there is reason for caution before concluding that conceptual stimu li are invariably fit better by ADDTREE than by KYST. As we
discuss in the next section, there are good reasons to suspect that MDS algorithms have difficulty when category names and exemplars must be represented in the same space. Thus, one difficulty may lie in the particular stimulus
sets employed by Pruzansky et al. (1982). Although most of them are unpublished, we have sufficient familiarity with eight of them to offer some speculation. The first seven data sets (referenced by Pruzansky et al as the Mervis et
al data sets) consisted of 19 exemplars and one category name. The eighth data
set (Henley, 1969) consisted of 30 exemplars and no category name. For the first
seven data sets, the superiority of ADDTREE as determined by both of Pruzansky et al.'s (1982) measures of goodness of fit averaged .15 for r2L and .07
for r 2 M . The superiority of ADDTREE for the eighth data set was about half
these means, .08 and .03 respectively. Only one of the first seven data sets had
smaller differences (in the goodness-of-fit measures) than did Henley's data set.

PROBLEMS WITH CATEGORIES
The difficulty that MDS has with categorical data sets may be a res ult of the way
people judge simi larities in this context and not an indication of the nature of the
underlying representation. We would like to suggest (following Shoben, 1983)
that the peculiarities of the similarity judgments may create problems for scaling
algorithms and that these problems may have led Pruzansky et al. (1982) to find
poorer fits with KYST than with ADDTREE for these types of data sets.
As others have found, Shoben (1976) noted that all members of a category
tended to be rated as highly simi lar to their category name. For example, even an
atypical bird such as goose was judged to be quite simi lar to bird. In fact , the
simi larity of these two terms was about as great as the simi larity between two
very similar exemplars , such as hawk and eagle. The problem for scaling algorithms arises when one considers that both robin and goose are highly simi lar
to bird, but robin and goose are quite dissimilar to each other. In an MDS
solution, robin and goose should be quite distant from each other because of their
direct simi larity rating. However, because of the proximity of each to bird, they
shou ld be quite close to each other. Put more generally , the distances between
exemplars often conflict with the distances between each exemplar and the
superordinate. This type of conflict is not present if superordinate terms are not
among the test stimuli. Therefore, it is possible that the reason that Henley's
(1969) data were fit relatively well by KYST in the study by Pruzansky et al. is
that her data did not contain superordinate terms.
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Some very recent work by Tversky and Hutchinson (1986) has formalized this
generalization. They noted that the situation in which many exemplars are most
similar to the superordinate is an example of the Voronoi problem (e.g ., Newman, Rinott, & Tversky, 1983) in which only a small number of points in a space
can be the nearest neighbor of a particular point. In terms of the spatial representation (using Euclidean distance) of categories, the superordinate can have only
five exemplars (in a two-dimensional solution; 11 in a three-dimensional solution) for which it is the nearest neighbor. As their Table 3 indicates, this constraint is violated in many cases in which exemplars are scaled with their
superordinates.
One obvious solution to this problem is to omit the superordinate. If one is
interested primarily in the relationships among exemplars, then this solution can
provide a distinct improvement. As measured by Tversky and Hutchinson, removing the superordinate greatly reduced the nearest neighbor problems in the
data (as measured by their statistics of centrality and reciprocity) and subsequent
scaling usually showed a decrease in stress when the superordinate term was
removed.
It is not clear how one can circumvent the problem of superordinate terms
when the relationship between the exemplar and category name is important. In
some sense the difficulty for algorithms such as KYST's is to fit the distance
between exemplars and the distance between exemplars and the superordinate
category name (typicality) at the same time. One possibility is to try to fit these
two types of distances separately; another approach is simply to decide that one
set of distances is less important than another. We discuss each of these issues in
turn.
Krumhansl (1983) attempted to measure the typicality of exemplars (in this
case, musical tones) separately. She argued that the similarity of two terms is a
function not only of the distance between two objects, but also of the distance
between each object and the superordinate. In the absence of explicit context, the
stimuli are structured in a chroma circle, as we noted earlier. However, when she
varied the context (in terms of which scale was used) she showed that not only
did the notes vary in their proximity to the superordinate (vertical structure); they
also varied in terms of their relationship to each other (horizontal structure).
Although this structure is certainly an elegant one, it is not clear how general
it might be. For musical tones, it appears that context refocuses the horizontal
structure; it does not require a radical restructuring. For semantic categories , if
we are to take the conclusions of Roth and Shoben (1983) at face value, radical
restructuring is at least a possibility , and thus this method developed by Krumhans I (1983) might not be applicable in such circumstances.
An alternative approach is simply to decide that one set of distances is less
important than another. For example, Shoben (1976) used MDS analysis to
derive distances which he then used to predict RT in a categorization task. To
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perform the necessary regressions, the distances he needed were the exemplarsuperordinate distances . In the initial MDS solution , an examination of the
Shepard diagram indicated that the greatest disparity between the fitted distances
and the original data occurred with superordinates. Because these distances were
precisely the ones that Shoben wanted to use in subsequent analyses, he rescaled
the original using the weights option in KYST. This little-known feature of
KYST allows the user to specify weights for various similarities. In thi s particular case, Shoben (1976) weighted the exemplar-superordinate similarities very
heavily in order to ensure that the disparity between the original data and the
fitted di stances would be minimal for these pairs. For his task, the manipulation
was highly successful in that these exemplar-superordinate distances predicted
RT very well.

SELECTING A REPRESENTATION

There are no hard and fast rules for selecting a single underlying representation.
Shepard (1980) , among others, has argued that the interpretab ility of the solution
is one important criterion. Clearly, the plausibility of the underlying representation is not enhanced if the so lution is not interpretable. However, this criterion is
far from objective. We have discussed several solutions based on Henley's
(1969) animal data that are readily interpretable. Yet, Sattath and Tversky ( (979)
have argued that their ADDTREE solution of these data is more interpretable
than the ones obtained by MOS.
Moreover, there are often theoretical reasons for preferring one solution to
another. Krumhansl (1983), as noted earlier, had excellent theoretical reasons for
analyzing her data on musical tones in a particular way . Because she wanted to
examine the similarity of the tones to each other and the typicality of each tone
with respect to a particular scale separately, her choice of the underlying representation was severely limited. Moreover, there may also be other data that
constrain what is the ideal representation.
Thus, the criteria established by Pruzansky et aJ. (J 982) should not be taken
too literally . Although their generalization that conceptual data are fit better by
an additive tree whereas perceptual data are better represented by a plane is a
provocative concl usion , one should not rule out an entire class of models because
of this conclusion . Besides the additional criteria of interpretability and other
constraints on the representation, there may be peculiarities of particular data sets
(such as categories) that may have led to artificially poor fits.
Finally , it should be pointed out that subtle changes in method may make a
tremendous difference in the results. The best example of this phenomenon is the
reanalysis of the Miller-Nicely data by Soli and Arabie (J 979). According to the
Pruzansky et aJ. (1982) classification, both INDSCAL and MDSCAL assume
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that the underlying representation is a plane, yet Soli and Arabie used the former
method and were able to recover four , highly interpretable, dimensions while
Shepard used the latter and recovered only two . It thus seems premature to
specify any clear set of rules for determining the best underlying representation
for any set of data.

MINKOWSKI

r METRICS

Most applications of MDS and related procedures in cognitive psychology have
assumed that the psychological distances recovered are Euclidean. However,
there is good reason to suspect that there are many circumstances where some
other, theoretically interesting , metric might provide a better fit to the data .
Moreover, the selection of the Euclidean metric also has psychological implications for our conception of the stimu li . More specifically , it has been argued by
Shepard (1964) and by Garner (1972) that if the stimuli are best represented in a
Euclidean space, then the stimuli are wholi stic or integral, rather than analyzable
or separable. Unfortunately, many have ass umed that their stimuli were integral
without a thorough exploration of other possibilities.
In the most general sense, the equation for distance is given in Equation 2. We
can restrict our attention to the Minkowski family of metrics when r 2: I.
d ij --

[~
~k IX

ik -

xjk 11'] 1/1'

(2)

In the case where r is 2, then we have the fami liar Euclidean case; the distance
between two points is the square root of the sum of the squared differences along
all the relevant dimensions.
However, in addition to the Euclidean metric, there are at least two other
metrics that are theoretically interesting. The first of these is the city-block
metric, so named because distance is computed in the manner in which one
measures distance in a city that is laid out in a grid pattern . For examp le, to go
from 42nd Street and 10th A venue to 32nd street and 6th Aven ue in New York is
a distance of 14 blocks. One cannot travel along the hypotenuse of the triangle.
In terms of dimensions, the distance between the two locations is the sum of their
differences on the two dimensions: north-south distance and east-west distance.
In terms of Eq uation 2, city-block metric is obtained when r = I. This metric is
particularly interesting to psychologists because it (according to Garner [1 972]
and Shepard [1964]) indicates that the stimuli are separable rather than integral.
The other theoretically interesting metric is the dominance metric, when r
approaches infinity. In this case, the distance between two objects reduces to the
maximum distance between them on any dimension. Thus , for example, two
objects that differ from each other by a moderate amount on each of three
dimensions are closer to each other -than another pair of objects that differ only
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slightly on two dimensions, but differ greatly on a third dimension . Although
there have been few applications of this metric in psychology, Arnold (1971)
found this metric fit his set of heterogeneous semantic terms better than did either
the city-block or Euclidean metrics . Moreover, he arg ued that the dominance
metric was psychologically more plausible than the Euclidean metric.
Although these two non-Euclidean metrics are inherently interesting, there are
understandable reasons why they have not received greater attention in applications of MDS in cognitive psychology. The first reason is that numerical problems are much more likely to be encountered with city-block or dominance
metrics. When working with Euclidean distances, one can begin with a rational
configuration or use some small number of random initial configurations and be
reasonably confident that the solution is a minimum. Such a procedure will
seldom produce optimal results for non-Euclidean metrics . It appears that local
minimum problems are much more severe, and that vastly greater numbers of
random initial configurations must be used (Arabie, 1973) when r is other than 2.
Fortunately, Arnold (1971) has devised a method to circumvent most of these
problems. As it can be both time consuming and expensive to run large numbers
of random initial configurations, Arnold proposed a success ive approximation
procedure that is neither time cons uming nor expensive. One begins by obtaining
the best solution when r = 2. Approaching city-block metric, one then uses the
final configuration for r = 2 as the starting configuration for r = 1.5. Subsequently , the solution with this metric is used as the starting configuration for r =
1.25, and so on. One approaches the dominance metric (with r usually set to 32)
is a similar way; one uses the best solution in Euclidean space as the starti ng
configuration for r = 2.5, and so on.
When Arnold (1971) employed this procedure on his data, he obtained some
striking findings. First, he found that stress declined monotonically as r moved
from 2 to 1; it also decl ined monotonically as r moved from 2 to 32. Second , the
solution with the lowest stress was the one employing the dominance metric . To
our know ledge, this report is the only application of MDS methods to cognitive
psychology that has fo und evidence for the psychological use of the dominance
metric.
As we noted earlier, the question of the appropriate metric is an exceedingly
important one from the perspective of cognitive psychology. How the dimensions are processed is nearly as important as what the dimens ions are. Models ,
for example, that ass ume that pairs of words in a same-different task are compared on all dimensions do not seem telTibly plausible if the underlying metric is
the dominance metric . Arnold's procedure is seldom cited, but it holds the
potential to surmount a formidable obstac le. Cognitive psychologists would do
well to become fa mili ar with these methods . There is one important limitation to
Arnold's procedure. For some unknown reason , it does not appear to work very
well with two-dimensional solutions (Carroll & Arabie, 1980).
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MDS AND MEMORY THEORIES

In this chapter, we have discussed a number of different scaling techniques and
provided some suggestions for their optimal use to study issues in cognitive
psychology. In this section, we illustrate these techniques and suggestions by
examining a particular problem. We considered using some well-known data set
or gathering some new data on a very specific issue, but we felt that such a
specialized topic might be of interest to only a limited group of readers. For
broader appeal, we elected to collect and analyze data on a topic that is not
usually studied by cognitive psychologists: What is the conceptual organization
that cognitive psychologists have of prominent memory theories? Although we
hope to learn something about the organization of the field, our main purpose is
to allow an illustration of techniques in an interesting context.
Some earlier research has been aimed at analyzing the organization that psychologists have of their field. Coan (1968), by a combination of factor analysis
and clustering techniques, examined how basic trends in psychology (e.g., objectivism) have changed historically and how they have been related over time.
Fuchs and Kawash (1974; Kawash & Fuchs, 1974) used ratings and then factor
analysis to describe six basic schools of psychology (e .g. , behaviorism) and
summarize their differences. As part of a project examining the learning of the
structure of cognitive psychology, Friendly (1981) scaled student and faculty
views of the field.
In the present case, two small groups of cognitive psychologists were asked to
rate the pairwise similarities of 12 memory theories . (The two groups enabled us
to analyze individual differences between groups as well as within groups, to
illustrate another use of these scaling techniques.) These 12 theories were chosen
from a larger list with the requirements that they be familiar to the subjects, that
they not be intimately related to each other, and that they be partially concerned
with memory for episodic information. The theories are listed in Table 7 . 1, with
short descriptions and bracketed abbreviations to be used for brevity. Each
subject received a random order of all 66 possible pairs of theories and rated
them on a scale of I (very different) to 9 (very similar). One group consisted of
four advanced graduate students at Stanford University and one visiting professor. These ratings were obtained in 1981. The other group consisted of five
faculty or visiting faculty at the University of Illinois in 1985. Four of these
faculty members have their doctoral degrees from midwestern universities.
There are two basic questions of interest. First, what is the underlying representation of memory theories for these researchers? Second , do the two groups
differ?
Before presenting the results , let us go over the form of the data to be
analyzed. For each of these ten subjects, we have a lower half matrix (without
diagonals) for the pairwise similarities of these 12 theories . In addition , for each
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group, we have the sum of the five individual matrices for that group , as well as
the total matrix of all ten subjects. We analyzed our data first using MDS
techniques and then using the more recent clustering techniques.

MDS Analysis. The most satisfactory answers to the two basic questions we
raised earlier are obtained by performing a SINDSCAL analysis, where the two
groups are used instead of individual subjects. The two dimensional solution from
this scaling is given in Fig. 7 . 1, accounting for. 728 of the variance. Although
SINDSCAL does have the advantage of allowing the recovery of higher dimensionality , our third dimension was difficult to interpret. Moreover, the increase in
variance accounted for was small: the proportion increased .032 to .760. Our
interpretation of Fig. 7.1 is that the X-ax is corresponds to the unit of material being
analyzed, while the Y-axis corresponds to the degree of formalism or rigor. First,
let us consider the abscissa. The two theories furthest to the left are the SCHEMA
and MOPS models, followed closely by LNR, KINTSCH, then HAM. The first
two theories deal with large units of analysis; groups of scenes, stories, or
episodes. LNR and KINTSCH usually apply to slightly smaller units, such as
small groups of sentences. HAM also is concerned with small groups of sentences,
but much of the well-known work has involved one or a few sentences. The other
seven theories usually deal with smaller units, such as sentence fragments or
paired-associates. TULVNG and LEVELS often deal with slightly larger units
than the other five, but the exact ordering expected by this interpretation for the
other theories is unclear.
Second, let us consider the ordinate. The two theories highest on this dimension , RATCLIFF and VECTOR have strong mathematical form ul ations, as does
the distant third theory, SAM. The next two theories, HAM and LNR, have
strong computer formulations. The four theories around the origin, although not
as strongly formalized, have strong and well -defined structure and processing
ass umptions. The three theories lowest on thi s dimension are espoused by psychologists who have concentrated on developing general principles, rather than
on developing formal models. Of these three, TUL VING has certainly been the
most rigorous.
Given this interpretation, we may next ask whether our two groups of subjects
differed in their weightings of the dimensions. In fact the two groups weighted
both dimensions very simi larly (.60 and .63, for the X-axis, and .58 and .55 for
the Y-axis). Hence, from this analysis, there appears to be little difference
between the two groups . Because the two groups were so similar, SINDSCAL
was applied to the ten individual matrices. The object space is similar enough to
Fig. 7. I that it would serve no purpose to present it , but the subj ect space is
presented in Fig . 7.2 for pedagogical purposes . As one can see , two of the
subjects appear to weight particular dimensions, but overall the dimensions
appear to be used by all subjects. Moreover, it is clear that subj ects' group
membership is not related to their assignment of weights to dimensions.

TABLE 7. I
Brief Description of Scaled Theories
(Bracketed Names are Used in Figures and Text)

N
C1

m

1. James Anderson's (1973; Anderson et al., 1977)

As§oci~tive

Theories

[VECTOR]

Anderson's theory is a distributed memQry model with vectors representing patterns of individual
neurons. Associations between items are modeled by a reweighting of the synaptic weights between all
cells. The model has been ap?lied to various paradigms including item recognition and categorization.
2. HAM - John Anderson & Bower (1973)

[HAM]

In HAM, information is encoded as propos itions in an associative network. Querie s are answered by
an activation search of the network. Most of the experimental work used sentence's or small group of
sentences as stimuli. Computer simulations and mathematical modeling were used to derive the predictions.
3. Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968)

[A&S]

This theory distinguishes between structure features of memo ry and control processes. The structural features include the sensory register, STM, and LTM and decay rules. The control processes regulate
information flow between the stores. The rehearsal buffer model is a subpart of this theory. Experi mental manipulations included all of the main verbal learning techniques.
4 . Levels of Proces sing - Craik & Lockhart (1972)

[LEVELS]

Levels of processing was proposed as an alternative framework to two - store theories.
Our memory
for an object or event is viewed as a byproduct of the various processing performed upon it . The
formulation of the framework rests largely upon common intuitions about the depth of processing required by different tasks.
5. Kintsch (1974)
[KINTSCH]
Kintsch's theory represents text as a list of atomic propositions. The organization of the test
is captured by the overlap of propositional elements. His early experiments tested various reading
time and memory predictions of his theory.
Hi s later work (e .g., Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) presents
a mathematical model for comprehension and memory of texts.
6. ELINOR - Norman, Rumelhart, & LNR (1975)

[LNR]

Their model contains a network representation, but it emphasizes representations of procedures,
called active structural networks.
These structures have a case-like quality and use semantic primitives in order to represent relations between ve rbs. Analy ses have been applied to a wide variety of
tasks, but most analyses related to memory use a short set of materials.

7. Paivio's (1971) Dual Code Theory

[PAIVIO]

Pa i v io argued that v erbal and figural information have separate memory structures, which are
independent but partially interconnected. Typical tests employ paired-associate learning and various
memory measures for single words and pictures.
8. SAM - Raaijmakers & Shiffrin (1980, 1981)

[SAM]

SAM is a theory of probabilistic search of associative networks with varying strengths of
connections. The retrieval processes are modeled mathematically and have been applied to free recall,
paired- associate recall, and recognition paradigms.
9. Ratcliff's (1978) Theory of Memory Retrieval

[RATCLIFF]

Ratcliff's t heor y of retrieval uses a resonance metaphor.
Probe items evoke, in parallel, evidence
from related items, wh ich is accumulated i n random walk comparison processe s . The mathematical model
incorporates sev eral response mea sures and has been applied to item recognition paradigms.
10. SCHEMA - Rumelhart & Ortony (1977)

[SCHEMA]

"Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. They exist
for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and
sequences of actions," (p. 101) and are of primary importance in comprehension.
Schemata have
var iables, can be embedded, and can va ry in their level of abstraction and represent knowledge.
[MOPS]

11. MOPS - Schank (1980)

Schank has proposed MOPS as a flexible version of scripts. MOPS are "memory organizations packets"
that are used in understanding and storing the experiences that we have.
They provide an organization
of the relevant episodes.
In addition to theoretical discu ssion, MOP-like structures have been used
in computer simulations of event understanding .
12. Tulving (1972, 1975; Tulving

&

Thomson, 1973)

[TULVING]

Tulving has an identifiable orientation towards memory that runs throughout his many publications.
Some salie nt aspects of his orien tation are the encoding specificity principle and the semant icepisodic distinction. Tulving generally strives to present general principles rather than formal
models. Most of the experimental work used list s of words or paired-associates and measures, recognition, recall, or cued recall. (Mo st of the subjects were not familiar with the Flexser and Tulving
[1978] paper in which a mo re formal account of recognition failures of recallable words is given.)
N
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Clustering. In addition to these scalings, a variety of MAPCLUS and INDCLUS solutions were generated. We focus on the groups and overall totals. As
with the question of ideal number of dimensions, the procedure for choosing the
"correct" number of clusters is not well-specified, but an examination of a large
number of solutions between 3 and 8 clusters convinced us that 5 was the best
solution. The variance accounted for increased quite a bit from using just 4
clusters , and did not increase much when we used 6 clusters. In addition, the
interpretability of these solutions was good. When groups were used in the
INDCLUS procedure, there was usually perfect agreement between the two
groups on the order in which to weight the five clusters . However, different runs,
with different random starts, seemed to provide quite different solutions. We
found that the MAPCLUS solutions were more similar to each other. Because the
groups showed only minor differences in their weights of the various clusters, we
focus on the MAPCLUS solution. Table 7.2 contains a MAPCLUS solution that
accounted for . 813 of the variance . In considering each of these clusters , we will
also provide information about the other solutions (generated with different
initial configurations) to help interpretability. The most weighted cluster in this
solution (HAM, KINTSCH, LNR, SCHEMA, MOPS), often emerged as the
most heavily weighted cluster in a large number of MAPCLUS and INDCLUS
solutions, even when the solutions used different numbers of clusters. These five
theories have a number of similar characteristics. As mentioned earlier, they use
the largest units of analysis. In addition, they are all symbol-processing models .

.8
2
.6

2 1
1

.4

2

.2
.00

.2

.4
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.8

FIG. 7.2. Subject space from the
two-dimensional SINDSCAL so lution when all often individual subjects are used. Number indicates
whether fro first or second group .
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TABLE 7.2
MAPCLUS So luti on for Five Cl usters (VAF

Weight
(1)

(2)
(3 )
(4 )
(5 )

.4447
.4091
.2308
.2162
.1743

=
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. 813)

Cluster
HAM KINTSCH LNR SCHEMA ~10PS
VECTOR SAM RATCLIFF
HAM A&S LNR SAM RATCLIFF TULVING
LEVELS SCHEMA MOPS TULVING
HAM A&S LEVELS KINTSCH PAIVIO SAM TULVING

That is, they all view the memory trace as highly structured, with the structure
related to the meaning of the trace (propositions, cases). The second cluster,
VECTOR, SAM, and RATCLIFF, also appears in most solutions. These three
theories have strong mathematical formulations.
The third cluster in Fig. 7.3 varied with different solutions. While it usually
contains HAM, A&S, SAM and RATCLIFF, three other theories (LNR ,
KINTSCH, and TULVING) are sometimes included and sometimes not. The
interpretation of this cluster is difficult, because it depends on which of these
theories is "really" in the cluster. In some ways, it appears to be excluding the
extremes: of units (SCHEMA and MOPS), and of formality (VECTOR at one
end, LEVELS and PAIVIO at the other).
The fourth cluster (LEVELS, SCHEMA , MOPS, TULVING) appears in most
solutions, though it is not usually weighted very heavily. While the interpretation
is arguable, they all appear to be popular theories that have clear general ideas,
but rather vague specifics. That is, they all serve as types of frameworks.
The fifth cluster occurs in a large proportion of the solutions, though often it
also contains LNR. It appears also to be including a middle portion of the
theories, by excluding extremes of units (SCHEMA and MOPS) and formality
(VECTOR and RATCLIFF) .

Minkowski -metric. In the last section , we discussed the use of metrics other
than the Euclidean metric (r = 2) and claimed that a consideration of different
processing possibilities through an examination of different metrics is an important and often neglected use of scaling. With the memory theories data, it is clear
that these theories are richly represented in the minds of researchers , but it is not
clear how even the major aspects' similarities and differences are used to arrive
at a rating. To provide an example of Arnold's procedure , we fit the city-block
(r = I) and dominance (r = infinity, approximated by 32) metrics by starting with
the Euclidean configuration. As we mentioned earlier, this procedure works
well, but appears to have trouble with two-dimensional solutions . However, our
preferred solution was in two dimensions , so we have compared Arnold 's procedure with 24 random starts in both metrics .
Let us first consider the dominance metric , in which the distance between two
objects is the maximum distance on any dimension. As SINDSCAL (or its
progenitor, INDSCAL) does not allow Minkowski metrics other than 2, we used
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KYST for this analysis. We found a good KYST solution (simi lar to Fig. 7 . 1) and
used it as a starting configuration for r=3, then used this solution as a starting
configuration for r=4, then go ing to 8, 16 , and 32 . The stress (formula I) declined
from 2 to 16 and then stayed level to 32 . (The stress values were . 100, .092 , .088 ,
.083, .081, and .08 1 for r's of 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively). The 24
random configurations used as starts for r= 32 did not fare nearly as well as the
stress of .08 1 found through Arnold's procedure. The smallest was .091, but only
4 were below. 100, and 17 were above .200.
The dominance metric solution is given in Fig. 7.3. Although the purpose of
this paper does not allow a lengthy discussion, a brief examination may be useful
for understanding the insights gained through the use of other metrics. Overall,
the solution is similar to the one in Fig. 7.1 (the SINDSCAL by groups with
r=2). The Y-axis appears to be related to the formality of the theory. The X-axis
is somewhat different from the earlier solution , but for reasons to be mentioned
shortly , seems to be well interpreted as before as dealing with the unit of
analysis. A second point to mention before discussing specifics, is that both axes
are stretched relative to the earlier solution . The Y-axis in particular has a much
greater range and appears to be the more important of the two dimensions.
In examining Fig. 7.3, the most striking result is how VECTOR is clearly set
apart. With the Euclidean solution, the fact that VECTOR was viewed as different from all the other theories was taken care of by making it a little more
extreme on both dimensions. With the dominance metric, we see that VECTOR
is set apart on the formality dimension; in every pair involving VECTOR, this
dimension has the greater distance. Given this placement, its location on the

• VECTOR

1.5

1.0

_RATCLIFF

.5
_HAM

eA & S

_LNR

-1.0

-.5

.5

-

1.0

KINTSCH

-MOPS

-SCHEMA

-.5
_TULVING

- 1.0
• LEV ELS

- 1.5

-

PAIVIO

FIG. 7.3. Dominance metric twodimensional solution lIsing KYST.
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other dimension is inconsequential. (In fact, it is likely that its X-coordinate is
due to its similarity to RATCLIFF, which in turn is most simi lar to SAM then
HAM, so may have needed to be intermediate .) This major determination by the
Y -axis is true to a somewhat lesser extent of RATCLIFF and LEVELS (and to an
even lesser extent to PAIVIO , which is extreme on both dimensions). We believe
the heavy use of the Y-axis by these theories is what accounts for some of the
differences on the X-ax is with the earlier solution , as just mentioned for VECTOR. As another example, in order to satisfy all the pairwise constraints , the
Fig. 7. I solution has KINTSCH as less formal than SCHEMA or MOPS, when
our feeling is that most of the subjects would view it as more formal. The
solution of Fig. 7.3 does have KINTSCH as more formal than the other two
theories, although it differs from these two theories more on level of unit than
formality. We view this result as more satisfactory.
The results for the city-block metric, in which the distance between the two
points is the sum of the distances along the dimensions, is not quite so straightforward . Starting with a configuration from a Euclidean solution , we went to rs
of 1.5, 1.25 and then 1.0 with corresponding stress values of . 100 , .091, .085,
and .093. Although the stress with 1'< 2 was slightly less than with 1'=2, this
decrease was not monotonic. We tried this sequence several times and variations
of it several more times and always found this non-monotonicity. A second
problem occurred when considering the results from the 24 random starting
configurations. Two of these solutions had stress of .071, although the solutions
were uninterpretable to us. Of the other 22 solutions, none was below . 10 and 18
were above .20. The solution for 1'= 1 with stress of .093 is very simi lar to the
r= 32 solution given in Fig. 7 .3. From a visual inspection, the only obvious
difference is that TULVING is closer to A&S on both dimensions in the cityblock solution .

Summary. As we stated when starting this section , although we hoped to
provide some information about the organization of the theories, the principal
goal was to illustrate the techniques. From a technical perspective , there are two
often neglected procedures that we hope will be used more . First, an important
use of these techniques may be to compare groups on their representations and
weightings. While our groups showed few differences , we hope the reasoning
and procedures were clear. Second, we suggested that the use of other metrics
should be considered and we tried to show the additional information that they
can provide. In terms of how cognitive psychologists (or a small group of them)
view memory theories, two further points may be made. One , degree of formality and level of analysis unit appear to be important dimensions. Two , these
features are correlated in that theories with high forma lity often involve mathematical treatments and small units , theories with intermediate formality often
involve symbol-processing and large units , while theories of low formality are
often concerned with characterizing general principles and use intermediatesized units .
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THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF MDS FOR
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
In its most straightforward applications, MDS analysis provides us with some
ideas about the underlying structure of a domain. Most of the applications that
are widely known are fairly simple domains, from a cognitive perspective, such
as the Miller-Nicely data on consonant phonemes, or the color circle, or the more
recent work on musical tones. However, we have also seen a tendency to deal
with more complex phenomena such as semantic categories, prose passages , and
musical passages as well. This extension to more complex domains suggests that
we have not yet reached the limit where MDS and related procedures become
useless . However, it does appear that MDS is able to recover dimensions only
when the stimuli have something in common. Although such a point may seem
obvious, it is worth mentioning explicitly that the scaling of heterogeneous
stimuli is probably not going to be terribly informative. For example, Arnold
(1971) scaled a set of unrelated words and recovered the dimensions of the
semantic differential: evaluation, potency , and activation. We suspect that the
reason these connotative aspects of meaning emerged as the dimensions is that
there were no denotative dimensions on which one could order the widely varying terms that Arnold investigated .
Although MDS and related procedure can clearly make an important contribution to our understanding of a structure of a domain, it is less clear what these
procedures can offer in terms of an understanding of the process . Strictly speaking, MDS tells us nothing about the way in which the stimuli of a domain are
processed. In terms of semantic categories, for example, these procedures provide no guidance on whether the concepts in a space are related because of
connecting pathways in a semantic network or because of overlapping features.
Thus, the kind of fundamental problem that is facing cognitive psychology and
that we discussed at the outset of this chapter, is unlikely to be solved by a wider
application of MDS. It is not clear to us, for example, how MDS could solve the
debate over semantic memory models or the propositional-imagery debate
generally.
Although the applicability of MDS to processing questions is far less than its
applicability to structural questions , MDS can help, usually indirectly , with
processing issues. Perhaps the best example of such assistance is the processing
model developed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) . By invoking some
additional assumptions (most notably Luce's choice axiom and an exponential
transformation) they were able to come up with a sophisticated processing account of analogical reasoning in a particular domain. Less dramatically , Shoben
(1976) developed a processing account of the same-different task (as applied to
categorization) that was derived from his multidimensional scaling of the stimulus items .
Perhaps the most general way in which to view MDS procedures in the
context of cognitive psychology is in terms of constraint. In our introductory
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remarks, we mentioned the difficulty in distinguishing between dual-store and
unitary accounts of the semantic/episodic dispute. The data, at present, seem not
terribly constraining in that results that are interpreted as support for one position
are quite readily reinterpreted as supporting the opposite view. In some respects,
this outcome is a natural course of the progression of science. Its logical conclusion, however, is that we need as much constraint on the domain we are studying
as we can possibly get. MDS and related procedures are clearly capable of
providing constraint and they are therefore of considerable use to cognitive
psychology .

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by NSF Grants (BNS 82-17674 and 1ST
83-08670) to the authors. The authors would like to thank Phipps Arabie and Lawrence
Jones for their helpfu l comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

REFERENCES
Anderson , 1. A. (1973). A theory for the recognition of items from short memorized lists . Psychological Review, 80, 417- 438.
Anderson, J. A., Sil vestei n, J . W., Ritz, S. A., & Jones, R. S. (1977). Distinctive features,
categorica l perception, and probability learn ing: Some applications of a neural model. Psychologiceil RevielV, 84, 413- 45 1.
Anderson, 1. R. , & Bower, G. H . (1973). Human associative memory. Washington: Winston.
Anderson, J. R. , & Ross, B. H. (1980) . Evidence against a semantic-episodic distinction . Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 44 1- 466.
Arabie, P. (1973). Concerning Monte Carlo eva luations of non metric multidimensional scaling
algorithms. Psychometrika , 38, 607 - 608.
Arabie, P., & Carro ll , J. D. (1980). MAPCLUS : A mathematical programming approach to fitting
the ADCLUS model. Psychometrika, 45, 2 11 - 235.
Arabie, P. , & Carroll , J. D. (1983). INDCLUS: An individua l differences generalization of the
ADCLUS model and the MAPCLUS algorithm. Psychometrika, 48, 157- 169 .
Arabie, P., Kosslyn , S. M., & Nelson, K. E. (1975) . A multidimensional scaling study of visual
memory of 5-year-olds and adu lts. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 19, 327- 345 .
Arabie, P. , & Soli , S. D. ( 1982). The interface between the types of regress ion and methods of
collecting proximity data. In R. G. Golledge & 1. N. Rayner (Eds .) , Proximity and preferellce:
Problems in the lIlultidimensiollal allalysis of large data sets. Minneapoli s: University of Minnesota Press .
Arnold , J. B. ( 1971). A multidimensional scaling study of semantic di stance . Journal of Experimental Psychology MOllograph, 90, 349- 372.
Atkinson , R . c. , & Shiffrin, R. M. ( 1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control
processes. In K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence (Eds .), The psychology of learnillg and motivation:
Advallces in research and theory, Vol . 2. New York: Academic Press.
Banks, W . P. ( 1977). Encod ing and processing of symbo lic in formation in comparative judgments.
In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and lIlotivation (Vol. II , pp . 101 - 159 .) New
York: Academic Press.

264

SHOBEN AND ROSS

Bisanz, G. L., LaPorte, R. E., Vesonder , G. T ., & Voss, 1. F. (1978). On the representation of
prose: New dimensions. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 357- 358.
Carroll, 1. D. , & Arabie, P. (1980). Multidimensional scaling. Annual review of psychology, 31,
607- 649.
Carroll, 1. D. , & Chang, 1. 1. (1970). Analysis of individual differences in multidimensional
scaling via an N-way generalization of 'Eckard-Young ' decomposition. Psychometrika, 35 ,2833 19.
Cech, C. G., & Shoben, E. 1. ( 1985). Context effects in symbolic magnitude compari sons. Journal
of Experimental Psychology : Learning, M emory, and Cognition, II , 299- 3 15 .
Ch i, M. T. H. , Fe ltovich, P. 1. , & G laser, R. (1981) . Categorizat ion and represe ntat ion of physics
problems by experts and novices. Cognitive Science, 5, 12 1- 152 .
Clark, H. H. ( 1968) . On the meaning and use of prepos itions. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 7, 42 1- 431.
Coan, R. W. (1968). Dimensions of psychologica l theory . American Psycholog ist, 23, 715 - 722.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading activation theory of se mantic process ing .
Psychological Review, 82 , 407- 428.
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of process ing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, II , 67 1- 684.
Ekman, G . ( 1954) . Dimensions of co lor vis ion. Journal of Psychology, 38, 467- 474.
Fillenbaum , S., & Rappaport, A.(l971). Scruccures in the subjective lexicon. New York: Academ ic
Press.
Flexser, A. 1. , & Tul ving, E. ( 1978). Retrieval independence in recognition and reca ll . Psychological Review, 85, 153- 171.
Friendly , M. L. (1977). In search o f the m-gram: The structure of organ ization in free reca ll.
Cog nitive Psychology, 9, 188- 249.
Friendly , M. ( 1981, November). Learning che structure o./, cognitive psychology. Paper presented at
the meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Philadelphia , PA .
Fuchs, A. H. , & Kawash, G. F. (1974). Prescriptive dimensions for five school s of psychology .
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 10, 352- 366.
Garner , W. R. ( 1972). In format ion integration and form of encoding. In A. Melton & E. Martin
(Eds .), Coding processes in human memory. New York: Wiley.
Halpern , A. R. ( 1984). Organi zation in memory for fami liar songs. Journal of Experimental Psychology : Learning, Memory , and Cognition , 10,496- 5 12 .
Henley, N. M. (1969). A psychological study of the semantics of animal term s. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Beha vior, 8, 176- 184.
Hirtle, S. C. (1982). Lattice-based simi larity measures between ordered trees . Journal of Math ematical Psychology, 25, 206- 225.
Howard , D. V. , & Howard , 1. H. (1977). A multidimensional scaling analysis of the development
of animal names . Developmental Psychology, 13, 108- 11 3.
10hnson, S. C . (1967). Heirarchi cal c lustering schemes. Psychometrika , 32, 241 - 254 .
Kawash, G., & Fuchs, A. H. (1974) . A factor analysis of ratings of five school s of psychology on
prescriptive d imensions. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 10 , 426- 437.
King, M. c. , Gruenewa ld , P. , & Lockhead , G. R. ( 1978). C lass ifying re lated stimuli. Journal a./'
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 4 17- 427 .
Kintsch, W. ( 1974). The representation of meaning in memory . Hill sdale, N1: Law rence Erlbaum
Assoc iates.
Kintsch, W. , & Dijk, T . A. ( 1978). Toward a model of tex t comprehension and production.
Psychological Review, 85, 363- 394.
Krumhansl, C. L. (1979). The psychologica l representation of musica l pitch in a ton al context.
Cog nitive Psychology, II , 346- 374.
Krumhansl, C. L. ( 1983, August). Set-theoretic and spatial models of similarity: Some consideratiolls in applicatioll. Paper presented at the Mathematica l Psycho logy meetings , Bou lder , CO.

7.

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

265

Krumhansl, C. L. , Bharucha, J . 1. , & Kessler, E . 1. ( 1982). Perceived harmonic structllre of chards
in three related musica l keys. Journal of Experimental Psychology : Human Preception and
Peljormance, 8, 24-36.
Kruska l, J. B. (l 964a). Multidime nsional scaling by optimizing goodness of fit to a nonmetric
hypothesis. Psychometrika, 29, 1- 27.
Kruskal , J. B. ( 1964b). Nonmetric multidimensional scaling: A numerical method . Psychometrika,
29, 11 5- 129 .
Kruska l, J . B. , Young, F. W . , & Seery, J . B. (1 977). How to use KYST 2 , a very flexible program
to do multidimensional scaling and unfolding. Murray Hill , NJ : Be ll Telephone Laboratories.
LaPorte, R. E., & Voss, J . F. ( 1979). Prose representations: A multidime nsional scaling approach.
Multi variante Behavioral Research , 14, 39-56.
Luce, R. D. ( 1959). Individual choice behavior. New York: Wiley .
McCloskey, M . , & Glucksberg, S. (1 979) . Decision processes in verifying category membership
statements: Implications for mode ls o f se mantic memory . Cognitive Psychology, II, 1- 27.
McKoon, G . , Ratcliff, R ., & De ll , G . (in press). A criti ca l eva luation of the semantic/epi sodic
distinction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition.
Miller, G. A . , & Ni ce ly, P. E. (1 955). An anal ysi s of perceptu al confusions among some English
consonants. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 27, 338- 352.
Miller, K. , & Gelman, R. ( 1983) . The child 's representation of number: A multidimensional sc al ing anal ysis. Child Development , 54, 1470- 1479.
Newman, C. M. , Rinott , Y ., & Tversky, A. ( 1983). Nearest ne ighbors and Verono i region s in
certain point processes. Advances in Applied Probability , 15 , 726- 75 I.
Norman , D. A. , Rumelh art, D. E., & The LNR Research Group ( 1975). Explorations in cognition.
San Francisco: Free man.
Osgood , C. E., Suci, G. J ., & Tannenbaum , P. H. ( 1954). Th e measurement of meaning. Urbana:
University of Illinoi s Press.
Paivio, A. ( 197 1) . Imagery and verbal processes. New York : Holt , Rinehart & Winston.
Poll ard-Gott , L. (1983 ) . Emergence of thematic concept s in re peated li stening to music. Cognitive
Psychology, 15, 66- 94.
Pru zansky, S. (1 97 5). SINDSCAL: A computer program fo r individual difference in multidimensional scaling. Bell Laboratories Technical Me morandum.
Pruzansky, S., Tversky, A. , & Carroll , 1. D. ( 1982). Spati al versus tree representati ons of proximity data . Psychometrika , 47, 3- 24 .
Raaijmakers, 1. G . W ., & Shiffl'in , R . M . ( 1980) . SAM : A theory of probabili stic search of
assoc iative memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed .) The psychology of learning and motivation , Vol. 14 .
New York: Academi c Press .
Raaijmakers, J . G . W ., & Shiffrin , R. M . (1 98 1). Search of assoc iati ve memory . Psycholog ical
Review, 88, 93- 134 .
Rappaport , A. , & Fillenbaum , S. ( 1972). An experimental study of semantic structures . In A. K.
Romney, R. N. Shepard , & S. B. Nerlove (Eds.), Multidim ensional scaling: Th eory and applications in the behavioral sciences (Vol. 2). New York : Seminar Press.
Ratc liff, R. ( 1978). A theory of memory retrieva l. Psychological Review, 85 , 59- 108.
Reitman , J . S ., & Reuter , H. H. (1 980) . Organi zation revealed by recall orders and confirmed by
pauses . Cognitive Psychology, 12, 554- 58 1.
Rips, L. J ., Shoben, E . J ., & Smith , E. E . ( 1973 ). Semantic di stance and the verificati on of
semantic relati onships . Journal of Verbal Leaming and Verbal Behavior, 12, 1- 20 .
Roth , E. M., & Shoben, E. J . ( 1983) . The effec t of context on the structure of categories . Cognitive
Psychology, 15 , 346-378.
Rumelhart , D. E., & Abrah amsen, A . A. ( 1973). A mode l fo r analogical reasoning. Cognitive
Psychology, 5, 1- 28.

266

SHOBEN AND ROSS

Rumelhart, D. E., & Ortony, A. (1977). The representation of knowledge in memory. In R. C.
Anderson , R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge.
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Sattath, S., & Tversky, A. (1979) . Additive sim ilarity trees. Psychometrika, 42,319- 345.
Schaeffer, B. , & Wallace, R. (1970). The comparison of word meanings. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 86, 144- 152.
Schank, R. C. (1980) . Language and memory. Cognitive Science, 4, 243-284 .
Schoenfeld , A. H., & Herrmann, D. J. (1982). Problem perception and know ledge structure in
expert and novice mathematical problem solvers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning ,
Memory, & Cognition, 8, 484- 494.
Shepard, R. N. (l962a) . The analysis of proximities: Multidimensional scaling with an unknown
distance function. I. Psycl!ometrika, 27, 125 - 140.
Shepard , R. N. (I 962b). The analysis of proximities: Multidimensi onal sca ling with an unknown
distance function . II. Psychometrika, 27, 2 19- 246 .
Shepard, R. N. (1964). Attention and the metric structure of the stimulus space. Journal ofMathematical Psychology, I , 54- 87.
Shepard, R. N. (1972). Psychological representations of speech sounds. In E. E. David & P. B.
Denes (Eds.) , Human communication: A unified view. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Shepard, R. N. (1980). Multidimensional scaling, tree-fitting, and clustering. Science, 2 10, 390398.
Shepard , R. N. , & Arabie, P. (1979). Additive clustering: Representation of sim ilarit ies as combinations of discrete overlapping properties . Psychological Review, 86, 87- 123.
Shoben, E. J. (1976). The verification of semantic relations in a same-different paradigm: An
asymmetry in semantic memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 15, 365- 379.
Shoben , E. J. (1983). Applications of multidimensional scal ing in cognitive psychology. Applied
Psychological Measurement, 4, 473- 490.
Smith , E. E., & Medin, D. L. ( 198 1). Categories and concepts. Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press.
Soli , S . D., & Arabie, P. (1979). Auditory versus phonetic accounts of observed confusion s between consonant phonemes. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America , 66, 46- 59.
Sternberg, R. 1. ( 1977). Component processes in ana log ica l reasoni ng . Psychological Review, 84,
353- 378.
Stevens , S. S., & Volkmann , J . (1940). The relation of pitch to frequency: A relative scale .
American Journal of Psychology, 53, 329- 353 .
Tu lving, E. ( 1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.) Organization of memory. New York: Academic Press.
Tulving, E. (1975) . Ecphoric processes in recall and recognition. In J. Brown (Ed.), Recall and
recognition. London: Wiley.
Tulving , E. ( 1983). Elements of episodic memory. London: Oxford Press.
Tulving, E. , & Thomson , D. M. ( 1973). Encod ing spec ificity and retrieva l processes in ep isodic
memory. Psychological Review , 80, 352- 378.
Tversky , A. , & Hutchinson, W. J. ( 1986). Nearest neighbor analysis of psychological spaces.
Psychological Review, 93, 3- 22.

New Perspectives in the
Analysis of Abilities

John B. Carroll
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

INTRODUCTION
One can understandably be skeptical when a "new perspective" is offered on a
topic that has been under scientific examination for a very long time. I am not
sure that I have any truly new perspectives , but I entertain the notion that my
perspectives have the kind of novelty that will last long enough to permit taking a
fresh look at some very old problems and getting new insights into their solution .
I'm concerned with several such problems: First, what is an " ability"? How can
an ability be defined? This is a problem that I believe has never been adequately
addressed in the psychometric literature. Second, how can data from ability
measurements be best analyzed to help in the definition of the ability , and thus to
determine what has often been called the "construct validity" of the measurements? Third, what are the implications for the construction of better measurements of abi lity ? Throughout my presentation, one detects influences from cognitive psychology-influences that I point out, but my primary concern is with
psychometric aspects of ability measurements.
Here, I use the term "ability" in a very general sense, so that it covers both
the concept of aptitude and the concept of achievement. At the stage of defining
an ability , the difference between aptitude- thought of as a capac ity for some
future achievement- and achievement- thought of as the demonstration of
some acquired performance- is irrelevant, because , as will shortly be seen, we
are concerned in either case with deriving the definition of an abi lity from
observations of performance. The question of the source of the performance
(i.e., to what extent it comes through constitutionalJgenetic factors and to what
extent it comes through learned experiences) need not enter discussion.
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WHAT IS AN ABILITY?
The American Heritage Dictionary defines ability as "the quality of being able
to do someth ing; physical, mental, financial, or legal power to perform." We
can immediately drop consideration of financial and legal powers; from the
standpoint of psychological and educational measurement we can be concerned,
however , with physical and mental powers. Nevertheless , even the definition
offered by the dictionary has an air of circularity: Ability is defined in terms of
"being able to perform something," and ironically enough, the word able is
defined in terms of "having sufficient ability." I'm afraid the dictionary is of
little help in defining " ability," except possibly in the phrase "ability to perform something." What is this something? In the context of psychological and
educational measurement, must it not refer to some class of tasks? If we think of
commonly recognized abi lities such as athletic ability, or musical abi lity , the
common ass umption is that a person with such an ability is able to perform well a
variety of tasks that can be called athletic, or musical , as the case may be. When
psychologists and educators speak of "mental ability," they are referring to
performance in a variety of "mental" tasks . The question is, what is a "mental"
task?
We know that abilities are often of a more specialized character. A good
basketball player is not necessarily a good IOO-yard runner; a good pianist is not
necessarily a good composer, or not even a composer at all. Evidence from
factor-analytic investigations of mental abilities suggests that there exist a
number of somewhat unrelated mental abilities: verbal ability, reasoning abi lity ,
spatial abi lity , numerical ability, and so on. Correlational and factor-analytic
evidence is of some use in classifying and identifying abi lities, because it yields
information on what abilities are likely to go together or to be separate. More
precisely , it yields information on the classification of the tasks that call for
different abilities.
Let us focus on the fact that the tasks that call for a particular abi lity, whatever
it is , can be of considerable variety , perhaps even of infinite variety . How do
they vary? One dimension along which they vary is their difficulty. One can often
diagnose what causes tasks to vary in difficulty. In simple cases, it may be a
matter of physics or physiology. In basketball, it is harder to shoot a basket from
a long distance than from a short distance. In musical performance , Bach Inventions are generally much easier to play than most of the compositions of, say,
Debussy . In fact , it has long been the practice of music educators to assign
grades of difficulty to instrumental musical compositions; I do not know whether
anyone has analyzed exactly what makes for ease or difficulty of such compositions.
In psychological and educational measurement , the concept of difficulty turns
up in the form of information about the proportions of tested samples or populations that are able to "pass" each of the items on a test. Such information is
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often used in arranging the items of a test in order of difficulty, apparently on the
assumption that subjects will be more comfortable in taking the test if they can
start with easy tasks. But as in the case of musical compositions, there is usually
little concern with what makes items easy or difficult. Test makers often simply
take item difficulty data as givens that need not be questioned further. Note, by
the way, that " items" on a psychological or educational test are really " tasks"
that call for correct performance; the more of these tasks the examinee can
perform correctly, the higher the score, and the higher the level of "ability" that
is inferred fro m the score .
A preliminary evaluation of the "construct validity " of a test is often made
simply by considering the cl ass of tasks that is involved in the test . If all the items
are concerned with English spelling, for example, the test may be regarded as a
test of "spelling ability ." Or if all the items seem to involve " manipulation of
visually presented spatial relationships," the test is regarded as a test of "spatial
ability." But intuitive classifications of tasks are often unsatisfactory, perhaps by
their very nature . They yield no guarantee that there is only one spelling ability ,
or only one spatial ability. In the case of spati al abi lity , at least, the available
evidence is to the contra ry (Lohman, 1979) .
At the same time, it is often pointed out that it is di fficult to establish the
unitary or nonunitary nature of abi lities fro m correlational studies of items or
tasks. The difficulties are technical, stemming fro m problems with the interpretation of bivariate distributions of item responses. Much of our know ledge about
the diffe rentiation of abi lities comes fro m fac tor-analytic studies using scores on
multi-item tests, the tests being composed of series of plausibly similar items.
There is now some promise in recently developed techniques for item factoranalysis (Wi lson, Wood , & Gibbons, 1984) but as yet these techniques have not
been widely applied , and I myself have not yet had the opportunity to use them.
But I am getting off the track. Suppose, for the sake of argument , that we
have a set of tasks that can be demonstrated to meas ure a single abi lity at
di fferent difficulty levels. What might convince us that they measure a single
abi lity would be evidence that there are systematic relationships between characteristics of indi viduals and the levels of difficulties of the tasks, such that individuals who can perform the more di fficult tasks have a uniformly higher probability of passing the eas ier tasks than those who can not perform the more
difficult tasks, and also, such that individuals who cannot perform the easy tasks
also cannot perform the harder tasks. T hi s idea is not new; to my knowledge it
was firs t pointed out by David Walker, a Scottish educational psychologist, in a
series of papers publi shed in the British Journal of Psychology over the years
193 1 to 1940 (Walker, 193 1, 1936, 1940). Walker called tests hav ing the abovementioned property " unig," whereas tests not having this property were called
" hig" (from the express ion " higgledy-pi ggledy" ). Walker anticipated the idea
of what later came to be known as the G uttman scale, and I li ke to refer to it as
the Walker scale, or perhaps the Walker-G uttman scale.
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There is much more to this idea, however , I can best illustrate it by referring
to data that I collected some years ago on a test that I believe can be shown to
measure a single dimension of ability , namely musical pitch discrimination ability. This is the old Seashore Sense of Pitch test; in fact, the data I collected were
for the 1919 version of the test. Let me describe this test, in case you are not
familiar with it. It consists of 100 items , divided into ten subsets of 10 items
each. Each item in a given subset presents, by a phonograph recording , two tones
that differ in pitch by a certain amount , constant over the items in the subset; the
subject's task is to indicate on the answer sheet whether the second tone is higher
or lower than the first. The pitch difference in the easiest subset is 30 cycles per
second, or (considering the overall pitch level) about a semitone; the pitch
differences in other subsets range down to one-half cycle. Subjects are required
to make a response to each item, and thus there is obviously an element of
guessing, or success by chance, of 50%. I may note, incidentally, that some
years ago Guilford (1941) (while he was in the psychology department at the
University of Nebraska) collected and analyzed data with this test and claimed
that the test measures three separate abi lities. I have recently shown, however
(Carroll, 1983) that Guilford was misled by statistical artifacts, and that the test
measures essentially only one ability. Imperfections in the 1919 recording add a
certain element of response set bias, but this may be ignored for practical
purposes.
In a further analys is of the data I co llected on about L100 college students, I
wanted to study curves of performance in relation to the pitch differences of the
subtests. How did the curves of performance for students with high scores
compare with those for students with average and low scores on the test? I
divided the total score distribution into deciles and plotted average performance
curves for each decile. The res ults are shown in Fig. 8. L. The baseline is scaled
in terms of the logarithm of the pitch difference ; the ordinate shows the probability of correct performance. As may be seen, the data are quite systematic.
High ability students have practically perfect performance for subtests with large
pitch differences; their average performance descends to a threshold only at a
pitch difference of about 1.25 Hertz, the limen or threshold being set at 75 %
correct (halfway between perfect and chance performance) . Students in the
lowest decile of ability, on the other hand , have on the average a threshold
performance at a pitch difference of about 20 Hertz.
The curves have , as one might expect, the general shape of normal ogives,
and have approximately the same slope. This slope can be expressed in terms of
the logarithm of the pitch difference: one standard deviation of the response
curve is about .25 log pitch difference units. I believe that this slope is in fact
characteristic of pitch discrimination ability. Even with a better-recorded test ,
and with many more items , this slope would probably not change much . The fact
that the slope is not higher, as it would be if the slopes were as represented in
Fig. 8.2, puts a certain constraint on the reliability of any test of pitch discrimina-
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tion ability . At least, it 'puts a constraint on the reli ability-per-item , and thu s on
the reliability of a test of any given length . (It is possible, in fact, to specify the
limits on reliability in terms of parameters of the slope function.)
Of even more importance is the fact that these data support the existence and
definition of pitch discrimination ability, in the sense that pitch discrimination
ability is revealed in a systematic relation between individual characteristics and
performance on subtests of di ffere nt pitch diffe rence levels. What makes for
" difficulty " in pitch discri mination is the smallness of the pitch difference . High
ability individuals have much smaller pitch difference thresholds than low ability
individuals.
These data illustrate a paradigm that I believe can be transferred or applied to
any ability. That is, an ability- any ability- can be defined in terms of the
relation between individual thresholds of performance and the characteristics of
tasks of different degrees of " difficulty. " In the case of pitch discrimination
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ability, it is clear that the task characteristics are described in terms of pitch
differences, and individual differences can be referred to threshold points on the
pitch difference scale. What about other abilities?
To introduce this topic further, 1 present one other set of data, this time on a
Block Counting test that was administered by my colleagues at the University of
North Carolina (Johnson & Meade, personal communication) to lOth-gradechildren in a study of the development of spatial abilities. The Block Counting
test has been regarded as a test of some kind of spatial ability. The test used in
this study is a little different from other block-counting tests that appear in some
test batteries. Sample items are shown in Fig. 8.3. Each item is a perspective
drawing of a pile of blocks; the subject's task is simply to count the blocks and
write down the answer. Subjects are told that all blocks in a given drawing are of
the same shape. Because the answers are free responses, there is practically no
guessing element.
In Fig . 8.4 are shown average probabilities of correct answers for sets of items
of varying difficulties, for ninths (noniles) of the total score distribution for 119
10th graders . Again, the data are quite systematic. High scoring individuals get
correct answers on most of the "easy" items, and have only a little trouble with
the hard items. Low scoring individuals have trouble even with the easy items ,
and have very little chance of passing the hard items. One can specify thresholds
of performance for different individuals. Beyond stating it in terms of difficulty
level, however, the baseline scale cannot easily be described. We must study ,
therefore, what makes the items easy or hard, since whatever makes for task
difficulty is what gives rise to differences in ability, and thus leads toward a
definition of that ability.
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Detailed examination of the items, arranged in order of difficulty (proportion
fai ling), discloses that they vary mainly in two characteristics : (I) the proportion
of blocks that are not " visible" because they are hidden by other blocks, and (2)
what I call the "symmetry" of the piles, that is, a characteristic such that one can
use arithmetic computations to arrive more quickly at the number of blocks. The
first of these variables has the greatest influence on item difficulty , but it interacts with the second . In Fig. 8.3 I have arranged the 4 sample items in such a
way as to suggest how these task characteristics affect item difficulty. The two
items in the bottom row have no or few nonvisible blocks, and are relatively
easy, whi le those in the top row have many nonvisible blocks and are harder. The
items in the left column have little "symmetry" ; the subject must simply count
the blocks more or less one by one. The items in the right column have high
symmetry, and counting the blocks can involve some si mple arithmetic. For
example, the item at the lower right appears to be composed of a wall of 3 x 3 =
9 blocks at the left, plus an adj oining wall of 2 x 3 = 6 blocks, or 15 blocks in
all. The items in the left-hand column are somewhat eas ier than those in the
right-hand column .
From this analysis, it appears that the ability chiefly measured by this test is
the ability to visualize the positions of blocks that are not immediately vis ible .
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Secondarily, it measures an ability to use simple arithmetical processes in arriving at answers. As a matter of fact, the "symmetry" dimension in this task may
tend to distort the assessment of the subject's ability to visualize missing blocks.
Possibly a better, purer test of visualization ability could be devised by constructing all items with a minimal amount of symmetry, so as to reduce the possibility
of using arithmetical processes.
Suggested by these findings , further questions cou ld arise and be answered by
appropriate investigations. Is the ability to visualize hidden blocks specific to the
block counting task , or would it be found to be correlated with abilities in other
types of visualization tasks , for example, the "surface development" test used by
Thurstone (1938) or the mental paper folding test studied by Shepard and Feng
(1972)? The answers to such a question cou ld be found by analyzing data for the
surface development and mental paper folding tests in the manner I have described, and examining relationships among the task parameters of the several tests.
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THE PERSON CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION (PCF)
The curves shown in Figs. 8.1 and 8 A-curves relating average performance of
individuals to item difficulty-may be called person characteristic functions
(peFs). They have approximately the shape of normal ogives with a negative
slope, descending from perfect or near perfect performance for "easy" items,
through a threshold point, to zero or chance performance for "difficult" items.
These curves are the reverse of the item characteristic curves familiar in item
response theory. As a matter of fact, one can model these curves using precisely
the same mathematical formula that is used in item response theory as developed
by Lord (1980) and others. This is the three-parameter logistic function expressed as follows:

p = c +

I - c
[-1.7a(6 - b)]'

-:--,-------,,-----,.-=-----;-;;-----;-=

I

+ exp

where p = the probability that an individual with ability 6 will correctly perform
an item or task characterized by the parameters a, b, and c, where
a = a parameter for the slope of the function;

b = a parameter specifying the difficulty of the item or task; and
c = a parameter specifying the probability that an individual completely lacking in ability ( 6 = - 00 ) will nevertheless perform the item or task
correctly, as (often) by guessing.
The difference is that the person characteristic function plots performance for an
individual (or group of individuals) as a function of item difficulty (the b parameter), whereas the item characteristic function plots performance for an item as a
function of individual ability (the theta parameter 6). Both functions assume that
all items measure the same latent ability (or cluster of abilities) . Item characteristic functions have well-known uses in test theory, as Lord (1980) has shown.
Use of the person characteristic function was first explored by Mosier (1941),
although he did not call it that. The advantage I see for it is that it emphasizes the
relation between ability and item or task difficulty. When there is a definite
relation between ability and item difficulty, one is encouraged to explain that
relation in terms of the characteristics of items or tasks.
Item response curves can also be used to look at these relations, but in this
case one has to compare the functions for different items. This may be illustrated
with data that I developed for vocabulary (opposites) items in the SAT, as shown
in Fig . 8.5. (The data available to me did not permit computing person characteristic functions.) What we see in Fig . 8.5 are item characteristic curves for 15
vocabulary items; performance (in terms of percentage correct) is plotted against
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5 ability levels, actually quintiles (fifths) of an item analysis sample of 1920
cases with a mean SAT score of 416 and a standard deviation of 110. Obviously ,
as ability increases, correctness of performance increases; the curves are generally of a normal ogive shape with a positive slope . Note, however , that fo r most
of the more difficult items, the percentages correct for low-scoring groups are
well below chance levels (chance being 20% since these are 5-alternative items).
The curves tend to have a U-shaped concavity, poss ibly because it is the lowaverage group , at an average SAT -V score of 358, that is most likely to be

8.

NEW PERSPECTIVES IN THE ANALYSIS OF ABILITIES

277

seduced into choosing an incorrect alternative. The very low scorers don't even
have enough ability to be seduced in this way ; they are the ones who are most
likely to answer by guessing .
The difficulty of the items can be measured in e ither of two ways: by the
" delta" value derived from overall percentage correct, or by the threshold value
estimated from the item characteristic curve. These two measurements are highly
correlated, though not perfectly. What are the task characteristics of the items
that make for difficulty? I estimated the familiarity of the words in the " lead"
and the correct choices by using "SFI" (standard frequency index) values from
the American Heritage Word Frequency Book (Carroll, Davies, & Richman ,
1971) . From these indices, item difficulty as measured by ETS's "delta" cou ld
be predicted with a multiple R of .80 (p < .01) . This finding supports, at least,
the rather obvious conclusion that these items are measures of vocabulary knowledge. What is more, however, the analysis using word frequency statistics makes
it possible to specify in rather exact quantitative terms the range of vocabulary
knowledge exhibited by examinees of given levels of ability. For example,
consider the vocabulary knowledge shown for the top fifth of the sample, with a
mean SAT-V or 570. These people have no trouble with words like CONCEAL,
STALE, STIFF, DOUBTFUL, EQUILIBRIUM, and VENTURESOME, and
the keyed correct answers expose, fresh, limber, unquestionable, lack of balance, and timid, respectively . But I find it rather disturbing that they tend to have
trouble with words like PARTISAN, DISCREPANCY , ELICIT, SOMBER,
WHET , ENIGMATIC, PAUCITY, AMIABLE, and INFERNAL.
One other example from my analysis of SAT items is instructive. (These data
are more fully discussed in Carroll , 1980.) Figure 8.6 shows item characteristic
curves for 10 "verbal analogies" items of an SAT-Verbal test. The common
supposition is that these items measure ' ' reasoning ," that is, ability to discern an
analogy. Sternberg (1977) developed a rather elaborate model for the behavior of
solving analogies, involving among other processes the "encoding" of the stimuli, the " inference" of relations, and the "mapping" and the "application" of
those relations. The question may be rai sed: To what extent do these processes
make for difficulty of these items?
There is little evidence here that the examinees have difficulty with the concept and structure of an analogy per se. Even very low-scoring individuals have a
fairly good chance of passing a simple analogy like number 27. T his suggests
that the SAT verbal analogies test does not measure the ability to solve analogies,
as such, in the sense that low-scoring individuals would be less able than highscoring individuals to deal with analogical structures, apart from their content.
Instead , the evidence suggests that the harder items involve more difficult encodings, and more difficult and subtle inferences, mappings, and applications than
the easy items. To a certain extent, there are vocabulary difficulties; Thus, lowscoring individuals probably have difficulty in encoding concepts represented by
words like "slink," " furtive," and "innocuous." But the major difficulty

278

CARROLL

C:o
26 "",I: .lIey
. l . - - - " / " ' 27 mlcrolcope: lee
29 helmel: he.d
28 IIn.lo: opera
33 lrowel: mo~ar
32 Irlckle: deluge

30 IlInk: lurllve

31 lodder: callie

35 .nlhuII ..I: cause
34 InnocuouI: harm

SAT SCALE

-1.40

-.53

262

358

416

+,53

+1.40

474

570

FIG. 8.6. Item characteristic curves for 10 verbal analogies items from a form of
the SAT-V (from Carroll, 1980).

arises from the complexity of the rules that are the bases of the analogies.
Consider, for example, the hardest of these items:
34. BARREN:PRODUCTIVITY:: (A) torrid :warmth
(B) innocuous:harm (C) aberrant change
(D) prodigal:reform (E) random:originality

The words in the lead, BARREN and PRODUCTIVITY, are not particularly
difficult words. The rule relating them is fairly complex: BARREN is an adjec-
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tive, and PRODUCTIVITY is an abstract noun that signifies a property opposite
to that of BARREN. The examinee has to find a choice that correctly exemplifies
this relation. From the item analysis data we find that alternative C, aberrant:
change, is rather tempting, as is also alternative D, prodigal: reform, and without careful thought they might appear to exemplify the rule. Only alternative B,
innocuous: harm correctly exemplifies the rule, but it does so in a fairly subtle
way. Unfortunately it would be difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to
establish a metric for the difficulty of rules used in verbal analogies items . I
would think, however, that it might be possible to make the construction of
verbal analogies tests more of a science and less of an art by devoting deliberate
attention to constructing items according to a metric for rule-difficulty.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TASK DIFFICULTY
Much of the current research in cognitive psychology is devoted essentially to
finding what elements or aspects of cognitive tasks make them easy or difficult,
and in this way the work is directly relevant to test construction and interpretation. One can find many examples, and I can mention only a few.
There has been considerable investigation concerning attributes of tasks used
in tests of spatial abilities . Pellegrino and Kail (1982), for example, consider
tasks used in tests of two fairly distinct spatial aptitudes- Spatial Relations and
Spatial Visualization. In the case of Spatial Relations, the task attributes that
chiefly make for difficulty (either in speed or accuracy of response) are angular
disparity and familiarity of stimuli. Pellegrino and Kail (1982) conclude on the
basis of developmental studies that "individual differences in spatial aptitude are
initially associated with basic encoding and comparison processes, that such
differences persist over development, and that the differences are then accompanied by additional differences in the speed of mental rotating or transforming
the information that has been encoded" (p. 333). In the case of Spatial Visualization, some of the task attributes that make for difficulty are rotation, displacement of elements, and number of stimulus elements. Considering these facts,
these authors conclude that "skill in a visualization task such as the form board is
related to the speed and quality of the stimulus representation that is achieved"
(p. 354).
Another example is the work of Goldman and Pellegrino (1984) on inductive
reasoning tasks. They find, among other things, that "the visual or semantic
complexity of a particular item affects the degree to which general system characteristics such as working memory and executive monitoring strategies become
important cognitive components of performance" (p. 193) .
Similarly, I would interpret the work of Rips (1984) on deductive reasoning as
an attempt to identify what elements in certain reasoning tasks- verification of
arguments containing the connectives and, or, (f . .. then, and no/- cause difficulties for subjects. Rips found stable differences between subjects in their
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handling of rules of reasoning. Although Rips does not present data allowing this
direct interpretation, I would speculate that his data suggest that deductive ability
can be defined in terms of knowledge of and ability to use an increasingly more
complicated set of deductive rules.

APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO COGN ITIVE
ABILITY FACTORS
Over the past several years , I have devoted my attention to surveying and in
many cases reanalyzing data from the factor-analytic literature in an attempt to
determine what the major dimensions of cognitive ability are. I am aware of
many of the limitations of factor analysis- they have been pointed out many
times. Nevertheless, I have been pursuing my survey on the conviction that if
adequate correlational data are uniformly subjected to presently acceptable methods of factor analysis, the results will be more meaningful, consistent, and
interpretable than they have appeared to be in the past. I am now approaching the
final stages of my survey, and while I am not ready to offer definite conclusions,
I now perceive a "light at the end of the tunnel" that appears to confirm my
convictions.
One conclusion that now seems evident, however, is somewhat contrary to
my initial expectations. My original expectation was that I cou ld identify, from
the literature, a fairly large number of factors of ability- not as many as Guilford
(1967 ; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971) had postulated and claimed to demonstratebut at least a few more than French (1951) and Ekstrom (1979) had listed in their
reviews of the factor-analytic literature. My present view is that there are not
more than about thirty distinct, identifiable factors of cognitive ability, and of
these, many are of a fairly specific nature and of little importance. The factors
that appear over and over in my reanalyses are mostly those originally identified
by Thurstone (1938) and other early investigators . Among the first-order "primary" factors that I believe can be confidently i.dentified are Thurstone's Induction, Deductive Reasoning, Verbal Comprehension, Spatial Relations, Visualization, Closure, Perceptual Speed, Associative Memory, Word Fluency, and
Memory Span. In addition, there is fairly solid evidence for a series of "second
order" broad factors, as identified by Cattell, Horn , and others (e .g., Hakstian &
Cattell, 1978): factors of " fluid intelligence," "crystallized intelligence ,"
"general visual perception," "general auditory perception," "general speed,"
"general memory capacity," and "general idea production." Even some of
these factors tend to be correlated, a fact that suggests that Spearman ( 1927) was
correct in asserting the existence and importance of a "general" factor, "g".
My analytic procedures assume a hierarchical model such that some factors are
of greater generality and applicability than others. The hierarchical model usually results in specifying two or more independent sources of significant variance
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fo r a given variable, that is, variance from a primary fac tor and also vari ance
from_a second- or higher-order factor.
Earlier, I suggested that the person characteri stic model as illustrated with
data from the pitch discrimination test and the block counting test could be
transferred or applied to any ability . My factorial res ults, however, pose certain
problems fo r th is suggestion.
First, not all fac tors appear to be characterizable in terms of tasks of varying
difficulties . Many , for example , refer mainly to the speed of performance of
simple cognitive tasks, like, for example, the comparison of stimuli , as in the
Perceptual Speed factor. It is not immediately clear how the person characteristic
function model can be applied to such factors, unless certain modifications are
made in the model. One way of doing this is to utilize individual variation in
speed of response over trials as a basis for developing the person characteristic
function. A person of a given degree of ability would have an average speed , but
the probability of exceeding a given rate would decrease as the baseline value
increases . The general idea is illustrated in Fig. 8. 7 .
The other problem posed by fac torial results is the fact that most variables
show multiple sources of variance- at least two , as 1 have mentioned . On the
average , I find that about half the common variance of a variable comes from a
primary or first-order fac tor, and the remainder from higher-order fac tors. This
means that many tasks can be supposed to have at least two sources of difficulty- one fro m a primary fac tor and one fro m a higher-order factor, such as a
general factor. It would be interesting to work out the implications of this fac t for
the person characteristic function. 1 suspect that it means that peF curves will be
somewhat attenuated , i.e . , with fl atter slopes , when tasks have multiple sources
of diffi culty. Nevertheless , it may still be poss ible to separate these effects.
For example, suppose we are concerned , as we should be, with the source of
difficulty due to a general factor. That is, independent of the effec ts of a particular primary fac tor, what makes a task di fficult if it also has a high loading on a
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general factor? If we could find this out, it would contribute to the interpretation
of the nature of the general factor. One possibility is deliberately to select tasks
that have loadings on different independent primary factors, and then study the
person characteristic function for such tasks and the task attributes that function
to make them load on a general factor. I am not aware that such an idea has ever
been tried. I intend at least to work out the theoretical model by which this might
be accomplished, or to determine whether or not it might be accomplished at all.

DISCUSSION
The major points I have been trying to emphasize are the following:
I. The existence of an ability can be demonstrated when it can be shown that
for any individual, there is a systematic, monotonic, and close relation between
the individual's probability of correct or satisfactory performance and the difficulties of a series of tasks, and when there are variations over individuals in the
parameters of this relation .
2. The ability is defined in terms of the attribute or attributes of the tasks that
give rise to differences in task difficulty.
3. This formulation, or one closely similar to it, is applicable to any cognitive
ability.
4. Cognitive psychology can be of help in the definition of cognitive abilities
by investigating what attributes of tasks make for differences in the accuracy or
speed with which individuals can perform those tasks, because such attributes are
involved in the definition of abilities. Further, knowledge of task attributes can
lead to inferences about the psychological processes that are called for in performances, and thus about the psychological processes that underlie a given ability.
A corollary of this formulation is that effects of education, training, or other
forms of intervention can be indexed by changes in the position parameter of an
individual's person characteristic function. A significantly positive effect of
learning or an educational intervention, for example , would be exhibited in a
significant increase in the individual's threshold of performance along the task
difficulty scale.
The person characteristic function (PCF) model can be shown to apply at least
in a number of "simple cases ." Probably it could be shown to apply to most of
the major types of ability that have been identified. Undoubtedly certain complications would arise in more complex cases. Among these complications are:
I. The possibility that task performance may be a function of more than one
ability .
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2. The possibility that tasks could be performed through different "strategies" or approaches.
3. The possibility that at least some abilities, especially those representing
educational achievements, involve results of specific learning . The fact that
individuals may vary in what particular learnings they may have achieved, independent of the overall difficulty of those learnings , may present problems in
applying the PCF model to certain kinds of abilities.
No doubt it would be fruitful to study the problems posed by these complications, but I believe that such studies would be appropriate only after considerable
success has been achieved in applying the PCF model to "simple cases." Since
this has been done thus far to only a limited extent, there is a wide field of
problems open for examination.
One final remark: I have only intimated how all this might help in better test
construction. I will try to be more explicit: We can make better tests of abilities
by paying more attention to the task characteristics that make for item ease or
difficulty and to the role of such task characteristics in defining the abilities we
seek to measure.
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